Collision between rigid tipper truck/quad axle trailer and freight train 4AM3, Lismore, Victoria, on 25 May 2006

Executive Summary

At 0714:251 on Thursday 25 May 2006, a southbound Kenworth 1995 K100E rigid tipper truck and quad axle trailer collided with an eastbound freight train at the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing in southern Victoria. The 34 year old male driver of the truck was fatally injured in the accident. The two train crew were uninjured. The level crossing is ‘passive’; protected by advance warning signs, give way signs and pavement markings only. The speed limit for road traffic over the level crossing is 100 km/h. The line speed limit for trains at the crossing is 115 km/h but the train, in this instance, was limited to 110km/h.

Train 4AM3 was being hauled by three locomotives, was 1356 m long, weighed 4382 tonnes and was travelling at 112 km/h at the time of the collision. The truck and quad axle trailer combination was loaded with citrus pulp, was 19 m long and weighed 48 tonnes.

The truck collided with the side of the second locomotive, adjacent to the trailing bogie. The estimated speed of the truck was between 53 and 78 km/h at impact and more likely to be toward the upper end of this range. The force of the impact was sufficient to derail this locomotive and the following locomotive. Forty-one of the train’s 64 wagons then derailed as a result. This portion of the train (844.8 m long) was compressed into an area 128 m long, about 45 m wide and up to 12 m high.

At the time of the accident the area surrounding the level crossing was enveloped in very heavy fog. The evidence suggests that visibility was as low as 20 m and certainly no greater than 50 m.

The locomotive headlight was illuminated and the horn was sounded twice before impact. Testing established that the headlight was as specified and aligned correctly and that the sound levels of the horn were within expected levels. Although the train was travelling at 2 km/h over its permitted speed, it was still 3 km/h under the permitted track speed.

The emergency response was both timely and adequately resourced and site management processes were appropriate. The magnitude of the recovery task was such that the track was not re-opened until 0045 on Wednesday 31 May, nearly six days after the occurrence.

Neither the deceased truck driver nor the company that he worked for had any history in terms of traffic offences or other non-compliances that would indicate an increased risk for this type of accident. Notwithstanding this, the investigation found that that the truck was not being driven in a manner consistent with the prevailing conditions of reduced visibility or at a speed that would have allowed the truck to be stopped short of any hazard on the road.

The investigation found that the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing did not comply fully with the relevant standards relating to road signage or the guidelines for sighting distances for passive level crossings controlled by give way signs. However, it is unlikely that these factors contributed to the accident.

At the time of the accident the processes for calculating sighting distances at passive level crossings were contained in State warrants and varied considerably across jurisdictions. The investigation noted that the Australian Standard Manual of uniform traffic devices, 1742(7) was under review and that the draft contained several initiatives aimed at improving warnings for motorists at active level crossings and a consolidation of sighting distance formulas for passive level crossings.

The investigation noted that in times of reduced visibility it may not be possible for a motorist to safely negotiate a passive level crossing based on sighting distances alone. This is regardless of whether give way or stop control is used. The investigation also noted that the Lismore Skipton Road level crossing has been scheduled by the Victorian Department of Infrastructure for upgrade from passive to active protection in March 2007 and that the Australian Transport Council has recently approved a level crossing strategy aimed at modifying road user behaviour to improve railway level crossing safety.

Safety actions recommended, as a result of this investigation, relate to:

• audits aimed at ensuring compliance with the relevant level crossing signage standards and sighting guidelines across Victoria
• consideration of measures to promote the need for vehicle drivers to drive according to the environmental conditions and recognise the increased risk at passive level crossings in times of reduced visibility and,
• ensuring the risks posed by the operation of B-double/higher mass limit trucks are evaluated by both road and rail authorities