International

Summary

On 26 June 1991 the Manila Transporter sailed from Dampier, Western Australia with a crew of 24 and a cargo of 103,001 metric tonnes of iron ore fines for Port Talbot, Wales.

On July 1991, the Master of the ship broadcast a distress message, stating that the ship was taking water in number 3 hold and that assistance was required. The Norwegian bulk carrier Berica responded to the message and rescued all 24 Filipino crew of the Manila Transporter, who abandoned ship in the lifeboats. The Berica then proceeded on passage as the Manila Transporter was believed to be sinking.

On 27 July 1991, the Singapore registered ship Algenib encountered the derelict Manila Transporter and attempted salvage operations. However, the Manila Transporter eventually sank on 7 August 1991.

The Australian Marine Incident Investigation Unit, in accordance with the International maritime Organization Resolution A440(XI) "Exchange of Information for Investigations into Marine Casualties" and under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, undertook an investigation of the evidence that was available within Australia to assist the Philippine Authorities.

Conclusions

From the findings of the investigation, it is concluded that:

1. The cargo was loaded in accordance with the Master's instructions.
2. The cargo presented by Hamersley Iron for loading aboard the Manila Transporter was in accordance with the IMO Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes.
3. There was no inherent characteristic in the cargo that made it unsafe.
4. The loading rate of cargo was within rates normally experienced at bulk carrier berths.
5. It is not possible to determine whether the proposed all hold loading would have prevented the subsequent hull failure.
6. In view of the known loss of bulk carriers, two of which had sailed from Dampier in 1991, Pilbara Harbour Services and West Coast Shipping should have ensured immediate delivery of the messages to the ship.
7. With the condition of the ship on the morning of 7 July the Master was prudent in his decision to abandon the vessel once the Berica was in position to stand by the Manila Transporter.
8. The discovery of the deficiencies in the lifeboat equipment during the Port State Control inspection and the rectification of the deficiencies before the vessel sailed from Dampier were instrumental in the successful outcome of the abandonment.

Summary

The Hong Kong registered motor bulk carrier Mineral Diamond of 141028 tonnes summer deadweight, sailed from the Western Australian port of Dampier on 11 April 1991 for the Netherlands port of Ijmuiden, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope. On sailing the vessel filed a voyage plan and indicated that it would participate in the Australian Ship Reporting System (AUSREP).

Six routine AUSREP messages were received by the Marine Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Australia (MRCCAUS), from the Mineral Diamond. The last of these messages at 0600 UTC (1400 Western Australian Standard Time) on 17 April reported that the vessel had reduced speed to six knots in force 9 to 10 winds (45 to 50 knots) in six metre seas, in position 30 degrees 21 minutes South 087 degrees 48 minutes East. When the Mineral Diamond failed to send her next scheduled message officers of the MRCCAUS initiated routine procedures to establish the safety of the ship and crew. When routine procedures failed to establish the ship's safety an air search was launched early on 20 April, coordinated by MRCCAUS and conducted by the Royal Australian Air Force, centred on a position 1500 miles west of Perth. When no trace of either ship or survivors was found the search was abandoned on the evening of 24 April.

It is assumed that the Mineral Diamond foundered with the loss of all hands in a position some 1500 miles to the west of Perth.

The Australian Marine Investigation Unit, in accordance with the International maritime Organization Resolution A440 (XI) "Exchange of Information for Investigations into Marine Casualties" and under the provisions of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, undertook an investigation of the evidence that was available within Australia to assist the Hong Kong Authorities.

Conclusions

The re-analysis of the surface pressure field indicates that the strongest surface winds would have been experienced in the 12-hour period from about 0000 UTC 17 April 1991. Satellite pictures indicate a northward surge of cold air and the development of a new front in the vicinity of "Mineral Diamond" at about 1200 UTC leading to very squally conditions. The estimated 10-minute mean winds are in the order of 50 knots. Accordingly, significant waves to about 9 metres can be expected to have developed at this time in the vicinity of "Mineral Diamond" with a maximum wave to around 18 metres. Although the winds then eased, significant waves to 7 metres would have persisted through 18 April with a maximum wave up to 14 metres.

Summary

The Panamanian registered bulk carrier Starfish sailed from Port Walcott, Western Australia on 22 March 1991 with 53549 tonnes of iron ore fines for the Polish port of Swinoujscie.

It is reported that the Starfish diverted to Port Louis, Mauritius on 1 April, when the ship's crew observed the vessel to be riding low in the water and water was discovered in numbers 6 and 7 cargo holds. The vessel arrived off Port Louis on 3 April but was ordered from the outer anchorage on 7 April when the ship threatened to cause a major pollution incident.

The Starfish was escorted to deep water, 40 miles west of Mauritius and some 60 miles north of Ile de La Reunion, by a vessel of the Mauritius National Coast Guard. The crew of the Starfish was taken on board the Coast Guard vessel before the Starfish sank on 8 April.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. The cargo of iron ore fines was presented in a proper manner, in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes.
2. The physical properties of the cargo were accurately detailed in documents handed to the Master.
3. The cargo was loaded in accordance with the instructions of the Master and ship's staff.
4. In the event that Starfish foundered as a result of structural failure, in addition to the working stresses pertaining at the time, a relevant factor would be any excess stresses placed upon the hull in recent times. However, in the absence of key witnesses and the ship's longitudinal strength data, the investigation was not in a position to reach any conclusion as to whether the permissible stresses were at any time exceeded during the loading operations at Port Walcott.
5. The issue of interim Statutory certificates provided prima facie evidence that the ship was seaworthy. Unless the Classification Society had recently conducted a comprehensive inspection of the ship, the issue of such certificates on the strength of the existing certificates means that they were issued without a full knowledge of the actual condition of the ship.
6. From the Bureau of Meteorology's analysis, the wind and sea conditions prevailing at the time in the area through which Starfish passed should not have caused problems to a well-found vessel.
7. There is insufficient evidence within Australia to indicate the cause of Starfish taking water into the cargo holds.

On 22 November 1991 at 0912 hours Australian Central Standard Time (Greenwich Mean Time + 9.5 h), a Bell 214ST helicopter was ditched into the Timor Sea shortly after take-off from a floating production facility. The two crew and 15 passengers evacuated uninjured from the floating helicopter, prior to the right main flotation bag being punctured and the helicopter capsizing.

The report concludes that at a critical stage of the take-off, at an altitude of approximately 120 ft above the sea, one of the engines experienced a high-side speed excursion. This was followed by an aircraft main rotor speed increase which illuminated a cockpit indication warning that the aircraft main rotor speed was out of limits. The captain reacted to what he thought was an engine power loss by lowering the collective, which is the prescribed response to that situation, thereby unloading the main rotor which rapidly accelerated to 116.7%.

The electrical control unit of the ungoverned engine, sensing a power turbine overspeed, actuated the fuel sequence valve to shut off fuel to the engine. As the over speeding engine accelerated, the other engine, while attempting to compensate, decelerated to idle power because of the lowered collective command.

The captain's action in lowering the collective exacerbated the rapidity of the event, and because of insufficient aircraft altitude, there was not enough time for the engine still under power to pick up the load, or for the captain to take further corrective action to avoid a sea ditching. At the time of the emergency, the captain was demonstrating a take-off to his co-pilot.

Outline of incident

At 0505 hours local time on 21 February 1990 the Australian flag bulk carrier 'IRON KEMBLA', whilst on passage from Newcastle NSW to Tobata, Japan, collided with the Japanese fishing vessel 'KASUGA MARU' in a position approximately 4 miles WSW of Hino Misaki lighthouse in Kii Suido.

The fishing vessel capsized and one of the crew members lost his life.

Conclusions

1. Had both ships maintained their course and speed as those for the period 0452-0459, the collision would not have occurred.
2. The collision is considered to have been brought about by the KASUGA MARU altering back onto an easterly course after having first altered onto a northerly course, parallel to that of the IRON KEMBLA. This second alteration occurred almost simultaneously with the alteration to starboard (towards the east) by the IRON KEMBLA. The coincidence of the alterations made the collision inevitable.
3. The KASUGA MARU was not exhibiting the correct navigation lights, either those for a power-driven vessel under way or those for a vessel engaged in fishing, as required by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
4. The Master of the IRON KEMBLA was correct in ordering an alteration of course to starboard when the KASUGA MARU was observed to alter course to port to run on a parallel course.
5. The Master of the IRON KEMBLA was correct in advising the Japanese Authorities immediately after the incident that a collision had occurred.
6. The master of IRON KEMBLA was correct in turning about in order to offer assistance to the crew of the capsized fishing vessel.
7. The Master of IRON KEMBLA is considered to have been at fault in assuming the KASUGA MARU to be power driven and that he therefore had the right of way, when the lights reportedly observed were those required to be shown by a sailing vessel.
8. The master of IRON KEMBLA could have prevented the situation developing by making an early, small alteration of course to port, to assist the small vessel to cross his bow.
9. The Master of IRON KEMBLA is considered to have been negligent in that he did not make use of all of the navigational equipment available to him in conning the ship.
10. The Master of the IRON KEMBLA is considered to have been remiss in not reducing speed immediately the capsized fishing vessel was sighted.
11. The Bridge Procedure aboard the IRON KEMBLA were deficient in that the Officer of the Watch did not, as a matter of course, monitor shipping on the radar so as to assist the Master by keeping him informed of the distances of other ships, or by targeting other ships on the ARPA.

Outline of incident

The Panamanian registered bulk carrier ALEXANDRE-P, a ship of 94532 tonnes deadweight and some 250 metres in length, loaded a cargo of iron ore at the Western Australian port of Dampier on 12 March 1990.

On completion of loading the ship proceeded to the outer anchorage in order to close and secure hatches, departing from the anchorage at 1610 hours Western Australian Standard Time on 13 March 1990, bound for Cape town and Gijon, Spain.

At 1400 hours WAST on 14 March 1990 the ship made a daily routine position report to the Federal Sea Safety Centre, Canberra under the Australian Ship Reporting System. The ship failed to keep its next scheduled broadcast at 1400 hours WAST on 15 March 1990 and 'ship overdue' procedures were put into motion at the FSSC.

Air searches commenced when the ship became 24 hours overdue on the afternoon of 16 March, flotsam eventually being located on 18 March in the area centred on position 20S 112E. The ship ENERGY SEARCHER arrived on the scene on 20 March and retrieved a life raft which was identified by the owners as belonging to the ALEXANDRE-P. No survivors were found.

Conclusions

1. The cargo of iron ore, lumps and fines, was presented for loading in a proper manner.
2. The cargo was loaded in accordance with the Master's/Chief Officer's requirements.
3. The loading sequence, which was modified as a result of No. 3 hatch jamming, although perhaps not the most preferable, is not considered unreasonable or to have placed undue stress upon the ship.
4. From the observations of witnesses, it is considered that the ALEXANDRE-P had not been well maintained, that there was heavy corrosion and wastage around the main deck and cargo hatches and also in the upper sections of the transverse bulkhead between holds 2 and 3.
5. From the position of the flotsam, it is considered that the ALEXANDRE-P foundered sometime around 1800/1900 hours ship's time on 14 March 1990 in approximate position 2020S 11200E.
6. Due to the fact that no distress message was heard by either coast radio stations or other shipping and due to the lack of survivors or further bodies, it is concluded that the foundering was both sudden and rapid.
7. The wind and sea conditions being light, are not considered to be causal factors to the loss.
8. A 2-3 metre swell from the southwest would have caused the ALEXANDRE-P to pitch moderately and also to roll slightly.
9. Although the cause of the foundering cannot be determined with any certainty and although beyond the scope of this investigation, it is considered that either a sudden, massive structural failure occurred, with the ship breaking into two sections or, there was some form of explosion in the engine room, of sufficient magnitude to rupture the ship's hull and cause rapid flooding and sinking.
10. Professional opinion is that the two recovered corpses bore evidence of flash burns and blast injuries, indicating that some form of explosion did occur.
11. If the foundering was in fact due to a major structural failure, it is considered that inspection at Dampier under the port state control provisions of the International Conventions would have been unlikely to prevent the foundering.

QF002 was scheduled for departure from London Heathrow at 1315 hours UTC on 25 March 1990. Due to engineering problems with the aircraft allocated for this sector, VH-EBY was dispatched from Sydney as a replacement, thus causing a subsequent 18-hour delay in the departure of QF002. The flight eventually departed London at 0704 hours UTC on 26 March 1990 as QF002A. On arrival at London Flight Dispatch the crew were issued with the Flight Plan and accompanying Notams, Intams and company documentation. Prior to departure the crew was issued with a runway 27L, Brookmans Park 3G SID. This departure requires a right turn, shortly after take-off, towards the Burnham VOR. At a position 6DME from London, another right turn is required to intercept a track of 058 degrees to Chiltern NDB. Noise abatement procedures apply to this departure as well as an altitude requirement of reaching 3,000 ft nearing completion of the turn towards Chiltern NDB, above 4,000 ft over Chiltern NDB and a crossing altitude of 6,000 ft at Brookmans Park VOR. A speed constraint of 250 knots existed below 10,000 ft. The seating configuration on the flight deck for departure is shown at Figure 1. The First Officer was flying this sector from the right hand pilot's seat.

Outline of incident

The Philippine registered bulk carrier SINGA SEA, a ship of 26586 tonnes deadweight and some 175 metres in length overall, loaded a mixed bulk cargo of mineral sands and copper ore at the West Australian ports of Geraldton and Bunbury between 27 June and 2 July. At 0915 hours Western Standard Time (WST)* the ship sailed for Rotterdam via Cape Town, where it was expected to take on bunker fuel.

At 0600 Universal Co-ordinated Time (z) (1400 WST) on 3 July the vessel made a routine position report to the Department of Transport and Communications' Federal Sea Safety Centre (FSSC) under the Australian Ship Reporting System (AUSREP) based on the ship's noon position at 1200 WST. The ship failed to keep its next scheduled broadcast at 1400 WST on 4 July and the search and rescue procedures were put into operation by the FSSC.

At 1018 WST on 7 July a "P3" Orion of the RAAF took off from Pearce RAAF base to search for the missing ship, followed by another sortie on 8 July with the primary task of searching for survival craft. Neither search found any trace of the ship.

On 12 July a search was undertaken of the West coast of Australia by a chartered civil aircraft, as it was possible that liferafts or debris may have drifted onto the coast by then. No trace was found of SINGA SEA, or of any pertinent wreckage.

By 27 July the SINGA SEA had failed to arrive in South Africa and no radio traffic had been heard from the ship. As the cargo had been loaded in Australia and the ship hab been participating in the AUSREP System, a preliminary investigation was commenced into the loading of the ship and the procedures followed by the Federal Sea Safety Centre as they related to the reporting of the SINGA SEA under the AUSREP scheme.

Shortly after midnight WST on the night of 2/3 August, the Greek flag bulk carrier STANDARD VIRTUE saw a single red flare in approximate position 34°19'S 112°22'E, and subsequently recovered six survivors from a lifeboat belonging to the SINGA SEA.

The survivors reported that the vessel had sunk rapidly, after breaking in two in heavy seas, on 4 July 1988. They had been adrift in the lifeboat since that time.

The survivors all definitely stated that no other person had survived the wreck of the vessel, and that no other life raft or boat had been seen subsequent to the sinking. No further searches were therefore carried out for survivors.

The STANDARD VIRTUE diverted towards Fremantle where, on 4 August, the six survivors were lifted off by helicopter arranged by the Sea Safety Centre. After being landed at Fremantle, the survivors were briefly hospitalised before being repratriated to the Philippines.

*See Appendix A for an explanation of the times used in this report.

Conclusions

The actions and procedures of the Federal Sea Safety Centre between the time that the position report from the SINGA SEA became overdue and the time 24 hours had elapsed were correct and in accordance with the AUSREP guidelines.

By deciding not to initiate an air search after the scheduled position report from the SINGA SEA was 24 hours overdue, having established that the ship had not been heard by ships specially tasked to attempt radio contact, or by coast radio stations handling traffic from the ship, the stated objective of the AUSREP scheme was compromised.

The decision by the Director not to fly an air search for the vessel on 6 July was made in the face of mounting evidence that something may have been amiss with the vessel and was not consistent with the primary objective of AUSREP.

The air searches carried out on 7 and 8 July were conducted properly and in accordance with sound and established search and rescue practices.

Given the circumstances of this particular AUSREP incident and the availability of an RAAF aircraft the decision not to fly a daylight visual search for survival craft on 9 July, or subsequent days, was questionable, following the unsuccessful flare search of 8 July.

Following notification of the rescue of survivors from the SINGA SEA on 3 August, an air search for survivors was undertaken. The decision not to conduct further searches after 3 August was correct, and made on the information available.

Introduction

The Liberian flag tanker 'MOBIL ENDEAVOUR', fully loaded with petroleum products, grounded momentarily in the eastern approaches to the Torres Strait on 24 July 1986, whilst on passage from Singapore to Port Moresby.

The vessel suffered bottom damage in the grounding, however there was fortunately no pollution as a result. The vessel was able to continue her voyage to Port Moresby.

At the time of the incident, the vessel was proceeding without the services of a licensed pilot, despite a recommendation of the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization to the contrary.

The Maritime Safety Committee:

"RECOMMENDS that ships of 100 metres in length and over and all loaded oil tankers, chemical carriers or liquefied gas carriers, irrespective of size, use the pilotage services provided by the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service when navigating in the Torres Strait and inner route of the Great Barrier Reef area between Booby Island (latitude 10°36' south, longitude 141°54' east) and latitude 16°40' south or through the Great North East Channel, or Hydrographers Passage."

A Preliminary Investigation into the incident was conducted by Captain WA Chadwick, Chief, Investigation Division, Office of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, and published by the Republic of Liberia.

The Preliminary Investigation included Findings of Fact established by Captain DN Pritchard from Mobil Shipping Company Ltd.

The Federal Department of Transport Australia is grateful to the Republic of Liberia for permission to reproduce in full, in the interests of marine safety, the Report of the Preliminary Investigation and the Decision of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs RL into the grounding of 'MOBIL ENDEAVOUR'. 

Conclusions

1. The Proximate cause of the grounding of the MOBIL ENDEAVOUR was that the Master ignored the Passage Plan drafted by his Navigator and followed the leading lights on the East Strait Island, which led him North of "East" buoy. He should have passed to the South of "East" buoy.
2. The Master failed to calculate and allow for the effect of squat.
3. The Master ignored the cautionary note on Aus Chart 293 that warned that "rocky outcrops occur in the channel between the patches".
4. The Master failed to appreciate the 11 metre soundings recorded on Aus Chart 293 that he would confront on his intended track.
5. The Master failed to heed the implied warnings by his Chief Mate and the Deck Watch Officer, when he confirmed that he intended to pass to the north of "East" buoy.
6. The Master failed to employ a Torres Strait Pilot, which would have minimized the risk of grounding and pollution in an area of great ecological sensitivity.

Early on 12 January 1984, Flinders Range was proceeding south off the east coast of South Korea. The weather was fine, with clear visibility and light airs. At about 0125, the Officer of the Watch (OOW) observed a target on the radar, about one point to port at a distance of between four and five miles. He then saw the lights of a vessel, a single red light above and well clear of a row of small "accommodation" lights.

The OOW kept an eye on the other vessel from a position on the centre line in the wheelhouse, and observed the relative bearing to be increasing. At about 0133, he saw a green sidelight and assumed that the other vessel had altered course to pass under the stern of Flinders Range. However, he suddenly realised that the other vessel had altered course to port, to cross ahead. He put the wheel hard over to starboard and stopped the engines, but the two vessels collided.

Contact was made with the other vessel, which was the Korean fishing vessel Han Gil No 105, which was returning to its home port from fishing grounds, on a course of 350º. One of the deckhands was alone on watch. The red light was an all round light.

Flinders Range suffered a puncture on the starboard side of the bulbous bow, at the 4m draught level, while the fishing vessel suffered a 20cm split in the hull plating, 5m from the stern on the starboard side. Both vessels were able to proceed without assistance.

Conclusions

The fishing vessel was not showing the correct navigational lights and, as the give way vessel, did not take appropriate action to avoid collision.

The OOW did not take action to avoid a close quarters situation and did not make use of the navigation equipment available to him, to determine the course and speed of the other vessel and to ascertain if risk of collision existed.