Rejected take-off

VH-TJZ was cleared for a rolling take-off from runway 16 right (16R). During the take-off roll at approximately 40 knots IAS, the Tower controller cancelled TJZ's take-off clearance and instructed TJZ to hold position. TJZ was brought to rest abeam taxiway F with light braking. During this sequence of events, VH-EKN was on short final approach to runway 07 when the Tower controller instructed the crew to execute a go-around manoeuvre.

During the take-off ground roll at approximately 90 kts, the left engine ingested a Galah and the gas producer (Ng) speed reduced to below 60% accompanied by the ignition light illuminating. Power was reduced and the take-off was discontinued. Maintenance investigation found a bird carcass and feathers partially blocking the engine air intake. After removal and inspection for damage, ground runs were carried out to verify engine performance parameters, and the aircraft was returned to service.

As the aircraft reached approximately 20 kts during the take-off roll, no 2 engine failed. The take-off was rejected. No other damage to the aircraft was reported. The engine examination by the aircraft operator revealed that all first-stage blades had failed adjacent to their blade platforms. The damage was most likely caused by failure of blade No 35, which failed in high cycle fatigue emanating from the blade trailing edge. The operator experienced several similar failures previously. The engine manufacturer was aware of the problem and was undertaking corrective action.

Shortly after the take-off roll commenced, the crew aborted the take-off. The aircraft departed normally eight minutes later.

The operator advised that the crew received a take-off configuration warning (stabiliser trim) at the commencement of the take-off roll. The trim was reset using the co-pilot's control and the subsequent take-off was normal.

At Sydney, the aircraft had been released for service, prior to departure for Bangkok, with the number three engine fire detection 'B' loop inoperative, in accordance with the provisions of the minimum equipment list. The remaining 'A' loop would be used for fire detection and warning for the engine. The aircraft operated normally to Bangkok, where a transit service was performed before the next sector to Rome.

The subsequent take-off was rejected at 140 knots when the fire warning for number three engine activated. The aircraft returned to the gate where eleven of the sixteen mainwheels deflated due to overheating. The mainwheels were changed. Rectification of the fire warning problem consisted of repairing a broken wire at the 'B' fire detection loop connector, adjacent to number three engine starter motor. Both 'A' and 'B' loops then tested normally.

As the aircraft was rotated during the next take-off the number three engine fire warning activated again. The crew carried out the fire warning actions and shut down the engine. Fuel was jettisoned to bring the aircraft to maximum landing weight, prior to returning to Bangkok. An inspection of the engine revealed two holes burnt in the combustion case adjacent to the fire detection loops. The holes allowed hot gasses to escape and activate the fire warning system.

Investigation of the incident by the operator has resulted in a change to company procedures. Any rectification for a fire warning defect will now require a ten minute minimum high power ground run to verify the integrity of the engine. In addition, the inspection intervals for combustion cases have also been reduced.

During the take-off run, just before reaching V1, the crew heard two bangs in quick succession. Both the No 3 engine EPR and EGT indications were seen to fluctuate, so the take-off was immediately rejected. Whilst decelerating, the crew requested a frequency to communicate directly with the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) but were given the ground control frequency. That frequency was cluttered with other traffic, which made direct communication to RFFS difficult. They were finally referred to a different frequency. The aircraft vacated the runway onto taxiway Alpha 5 where a small brake fire was extinguished by the RFFS. The aircraft was subsequently towed back to the departure gate, where the passengers and crew disembarked.

Ground inspection revealed damage to several compressor stages of No.3 engine. The engine was changed, and the aircraft released for service.

Safety Action

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation is evaluating aspects of a discrete air traffic services frequency on which aircrews and rescue firefighting services at airports can be transferred during an emergency situation. Any forthcoming recommendations will be published in the Quarterly Safety Deficiency Report.

The take-off was rejected when the left engine torque indication was noted to be 13% below target torque. The subsequent investigation found that a fuel control unit drive shaft seal failure had allowed fuel to wash the lubrication from the shaft bearings which then failed. The drive shaft and spacer were badly worn and had caused a restriction to the governor flyweights which had signalled the lower torque during take-off.

The pilot reported that on lift off, the helicopter rolled to the left. Right cyclic control was applied but did not appear to have any effect. The helicopter was landed immediately but contacted the ground heavily. The pilot later said that he must have pushed the left pedal during the landing, which spun the helicopter through 90 degrees, causing most of the damage. He also thought the cyclic friction control may not have been fully released before flight.

After landing the helicopter in a confined area the pilot had some reservations about its ability to climb over adjacent trees. He identified an area that appeared suitable for a run-on landing in the event of the need to reject the take-off.

After commencing the take-off, the pilot realised that there was insufficient power available to clear the trees and manoeuvred the helicopter for a run-on landing in the area he had previously identified.

During the ground run, just before the helicopter came to a stop, the ground gave way into an underground cavity. The helicopter pitched forward, and the main rotor struck the ground.

On 1 October 2013, at about 0530 Central Standard Time, the crew of a Vincent Aviation Beech 1900C aircraft, registered VH-VNV, was preparing for two return flights from Darwin to Jabiru, Northern Territory.

The crew conducted a pre-flight briefing, which involved reviewing the applicable Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). This included a NOTAM which advised that the runway 29 threshold would be displaced from 0800 due to works in progress. The flight departed Darwin at about 0615 and returned at about 0800, at which time the displaced threshold was in place.

For the second flight, at about 0900, the first officer (FO) requested and obtained a clearance to taxi to taxiway ‘Bravo 2’ (B2). While taxiing to B2, the captain asked the FO to check the take-off performance data in the manual regarding the displaced threshold; however, he was unable to locate the relevant section prior to approaching the holding point.

When at the B2 holding point, the captain observed an aircraft on final approach. Air traffic control then cleared the crew to line up on runway 11 and asked them to confirm that they were aware of the displaced threshold to the east of taxiway ‘Echo’ (E). The FO replied that he understood.

The crew reported that when they were lined up on runway 11, they could see the tops of vehicles conducting the runway works, but due to a rise in the runway, were unable to see the start of the displaced threshold. The crew were cleared for take-off by ATC.

As the take-off run was commenced, both crew members observed that the displaced threshold was closer than expected and the captain immediately rejected the take-off at low speed.

As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that a notice was released to company pilots reinforcing the policy regarding planning of the flight by both members of the crew.

A report previously prepared for the ATSB found that there was a significant potential for oversight of critical information in the NOTAM system. This incident highlights the importance of thorough pre-flight planning and the use of all available information in preparing for flight.

Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin - Issue 25