Loading related

Inadvertent load release involving an Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3, near Wentworth Falls, New South Wales, on 20 February 2020

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 20 February 2020 at about 1322 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, the pilot of an Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3 was conducting external load activities at the Rocket Point walking track near Wentworth Falls, New South Wales.

As the remote hook, slung 150 ft below the helicopter lifted a 122 kg load of pipe, the pilot checked the rigging and slowly accelerated the helicopter into forward flight. As the pilot observed the load was stable, the helicopter was accelerated to 40 kt. A short time later, the load was inadvertently released from the hook and fell approximately 1,000 ft into unoccupied bushland.

Operator’s investigation

The operator conducted an in-depth investigation into this occurrence and determined that there were three significant factors that contributed to the load release. They were unable to establish a clear single cause as to what precipitated the occurrence.

The first contributing factor was the use of load beam part number (P/N) 290-683-00, which is of a different design to the normal in-service load beam P/N 290-683-02, specifically in the length of the beam (Figure 1) and slight variation in geometry. According to the manufacturer’s manual, the shortened load beam can be retrofitted to different P/N cargo hooks, however the load ring warning decal that specifies a smaller diameter shackle must be displayed. The cargo hook and load beam in use at the time of occurrence had incorrectly been marked with warning decal for the longer beam design (this contravened the manufacturer’s manual by not displaying the correct load ring warning decal). This is how the operator received the hook back from a routine equipment servicing in 2017.

The load beam that was in use has approximately 30 mm reduced beam length and different geometry to the more commonly used load beam, further increasing the likelihood of dynamic rollout occurring.

Dynamic rollout (or ring rollout/D-ring reversal) is a phenomenon that can be described as the unintended release of the primary engaging ring from a winch or cargo hook that may occur after a momentary unloading situation. An unloading event permits a dynamic condition allowing the ring to travel up and flip over the beak (tip) of the hook and come to rest on the spring-loaded keeper. The ring is now only supported by the spring-loaded keeper. When the load is re-applied, the spring-loaded keeper allows the ring to fall free from the hook, thereby inadvertently releasing the load.

Figure 1: Remote Hooks – the different load beams

Figure 1: Remote Hooks – the different load beams.
Source: Operator

Source: Operator

Secondly, it had become common practice for ground staff to utilise the method of attaching loads by attaching the strop loop directly to the hook’s load beam. As the radius of the loop in the nylon strop is greater than the length of the load beam, the likelihood of dynamic rollout occurring significantly increases. The operator had prepared an internal safety alert stipulating that a correctly sized shackle must be used when attaching loads to the load beam, however due to delays this was not released by the time of the occurrence.

Lastly, with the four strop loops of the load within the hook, it is possible that this created an overcrowding situation which could have prevented the keeper from correctly operating and/or being less visible to the ground crew if the strops had been placed on the hook correctly.

While the operator was unable to determine the exact cause for the inadvertent release of the load, the operator concluded it was reasonable that the load dropped due to dynamic rollout or due to the incorrect rigging of the nylon load strops to the shortened load beam. Dynamic rollout is more likely, as it is a known fault to occur when using the nylon strops without shackles. The use of the remote hook with a shorter load beam further exacerbated the situation leading to the loss of the load.

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that they have updated their operations manual procedure to prevent unintentional release from the remote hook. Specifically, this involves the use of a self-locking hook and swivel with a correctly sized shackle as the single attachment to the remote hook.

Figure 2: Remote Hook lifting load with self-locking hook and swivel

Figure 2: Remote Hook lifting load with self-locking hook and swivel.
Source: Operator

Source: Operator

Safety message

This incident serves as a reminder for both ground and aircrew members that while conducting sling and winch operations, there are potential hazards to the safe completion of the task. Identification and communication of such hazards allows safety action to mitigate the associated risk. Further information on dynamic rollout and prevention can be found in CASA’s Airworthiness Bulletin 25-006.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2020-023
Occurrence date 20/02/2020
Location Near Wentworth Falls
State New South Wales
Occurrence class Incident
Aviation occurrence category Loading related
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 22/06/2020

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Airbus Helicopters
Model AS 350 B3
Sector Helicopter
Operation type Aerial Work
Damage Nil

Loading related incident involving Airbus A330-202, at Jakarta International Airport, Indonesia, on 18 November 2018

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 18 November 2018 an Airbus A330-202 aircraft was being operated on a scheduled passenger flight from Jakarta, Indonesia, to Sydney, New South Wales.

During take-off, the flight crew detected improper adjustment to the trim controls. After take-off, the flight crew received an aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) message advising that there was a discrepancy between the weight of a loaded cargo pallet on the load sheet and the actual weight of the pallet.

During the loading of the aircraft, all pallets had been packed and weighed correctly. The Load Control system requires a ground handler to enter the load data (pallet weights) into an electronic messaging system for transmission to the regional load control who generate the aircraft load sheet and load instruction report. The ground handler made an error when entering this data.

Therefore, the final load sheet had included a cargo pallet that was 3,000 kg whereas the actual weight of the pallet was 2,000 kg. This resulted in the zero fuel weight (ZFW) used being 1,000 kg heavier than the actual ZFW. The stabilizer setting from the final load sheet was 4.4 up, but should have been 4.7 up. The crew reported that the out of trim condition was evident during rotation.

Safety action

As a result of this incident, the operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety action:

The ground handling agent has added the requirement for a second ground handler to cross- check data entry prior to transmission. Freight scanning has been introduced in a number of airports, and is to be introduced across the whole network including in Jakarta. This will assist in identifying errors such as this.

Safety message

This occurrence highlights the importance of cross-checking all container, pallet and baggage weights when loading an aircraft. The use of a second person or an electronic system will assist in reducing these types of data entry errors. ATSB research report, Aircraft loading occurrences July 2003 to June 2010 (AR-2010-044), documents the number and types of safety occurrences involving the loading of high-capacity aircraft to raise awareness within the industry of the associated issues.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2018-127
Occurrence date 18/11/2018
Location Jakarta International Airport, Indonesia
State International
Occurrence class Incident
Aviation occurrence category Loading related
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 14/01/2019

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Airbus
Model A330-202
Sector Jet
Operation type Air Transport High Capacity
Departure point Jakarta, Indonesia
Destination Sydney, NSW
Damage Nil