Fuel exhaustion

Cessna 210M, VH-PJQ

Safety Action

Bureau of Air Safety Investigation safety action

The Bureau is currently conducting an occurrence data analysis of accidents and incidents between 1989 and 1998 resulting from fuel exhaustion and/or fuel starvation. The results of this analysis are due for release in mid-1999.

CASA safety action

The March 1998 edition of CASA's quarterly journal "Flight Safety Australia", contained an article titled "Running on empty - too many pilots are running out of fuel". The article explored some of the underlying factors of fuel-related occurrences and provided advice to pilots on fuel planning and monitoring.

Significant Factors

  1. The flight plan was poorly constructed and was not used to monitor the progress of the flight.
  2. The errors in the flight plan may have provided the pilot with a false impression that he had sufficient fuel for the flight.
  3. The pilot did not maintain an adequate sense of time, distance and fuel endurance.
  4. The engine failed due to fuel exhaustion.
  5. The pilot did not take advantage of suitable areas available for a forced landing.
  6. The aircraft stalled at a height from which recovery was not considered possible.

Analysis

The flight plan used by the pilot for monitoring the flight was written in a manner that was not in accordance with conventional flight planning techniques. This meant that the recording of departure and arrival times, and the monitoring of the flight's progress, might not have been as straightforward as when using the conventional technique. No waypoints other than departure and destination points were entered, except for the significant sightseeing destinations of the Bungle Bungles and the East Alligator River area. The use of intermediate waypoints could have assisted the pilot in establishing arrival times and in monitoring the duration of the flights. A large error in the planned time interval between Kununurra and Tindal was considered to have been a significant factor in this accident and would have contributed to the pilot's overall lack of situational awareness during the accident flight. The overall plan allowed barely adequate time for refuelling at each landing point and made no allowance for time to be spent in sightseeing at significant locations. As a result, the day's activities were artificially shortened at the planning stage and the day's flying would inevitably take longer than originally planned.

Minimal notations of position and time on the flight documentation available suggested that the pilot was using the GPS as his main source of position and time reference. The balance of evidence also suggested that the pilot was not experienced in planning and conducting ad hoc scenic flights such as occurred on that day. It also suggested that the pilot did not monitor the relationship between the aircraft's position, time, and endurance remaining. There was no apparent recognition that the flight plan lacked the route segment between Timber Creek and Tindal.

The errors in the flight plan meant that the flight-planned fuel required for the Kununurra to Tindal flight, was inadequate. Considering that a more accurate time interval for the flight to Tindal would have been 3 hours 20 minutes, fuel should have been of considerable concern. The pilot apparently did not associate the delays in the flight and the additional leg from Timber Creek to Tindal with the amount of fuel available. On arrival in the Tindal circuit, the pilot did not appear to be aware that the fuel supply was almost exhausted, as none of the pilot's radio transmissions indicated any sense of urgency or need to land promptly.

When faced with the emergency, the pilot did not take advantage of available options that could have minimised the consequences. Once the engine power began to fail, it is likely that the pilot was concentrating on the reasons for the power loss and was attempting to restore power rather than considering suitable areas in which to make a forced landing. The pilot had not attempted to configure the aircraft for a forced landing as evidenced by the retracted landing gear and flaps at impact. The aircraft speed taken from the Tindal radar system recording and the witness reports of the aircraft "porpoising" prior to impact, are consistent with the aircraft stalling at approximately 300 ft AGL. With the aircraft in a stalled condition, the pilot had little control over the aircraft.

Summary

A Cessna 210 (C210), operating under visual flight rules, was chartered for a one-day aerial sightseeing flight by a group of four interstate visitors. The flight departed from Darwin NT and flew to Kununurra WA where the aircraft was refuelled. It has been established that the aircraft held fuel for approximately 240 minutes of flight when it departed Kununurra. This was consistent with the fuel endurance noted on the flight plan.

From Kununurra, the aircraft flew to the Bungle Bungle Range (Bungle Bungles) WA, where some scenic flying was carried out before continuing to Timber Creek NT for an unscheduled landing due to the unavailability of an air traffic control clearance into Tindal airspace. During this leg of the flight the pilot amended his SARTIME for arrival at Tindal by 1 hour 30 minutes. The aircraft then flew to the Tindal airport at Katherine NT, where a refuelling stop had been planned. The pilot again amended his SARTIME for arrival at Tindal by a further hour. Approaching Tindal, the pilot communicated with other aircraft in the area and manoeuvred to establish a traffic pattern. After further communications, the pilot advised that he was joining downwind for runway 14. Shortly after this, the aircraft was observed to be flying at a very low height with the engine "spluttering". Witnesses saw the aircraft "porpoising" as it descended into trees. The sound of an impact was heard shortly after. The aircraft speed taken from the Tindal radar system recording was consistent with the aircraft being in a stalled condition from approximately 300 ft AGL.

The accident site was located approximately 6.6 km west of Tindal airport. Adjacent to the accident site were a number of areas suitable for a forced landing. Apart from these areas, the terrain was generally flat with occasional rocky outcrops, and was moderately treed. The accident site was contained within the moderately treed area. The five occupants had received fatal injuries.

Pilot information

The pilot held a commercial flight crew licence, a valid class one medical certificate and appropriate endorsements to allow him to operate C210 aircraft. The operator employed the pilot on a casual basis.

At the time of the accident, the pilot had accrued a total of 798 hours flying experience. Of this, 636.8 hours were in command with 481.3 hours on C210 aircraft. In the previous 30 days he had flown 47.2 hours, all of which were conducted as pilot in command on the C210. Evidence indicated that the last time the pilot had demonstrated practice forced landings was in March 1996. Evidence also indicated that the pilot had not previously conducted an extended flight with fare-paying passengers as was planned on the day of the accident.

Wreckage examination

The combination of speed and descent angle of the aircraft resulted in an estimated descent rate at impact of about 3,100 ft/min and an estimated peak impact load of 64G. Such an impact was not considered to be survivable.

The right fuel tank had been ruptured at its inboard end and there was evidence that a small amount of fuel had been released from the ruptured area. The left fuel tank was intact and it contained about one cup of fuel. Traces of fuel were found in some areas of the engine fuel system, most areas being dry. The aircraft was assessed as containing no useable fuel at the time of impact. The engine instruments indicated that the aircraft had flown for approximately 240 minutes since refuelling at Kununurra.

The landing gear and flaps were retracted and there was no evidence that either had been selected in anticipation of configuring the aircraft for a landing.

Flight Planning

On the reverse side of the flight plan form, the pilot had documented the planned flight legs for each route. Each line commenced with the departure point and contained the data for the flight to the destination. This method was not in accordance with the conventional method of flight planning and meant that the thought process required for each line of data was to think FROM the location at the beginning of the line rather than TO the location at the beginning of the line.

The line on the flight plan commencing with "KU" contained data applicable for the flight from Kununurra to the Bungle Bungles, a distance of 100 NM and an estimated elapsed time of 45 minutes. No time had been planned for sightseeing at the Bungle Bungles.The line on the flight plan commencing with "BU", assumed to be the Bungle Bungles, contained data applicable for the flight from the Bungle Bungles to Timber Creek, a distance of 161 NM and an estimated elapsed time of 1 hour 12 minutes. No data had been entered on the flight plan for the leg between Timber Creek and Tindal, a distance of 131 NM, which would have been expected to take approximately 60 minutes. A more accurate planned time interval, calculated by the investigation team, for the flight between Kununurra and Tindall was approximately 3 hours 20 minutes, including an allowance of 20 minutes for flight in accordance with standard operating procedures for sightseeing at the Bungle Bungles. The pilot's flight plan indicated that he had allowed only 1 hour and 57 minutes. No waypoints other than departure and destination points were entered, except for the significant sightseeing destinations of the Bungle Bungles and the East Alligator River area. The anomaly in the flight-planned time between Kununurra and Tindal was consistent with the information contained on the other side of the flight plan form and which was submitted to Airservices Australia for flight notification purposes. Although the actual time of landing at Timber Creek could not be established, evidence suggested that the actual time from Kununurra to Timber Creek was probably about 2 hours 50 minutes. Although two fuel calculation columns were annotated with "KU" and "TN" under the "endurance" line at the bottom of the table, no other entries were made in the columns.

Fuel considerations

Persons interviewed during the investigation said that the pilot considered fuel loading prior to flights and there had been occasions when the aircraft's load was reduced in order to carry an adequate fuel load. However, there was some evidence, other than on the accident flight, that the pilot was not in the habit of maintaining a running log of time, distance and fuel endurance. The operator's chief pilot advised that during the pilot's most recent check, he noted that the pilot used only the GPS for navigation and did not keep a flight log, but that he always seemed to know where he was.

There was no evidence to suggest that the fuel gauges were unreliable. A video recorder recovered from the wreckage contained a recording of the flight taken by one of the passengers and provided a clear view of the instrument panel while the aircraft was on approach to land at Timber Creek. The left fuel gauge indicated that the tank was nearly empty while the right gauge indicated approximately one quarter full. Calculations based on this evidence determined that the aircraft had approximately 15 US gallons or some 57 L on board during the approach to Timber Creek, which equated to approximately 1 hour's flight time.

The operator

The chief pilot was the owner of the organisation and the only full-time employee. Three part-time pilots, including the pilot of the accident flight, were employed on a casual basis. From June 1994, the operator's AOC was upgraded from aerial work to include charter operations.

The company operations manual required the chief pilot to ensure that pilots rostered for charter flights familiarise themselves with the route and conditions expected along the route. The chief pilot reported that he had not seen the pilot's plan, and that he had not discussed the plan or the route in detail with the pilot before he departed on the accident flight.

Navigation

One Global Positioning System (GPS) unit was recovered from the wreckage and another was found in the pilot's bag. The unit in use on the accident flight contained waypoints appropriate to the flights conducted on the day of the accident; however, the route-tracking facility was not selected. Although the unit could be used for fuel endurance calculations, no parameters had been entered into the unit to allow this to occur. The last position retrieved from the unit after the accident was consistent with the accident location.

Information obtained during the investigation suggested that the pilot tended to use the GPS exclusively for navigation, and was not in the habit of recording any fixes on a map or other documentation. This information was consistent with the evidence provided by the pilot's documentation recovered from the aircraft. No entries had been made on the pilot's navigation charts. Only the intended tracks had been drawn on them. Some positions and estimates given by radio would most likely have been obtained by reference to a GPS unit.

The flight plan contained almost no information other than that entered during the flight planning stage. No positions and times were entered. There was no evidence of any attempt to maintain a fuel log by recording fuel quantities at significant points, or recording tank selection times.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 199702601
Occurrence date 14/08/1997
Location 6.6 km W Tindal, Aero.
State Northern Territory
Report release date 01/07/1999
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Aviation
Aviation occurrence category Fuel exhaustion
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Fatal

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Cessna Aircraft Company
Model 210
Registration VH-PJQ
Serial number 21062072
Sector Piston
Operation type Charter
Departure point Timber Creek, NT
Destination Tindal, NT
Damage Destroyed

Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 47G3B-KH4, VH-AHU, 8 km north of Silent Grove, 175 km north-east of Derby, Western Australia

Summary

The flight was planned as a one-hour inspection of tourist spots in the Isdell River area, 175 km north-east of Derby. The helicopter departed the base camp at Silent Grove, 15 km south-east of Mount Hart Station, landed once during the flight, and was returning to the base camp when the crash occurred. The crash site was 8 km north of the camp.

All occupants received serious injuries in the crash. One passenger, who appeared to be the most able, walked to the base camp to get help. He arrived there shortly after first light the next day. The wreckage, and the other occupants were found at approximately 1100 on the day after the crash. One passenger died during the night.

Occurrence summary

Investigation number 199601982
Occurrence date 27/06/1996
Location 8 km north of Silent Grove, 175 km north-east of Derby
State Western Australia
Report release date 27/03/1997
Report status Final
Investigation type Occurrence Investigation
Investigation status Completed
Mode of transport Aviation
Aviation occurrence category Fuel exhaustion
Occurrence class Accident
Highest injury level Fatal

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Kawasaki Heavy Industries
Model 47
Registration VH-AHU
Serial number 2166
Sector Helicopter
Operation type Charter
Departure point Silent Grove, WA
Destination Silent Grove, WA
Damage Substantial

Fuel exhaustion, Piper PA-30 near Caboolture, Queensland, on 14 January 2021

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 14 January 2021, the pilot of a Piper PA-30 aircraft planned to conduct circuits for the purpose of running the engines after a prolonged storage period. The pilot’s usual procedure had been to fill the aircraft tanks (to full) prior to flight. On this occasion, instead of filling the tanks, the pilot visually checked the quantity of fuel in the wing tanks and assessed it was sufficient for the planned flight.

A graphic engine monitor unit was installed in the aircraft but was reported to have reverted to factory settings following a flat battery. The pilot therefore deemed this an unreliable source of fuel quantity information.

Shortly after take-off on the fourth circuit, the left engine stopped due to fuel exhaustion. The pilot initiated a turn back to the runway. Once confident of making the runway, the pilot configured the aircraft for landing.

With limited manoeuvrability due to one engine inoperative, and the possibility of the right engine stopping at any moment, the pilot elected to land with a tailwind. This resulted in a higher ground speed on touchdown. The ground speed, combined with the wet grass surface, meant that the braking performance was insufficient to stop the aircraft on the runway remaining. The aircraft overran the runway into a wire fence resulting in minor damage to the nose and wings.

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the owner has advised the ATSB that they have made a calibrated dipstick to accurately measure the quantity of fuel in the wing tanks.

Safety message

This incident is a reminder to pilots to ensure sufficient fuel is carried for the proposed flight. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority advisory publication,

, provides guidance for fuel quantity crosschecking. Pilots should use at least two independent verification methods to determine the quantity of fuel on board the aircraft.

Case studies for pilots to learn about fuel management related accidents are documented in the ATSB publication Avoidable Accidents No. 5 – Starved and exhausted: Fuel management aviation accidents.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2021-004
Occurrence date 14/01/2021
Location near Caboolture,
State Queensland
Occurrence class Incident
Aviation occurrence category Fuel exhaustion
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 24/02/2021

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Piper Aircraft Corp
Sector Piston
Operation type General Aviation
Departure point near Caboolture, Queensland
Destination near Caboolture, Queensland
Damage Minor

Fuel exhaustion and forced landing involving a Piper PA-25, Benalla, Victoria, on 28 September 2019

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 28 September 2019, the pilot of a Piper PA-25 was conducting glider-tow operations at Benalla Airport, Victoria. After releasing the glider at about 4,000 ft AGL, the pilot began a descent to 1,000 ft. During the descent, the engine failed. The pilot subsequently switched fuel pumps and activated the emergency power system[1], however experienced no restoration of engine power. He assessed that the aircraft was too low to conduct a glide approach to the runway and elected to land in a paddock near the airport. After the forced landing, he checked the fuel tank and identified that it was empty.

Pilot comments

The procedure for refuelling the aircraft was to refuel at the beginning of the day, and again after one hour of towing time. The pilot advised that he took over the aircraft and inspected the log, observing a total of 35 minutes towing time logged. This was consistent with the number of tows completed for the day. The pilot’s expectation was that there was sufficient fuel for another four or five glider tows. He did not visually inspect the fuel tank to confirm the fuel levels during the pre‑flight walk-around and mentioned the fuel gauge indication is difficult to read.

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions:

The operator sent an email to all glider-tug pilots reminding them of the requirements in regards to fuel checks. Additionally, the fibreglass fuel gauge indicator was polished to allow for easier visual indication so accurate readings can be taken. The operator advised that they are looking into options for replacing the fuel gauge.

Safety message

This incident serves as a reminder that is in the pilot in command’s responsibility to ensure there is sufficient fuel quantity on board the aircraft.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority advisory publication,

, provides guidance for fuel quantity crosschecking, specifically that the crosscheck should use at least two different verification methods to determine the quantity of fuel on board the aircraft.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

  1. The emergency power system is an independent source of electrical power that supports important electrical systems upon loss of normal power supply. The incident aircraft has a back-up battery fitted that was switched on in this instance, in case the engine stopped due to failure of the primary electrical system.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2019-037
Occurrence date 28/09/2019
Location 2 km ESE of Benalla Airport
State Victoria
Occurrence class Serious Incident
Aviation occurrence category Fuel exhaustion
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 08/11/2019

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Piper Aircraft Corp
Model PA-25-260
Sector Piston
Operation type Gliding
Departure point Benalla Airport, Victoria
Destination Benalla Airport, Victoria
Damage Nil

Fuel exhaustion involving Cessna 152, Bankstown Airport, New South Wales, on 21 November 2018

Brief

Occurrence Briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation.

What happened

On 21 November 2018, the crew of a Cessna Aircraft Company 152 departed Bankstown, New South Wales to conduct a training flight with two crew members on board.

Returning from the Bankstown training area, the aircraft was cleared by air traffic control (ATC) to join downwind for runway 29R. Whilst on downwind, at 1,500 ft above ground level, the aircraft’s engine RPM started to reduce uncommanded. The instructor took over from the student and applied full throttle and carburettor heat to attempt to increase engine RPM and performance. The engine’s RPM increased momentarily and reduced again.

The instructor advised the tower of the engine issues and requested a glide approach. ATC cleared the aircraft for a glide approach for runway 29R. During the glide approach, the engine failed and the propeller stopped windmilling.[1] The aircraft landed safely on the runway.

Engineering inspection

Following the incident, the engineering inspection revealed the right fuel tank was empty and the left fuel tank had 15 L of fuel remaining. The remaining fuel failed to feed through the fuel lines, resulting in fuel being starved from the engine. The engineers inspected the fuel lines and vents for blockages but could not find any fault or blockage in the fuel system.

The Cessna 152 has a gravity fed fuel system that does not have a fuel tank selector switch. Asymmetric (uneven) fuel delivery is a well known phenomenon in single engine Cessna aircraft. It is very common for a 10 to 15 L difference to be found between left and right tanks. Once the aircraft reaches a fuel level equal to or below this common difference, and one tank is dry, the likelihood of fuel starvation increases significantly.

A company investigation identified a non-vented fuel cap on the left tank as a possible contributing factor. The right tank had a vented fuel cap. The Cessna 152 has an underwing vent on the left-hand side. The dual vented caps have become standard as a back up to this vent due to complicated pressure forces created within the fuel system and the tendency of the underwing vent to become blocked.

Airworthiness Directives have been released previously regarding the replacement of non-vented caps on Cessna 150 aircraft (predecessor to Cessna 152), however none have been released for the Cessna 152 as all but the very early models (first year of production) were released from the factory with dual vented fuel caps; and Cessna no longer provides the non-vented fuel cap as a replacement part. Although the majority of Cessna 152 were released from the factory with dual vented caps, many fuel system diagrams still show a vented cap on the right-hand tank only.

Figure 1: Example of Cessna unvented fuel cap

Figure 1: Example of Cessna unvented fuel cap

Source: Google Images

Figure 2: Example of Cessna vented fuel cap

Figure 2: Example of Cessna vented fuel cap

Source: Google Images

Safety action

As a result of this incident, the operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following ongoing safety actions:

  • They will be replacing the left fuel cap with a vented fuel cap.
  • They will also inspect their entire Cessna fleet to ensure all aircraft have vented fuel caps on both tanks.
  • Additional training for staff and students in measuring fuel levels on uneven ground will take place.
  • Additional training for staff regarding total fuel and fixed fuel reserves will be implemented.

Safety message

Simulated total loss of power and a subsequent practice forced landing is at the core of a pilot’s emergency training. It is important that pilots remain aware that despite conducting comprehensive pre-flight checks, unanticipated failures can still occur during flight. Following a complete engine failure, a forced landing is inevitable. In this instance, the crew followed standard emergency procedures to ensure a safe outcome was achieved.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

  1. Windmilling - The continued rotation of a propeller after the engine is shut down in flight. Aerodynamic forces act on the propeller to keep it turning, or windmilling, with no power from the engine.

Occurrence summary

Mode of transport Aviation
Occurrence ID AB-2018-131
Occurrence date 21/11/2018
Location Bankstown Airport
State New South Wales
Occurrence class Serious Incident
Aviation occurrence category Fuel exhaustion
Highest injury level None
Brief release date 08/02/2019

Aircraft details

Manufacturer Cessna Aircraft Company
Model 152
Sector Piston
Operation type Flying Training
Departure point Bankstown Airport, NSW
Damage Nil