| Safety issue description |
Sydney Trains validation processes were not effective in detecting errors in Special Train Notice (STN) 1004 prior to the Local Possession Authority (LPA) implementation. |
|---|---|
| Issue number | RO-2013-017-SI-03 |
| Issue owner | Sydney Trains |
| Transport function | Rail: Passenger - metropolitan |
| Date issue released | 19/09/2014 |
| Issue status justification |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is satisfied that the action taken by Sydney Trains adequately addresses the safety issue. |
| Action type | Proactive action |
|---|---|
| Organisation | Sydney Trains |
| Action date | 19/09/2014 |
| Action description |
Sydney Trains acknowledges that the inaccuracy of the Special Train Notice (STN) and relevant rules and procedures not being followed during implementation of the LPA were contributing factors to this incident. Sydney Trains has implemented a number of changes to their STN production and validation processes and incorporated new tools and systems to improve the integrity of the validation process and make it easier to independently assess possession information. |
| ATSB response |
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau is satisfied that the action taken by Sydney Trains addresses this safety issue. |
| Action status | Closed |
| Date received | 11/07/2014 |
|---|---|
| Organisation | Sydney trains |
| Response status | Closed |
| Response text |
Sydney Trains drew our attention to page 23 of the draft report. At this point the draft report acknowledged that the Tran Planning Unit (responsible for the development and publication of STNs) had implemented a number of process changes based on their internal investigation of this incident; these changes were then listed and the report noted that the Train Planning Unit had ‘….implemented a number of changes to strengthen their production and validation processes.”
|
| Date received | 11/07/2015 |
|---|---|
| Organisation | Sydney Trains |
| Response status | Closed |
| Response text |
Sydney Trains drew our attention to page 23 of the draft report. At this point the draft report acknowledged that the Tran Planning Unit (responsible for the development and publication of STNs) had implemented a number of process changes based on their internal investigation of this incident; these changes were then listed and the report noted that the Train Planning Unit had ‘….implemented a number of changes to strengthen their production and validation processes.”
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