The Port Authority of New South Wales did not have a proper and correct understanding of its responsibilities for emergency response under its operating licence and relevant state plans. This contributed to the inadequate coordination of emergency towage, salvage and refuge, which were critical for the single, integrated and comprehensive response required and significantly prolonged the emergency.
To be advised
Response by Port Authority of New South Wales
The Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) did not advise the ATSB that it had taken or proposed to take any safety action to address this safety issue. The Port Authority advised the ATSB that its roles and responsibilities under relevant state plans and its operating licence were limited to responding to spills (pollution) and because that did not occur during this incident, its role as a combat agency under the NSW Coastal Waters Marine Pollution Plan was not ‘enlivened’.
ATSB comment
The ATSB has significant concerns that the Port Authority has not taken safety action to address this safety issue, and its interpretation of its roles and responsibilities under the state’s plans and its operating licence. The ATSB considers the ongoing risk due to this issue is unacceptably high with potentially severe consequences in the event of a similar incident and has, therefore, issued the following safety recommendation to the Port Authority.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the Port Authority of New South Wales takes safety action to adequately address this safety issue.
On 27 August 2025, the Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) advised that it partially agreed with the ATSB’s recommendation associated with this safety issue and that it had taken the following action.
‘Port Authority has reviewed and where applicable, updated its internal incident response checklists and procedures. Port Authority maintains the view that it does not have the powers to play an enforcement role in issues of salvage and place of refuge which specifically rest with AMSA and the State Marine Pollution Controller. With regards to emergency towage, under Port Authority’s towage licence regime, an activation requirement for tug assets is in place noting this is subject to any powers of direction and noting that activation times for offshore emergency response is not immediate.’
The ATSB notes that the Port Authority partially agreed with the ATSB recommendation and its view as stated in its response. This suggests the Port Authority has a different understanding of its responsibilities for emergency response under its operating licence and relevant state plans than that described in those documents.
In addition, the Port Authority has not provided any detail of the action that it has taken to enable an assessment of the extent to which the safety issue may have been addressed. Therefore, the ATSB has asked the Port Authority to provide details of the action taken.
On 19 January 2026, the Port Authority of New South Wales (Port Authority) provided documented records of updates made to its internal incident response checklists and procedures to address the safety recommendation.
The documents included a copy of VTS [vessel traffic service] Operations Procedures 3.3-05, Vessel Grounding External/Emergency Checklist, Revision 11 of 8 April 2025, and its change record. The checklist provides instructions for Port Kembla VTS, and its immediate response section includes notification to AMSA JRCC [Australian Maritime Safety Authority Joint Rescue Coordination Centre].
A copy of the VTS Operations Procedure 2.1.1-04, Gathering and Recording Information, Internal/Routine, Revision 25 of 28 July 2025, was also provided. This procedure provides instructions for Port Kembla VTS to distribute incident reports based on incident levels. In the event of a ‘level 3 vessel safety incident’, the procedure requires telephone notification to AMSA and, if relevant, to JRCC. The procedure defines a level 3 vessel safety incident as one resulting in a fatality, major damage to infrastructure or vessel, or injuries that require hospitalisation
The ATSB reviewed the amended procedures to assess if they could be effective for an incident similar to the July 2022 propulsion failure and near grounding of Portland Bay.
The ATSB found that the emergency checklist procedure 3.3-05 specifically applies to a grounding. It provides no instruction or guidance to ensure that, in a similar situation to that of Portland Bay (main engine failure about 7 miles off the coast and tug assistance requested), VTS would promptly notify the AMSA JRCC. Therefore, for such a notification to be made, the VTS operator would need to first assess that a grounding was imminent or otherwise be reported. However, without explicit instructions and/or clear guidance, making an objective assessment would be difficult or impossible and render the procedure ineffective.
Similarly, the gathering and recording information procedure 2.1.1-04 requires that a level 3 incident (major infrastructure or vessel damage, fatality or serious injury) be reported to AMSA or JRCC. These level 3 incident criteria are not the same or similar to those reported by Portland Bay’s master to Port Kembla VTS. Therefore, in a similar situation, this procedure would not be effective.
The ATSB concluded that the updated Port Kembla VTS procedures could not individually or jointly ensure that AMSA was notified in an incident similar to the Portland Bay incident. The ATSB will request further information from the Port Authority, including confirmation that the relevant VTS procedures apply to all its managed ports.
