The operator did not provide formal training on version 3 of the ground control station software to its pilots. Instead, relying on familiarisation flights and ad hoc advice from the manufacturer. This increased the risk that show-qualified pilots would fail to identify exceedances in flight critical parameters and experience increased workload.
To be advised.
The Australian Traffic Network Pty Limited advised that following this accident its pilots undertook a more detailed familiarisation with the ground control station software. This included the development of a document containing details of all identifiable software features and making this information available to be used in future pilot familiarisation as necessary.
The ATSB welcomes the safety action taken by the operator to ensure that its pilots are familiar with all the identifiable features on the current version of the ground control station software.
However, in the context that RPAS operations continue to rapidly develop and diversify, without a documented process for such familiarisation whenever new software features are introduced there is limited assurance that all pilots will maintain the required systems knowledge. The ATSB therefore issues the following safety recommendation.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that The Australian Traffic Network Pty Limited develops a process to ensure that future software changes are communicated and understood by all pilots before commencing operations.