Safety issue

Investigation number AO-2023-018
Safety issue description

The Integrated Tower Automatic Suite (INTAS) QNH change alert threshold was greater than that required for revision of the automatic terminal information service (ATIS), leaving it reliant on the controller to identify smaller changes in QNH that require ATIS revision. This could result in flights conducting required navigation performance authorisation required (RNP AR) approaches operating with altitude errors greater than those used in the design of the approach.

Response by Airservices Australia

On 12 October 2026, after reviewing the draft report and receiving a briefing from the ATSB on the safety issue, Airservices Australia advised the ATSB that:

… the RNP AR approach design does not incorporate a specific tolerance intended to compensate for a discrepancy between the QNH provided to the aircraft and the actual aerodrome QNH. The validity of the procedure’s vertical profile therefore relies on the aircraft using an accurate and current QNH. This is consistent with the broader altimetry framework, under which QNH is the pressure setting used to make the altimeter indicate altitude relative to mean sea level and is required to be set before the initial approach fix. Approved actual QNH is also time-limited to 15 minutes from receipt for instrument-approach purposes. 

That said, the absence of a specific QNH-error tolerance does not mean that a 2 hPa discrepancy would necessarily result in a collision risk. There are other independent layers of protection relevant to assessing the actual collision risk:

• Visual completion of the approach: The relevant approaches (RNP) terminate in a visual segment. Continuation through that segment requires the flight crew to establish and maintain the prescribed visual reference. This provides an opportunity for the crew to identify the runway environment, assess the aircraft’s flight path and discontinue the approach if the required visual conditions are not maintained.

• Terrain and obstacle-clearance margins: The procedure design incorporates terrain and obstacle-clearance margins greater than the vertical effect of a 2 hPa QNH discrepancy. These margins provide resilience against a small pressure-setting discrepancy and reduce the likelihood that a 2 hPa error, by itself, would result in terrain or obstacle infringement.

• Operational QNH controls: QNH is a mandatory ATIS meteorological element. The ATIS must be revised and assigned a new code letter when QNH changes by at least 1 hPa and the change is expected to persist for at least 15 minutes. This is a licensing requirement for any ATC and failure to undertake this would most likely result in remedial actions. So, the likelihood of a 2 HPa change without the ATIS being reviewed would be rare which is supported by CIRRIS data. 

These are additional layers of protection, not substitutes for accurate QNH. They do, however, reduce the likelihood that a short-duration or small QNH discrepancy will progress to a collision with terrain or an obstacle. The safety assessment should therefore distinguish between the absence of a specific QNH-error allowance in the procedure design and the presence of broader procedural, operational and obstacle-clearance protections.

The existing requirement to amend an ATIS is not triggered by every instantaneous 1 hPa fluctuation. It requires the ATIS to be amended when the QNH changes by at least 1 hPa and is expected to persist for at least 15 minutes. This necessarily requires a period of observation and operational judgement to distinguish a sustained change from a momentary fluctuations. 

An alarm generated at the initial 1 hPa change would not remove that requirement. If the QNH subsequently remained at the changed value, there would be no further change of state to generate another alarm at the end of the observation period. The proposed alarm could therefore occur before the controller is required to amend the ATIS, but provide no subsequent reminder when the persistence criterion is met. In practical terms, the identified residual risk would remain.

Lowering or changing the alarm threshold may also generate additional alerts during normal short-term pressure variation. This would increase controller workload and create the potential for nuisance-alert exposure without providing a reliable or enduring control against a missed ATIS amendment. It would also require system modification, assurance, implementation, training and ongoing support.

On balance, Airservices Australia considers that:

1. accurate and current QNH remains necessary for the intended operation of the RNP AR approach;

2. the visual segment, obstacle-clearance margins, ATIS revision requirements and altimeter-setting verification provide multiple independent layers of protection;

3. the proposed alarm change would not provide a further reminder after the required observation period;

4. the change would increase workload and implementation complexity without materially eliminating the residual risk; 

5. current safety data does not support the notion that ATIS data is not updated in a timely manner; and

6. the limited incremental safety benefit would not be proportionate to the implementation and ongoing support costs.

For these reasons, Airservices Australia considers that the existing procedural controls remain appropriate and that amendment of the current alarm process is not justified.

ATSB comment

The ATSB acknowledges that Airservices Australia considered the ATSB’s safety issue and determined that the existing controls in place were appropriate. The ATSB also notes that the air traffic control procedures require the controller to monitor the meteorological conditions for changes that require communication to arriving aircraft, either through an ATIS update or radio communication. However, as this incident has shown, there are limitations to humans’ abilities to attentively monitor and recognise changes in complex dynamic systems. This is well documented in the aviation human factors (also referred to as human performance) literature.

Airservices Australia’s INTAS system has the built-in capability to alert controllers to changes that require attention. However, by not matching the tolerances of the INTAS alerting system with the requirements in the Manual of Air Traffic Services, there remains an increased risk of aircraft conducting RNP AR approaches with altitude errors greater than allowed for in the design of the approach. 

Issue number AO-2023-018-SI-02
Issue owner Airservices Australia
Transport function Aviation: Airports
Issue status Closed – Not addressed
Date issue released 19/11/2026
Issue status justification

Airservices Australia indicated that the existing procedural controls remained appropriate and that amending the INTAS alarm process to match the QNH threshold required for revision of the ATIS was not justified. As such, the ATSB has closed the safety issue as not addressed.