Reporter's deidentified concern
The reporter has raised a safety concern in relation to the use of non-commissioned rail sidings.
The reporter is concerned Network Controllers are being instructed to utilise a recently constructed rail siding despite the fact it is yet to be commissioned as safe to use. The reporter advised, recently an [Operator] Network Controller was instructed to use a newly constructed, however not yet commissioned, rail siding located [xx] km south of [Location 1] in the [State] to reverse a train consist in order to return to [Location 2]. The instruction was initially refused by the Network Controller due to the siding not being commissioned however authorisation was given by higher management. Network Control was advised it was for an emergency situation however it appeared to be more so for convenience. The reporter advised of an incident involving a work train which derailed when being stored at this particular siding when it was under construction.
The reporter advised, the [Operator] management now insists this location has been commissioned yet all signage in the field remains covered and points clamped indicating it is not commissioned. The reason this siding cannot be used or commissioned is because the safe working system ([system name]) currently used is outdated and not able be updated to include new sidings. The reporter further advised that there is already a workaround instruction implemented for another siding located at [Location 3], just north of [Location 4], which was constructed just over 12 months ago.
The reporter finally states, the Network Controllers feel this is an illegal and unsafe operation. The operator intends to construct two additional rail sidings in the near future which are also, not at this stage, able to be supported by our safe working system. This will place further pressure on Network Controllers to continue to operate in this way and the reporter queries where the Network Controller stands legally, if instructed by management to utilise the non-commissioned rail sidings.
Regulator's response
ONRSR confirms receipt of REPCON report number RR2026-0001, dated 15 January 2026, in relation to the use of non-commissioned rail sidings. ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and the operator’s response.
ONRSR has discussed the REPCON report with the operator at a scheduled stakeholder engagement meeting and is satisfied with the clarification provided by the operator which is aligned with the operator’s response in the REPCON report.
Named party's response
Thank you for your REPCON RR2026-00001 dated 08 January 2026. [Operator] acknowledges the reporter’s concerns and provides the response below.
In providing some additional context to the issue raised, [Operator] has constructed a crossing loop and engineer’s siding at [siding location] to enable a safe increase in capacity on [Operator]’s network. The construction work was completed and the infrastructure assessed as fit for use on [date]. This was communicated to relevant workers through a Safety Notice at that time. At the time of this response [Operator] is still working through a program of work to update its [safe working system] to incorporate the crossing loop into its core revenue service operations.
On [date], [Operator] service [train] experienced issues with a seized bearing on a locomotive. The seized bearing required [train] to operate at significantly reduced speed until it could safety exit the mainline at [Location 5]. The speed restriction introduced significant operational delays onto other services on the network.
In managing the operational delays, the [Position title] [Operator] approved the use of the commissioned crossing loop to turn the train to return to [Location 6]. If not used, the movement would have required the train to be propelled approximately 58 km to the next safe turning location, introducing safety risk (notably [Operator]’s requirement to have a worker proceeding the propelling movement). The movement was safely completed by the Network Controller and Rail Traffic Crew, utilising existing safe working processes.
Following this event and based on feedback from [Operator]’s Network Control team (see below), a Work Instruction for the use of [siding location] crossing loop in emergencies has been developed and was consulted with Network Control on [date]. The Instruction will remain in place until [Operator] has finalised a permanent solution through the [safe working system].
Feedback and issue resolution processes
[Operator] has in place a robust safety, health and environment (SHE) resolution process for workers to raise concerns they may have with a SHE Management System (SMS) process or hazard through their leader, health and safety representatives, or union representatives. On an ongoing basis, [Operator] personnel are also encouraged to provide feedback on [Operator]’s safety management system (SMS) documents, processes and forms at any stage during that process’ lifecycle through the [Operator] SHE management system hub.
REPCON details
| Date reported | 04/01/2026 |
|---|---|
| Published date | 08/05/2026 |
| Affected operation/industry | Vehicle Operations |
| Concern subject type | Operating Procedures |
| Transport mode | Rail |