Collision between passenger train and truck, at Goornong, Victoria, on 13 July 2022

Section 21 (2) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) empowers the ATSB to discontinue an investigation into a transport safety matter at any time. Section  21 (3) of the TSI Act requires the ATSB to publish a statement setting out the reasons for discontinuing an investigation. 

Overview of the investigation

The occurrence

On 13 July 2022 at about 0716 local time, V/Line passenger train 8070 departed Echuca on a scheduled service to Southern Cross Station, Melbourne, via Bendigo in Victoria (Figure 1). The 3-car VLocity DMU was operating on the V/Line regional broad gauge network. On board were the driver, conductor and about 40 passengers. The train was scheduled to arrive at Goornong station at 0808. By rail, Goornong was about 28 km before the stop at Bendigo.

Figure 1: Broad gauge rail route from Echuca to Bendigo

Source: Nearmap, annotated by the Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI)

On the morning of the incident, a farmer whose property was located near Goornong was expecting a truck to collect and transport a load of hay to Mansfield. Arrangements had been made for a truck from a local truck depot to use a gated level crossing which provided a route between the Midland Highway and the unsealed Railway Road on the other side of the railway (Figure 2). This level crossing was referred to as the Holmes Road level crossing, although it was not on Holmes Road, which was further north.  

Figure 2: Holmes Road level crossing and local area

Source: Google maps, annotated by OCI

The Holmes Road level crossing was about 700 m from the farmhouse and hay shed. In preparation for the truck’s arrival, a farm worker attended the crossing. They opened the gates then returned to the farm leaving the level crossing unattended.

Travelling north along the Midland Highway, the truck arrived at the left turn for the side road to the level crossing at about 0804. The truck’s driver had not previously used this crossing. As the truck commenced the turn, train 8070 was approaching from the north on the single bi-direction track and was about 400 m from the crossing. The truck driver recalled monitoring road traffic approaching from behind as they made the turn and did not observe the approaching train at this point. The driver of train 8070 saw the truck turn and travel towards the level crossing.

After turning their truck onto the short, unsealed road which joined the Midland Highway to Railway Road, the truck driver observed that the gates on either side of the crossing were open, and they had clear access across the crossing (Figure 3). The truck driver recalled that they had been told to expect closed gates on their way to the farm and was surprised to find open gates. The truck then proceeded towards and onto the level crossing. Its driver recalled not seeing the train until the last moment before the collision.

Figure 3: View from truck as it approached the Holmes Road level crossing

Source: Still image from the truck’s video camera, annotated by OCI

The train approached the crossing travelling at about 74 km/h which was below the permitted speed of 80 km/h. The train’s event recorder indicated that the train’s horn was sounded when the train was about 230 m from the crossing and again when about 70 m from the crossing. The truck driver did not recall hearing the train horn.

On seeing the truck drive onto the crossing, the train driver made an emergency brake application. This slowed the train to about 63 km/h before the train collided with the side of the truck. It then travelled a further 90 m before coming to a stop (Figure 4). 

Figure 4: The front of train 8070 following impact, looking back towards the crossing

Source: OCI

The collision resulted in significant damage to the front of the train and the derailment of its leading car. Its driver sustained minor injuries. There were no reported injuries to passengers or the conductor.

The truck’s prime mover and trailer were separated and damaged in the collision, and the driver of the truck was seriously injured. 

The Holmes Road level crossing

The level crossing was at the intersection of a 6 m wide unsealed road and a single bi‑directional track, about 50 m from the Midland Highway. The approach to the turn‑off from the highway (as taken by the truck) was equipped with standard road signage identifying the presence of the crossing on the side road ahead.

On the truck’s approach to the crossing (from the east), the truck driver’s view of the approaching train was largely unobstructed although a small number of self-seeded trees restricted some views on the approach. Near the crossing, the view of an approaching train was not impeded (Figure 5).

Figure 5: View from eastern gate towards the approach direction of train 8070 

Source: OCI

Protection at the crossing included railway crossing identification signage, give way signs and a lockable single swing gate on each side of the crossing to restrict access. Railway crossing and give way signage was located between each gate and the track, with some signage on the east side being knocked over in the incident (Figures 6 and 7).

Figure 6: The crossing when approached from the east, with some signage knocked over

Source: OCI

Figure 7: The undamaged crossing signage on the west side of crossing

This image shows the signage between the gate and track on the western side of the crossing, with the closed eastern gate on the other side of the track in the background. Prior to the collision, the same signage was present on the east side, facing the truck as it approached. Source: OCI

The lockable swing gates were installed at the crossing in 2013 and were a frangible design.[1] Frangible gates allow vehicles to push through the gates in the case of an emergency such as bushfire. Signage on the gates indicated train running information should be sought for transferring livestock or heavy machinery. V/Line advised that this instruction was not intended to apply to normal vehicle traffic including trucks.

The installation of lockable gates followed V/Line consultation with the local shire council and community on the potential for closing the crossing. The gated solution was adopted to restrict access following community opposition to proposed crossing closure. The installed gates were in addition to pre-existing passive give way signage.

To manage use of the crossing, licence agreements were established between V/Line and several farmers in the area.[2] Each agreement nominated authorised users which allowed use of the crossing under conditions set out in the agreement. Keys to the gate’s locks were provided to each of the authorised users.

The agreement described that an authorised user was expected to unlock and open each gate, drive their vehicle across the rail line clear of the track, and return to close and lock both gates. V/Line advised that training in the use of the gates was also provided at the time the licence agreements were established.

Frangible gate level crossings at other locations

There were 6 other level crossings on the V/Line network identified as having frangible gate arrangements. Two of these were located on the Ballarat to Ararat rail line and 4 were located on the Ballarat to Maryborough line. Their local environment, infrastructure configuration and usage arrangements varied.  

Restricted-access crossings

The V/Line regional network contained about 450 level crossings which had some form of restricted access or private usage. A large subset of these crossings were occupation crossings which provided access between 2 parcels of land.[3] The Holmes Road level crossing was not an occupation crossing. However, its restricted access and user arrangements placed it within this broad group of restricted-access crossings. 

Summary of observations 

The review of evidence identified that:

• Lockable gates were added to the Holmes Road level crossing in 2013 to restrict its usage. The gates supplemented pre-existing passive level crossing signage.
• On the day of the collision, the gates at the Holmes Road level crossing were opened in preparation for the arrival of a truck. The crossing was then left unattended.
• The truck subsequently entered the level crossing into the path of train 8070. The driver of the truck did not see the train and was possibly distracted by their lack of familiarity with the gated arrangement and surprise at finding the gates open.
• The train was observable from the truck during its turn from the Midland Highway and nearer the crossing. Self-seeded trees restricted the view to the track on part of the truck’s approach.
• The V/Line network had about 450 restricted-access crossings including occupation crossings and other private crossings.  

Safety actions taken since the event

Following the collision at the Holmes Road level crossing, several safety actions associated with frangible gate crossings have been taken by V/Line. The Holmes Road level crossing has been permanently closed, and a V/Line review identified that 4 of the 6 other frangible gate crossings should be considered for closure. One of these 4 has subsequently received funding to progress its closure.

V/Line has also developed a new level crossing management strategy and associated plan to enhance level crossing safety across regional Victoria.[4] The strategy contains 11 objectives across 3 strategic themes, with several objectives relevant to safety at restricted-access crossings. The plan identifies the further inspection and review of all occupation and private crossings over a 5-year period. The plan also describes the potential use of new technologies for warning systems at such crossings and identifying opportunities for crossing closures.

Reasons for the discontinuation

Based on a review of investigation evidence and the subsequent safety actions taken by V/Line, further investigation is unlikely to yield additional important safety lessons. Consequently, the ATSB has discontinued this investigation. 

The evidence collected during this investigation remains available to be used in future investigations or safety studies. The ATSB will also monitor for any similar occurrences that may indicate a need to undertake a further safety investigation.