Engine failure and ditching involving Bell 206L-3, VH-LMW, 6.5 km west of Horn Island Airport, Queensland, on 6 January 2026

This preliminary report details factual information established in the investigation’s early evidence collection phase and has been prepared to provide timely information to the industry and public. Preliminary reports contain no analysis or findings, which will be detailed in the investigation’s final report. The information contained in this preliminary report is released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. 

The occurrence

On 6 January 2026, at about 1406 local time, a Bell B206L-3 helicopter, registered VH‑LMW and operated by Fortescue Helicopters, was returning to Horn Island (Ngurupai) from Sadie’s Beach Helipad, Thursday Island (Waiben), Queensland, after transporting 2 passengers between the outer Torres Strait Islands.

VH-LMW operations that day included 11 sectors, beginning from Horn Island Airport before embarking passengers at Thursday Island at about 0800. Following the departure from Thursday Island, the helicopter tracked and landed briefly at Tudu Island, Coconut Island (Poruma), Daua Island, Murray Island (Mer), Stephen Island (Ugar), Dalrymple Islet, Yorke Island (Masig), Coconut Island and Sue Island (Warraber), before returning the passengers to Thursday Island at about 1400 (Figure 1). The helicopter had completed about 3.2 hours of flying that day prior to the accident flight.

Figure 1: VH-LMW flight track

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

On each of the 2 stops at Coconut Island, about 130 km north-east of Thursday Island, the helicopter was refuelled from a company intermediate bulk container (IBC). The pilot reported that after disembarking the passengers at Sadie’s Beach Helipad, Thursday Island (Figure 2), before the re-positioning flight to Horn Island, about 200 lb (114 L) of fuel remained on board.

Figure 2: Location of Sadie’s Beach, Thursday Island 

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

Following a normal take-off, at about 300 ft over the water, the pilot reported the helicopter made several sudden and  violent yawing[1] movements of about 60° to each side, accompanied by a reduction in both engine RPM and rotor RPM. An immediate scan of the engine gauges indicated that the torque gauge was fluctuating between 10‍–‍90%. The pilot partially reduced the collective[2] to recover rotor RPM, estimating they had lost about 5‍–‍6% rotor RPM at this time, however it continued to decay until the low rotor RPM warning light illuminated. 

The pilot initiated an autorotation[3] and activated the pop-out floats at about 100 ft above the water. The pilot reported that the engine had stopped before the aircraft landed on the water. 

After landing on the water, the helicopter remained afloat and upright for about 15 seconds, during which time the pilot transmitted a MAYDAY call. They recalled the helicopter then rolled about 120 degrees onto the right side. Images of the inverted helicopter showed the rear right float had detached from the skid tube and the front right float had also partially detached. The pilot reported that the float had pushed against their door which prevented egress from their nearest exit, requiring the pilot to egress through the front left (passenger) door. They then swam away from the helicopter before inflating their lifejacket. The helicopter continued to roll in the water until it became inverted. 

A private boat nearby, followed by a police boat, arrived within about 5 minutes to rescue the pilot. 

Context

Pilot information 

The pilot held a Commercial Pilot Licence (Helicopter) single-engine class, with a low‑level rating. At the time of the occurrence, the pilot’s total flying experience was 1,144 hours with about 300 hours on the Bell 206. The pilot’s last flight review was a proficiency check on 30 October 2025, valid for 2 years.

The pilot completed helicopter underwater escape training (HUET) on 25 September 2025 and held a Class 1 medical certificate valid until 14 January 2026. They had been employed by the operator since September 2025.

Aircraft information

VH-LMW was a Bell 206L-3, single-engine turbine powered helicopter, serial number 51120, constructed in the United States in 1984. A Rolls-Royce Allison 250-C30P engine was fitted to the helicopter and was registered to Fortescue Helicopters Pty Ltd, on 19 April 2023. VH‑LMW was fitted with emergency pop‑out floats for short‑term stability in the event of a ditching.

Meteorological information

Meteorological information recorded at Horn Island Airport at 1400 indicated:

• wind 340° at 07 kt
• visibility greater than 10 KM
• cloud scattered[4] at 1,100 ft above the airport
• temperature 27°/ and dew point of 25°
• QNH[5] 1006
• recent rain showers.

Operational information 

The operator was contracted to transport employees of an organisation that regularly conducted inspections on islands throughout the Torres Strait. 

The previous day, VH-LMW had flown 2.3 hours conducting similar inspections on islands in the north of the Torres Strait. Prior to that the helicopter had not been flown since 22 December 2025 when it had returned from Atherton, Queensland, following scheduled maintenance. 

Wreckage and post-impact information

The helicopter ditched shortly after take-off from Sadie’s Beach Helipad, about 6.5 km from Horn Island Airport. Following the pilot’s rescue, the police and pilot anchored the helicopter to prevent it drifting in the current while the operator was making recovery arrangements.

The operator subsequently arranged recovery of the helicopter and commissioned an independent engineering report. The results of the engineering report were not available to the ATSB at the time of writing.

Fuel 

The pilot’s flight plan showed the intended fuel for departure at the commencement of their day from Horn Island Airport was 800 lb (363 L).

The helicopter used Jet A-1 fuel that was stored in static tanks on Horn Island and an intermediate bulk container (IBC) on Coconut Island which was supplied via Horn Island as part of a broader distribution network. The pilot reported the IBC had been refilled in early December 2025. 

Fuel quality and contamination 

Free water[6], if present in aviation fuel, can result in filter blockages and, in more severe cases, engine failure through fuel starvation. In tropical climates, it can also create conditions that support algal growth in fuel tanks, which can degrade fuel quality and further contribute to filter obstruction. Water contamination is commonly checked in fuel using a water detecting tablet or paste which indicates the presence and level of water. 

Microorganisms that can be found in aviation turbine fuel can include bacteria, yeasts and fungi. As these organisms develop, they form solid residues that can block and damage fuel filters. Some microorganisms also generate acids that can accelerate corrosion of metal components. Because most microbial growth depends on the presence of free water, this kind of contamination is most commonly found anywhere fuel meets water, particularly in high humidity environments.

The CASA advisory circular AC 91-25 v1.2 Fuel and oil safety stated that:

Fuelling in remote locations exposes operators to increased risk in various areas, such as:

• multi-transfer fuelling cycles, 
• contamination of fuelling equipment whilst in transit and during aircraft arrival
• miscellaneous fuelling equipment causing contamination issues. 

At the completion of the scheduled maintenance in December 2025, the pilot reported they had a discussion with the maintenance provider about algal growth which the pilot had identified in the helicopter’s fuel tanks. The pilot subsequently began an algal preventative treatment for VH-LMW. That involved adding an algal preventative to the full fuel tank while the helicopter remained on the ground between 22 December and 5 January.

Operator refuelling process

The operator’s procedure for drum stock refuelling required that fuel be sourced from approved drums and subjected to a series of quality checks prior to use. The procedure detailed that:

Drum stocks of fuel should be:

• Stored under cover;
• Stored with minimal ground contact (using wooden slats or equivalent);
• Stored horizontally with bungs at the 3 and 9 o'clock position, or stored vertically with drum tops covers in place;
• Refueling pumps must be fitted with a Go/No-Go filter;
• Drum seals are checked that they are tight and not broken prior to use;
• Drum-stock fuel is to be consumed within the specified Aviation Release Note certification date - Check the release note for the fuel to confirm it is from an approved source and within date;
• Before fuelling an aircraft, a small amount of fuel is to be pumped into a container to be visually checked for colour, clarity and freedom from dirt and/or visible water;
• Prior to opening the drum stand the drum upright and leave for a minimum of 30 minutes for AVGAS and one hour for JET A1 (or as long as practical);
• Before commencing fuelling operation’s, the following earthing procedures should be carried out prior to opening the fuel cap: a. Drum to ground; b. Aircraft to ground; c. Nozzle to aircraft (disconnect by reversing this procedure);
• Check fuel pump and associated equipment for contamination – should the pump not be fitted with an aviation grade filter the fuel should be checked for contamination using water detector capsules, or an approved equivalent;
• Full or partly used drums should be stored when not under cover by tilting the drum so that the bungs are clear of any pooled water, or by laying the drum on its side.

The pilot reported they had taken a fuel sample from VH-LMW prior to their departure from Horn Island that morning and reported that the fuel drain looked normal. Prior to refuelling VH-LMW from the IBC at Coconut Island, the pilot had also reported they took 2 fuel samples from the IBC, an initial large sample that, in their experience, often contained contaminants, followed by a second smaller sample which they used to assess the quality of the fuel before refuelling the helicopter. They also stated they were conscious that the presence of water within the IBC was possible and therefore did not place the fuel hose toward the bottom of the IBC where water was likely to settle.

A Go-No-Go absorptive cartridge (filter) can be fitted to a fuel pumping device to absorb water from the fuel and remove any solids. 

The pilot reported that during their time with the operator they had not used a filter when refuelling from an IBC. However, they had previously used filters during their employment with other operators within the Torres Strait. The pilot reported they were unaware the operator had a filter and were advised after the occurrence the filter was stored at the company‑owned pilot accommodation on Thursday Island. 

Survival aspects 

The pilot conducted an autorotation and ditched the helicopter which remained stable for a brief time before rolling onto its right side. The pilot, who had completed helicopter underwater escape training (HUET), was able to egress and swim clear of the helicopter. However, the effectiveness of the emergency pop-out flotation system was limited. Images of the helicopter after impact showed the right rear float detached from the skid tube and the right front float displaced and the pilot reported the float obstructed their door and required an egress via the front left door. This may have impeded egress in a multi-occupant scenario or for occupants who had not completed HUET training.

HUET involves a replica of a helicopter cabin and fuselage being lowered into a swimming pool to simulate the ditching of a helicopter. The cabin can rotate upside down and focuses participants on bracing for impact, identifying primary and secondary exit points, opening an exit, releasing harness, egressing the wreckage and surfacing. HUET is normally part of a program of graduated training that builds in complexity, with occupants utilising different seating locations, exits and visibility. This training is conducted in a controlled environment with safety divers in the water.

The pilot recalled that HUET assisted them to quickly determine their primary exit was blocked by the float and identified the front left door as a secondary exit and successfully egressed the overturned and partially submerged helicopter. 

Further investigation

To date, the ATSB has:

• collected records from the aircraft operator and Civil Aviation Safety Authority
• collected fuel source records and quality control documentation
• collected recorded data
• interviewed the pilot, passengers and operator.

The investigation is continuing and will include:

• further interviews relating to fuel quality monitoring
• analysis of the survivability of the accident post-water impact
• analysis of the independent engineering investigation report
• review of operator’s fuel management process for mobile storage facilities and quality control
• review of pilot induction training and procedures.

A final report will be released at the conclusion of the investigation. Should a critical safety issue be identified during the course of the investigation, the ATSB will immediately notify relevant parties so appropriate and timely safety action can be taken. 

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