Close proximity to an aircraft on a taxiway during approach involving Pilatus PC-12, VH-NWI, Launceston Airport, Tasmania, on 13 June 2025

Investigation summary

What happened

On the afternoon of 13 June 2025, a Pilatus PC‑12, registered VH‑NWI and operated by Armada Aviation, was being used to conduct a charter air transport flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria, to Launceston Airport, Tasmania. On board were a pilot and 4 passengers.

During the approach to Launceston, the aircraft deviated left from the final approach course and intercepted the extended centreline of the adjacent taxiway. The aircraft then continued towards the taxiway where a Cessna 152 (C152) was holding for departure. Approaching the taxiway, the pilot conducted a low-level right then left turn to realign with the runway, before commencing a missed approach. During the manoeuvre the aircraft passed in close proximity to the C152. Following the missed approach, the aircraft conducted a visual circuit and landed without further incident.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB found that the final approach was conducted in clear conditions almost directly into the sun, exposing the pilot to glare. Subsequently, the pilot misidentified the taxiway as the runway and aligned the aircraft with the taxiway's extended centreline. The pilot then corrected the aircraft's flight path at a low level rather than conducting an immediate missed approach. During the manoeuvre the aircraft passed in close proximity to an aircraft on the taxiway.

It was also found that after identifying that the approaching aircraft was aligned with the taxiway, the instructor on board the aircraft on the taxiway made a radio broadcast, likely alerting both the pilot and air traffic control to the situation.

What has been done as a result

Armada Aviation circulated a notice to its aircrew advising them of hazards associated with a visual approach, such as sun glare. Additionally, it made the following changes to its operating procedures:

• Updated the final decision to proceed to landing to include a requirement that the runway was confirmed and clear by 400 ft above ground level, or the approach minima.
• Added a top of descent safety briefing to ensure pilots brief other risks associated with the visual approach segment following an instrument approach, including lighting configuration and sun position.
• Updated the checklist of the final phase of flight to include checking that the runway was confirmed and clear.

Safety message

Sun glare can reduce a pilot’s visual effectiveness even when meteorological visibility is good. When flying visually in such conditions, pilots should crosscheck against available flight and navigation instruments in conjunction with external indicators, such as airport lighting, to verify that the aircraft is on the intended flight path.

If a discrepancy is identified below an appropriate stabilised approach height, an immediate missed approach should be conducted. Low-level manoeuvring outside of the published approach and associated obstacle clearance increases the risk of collision with terrain or objects on the ground.

The investigation

The occurrence

On 13 June 2025, a Pilatus PC-12, registered VH‑NWI and operated by Armada Aviation, was being used to conduct a charter air transport flight from Essendon Airport, Victoria, to Launceston Airport, Tasmania (Figure 1). On board were a pilot and 4 passengers.

Figure 1: Occurrence flight

Source: Google Earth annotated by the ATSB

At 1511 local time, the aircraft commenced the instrument approach procedure for runway 32L[1] at Launceston. The weather at the time was predominately clear skies with few[2] clouds at 3,000 ft, variable wind up to 5 kt and visibility greater than 10 km.

At approximately the same time, the occupants (instructor and student) of a Cessna 152 (C152) on the ground at Launceston contacted air traffic control (ATC) to request taxi clearance for departure on a training flight. Due to the closure of a section of the taxiway (see Figure 4 and the section titled Construction works), the C152 was required to backtrack the runway and vacate onto taxiway A at the runway 32L threshold. The aircraft then turned 180° on the taxiway and stopped with the nose of the aircraft at holding point A. At 1515, the C152 reported to ATC that they had completed the taxi and were clear of the runway.

By this time VH‑NWI was established on the final segment of the approach, approximately 7 NM (13 km) from the runway. Shortly thereafter, ATC cleared the aircraft to land, later reporting that at this time they observed the aircraft established on the final approach. The pilot reported that throughout the final approach, they were looking into the sun and consequently they ‘couldn’t really see much at all’. 

ATC reported again sighting the aircraft when it was approximately 4 NM (7 km) from the runway. At this point the aircraft was approximately 1,340 ft above ground level (AGL) and still aligned with the final approach course (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Final approach flight path

Recorded altitude resolution ± 12.5 ft, over underlying terrain elevation, rounded to nearest 5 ft. Source: ADS-B flight data overlaid on Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

The pilot advised that, during the approach, they used the autopilot to manage the aircraft’s flight path until approximately 1,000 ft AGL. At this point they disconnected the autopilot and transitioned to looking outside. The pilot recalled that they were still looking into the sun and only seeing one feature on the ground that stood out. Identifying it as the runway, they began visually flying the aircraft towards it. Recorded flight data showed that at approximately 750 ft AGL, the aircraft began to deviate left until it intercepted the extended centreline of taxiway A. From this position the aircraft continued to descend towards the taxiway. At 1519, when the aircraft was approximately 120 ft AGL, weather cameras at the airport recorded images showing both the aircraft on final and the C152 at the holding point (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Weather camera images at 1519

Combination of 2 images: Left image camera bearing 135° (SE) at 1519:04, right image camera bearing 225° (SW) at 1519:02. Source: Bureau of Meteorology, annotated by the ATSB

The instructor on board the C152 recalled that upon looking for the approaching aircraft, they saw that it was lined up with the taxiway. At 1519:12, they made a radio broadcast on the Launceston Tower frequency advising ‘He’s landing on the taxiway’. Following the call, VH-NWI passed above and behind them. It then reappeared on their left side, after conducting a right, then left, turn to align with the runway.

A review of flight data showed that VH-NWI continued to descend as it tracked the taxiway extended centreline until 1519:16, at which point it commenced a right turn (Figure 4). During the turn, the aircraft passed over the taxiway at a height of approximately 45 ft AGL, 15 m behind holding point A, at which the C152 was positioned. Subsequently, the aircraft descended further as it flew over the grassed area between the taxiway and the runway before turning left to align with the runway centreline. During the realignment manoeuvre, the aircraft descended to approximately 15 ft AGL. 

Figure 4: Low-level manoeuvre and missed approach

Recorded altitude resolution ± 12.5 ft, over underlying terrain elevation, rounded to nearest 5 ft. Source: ADS-B flight data overlaid on Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

The pilot recalled that when not far from the runway environment they became aware that they were approaching the taxiway and in response turned the aircraft towards the runway. They further reported that they were not aware of the C152 at the holding point. While they recalled hearing a radio broadcast as they were moving towards the runway, they did not know who had made it. 

ATC reported that upon hearing the broadcast from the C152 they observed VH-NWI on short final lined up with taxiway A, after which it immediately made a right turn to align with the runway. At 1519:22 they instructed the pilot to go around.[3] The pilot later reported that they heard the instruction from ATC, by which time they had decided to initiate a missed approach. Flight data recorded that the aircraft commencing a climb away from the runway at 1519:31. Following the missed approach, the pilot conducted a visual circuit and the aircraft landed without further incident. Subsequently, the C152 departed.

Context

Pilot

The pilot held an air transport pilot licence (aeroplane) issued in 2013 and a class 1 aviation medical certificate. They had accumulated 4,251 flight hours, of which 659 hours were operating the Pilatus PC‑12. In the previous 90 days, the pilot had accumulated 26 hours, all in the PC‑12. They completed an instrument proficiency check in January 2025.

The pilot reported that they had flown into Launceston Airport a number of times previously, both during the day and at night. They did not recall any prior occasion where sun glare had been an issue during final approach.

Aircraft

VH-NWI was a Pilatus PC‑12, powered by a Pratt & Whitney PT6A‑67B turbine engine driving a 4‑bladed, variable pitch Hartzell propeller. The aircraft was manufactured in 1995 and first registered in Australia in 2002. It was subsequently registered with the operator in 2014.

At the time of the incident, the aircraft had accumulated 8,674 hours total time in service. The aircraft was being maintained in accordance with the operator’s system of maintenance and the PC‑12 maintenance manual. The last periodic inspection was conducted in April 2025, and the maintenance release showed no outstanding items.

Launceston Airport

Runway environment

Launceston Airport had a single grooved asphalt runway 14R/32L (Figure 5). The runway was 45 m wide and approximately 2 km long with a runway heading of 313°. The airport had previously operated a parallel grass runway 14L/32R which had been decommissioned however, the remaining runway had not been renamed to remove the left / right designation. The En Route Supplement Australia (ERSA) provided information on Launceston Airport and identified the single operational runway and the decommissioned runway.

Access to the ends of the runway was via taxiway A located on the western side. The taxiway was 23 m wide and ran the length of the runway. The taxiway surface was a lighter colour compared to that of the asphalt runway.

Figure 5: Launceston Airport runway environment and lighting

Source: Google Earth, annotated by the ATSB

Aerodrome and approach lighting

Launceston Airport was equipped with runway edge lighting, approach lighting, taxiway lighting and precision approach path indicator (PAPI)[4] systems. Approach lighting was installed leading to runway 32L with a PAPI on both sides of the runway. Runway 14R had no approach lighting, and a single PAPI on the left of the runway. When activated, the intensity level of each lighting component could be set between 1‍–‍6, with 1 being the lowest intensity, and 6 being the highest. During tower hours, this setting was controlled by ATC via a panel in the control tower. Outside tower hours the settings were preset.

On the day of the occurrence, all aerodrome lighting was initially inactive. At 1331 local time, the PAPIs for both runway 14R and 32L were activated at an intensity setting of 5. At 1506, 13 minutes prior to the occurrence, the runway edge lighting, taxiway lighting and the approach lighting for runway 32L were activated with an intensity setting of 4. At the same time, the intensity of the PAPIs was reduced to 4. Airservices advised that this intensity setting was selected due to decreasing ambient light associated with winter conditions at that time of day.

The pilot could not recall whether the airport lighting was on during the first approach. During the second approach and landing, they recalled that the lighting was on and thought that it looked dim and was difficult to see.

Construction works

At the time of the incident construction works were being conducted in the area adjacent to the southern apron. These works required the closure of taxiway A between taxiway B and taxiway E (Figure 6). Barriers, unserviceability markers and lighting was deployed at the ends of the closed section of taxiway to prevent access. The presence of works and the taxiway closure were advised both via NOTAM[5] and the airport’s automatic terminal information service (ATIS).[6] The pilot reported being aware that the taxiway was closed.

Figure 6: Airport construction works

Source: Google Earth, inset supplied, annotated by the ATSB

Sun effect during the approach

Sun position

At 1517, the time that the aircraft began to deviate from the final approach course, the sun was positioned 10° to the left of the runway heading and 12° above the horizon. 

Glare

Glare occurs when unwanted light enters the eye. Direct glare comes directly from a light source whereas veiling glare occurs when light is reflected from crazing[7] or dirt on the windscreen. The ATSB research report Limitations of the See-and-Avoid principle examined the effect of glare on pilots stating:

It has been claimed that glare which is half as intense as the general illumination can produce a 42 per cent reduction in visual effectiveness when it is 40 degrees from the line of sight.

When the glare source is 5 degrees from the line of sight, visual effectiveness is reduced by 84 per cent (Hawkins 1987). In general, older pilots will be more sensitive to glare.

Direct glare from the sun and veiling glare reflected from windscreens can effectively mask some areas of the view.

The pilot reported that the aircraft was equipped with a tinted sun visor. They had placed this between their eyes and the sun during the approach however this did not sufficiently reduce the direct glare. Consequently, they reported that for most of the final approach, when not required for power adjustments, they held their right hand in front of their face to block the sun.

They further reported that the windscreen was not crazed or dirty and that the aircraft had been recently washed. They were wearing reading correction glasses which did not provide glare protection and were not wearing any headwear that could be used to shield the sun. 

Stabilised approach criteria

The operator’s procedures defined criteria for stabilised approaches. If an approach was not stable below 300 ft above aerodrome elevation, an immediate missed approach was required to be conducted. These criteria included that:

From 500 ft AGL on the descent, the aircraft shall be:

 - on the correct flight path with only small changes in heading and pitch required to maintain the correct flight path

 - the indicated airspeed is not more than Vref [landing reference speed] (-0/+ 10 kts)

 - the aircraft is in an acceptable landing configuration

 - sink rate is no greater than 600 fpm [feet per minute]; if an approach requires a sink rate greater than 1000 fpm, a special briefing should be conducted

 - power setting is appropriate for the aircraft configuration and is not below the minimum power for approach as defined by the aircraft operating manual

 - all briefings and checklists have been completed.

Safety analysis

The pilot conducted the final approach segment in clear conditions with the sun low in the sky and 10° to the left of runway heading. This exposed them to direct sun glare during the approach. To reduce the effect of the glare they used the aircraft’s visor and their right hand to block the sun. However, some glare remained, and their raised hand likely impacted their view of the runway and associated lighting. Consequently, the pilot misidentified the taxiway as the runway and aligned the aircraft with the taxiway centreline.

During the subsequent segment of the approach, the aircraft’s navigation instruments were likely indicating that the aircraft was to the left of the intended flight path. However, the pilot was looking outside during this time and therefore did not detect the deviation. Furthermore, they did not observe the C152 positioned on the taxiway, likely due to the continued reduced visibility throughout the approach.

The instructor on board the C152 broadcast over the radio after identifying that the approaching aircraft was aligned with the taxiway. Shortly after this broadcast, the aircraft commenced a turn towards the runway. While continuation to landing on the taxiway would likely have resulted in the aircraft passing over the C152, it would probably have resulted in a collision with obstacles associated with the airport’s construction works. As the aircraft commenced its turn toward the runway after the broadcast was made, it is likely that the broadcast contributed to the pilot’s recognition of the situation. However, they advised that they remained unaware that there was an aircraft on the taxiway.  

During the manoeuvre, the aircraft passed behind and in close proximity to the C152. Conducting such a manoeuvre carried a risk of collision with both the C152 and other objects on the ground. Moreover, this manoeuvre was not in accordance with the operator’s stabilised approach criteria where only small heading changes were permitted below 500 ft above ground level (AGL). Upon recognising that the aircraft was not on the intended flight path, an immediate missed approach was required to be conducted. The broadcast from the C152 instructor also alerted air traffic control (ATC) to the situation, prompting them to instruct the pilot to discontinue the landing.

Consideration was given to whether the designation of the landing runway at Launceston Airport as the left runway may have led the pilot to misidentify the taxiway as the left of 2 parallel runways. However, this was not reported by the pilot. Furthermore, they had prior experience operating at the airport and were therefore familiar with the runway layout.

Findings

From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the passing in close proximity to an aircraft on a taxiway during approach involving a Pilatus PC‑12, VH‑NWI, Launceston Airport, Tasmania, on 13 June 2025. 

Contributing factors

• The final approach was conducted in clear conditions almost directly into the sun, exposing the pilot to glare. Subsequently, the pilot misidentified the taxiway as the runway and aligned the aircraft with the taxiway's extended centreline.
• The pilot corrected the aircraft's flight path at a low level rather than immediately conducting a missed approach. During the manoeuvre, the aircraft passed in close proximity to an aircraft on the taxiway.

Other findings

• After identifying that the approaching aircraft was aligned with the taxiway, the instructor on board the aircraft on the taxiway made a radio broadcast, likely alerting both the pilot and air traffic control to the situation.

Safety actions

Safety action by Armada Aviation

Armada Aviation circulated a notice to its aircrew advising them of hazards associated with a visual approach, such as sun glare. Additionally, it made the following changes to its operating procedures:

• Updated the final decision to proceed to landing to include a requirement that the runway was confirmed and clear by 400 ft above ground level, or the approach minima.
• Added a top of descent safety briefing to ensure pilots brief other risks associated with the visual approach segment following an instrument approach, including lighting configuration and sun position.
• Updated the checklist of the final phase of flight to include checking that the runway was confirmed and clear.

Sources and submissions

Sources of information

The sources of information during the investigation included:

• the pilot and operator
• the pilot and operator of the aircraft on the taxiway
• Bureau of Meteorology
• Launceston Airport
• Airservices Australia
• recorded data from the electronic flight bag (EFB) on the aircraft. 

References

Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) (2004). Limitations of the see-and-avoid principle, /sites/default/files/media/4050593/see_and_avoid_report_print.pdf, ATSB, accessed 13 June 2025

Hawkins, F.H. (1987). Human Factors in Flight, Gower, Aldershot.

Submissions

Under section 26 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, the ATSB may provide a draft report, on a confidential basis, to any person whom the ATSB considers appropriate. That section allows a person receiving a draft report to make submissions to the ATSB about the draft report. 

A draft of this report was provided to the following directly involved parties:

• the pilot and operator
• the pilot and operator of the aircraft on the taxiway
• Launceston Airport
• Airservices Australia
• Civil Aviation safety Authority.

Submissions were received from:

• the operator.

The submission was reviewed and, where considered appropriate, the text of the report was amended accordingly.

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