Collision between River Embley and the FV Bronze Wing

Summary

The Australian bulk carrier River Embley sailed from Gladstone on the afternoon of 8 July 1996 on its regular voyage to Weipa to load bauxite. By 0100 on 10 July, River Embley was approaching Little Fitzroy Light at a speed of 16 knots. At about 0115, three vessels were seen northwest of Little Fitzroy Light, on River Embley's port bow, the closest and the only one liable to pass close to River Embley was at a distance of 8 miles. At about 0119, River Embley altered course from 344 to 320 on the track to Low Isles.

At about 2330 on the night of 9 July 1996, the fishing vessel 'Bronze Wing' sailed from Cairns for Gibson Reef, about 46 miles south-south- east of Cairns, to collect aquarium fish. The vessel cleared Cairns fairway channel and set course for Cape Grafton. From a position about a mile off Cape Grafton and making good a speed of between 6 knots and 7 knots, the vessel was to follow a predetermined track to a position between 1 mile and 1.6 miles off Little Fitzroy Lighthouse. At about 0119, the Deckhand on watch on board Bronze Wing saw a large vessel on the starboard bow at 6 miles on the radar and confirmed the ship's location by a visual sighting.

The two vessels collided at about 0134, with the starboard bow of the fishing vessel coming into contact with the starboard side of River Embley's hull, forward of mid length. Bronze Wing suffered significant damage, but River Embley's paint work was only superficially scratched. Nobody suffered any significant injury and no pollution resulted.

After the collision the two vessels contacted each other by VHF Radio. When it was determined that Bronze Wing did not require assistance and would return to Cairns under her own power, River Embley resumed course for Weipa.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning liability or blame to any particular individual or organisation. The following factors are considered to have contributed to the collision between Bronze Wing and River Embley.

1. The probability is that Bronze Wing initially crossed the bow of River Embley from port to starboard and subsequently, shortly before the collision, altered course towards the approaching vessel to become a crossing vessel on River Embley's starboard side.
2. The Deckhand on watch on Bronze Wing did not have the experience to assess the developing situation and to take action to avoid collision, nor was he qualified to do so.
3. The Deckhand on Bronze Wing had an insufficient knowledge of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea.
4. The Deckhand on Bronze Wing was not proficient in the use of radar or techniques to determine whether risk of collision existed.
5. The lookout kept on board Bronze Wing was not effective.

6. Bronze Wing was manned in accordance with the provisions of the Uniform Shipping Laws Code, however this standard does not allow a qualified person to be in charge of a navigation watch at all times on planned extended voyages.

   Although the Second Mate on River Embley was placed in an extremely difficult situation by the fishing vessel altering to a collision course so close to the bulk carrier, the following factors also contributed to the collision:

7. The Second Mate on River Embley made assumptions regarding the nature of Bronze Wing's operation based on scanty information and an inaccurate perception of the situation, during a time when other duties may have led to a degree of distraction.
8. The Second Mate's experience of the typical actions of fishing vessels operating in the relatively confined waters of the Great Barrier Reef reduced his sensitivity to the risk of collision.
9. The absence of the Rating from River Embley's bridge between about 0130 and 0134 resulted in the bridge manning being insufficient to manage normal contingencies and the Second Mate alone could not respond to the developing situation, as he was unable to both sound and flash the appropriate warning signals and alter course at the same time in an attempt to avoid collision.
10. In the circumstances immediately before the collision, the Second Mate's only option was to turn to port, away from Bronze Wing.