Grounding of the Australian flag bulk carrier Iron Spencer

Summary

The Australian bulk carrier Iron Spencer anchored off Port Hedland at 0736 on 27 November 1998, about 2 miles SSW of Minilya Bank. At 1246 on 3 December, the anchor was weighed, and the Master started to manoeuvre the ship to the pilot boarding ground. The wind was easterly, force 6 to 7 and there was a tide setting north-westerly at about one knot.

The ship was turning to port under full rudder when Port Control called Iron Spencer asking the Master, amongst other things, to hold the ship in its present position. Since the anchor was aweigh the Master was unable to hold Iron Spencer's position in the strong wind and the prevailing tide. The turn to port continued.

At about 1312 the Master ordered full ahead manoeuvring revolutions. A few minutes later he ordered that the rudder be put amidships to allow the engine revolutions to pass through the critical range and, subsequently, to allow the pilot helicopter to lift off.

Shortly after this the rudder was put hard to port. At about 1322, with the Pilot still on the main deck, the speed on the doppler log was seen to drop from 10 knots to about 1.8 knots. A crew member on the poop saw mud and sand discolour the water. The Master contacted the engine room saying that the ship might have touched bottom, but the Chief Engineer replied that all temperatures and pressures and other machinery parameters were normal.

After the Pilot arrived on the bridge, the Master retained the con for some minutes before relinquishing the conduct of the navigation to the Pilot. The Master and Pilot completed the pre-berthing declaration and checklist and the ship proceeded to its berth.

When manoeuvring to the berth, the Chief Engineer detected unusual vibration for certain rudder movements. Suspecting there may have been some bottom contact off Minilya Bank, the Master arranged for divers to undertake an inspection of the ship's bottom. Loading of Iron Spencer was delayed until this was completed.

The divers reported that there was evidence that the ship had made contact with the seabed. Further investigation showed that the rudder was working normally.

Nobody was injured as a result of the contact and no pollution resulted.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular individual or organisation.

Based on the evidence available, the following factors are considered to have contributed to the incident:

1. The Master did not follow the directions given to the vessel at 1128 by the tower at Port Hedland.
2. The Master weighed anchor and got under way to head for the pilot boarding ground without obtaining clearance from the tower.
3. Although a passage plan was stated to have been available, it was not used by any of the ship's staff.
4. Ship's staff did not comply with Company standing orders and Master's standing orders in that positions were not plotted with the frequency required for these waters.
5. There was no effective appraisal for the change in plan at about 1257 when the Master altered course, while Iron Spencer was swinging to starboard, and brought the vessel around to port.
6. Lack of bridge resource management principles contributed to the grounding.
7. The Master did not take the opportunity to call the tower and seek clarification of the instructions.
8. The Master did not query the message from the tower stated to have been transmitted at 1305, neither did he inform the tower that it was not possible to maintain the ship's position.
9. Whatever the message from the tower, the bridge team did not understand that the helicopter with the marine pilot on board was about to land.
10. The helicopter landed before receiving confirmation that the vessel was prepared and that the landing party were standing by.
11. Once the helicopter had landed on board, the Master maintained course in accordance with guidelines in the Australian Code of Safe Practice on Ship-Helicopter Transfers.
12. It is likely that maintaining the course and delaying the turn to port, was the final link in a series of factors that resulted in the vessel making contact with Minilya Bank.
13. Advice in the Port Information booklet on radio procedures between ship and helicopter and the actual procedures in force at the time of the incident are inconsistent and liable to create confusion.