Grounding of the bulk carrier Dakshineshwar

Summary

On 12 July 1997, the Indian flag bulk carrier Dakshineshwar was on a loaded, northbound passage through the inner route of the Great Barrier Reef, from Hay Point to the east coast of India with a cargo of coal. A licensed Reef Pilot was in charge of the navigation.

At about 2100, the vessel passed between Alert Patches and OG Rock at the eastern end of the Prince of Wales Channel, Torres Strait, and settled on a course of about 270. The ship's speed over the previous hour had been 12 knots.

At about 2111, the vessel was abeam of Ince Point and the Pilot saw that the Global Positioning System display showed a speed of 10.5 knots. About three minutes later the Pilot, who had moved to the port bridge wing, heard an alarm or some alerting device ringing on the bridge, and he went to investigate. As he got close to the centre line, he glanced at the helm indicator and engine room tachometer. The helm indicator showed that full starboard rudder had been applied and the tachometer showed zero revolutions. The ship's head had been paying off to port and the rate of turn increased rapidly as the ship closed with Wednesday Island to the western side of Ince Point.

The ship's speed had slowed to about 6.5 knots when the engine was restarted. The Pilot had to make a quick decision and decided to maintain full starboard rudder and ordered emergency full ahead revolutions to maximise the rate of turn to starboard. The ship reached a heading of 172, before starting to turn to starboard. At about 2120, Dakshineshwar grounded in position 10 30.4 degrees South 142 17.9 degrees East, with Ince Point Light bearing 100 x 0.85 of a mile.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. The following factors are considered to have contributed to the grounding:

1. The engine failure which occurred sometime after 2100.
2. Too rapid shut-down of the freshwater generator.
3. The practice of manually adjusting the set point on the jacket cooling water temperature controller.
4. The lack of understanding and knowledge of the proper operation of automated systems and specifically the engine temperature control system by all the engineers.
5. The lack of sufficiently experienced engineers in the engine room while preparing for stand-by.
6. Poor or deficient operational procedures in the MCR.
7. Deficient communications between the bridge and engine room and the failure to use the most basic communication system, the bridge telegraph. It is further considered that.
8. The Pilot had to make an immediate decision and took the best action under the circumstances.
9. The assumption made by the 3rd Mate that the problem was not the engine but the steering, and any confusion that caused, occurred at such a time that his actions did not alter the outcome.