Separation issue

On 18 April 2013, a Robinson R22 helicopter registered VH‑HLY (HLY), departed from Cloncurry tracking to the north. At the same time, a Bombardier DHC‑8 aircraft, registered VH‑QOB (QOB), was conducting a scheduled service from Townsville, Queensland to Cloncurry.

The pilot of HLY broadcast his intentions and about 2 minutes later, while taxiing towards the runway intersection he looked ahead and to the left along the main runway in the most common direction of arriving aircraft operations into Cloncurry.

The pilot in command (PIC) of QOB made inbound broadcasts at 30, 10 and 3 NM on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and conducted a straight-in approach to land on runway 30.

As the helicopter crossed the runway, the pilot realised that he had not heard a response from the aerodrome frequency response unit (AFRU) on the CTAF. Simultaneously, he heard a call from QOB, which was in the landing flare on short final for runway 30, stating that he should get off the runway.

The pilot of HLY then looked to his right and observed QOB on the runway. He realised he had been broadcasting on the ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio, although he could hear calls on the very high frequency (VHF) CTAF.

HLY departed across the runway at about 100 feet. The pilot of HLY estimated that, when QOB had touched down, the distance between the aircraft and HLY was about 1,000 m horizontally. The PIC of QOB estimated that the horizontal separation reduced to about 200 m.

This incident highlights the importance of conducting pre-flight checks thoroughly and maintaining vigilance particularly at non-controlled aerodromes.

Aviation Short investigation Bulletin Issue 21

On 21 November 2012, a Beech 200 Kingair aircraft, registered VH-VAH (VAH) turned onto final approach for runway 26 at Swan Hill aerodrome, Victoria.  At the same time, an Ag-Cat aircraft VH-IFE (IFE) was approaching the circuit at about one hundred feet above ground level, from the north-west.

The pilot of VAH had made all mandatory radio broadcasts on the CTAF frequency and had not received a reply since earlier negotiating separation with a departing aircraft.

When at about four hundred feet above ground level and configured for landing, the pilot of VAH first noticed IFE. He broadcast his position and intentions, but received no reply. IFE continued a curved approach and landed on the grass section, north of the sealed section of runway 26. To maintain a safe separation, VAH landed long and well clear of IFE.

IFE was not fitted with a radio. The pilot always relied on a hand-held one. On this occasion he had inadvertently left the radio at home.

The ATSB’s Safety Watch initiative highlights safety around non-towered aerodromes as one of the major safety concerns that arise from investigation findings.

Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin - Issue 16

On 6 September 2012, the pilot in command (PIC) of a Beech 1900C, registered VH-KFN (KFN), rejected a takeoff on runway 05 at Newman, Western Australia, as he believed that the flight path of an Aerospatiale AS.350 B2, registered VH-VRW (VRW) that had become airborne parallel to runway 05, would conflict with his aircraft. As the aircraft slowed from 120 kt, 11 kt above V₁, the PIC of KFN observed VRW turn right and cross the runway about 200 m in front, at about 200 ft above ground level.

The PIC of KFN and the pilot of VRW made all necessary broadcasts but the pilot of VRW did not hear all the broadcasts from KFN and only became aware of the aircraft when he heard ‘KFN aborting’. The pilot of VRW later reported that he felt under pressure to transit to a remote site to evacuate an injured person.

As a result of this occurrence, the airfield operator has advised the ATSB that they are seeking to have information promulgated in the aviation information publication for Newman on visual and radio shielding between the apron and the threshold runway 05, and on helicopter arrival and departure procedures.

A study by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) found that perceived or actual pressure can contribute significantly to degradation in human performance and behaviour. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on-line store has a number of resources to assist pilots to understand the significance of pressures in the aviation environment.

Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin – Issue 17

The Air Accident Investigation Department (AAID) of the Ministry of Transport and Communication of the Republic of Kazakhstan is investigating a loss of separation that occurred in Kazakhstan airspace on 26 May 2012. One of the aircraft involved in the occurrence was an Australian-operated Boeing Company 747, registered VH-OJI, which was en route from Singapore to Frankfurt, Germany.

The investigation is being carried out in accordance the Republic of Kazakhstan’s obligations as the State of Occurrence under Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Annex 13). On 18 June 2012, the AAID requested Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) assistance with obtaining relevant technical and operational information from the aircraft operator. In accordance with paragraph 5.23 of Annex 13, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the AAID. To facilitate this support, the ATSB commenced an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. The ATSB obtained aircraft and flight crew details from the aircraft operator and forwarded them to the AAID.

The AAID is responsible for releasing the final investigation report into this occurrence. Any enquiries in respect of the AAID investigation and report should, in the first instance, be directed to the:

Air Accident Investigation Department
Ministry of Transport and Communication
47, Kabanbai batyr Avenue
010000 Astana
Republic of Kazakhstan

Telephone: +7 7172-242605
Fax: +7 7172-243165

______________

Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

Section 21 (2) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) empowers the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to discontinue an investigation into a transport safety matter at any time. Section 21 (3) of the TSI Act requires the ATSB to publish a statement setting out the reasons for discontinuing an investigation.
 
On 17 April 2012, the ATSB commenced an investigation into an airspace event, between an Airbus A330 aircraft registered VH-EBE and a Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft registered VH-TQL, near Cairns Airport on 21 March 2012.
 
Examination of the information collected during the investigation indicated a loss of separation assurance had occurred. However, the controller was aware of the potential conflict between the two aircraft and was actively managing the situation, which resulted in the separation standard between the aircraft being maintained.
 
The investigation did not find any systemic issues had contributed to the occurrence. The ATSB assessed that no safety issues would be identified through further investigation. On that basis, the ATSB has decided to discontinue its investigation.

On 21 February 2012, at about 0900 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, at about 8 NM east of Gunnedah, New South Wales, a Piper aircraft company PA-39 aircraft registered VH-ICS (ICS) and a Pacific Aerospace CT/4B aircraft registered VH-YCR (YCR) were conducting instrument flight rules (IFR) flying training operations, in visual metrological conditions on a reciprocal track between Tamworth and Gunnedah. There was a flying instructor and two students on board ICS and a flying instructor and one student on board YCR.

YCR received traffic advice from Brisbane Air Traffic Services (ATS) on two other aircraft in the area below 5,000 ft, including ICS. YCR was nearing Gunnedah at 6,000 ft above mean sea level, and broadcast their intention to over-fly Gunnedah at 6,000 ft, on the Gunnedah common traffic advisory frequency. ICS then requested traffic information for a departure from Gunnedah to Tamworth, at 7,000 ft and later advised Brisbane ATS that they were 5 NM outbound from Gunnedah and passing 6,000 ft. Both aircraft were on the same bearing and unable to contact each other; both took evasive action at 6,000 ft. The PIC of YCR estimated that at the time of the event their separation was 1 NM laterally.  Neither crew sighted the other aircraft.

This incident highlights the importance of applying the principles of 'see and avoid' in conjunction with an active listening watch and clear communications when operating in the vicinity of a CTAF.

Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin - Issue 11

At 0940 Eastern Daylight-saving Time on 2 December 2011 the crew of a Fairchild Industries SA227 aircraft (Metroliner) registered VH-UUN (UUN) was rolling through to the turning node after landing on runway 26 at Portland aerodrome, Victoria when a Cessna Aircraft Company 172 (C172) registered VH-VSH (VSH) was observed on short final for the reciprocal runway. VSH subsequently conducted a go-around.

The crew of UUN were completing a scheduled flight from Hamilton to Portland, Victoria. VSH was on a solo Visual Flight Rules navigation training flight from Ballarat. Despite both aircraft making all required Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) broadcasts, the pilots of UUN and VSH were not aware of each other prior to the incident. Neither aircraft was fitted with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System, nor was fitment required.

The crew of UUN and VSH reported their radios were serviceable and that the correct frequency was used for all required CTAF broadcasts.

This incident highlights the need for pilots to apply all available methods to maintain separation with other aircraft when operating outside controlled airspace. These methods include:

• utilisation of both alerted and un-alerted see-and-avoid principles,
• conducting a radio serviceability check when operating at a non-towered aerodrome equipped with an Aerodrome Frequency Response Unit, and
• use of on-board collision avoidance systems where fitted.

Where ground-based personnel could provide regular operators with advice on the presence of other airspace users, operators should formalise the use of such resources to ensure maximum benefit without detracting flight crew from their prime duties.

On 26 August 2011, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation B200 aircraft, registered VH-MWH (MWH), departed Ivanhoe for Broken Hill, New South Wales. While maintaining flight level 140, the pilot of MWH received a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) traffic advisory (TA) on a Regional Express S.A.A.B. Aircraft Corporation 340B aircraft, registered VH-ZRC (ZRC), which had departed Broken Hill for Sydney and was on climb to flight level 170.

At about the same time, while climbing through flight level 130, the crew of ZRC received a TCAS TA, shortly followed by a resolution advisory (RA). As the First Officer (FO) believed they were above MWH, he immediately commenced a climb. Shortly after, the Captain noted that the FO's response was contrary to the RA command to descend and advised the FO, who immediately commenced a descent.

A review of the Airservices Australia radar data indicated that, with both aircraft at flight level 142, lateral separation reduced to 2.2 NM.

This incident highlighted the benefit of TCAS in assisting pilots with traffic awareness and the importance of responding appropriately to a TCAS RA.

On 25 November 2010, a De Havilland Canada DHC-8-202 aircraft, registered VH-SDA (SDA), was taxied to runway 03 at Port Macquarie, New South Wales for a scheduled passenger service to Sydney.

After lining up on runway 03, the pilot in command (PIC) of SDA observed a traffic return on the aircraft's traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) indicating that an aircraft was behind them, about 400 ft above and descending. As a precaution, the take-off was expedited.

At the same time, a Beech Aircraft Corporation 58 aircraft, registered VH-VFG (VFG), was on final approach to runway 03. After observing SDA commence the take-off, the crew initiated a go-around and positioned the aircraft to the right of the runway centre line to maintain separation with SDA.

At about 600 ft, the crew of SDA noted that the TCAS was indicating that VFG was about 100 ft above and climbing. The PIC of SDA discontinued the aircraft's climb and turned left onto a westerly heading.

Both crews attempted to contact each other on the Port Macquarie common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) but received no response. The crews eventually established communications on the Brisbane Centre frequency.

Following the incident, the copilot of SDA reported that he may have mistuned the CTAF prior to taxiing. A subsequent engineering inspection by the operator determined that the aircraft's radio transceiver was faulty.

The operator of SDA has advised the ATSB, that as a result of this incident, a safety alert was issued to pilots emphasising the radio requirements for when operating on the CTAF. In addition, the operator also intends to conduct a review of their CTAF operating procedures.

On 3 March 2011, a Tiger Airways operated Airbus Industrie A320-232, registered VH-VNG (VNG) and a Pilatus Aircraft Ltd PC-12/45, registered VH-FMP (FMP), were on approach to Alice Springs Airport, Northern Territory. Both aircraft were operating under instrument flight rules (IFR).

The Alice Springs tower was closed, giving the pilots responsibility for organising their own separation. Both flight crews provided a number of updated estimates for their arrival into Alice Springs during the approach. The pilots of VNG estimated their position to be established on finals at time 11 (1941 CST) and FMP estimated their position established on the Instrument Landing System (ILS) at the same time. The conflict between the estimates was not initially recognised by either crew.

As both aircraft approached the initial approach fix, the potential conflict was realised, and separation was organised. During the separation manoeuvring, the pilot of FMP turned towards VNG, and a Traffic Collision Avoidance System Resolution Advisory warning was activated. The pilots of VNG conducted a missed approach and FMP continued the turn behind VNG.

Tiger Airways have conducted a risk assessment on operating into non-towered aerodromes. As a result of that assessment, they have rescheduled all Alice Springs flights so that they operate within active tower hours. They have also made a policy decision that flights will not be scheduled into CTAF aerodromes outside of tower hours for all future schedule developments.