Safety issue
| Safety issue description |
There was limited functionality for a Queensland Rail network control officer to physically verify the availability of a released section block prior to issuing an authority in the direct traffic control system. With an extension of authority, increased reliance was placed on the second train crew detecting the section was obstructed at a distance sufficient to avoid a collision, which may not be achievable in all situations. |
|---|---|
| Issue number | RO-2022-010-SI-01 |
| Issue owner | Queensland Rail |
| Transport function | Rail: Infrastructure |
| Issue status | Open – Safety action pending |
| Date issue released | 19/06/2026 |
| Issue status justification |
The ATSB acknowledges the immediate and ongoing safety actions taken by Queensland Rail. The ATSB will continue to monitor the progress of the trailable facing and dark territory clearance point projects, with the view that the safety issue will be adequately addressed following implementation. |
Safety action
| Action type | Proactive action |
|---|---|
| Action number | RO-2022-010-PSA-01 |
| Organisation | Queensland Rail |
| Action description |
The direct traffic control (DTC) operated on the principle of absolute block working, meaning only one rail traffic movement may be authorised within a block at any given time. The DTC system did not provide network control officers with functionality to independently verify that rail traffic had arrived clear and complete at the limit of its DTC authority. Under the DTC standard (MD‑10‑113), it was the responsibility of the rail traffic crew to confirm the location of their rail traffic and ensure it is clear of the nominated location within the block being occupied. Queensland Rail’s investigation of the collision at Oonoomurra determined that the rolling stock operator did not ensure the rear of the train was clear of the nominated location within the block before releasing their held authority for the section they no longer occupied. A recommendation arising from Queensland Rail’s investigation was for the general manager commercial and access to formally write to the rolling stock operator regarding the incident. On 19 October 2022, a formal letter was issued to Qube, as the rolling stock operator involved in the Oonoomurra collision, requesting that it demonstrates effective compliance with the controls outlined in the existing interface risk management plan (IRMP). On 2 December 2022, a formal response was received from Qube advising that it was confident that its existing control measures as referenced in the Qube safety management system and the IRMP were effective and provided sufficient controls to mitigate recurrence of this type of event. Additionally, Queensland Rail commenced the trailable facing point and dark territory1 clearance point monitoring projects to mitigate the risk of a collision arising from a rail traffic crew erroneously releasing a block section at a directional travel station under the direct traffic control system. The trailable facing points monitoring project on the West Moreton and Mount Isa lines provided a ‘failed to normalise alarm’ notifying the network control officer if the points did not return to normal position within 5 minutes. Installation of the points monitoring equipment on the Mount Isa line was ongoing. The dark territory clearance point monitoring project will provide object detection sensors and CCTV cameras at the clearance points of a crossing location to monitor any obstructions present. Funding was approved with Oonoomurra included as a trial location with an expected completion date of 30 June 2027.
|
| Action status | Monitor |