Reporter's deidentified concern
The reporter has raised safety concerns regarding the qualification/accreditation of some staff working in safety roles, and the inability of train control staff to directly contact train services outside the suburban passenger fleet.
Operation with unqualified/unaccredited staff
The reporter states, '[a number of key train control functions] are all staffed by people with zero Australian recognised competency levels and have received no officially recognised standard that conforms to industry standards.'
They state that 'several hires and promotions in these roles are selective and non-merit based, with trainers assessing and approving exams based on their own opinion or decision, rather than by national framework or a respectable score card system', and hold concerns that 'there is mostly little or zero evidence to support Safeworking or panel exams, except for a spreadsheet and sign off that they have occurred'.
At the root of this concern is the belief that the overall competence of safeworking staff is reducing as [the Network Operator] 'tries to fill the gaps in staffing levels'.
Train Control (TC4) staff cannot directly communicate with trains outside of the suburban passenger network fleet
The second area of concern raised by the reporter relates to TC4 staff not having ICE radios (In-cab Communications Equipment) available and thus being unable to contact other operating services. They state 'The Train Controller 4 (TC4) staff who manage all the inner suburban area signalling functions for the busiest part of [City]'s network have no function to call [another passenger train] or freight train driver in emergencies, instead relying on counterparts in different roles such as Train Controller 3, to carry across information which is extremely challenging due to location on the control room floor and other incidents which may be occurring'.
Further, the reporter notes that, 'This has resulted in several near misses and potentially avoidable fatalities which could have been avoided if simple contact would be able to have been made from the Train Controller 4 monitoring an area and alerting [passenger] or freight train drivers in the event of an emergency'.
Ultimately, the reporter is concerned that with a cohort of potentially unqualified operational staff and the absence of key communication systems, safety of the [City] suburban train network is being reduced.
Named party's response
[Network operator] provides the following response to the above Repcon received on 2 July 2026 by the [Network operator] Business Unit responsible for these activities.
Operation with Unqualified or Unaccredited Staff
Network Operations delivers operational training in accordance with the Book of Rules and the CBTC Standard.
Safeworking assessments are developed, trialled, and administered by the Network Operations Training Team.
Upon completion, all assessment materials are submitted to Network Safety for review and endorsement to ensure technical accuracy and alignment with operational requirements.
Key controls include:
- Training materials are developed by qualified Training Officers who hold a Certificate IV in Training and Assessment.
- Each trainer is current in ABS/ATC/CBTC. They have completed Cert IV Training & Assessing; therefore, they meet the requirements from a technical point of view and have all been in the specific roles for 5+years. Each trainer also meets the accredited Officer requirements. Employees are assessed against defined competency criteria and are deemed either Competent or Not Yet Competent.
- For project-specific activities, a Role-Based Training Needs Analysis (RBTNA) is conducted by the Network Operations Training Team to determine the appropriate level of training and competency requirements for each task.
- All Safeworking accreditation is aligned with A6807 Safeworking Systems & Signaller Operational Interface Qualification (provided to the ATSB) and assessed against the requirements contained within A7339 Safeworking Systems Competency Criteria Assessment Form (provided to the ATSB).
- The Safeworking accreditation framework has significantly matured over the past 12 to 18 months, transitioning from a predominantly verbal assessment process to a structured, evidence-based assessment methodology aligned with A7339 requirements.
- Safeworking accreditation is mandatory and status is monitored, tracked, and recorded through the organisation's Learning Management System (LMS).
- Employees are not permitted to be rostered to a shift or control panel if their Safeworking accreditation has expired, or if they have been assessed as unsuccessful during either the initial assessment or any subsequent reassessment process.
- Training materials and assessments are reviewed whenever changes are made to Safeworking systems or network infrastructure. Where updates are required, amendments are developed in consultation with relevant Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and formally endorsed by Network Safety prior to implementation.
- Network Operations is also progressing towards nationally recognised competencies aligned to the Certificate IV in Train Control and Certificate III in Signalling qualifications with no finalised date for implementation at this point.
These controls ensure that only appropriately trained, assessed, and accredited employees are authorised to undertake Safeworking responsibilities, thereby minimising the risk of operational activities being performed by unqualified or unaccredited personnel.
Train Control (TC4) staff cannot directly communicate with trains outside of the suburban passenger network
There was a risk assessment conducted in August 2024 with Train Controller workgroup HSRs in relation to this issue.
The assessment determined that the absence of VCS radios (Voice Communication System) on the TC4 panels did not contribute to an increased risk of safety incidents occurring.
Each TC4 workstation is fitted with a Local Train Radio (LTR) button, which is available through the ACOM panel. LTR provides an open-air communication channel that can be used to contact, predominantly, [passenger], freight and non-EMU rail traffic from the TC4 workstations.
In addition to above the TC4 has the ability to place Signals to stop in their area of control where required.
Furthermore, we have reviewed our available records and have found no evidence that the absence of VCS Radios on the TC4 panels has contributed to, or resulted in, a near miss or person-struck incident within our network.
If there are specific incidents being referred to where the absence of a VCS Radio on a TC4 panel is alleged to have been a contributing factor, we would appreciate being provided with the relevant dates and times so that we can investigate these further.
Regulator's response
ONRSR confirms receipt of ATSB REPCON report number RR2026-00017, dated 2 September 2026 regarding concerns with safeworker qualification and emergency communication concerns.
ONRSR has reviewed the reporter’s concerns and operator’s response. ONRSR has also reviewed the additional [incident] information provided via an updated REPCON report on 25 September.
ONRSR does not identify any immediate safety concerns with the operator’s response. ONRSR will continue to monitor for future concerns or safety issues regarding the matters raised in the REPCON report which may also be considered in the scoping of a regulatory activity scheduled as part of ONRSR’s critical risk compliance program for 2026/2027.
ATSB comment
Subsequent to the provision of the subject concerns to the Named Party and the Regulator, the Reporter provided general details of two incidents which were held as illustrative of the concerns raised.
These details were provided to the Named Party and Regulator for their consideration as part of the REPCON process, but were not intended for publication, and as such are not included herein.
REPCON details
| Date reported | 02/08/2026 |
|---|---|
| Published date | 29/10/2026 |
| Affected operation/industry | Vehicle Operations |
| Concern subject type | Training |
| Transport mode | Rail |