Reporter's deidentified concern
The reporter has raised a safety concern relating to a systemic, fleet-wide culture of non-compliance regarding critical cabin safety procedures during taxi, take-off and landing phases at [Operator]. Furthermore, the reporter states, 'This report highlights a critical failure in the operator's safety management system'.
The reporter provided the following examples of observed hazardous behaviours and safety violations:
Failure to Secure the Cabin
Cabin crew regularly neglect to ensure that passenger baggage remaining at seats is pushed completely beneath the seat structures, creating immediate missile hazards and evacuation obstructions.
Failure to conduct [emergency procedure drills]
Cabin crew routinely fail to perform mandatory [emergency procedure drills] while seated in crew jump-seats during take-off and landing.
Loss of situational awareness / mobile device use
Flight attendants are frequently observed actively using personal mobile devices or sitting with eyes closed while on active jump-seat duty during critical phases of flight.
Improper bracing and ergonomics
Cabin Crew members frequently rest their legs up on cabin service carts while seated in the jump-seat, preventing proper brace positioning and blocking immediate access to emergency exit doors.
Failure of internal safety and Just culture
Internal reporting channels have been exhausted. Management is entirely inconsistent in enforcing its own policies. Rather than auditing the entire staff base or addressing the root cultural issues, management isolates specific incidents to punish individual crew members while allowing the broader fleet-wide behaviour to continue unchecked. This inconsistent enforcement and failure to recognise a clear operational pattern poses an immediate risk to flight safety as internal safety assurance mechanisms are broken.
The reporter believes this creates a punitive culture that actively discourages open safety reporting.
Named party's response
[Operator] acknowledges receipt of REPCON RA2026-00109 and thanks the reporter for raising these concerns. [Operator] welcomes the opportunity to outline how its Safety Management System (SMS) identifies and manages the behaviours described. The behaviours raised in this REPCON are known concerns across industry. [Operator]'s SMS is designed to identify, monitor and manage these concerns on an ongoing basis through multiple, complementary assurance and promotion mechanisms. This ensures identification and opportunity for learning outcomes at an individual level, whilst ensuring appropriate communication to highlight opportunities for learning across the broader cohort.
[Operator] uses a number of embedded assurance metrics to monitor performance and compliance with procedures. Line checks are conducted across the cabin crew population and specifically assess each of the areas raised, including cabin securing, [emergency procedure drill], crew vigilance and device use, brace position and jumpseat procedures. Where a finding is identified, the checking crew member addresses it with the individual through an on-the-day debrief focused on awareness, coaching and correct procedure. This approach is designed to treat isolated non-compliance as a learning opportunity at the individual level, with findings recorded for trend analysis.
[Cabin safety audit] provides an independent, normal-operations observation program. [Cabin safety audit] observers record crew performance across a structured set of criteria that includes the themes raised in this REPCON, providing a separate data source for identifying both individual and systemic performance patterns.
Safety reporting is actively encouraged and widely used. In the twelve months to 30 June 2026, cabin crew submitted [over 1,000] safety reports relating to cabin management, cabin securing and procedural compliance. A proportion of these reports concerned the crew member's own procedural error or that of a colleague.
To ensure these learnings, and an ongoing focus on learning, safety promotion is used to proactively communicate expectations and areas of focus to cabin crew. Recent examples include the introduction of a [Cabin checklist] on [date]; a cabin secure briefing issued in [date]; a [emergency procedure drill] briefing issued on [date] covering the emergency drill sequence, the restricted communication period and brace position; and cabin crew safety advices issued in [date] on iPad stowage during take-off and landing.
Corrective action is managed through a structured process. Where safety reports or assurance findings identify individual non-compliance, corrective action tasks are raised, investigated and closed. Where data indicates a broader pattern, actions are extended to procedures, training, communications and assurance oversight across the operation.
Response to the specific concerns raised
Cabin securing, [emergency procedure drill], situational awareness and device use, and brace position technique are each specifically assessed through [Operator]'s line check program and observed through [Cabin safety audit]. They are known areas requiring ongoing reinforcement, and [Operator]'s assurance data confirms they are being identified and managed through its existing platforms. The majority of findings are addressed through developmental debrief at the time of identification, consistent with a learning-focused approach to individual non-compliance. The assurance data does not, however, indicate that these behaviours are widespread across the operation, or that [Operator]'s Safety Management System has failed. It also did not identify any instances of crew resting legs on service carts.
[Operator] recognises that consistency of outcomes is important to maintaining confidence in reporting systems and will continue to monitor alignment with just culture principles.
Closing
[Operator] appreciates the opportunity to comment on the concerns raised. The behaviours described are managed through [Operator]'s SMS as part of ongoing cabin operations assurance, and each theme was visible within [Operator]'s assurance data prior to receipt of this REPCON. [Operator] will continue to monitor these areas through its line check, [Cabin safety audit], safety reporting and safety promotion programs.
Regulator's response
CASA has reviewed the matters raised regarding alleged non-compliance with cabin crew safety procedures during critical stages of flight and provides the following response.
Following a review of the REPCON and the operator’s response, CASA considers that the matters raised constitute a valid safety concern insofar as they relate to compliance with cabin safety procedures and the effectiveness of the operator’s Safety Management System in identifying and addressing recurring non-compliance. This does not mean that the reported fleet-wide or systemic nature of the behaviours has been substantiated.
CASA notes that the operator’s response identifies relevant controls and assurance activities, including line checks, [Cabin Safety Audits], safety reporting and corrective-action processes. CASA has requested that the operator provide additional detail regarding these activities and controls, including relevant assurance results and trends, in support of its conclusion that the reported behaviours are not widespread.
CASA will consider the REPCON alongside relevant information already held and the further information provided by the operator, including information concerning personal mobile device use and the effectiveness of actions taken. CASA will use this information to determine whether further targeted surveillance or other regulatory action is warranted.
REPCON details
| Date reported | 01/08/2026 |
|---|---|
| Published date | 23/10/2026 |
| Affected operation/industry | Cabin Safety |
| Concern subject type | Operating Procedures |
| Transport mode | Aviation |