Fire in the engine room aboard Leonardo Da Vinci

Summary

On 11 June 1998, the Netherlands flag dredger Leonardo da Vinci was engaged in widening the approach channel to the Parker Point Terminal at Dampier, Western Australia.

At approximately 1750, the fire alarm sounded and crew members in the engine control room saw a fire on No. 1 diesel engine. The engines were stopped, the fuel supply shut off and the engine room battened down. A fire party attacked the seat of the fire with portable dry powder extinguishers, but as the party could not be certain the fire was fully extinguished, the Halon system was activated.

Two harbour tugs provided assistance in boundary cooling until a shore fire brigade party arrived on board. Members of the shore fire brigade party entered the engine room and, after a careful inspection, declared the fire to be fully extinguished.

The fire was caused by diesel fuel oil spraying onto the hot exhaust trunking of the engine. The source of the diesel fuel oil leak was traced to the shut-off cock to the pressure differential indicator on the No. 1 engine fuel oil filter. The bonnet of the cock had become dislodged, permitting diesel oil, under 8 bar pressure, to be sprayed upwards onto the exhaust trunking.

The fire caused extensive damage to electrical wiring and fittings, resulting in Leonardo da Vinci being out of commission for three weeks. One person was injured in the incident, receiving burns to the face and left forearm.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the factors contributing to the incident and should not be taken as apportioning either blame or liability.

• The fire occurred when diesel oil sprayed from a shut-off cock on No. 1 engine fuel filter on to the hot exhaust trunking of No. 1 diesel engine.
• Over an undetermined period, the spindle bonnet of the shut-off cock had vibrated loose, had unscrewed and had been blown off, permitting the escape of diesel oil under 8 bar pressure.
• At some undetermined time, the handle of the shut-off cock had been removed, to allow access to the square head of the spindle and had not been replaced. This action removed the locking, or keep-safe, portion of the valve.
• Although five spare shut-off cock assemblies were held on board, missing handles had not been replaced on two shut-off cocks, indicating a laxity towards maintenance.

The following factors are considered to have contributed to the Technician sustaining burn injuries:

• When leading the way out, the Electrician chose a route that took them into the engine room, the compartment in which the fire was burning, and he did not maintain physical contact with the Technician, so that they became separated in the dark/smoke.
• On first boarding, the Technician had not been given a formal induction session, to ensure he understood the emergency signals and was familiar with the escape routes from the areas in which he was to be working.
• The exits and emergency exits from the engine room and workshop areas were not clearly marked.