Grounding of the Panamanian flag Peacock

Summary

The Panamanian flag refrigerated cargo vessel Peacock, on a ballast passage from Singapore to New Plymouth, New Zealand, embarked a licensed pilot off Goods Island at 1630 AEST on 17 July 1996 for the passage through the Torres Strait and the Inner Two Way Route of the Great Barrier Reef.

At about 0155 on 18 July 1996, the vessel grounded on Piper Reef at full speed, in a position 100 metres eastward of the light beacon. Initial attempts to refloat the vessel by going astern on the engine were unsuccessful.

Peacock remained stranded on Piper Reef until the late afternoon of 26 July 1996, when salvors successfully refloated the vessel after having transferred some of the fuel oil bunkers to a barge.

The vessel's hull was not breached, and no pollution occurred. However, machinery tests showed that only one steering motor was fully functional, therefore Peacock was towed to Cairns for necessary repairs.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

Peacock grounded on Piper Reef as a result of the vessel's course not being altered, from 175 to 149, as it approached from the north with the reef right ahead.

The following factors are considered to have contributed to the grounding:

1. The Pilot's loss of situational awareness, the balance of probability being that he fell asleep.
2. The Pilot's sitting with his chin cupped in his left hand, making him more susceptible to falling sleep.
3. The warm, stuffiness of the wheelhouse atmosphere, in association with the sleep-inducing factors of time of day and background environmental noises.
4. Chronic fatigue as a result of the Pilot's recent work schedule, particularly the high proportion of nights of disrupted sleep.
5. The lack of a strategy on the part of the Pilot to counter the effects of foreseeable fatigue during periods of reduced activity.
6. The lack of proper bridge management and lack of interaction between the Pilot and the Watch Officer.
7. The lack of proper monitoring of the vessel's progress by the Watch Officer.
8. The attitude of the Watch Officer in assuming the Pilot was solely responsible for the navigation and his prolonged absence from the wheelhouse.
9. The absence of a formal control framework, to monitor a coastal pilot's nights of disrupted sleep, to prevent the development of chronic fatigue.