Collision between Bogasari Dua and Midas

Summary

On the morning of 5 March 1996, the Indonesian 33,747 tonnes deadweight geared bulk carrier Bogasari Dua and the Panamanian 38,313 tonnes deadweight geared bulk carrier Midas were both lying at anchor in Geraldton Roads, Western Australia. Midas was anchored about 1 mile to the north of Bogasari Dua.

At about 0400, Bogasari Dua, lying to a single starboard anchor with eight shackles in 30 m of water, began to drag anchor in gale force southerly winds and was driven towards Midas. Those on the bridge of Bogasari Dua did not realise that the vessel was dragging anchor until after 0430, when they were alerted by the whistle signals of Midas. Bogasari Dua came into contact with Midas at about 0445, before either the anchor could be weighed, or the engine made ready. As soon as the two vessels moved apart, at about 0450, the Master of Bogasari Dua manoeuvred his vessel clear.

Bogasari Dua received damage to port side shell plating in way of no.5 hold to the main deck bulwark on the port side, to the port side accommodation ladder hoist, to the port side lifeboat davit base and to the port lifeboat, which was split into three sections. Midas received indentation damage to the bulbous bow, also to shipside plating in way of nos. one and two starboard topside tanks and damage to various lengths of shipside railing.

No one was injured in the incident and no pollution occurred.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

It is considered that:

• Bogasari Dua's anchor broke out shortly after 0400.
• The Mate of Bogasari Dua was not aware that his vessel was dragging anchor until after 0436.
• When the Mate's attention was caught by the intermittent whistle signals of Midas, Bogasari Dua was already too close to the other vessel for effective avoiding action to be taken.

The following factors are considered to have contributed the collision:

1. The Master of Bogasari Dua had switched off the weather facsimile machine, denying the vessel access to local weather forecasts and the strong wind warnings.
2. Despite his earlier experiences of dragging anchor off Geraldton, the Master of Bogasari Dua did not give any specific directions or warnings to the deck officers to be on their guard or give instructions for the engineers to maintain watches.
3. The watch keeping officers aboard Bogasari Dua did not properly monitor the weather conditions and so did not inform the Master of the increasing wind strength.
4. The Mate of Bogasari Dua did not monitor the vessel's position or keep a lookout.
5. Knowing there was to be a lengthy time at anchor before berthing and knowing the exposed nature of the anchorage, the Master of Bogasari Dua did not consider using more anchor cable to improve the holding capability of the anchor or consider ballasting the vessel down to reduce its windage area.
6. The Master of Bogasari Dua did not consider the option of weighing anchor and standing off the port when the wind increased during the evening of 4 March.
7. The Mate of Midas did not keep a proper lookout in that he did not make sufficiently frequent checks on the relative position of Bogasari Dua.
8. The Master of Midas did not consider the slipping of his anchor cable as an option open to him.