Grounding of the bulk carrier Thebes

Summary

Late on the evening of 10 June 1997, the Egyptian bulk carrier Thebes, on a ballast passage from Singapore to Newcastle, NSW, embarked a licensed coastal pilot to the north-west of Booby Island for the passage through Torres Strait and the Inner Two-way Route of the Great Barrier Reef.

At about 2345, after negotiating Gannet Passage and with the vessel steadied on a course with Goods Island light right ahead, steering was changed from manual to automatic steering mode. The Pilot then handed the con back to the Master, in order to go below for a few minutes, but before leaving the bridge, at about 2352, he explained his passage plan, on the chart, for the Torres Strait.

When the Pilot returned to the bridge at 0002, the Master and watch officers were at the chart table. Moving through to the wheelhouse, the Pilot initially could not see Goods Island light ahead, but seeing the heading was on 110, he then saw the light wide on the port bow. At the same time, the Master's attention was brought to the 2400 position on the chart, which was well to the south of the track. The Master ran to the steering console and the rudder was put hard to port. However, after turning through about 70, Thebes ran aground on the south side of Larpent Bank.

The engine was put to full astern, water ballast was dumped from the forward upper wing tanks and pumped from the forepeak, and the vessel refloated at 0112 on 11 June. Soundings indicated that no tanks had been breached, therefore passage was resumed.

No pollution or significant damage to the vessel occurred as a result of the grounding and no-one was injured.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Thebes grounded after it had deviated from the intended course, the deviation going unnoticed by the ship's bridge team for a period of almost 15 minutes. The following factors are considered to have contributed to the grounding:

1. An error in the setting of the selector switch when changing from manual to autopilot steering modes.
2. During the period the Master had the conduct of the vessel, while the Pilot was absent from the bridge, all officers remained in the chart area and the vessel's progress was not monitored.
3. The spontaneous and simultaneous reactions of the Master and the Pilot to go hard to port, towards the intended track, before a full appraisal of the situation was carried out.
4. The lack of Bridge Resource Management procedures on board, which resulted in the wheelhouse being unattended, the vessel's progress not being monitored and the order to go hard to port not being challenged by the Officer of the Watch.
5. The design of the steering console is such that the setting of the selector switch is not readily discernible, particularly to someone of medium or small stature and at night cannot be readily seen at all. It is further considered that it was reasonable for the pilot to have absented himself from the bridge at that particular time.