Grounding of the Aikaterini L

Summary

Early on 13 March 1997, the Cypriot flag bulk carrier Aikaterini L was lying at anchor off the Western Australian port of Geraldton, where it was to load a cargo of mineral sand and barley. In ballast, the 20,297 tonnes deadweight vessel had a calculated draught of 4.1 m forward and 5.67 m aft. The anchor was weighed at 0640 and at 0700 the Duty Harbour Master boarded to pilot the vessel to its berth.

After an exchange of greetings and brief formalities, and with the telegraph on full manoeuvring speed, the Harbour Master steadied the vessel on a south-easterly course, to pass about 300 m seaward of the Pimple Buoy, an orange marker buoy protecting the wave-rider buoy to the north of the entrance channel. His intention was to alter course to port tightly around the Pimple Buoy, into the entrance channel.

'. However, when the ship had turned through about 45, a shudder went through the vessel, followed by a second shudder a few seconds later.

The vessel continued to make way and tests showed that both the steering gear and the main engine were fully functional, so the vessel was berthed as planned. However, underwater inspections by divers on 14 March revealed substantial damage, with hull penetration into double bottom ballast tanks beneath holds 2 and 4. There had also been an ingress of water into No. 4 fuel oil tank, but no pollution occurred.

After temporary underwater repairs had been carried out, Aikaterini L sailed from Geraldton in ballast on 19 March, bound for Singapore to undergo permanent repairs.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. Aikaterini L came in contact with a charted rock ridge to the south of the entrance channel after the Harbour Master overshot the intended alter-course position to the west of the Pimple Buoy. The following factors are considered to have contributed to the incident:

1. A loss of concentration and awareness by the Harbour Master.
2. A reduced alertness on the part of the Harbour Master, due to the combined effects of his work regime and a slight sleep dept.
3. The Harbour Master's instinctive order of 'hard a port' when he realised, he had overshot the wheel-over position.
4. The pressures induced by the local environmental conditions and the local commercial climate.
5. The absence of Bridge Management procedures, as a result of which: i. the pilotage plan was not discussed; ii. the Master and Third Mate were not fully informed of the Harbour Master's intentions and so were unable to monitor his actions; iii. the Master and his officers had not drawn up their own pilotage plan and the vessel's progress was not monitored properly, so the overshoot was not recognised.