

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199301543**

**Airbus
A300-B4-203**

26 May 1993

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199301543 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: Melbourne Airport
State: VIC **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Wednesday 26 May 1993
Time: 1110 hours **Time Zone:** EST
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft: Airbus
Manufacturer:
Aircraft Model: A300-B4-203
Aircraft Registration: VH-TAD **Serial Number:** 196
Type of Operation: Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger
Scheduled
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Sydney NSW
Departure Time:
Destination: Melbourne VIC

Approved for Release: Thursday, October 27, 1994

After landing on runway 27 the crew of VH-TAD commenced taxiing the aircraft along taxiway echo, back to the terminal. It was necessary to obtain a clearance to cross runway 34 on the way in.

In the control tower the aerodrome controller issued a clearance to another aircraft to take off on runway 34. He also gave approval to the surface movement controller to allow VH-TAD to cross runway 34 behind the aircraft taking off.

The surface movement controller then issued a clearance for VH-TAD to cross runway 34. In doing this he omitted to say to cross behind the departing aircraft. The crew of VH-TAD saw the other aircraft taking off on runway 34 and held VH-TAD short of runway 34 until the other aircraft had passed.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The surface movement controller incorrectly issued a clearance for VH-TAD to cross runway 34, in lieu of saying to cross behind the aircraft taking off on runway 34.
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