Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199300833

Fokker B.V. Fellowship

07 April 1993

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Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number: 199300833 Occurrence Type: Incident

Location: Meekatharra

State: WA Inv Category: 4

Date: Wednesday 07 April 1993

Time: 0900 hours **Time Zone** WST

Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Fokker B.V.

Manufacturer:

Aircraft Model: F28 MK 4000

Aircraft Registration: VH-FKI Serial 11183

Number:

Type of Operation: Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger

Scheduled

Damage to Aircraft:

Departure Point: Argyle WA

Departure Time:

Destination: Perth WA

Approved for Release: Saturday, October 30, 1993

VH-LBA was maintaining FL 270 and northbound from Meekatharra. VH-FKI was southbound to Meekatharra and was cleared to descend from FL 310 to FL 260 through the level assigned to VH-LBA. The duty air traffic controller was advised of this error by the pilot of VH-LBA and VH-FKI was assigned a new clearance which should have provided lateral separation for the descent. However, the controller's calculations were in error and the distance between the aircraft was reduced below the minimum separation standard.

The controller had just completed a hand-over/take-over when he was presented with this slightly more complicated separation problem. Coupled with this was a reduction in currency due to administrative tasks associated with being a team leader. Flight progress strip management practices at Perth may have contributed to the occurrence. Strip procedures have since been modified to be consistent with an apparent national standard developed from discussions with other check control staff.