

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199401449**

**Boeing Co
B737**

29 May 1994

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Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199401449	Occurrence Type:	Incident
Location:	Melbourne		
State:	VIC	Inv Category:	4
Date:	Sunday 29 May 1994		
Time:	1015 hours	Time Zone	EST
Highest Injury Level:	None		

Aircraft Manufacturer:	Boeing Co		
Aircraft Model:	737-377		
Aircraft Registration:	VH-CZP	Serial Number:	24305
Type of Operation:	Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger		
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil		
Departure Point:	Melbourne Vic		
Departure Time:	1015 EST		
Destination:			

Approved for Release: Monday, August 29, 1994

More than usual forward trim was required during and after takeoff. The auto pilot trim actuator ran out of forward trim and then ran continuously to full aft. The crew were unable to adequately manually trim forward. The aircraft returned for a normal descent and landing.

The auto pilot mach trim actuator was found to be inoperative. The actuator had been fitted during overnight maintenance and the observed problem occurred on the first flight after installation. Ground test procedures after installation had not shown up any problems.

Workshop rectification found anomalies with the backlash on the jackscrew and with the actuator length. The manufacturer advised that these anomalies would not have caused the problem that was experienced.

The actuator was refitted four days after the workshop check and has since operated satisfactorily. The cause of the inflight problem was not discovered.