

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199400660**

**Airbus
Airbus**

07 March 1994

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199400660	Occurrence Type:	Incident
Location:	Perth		
State:	WA	Inv Category:	3
Date:	Monday 07 March 1994		
Time:	1439 hours	Time Zone	WST
Highest Injury Level:	None		
Aircraft Manufacturer:	Airbus		
Aircraft Model:	A310		
Aircraft Registration:	9V-STU	Serial Number:	
Type of Operation:	Air Transport	High Capacity International Passenger	
Damage to Aircraft:	Minor		
Departure Point:	Singapore		
Departure Time:			
Destination:	Perth WA		

Approved for Release: Monday, October 28, 1996

The aircraft was taxiing towards Gate 53 at Perth International Terminal. The visual docking guidance system in use at Gate 53 consists of a centreline guidance light and two side marker stop boards. The rear side marker board is for DC10 type aircraft and aircraft using a middle or second entrance door. The side marker board closer to the aerobridge entrance is for most aircraft using a forward entrance door, including the A310. The pilots did not see the side marker board adjacent to the aerobridge, as the aerobridge weather shield almost completely obscured it, and were taxiing towards the second board when the top of the left engine collided with the aerobridge structure.

The pilots were not familiar with Perth Airport and relied on information supplied in the Jeppesen documentation for their pre-arrival briefing. Investigation revealed that Jeppesen use information from the Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), Aerodromes (AGA) section to provide briefing material in their documentation regarding visual docking guidance systems.

The information available to the pilots about the side marker boards was not clear and did not indicate that there may be more than one board on the gate they were to use.

Further investigation revealed that there are a number of different visual docking guidance systems in use at Federal Airports Corporation (FAC) airports and that operational use of these systems is not clearly explained in an easily accessible format in the AIP and Jeppesen documents.

Significant factors

The following factors are considered relevant to the development of the incident.

- (1) The information presented in the Jeppesen documentation about the side marker boards was not clear and did not indicate that on the selected gate there may be more than one marker board; and
- (2) The FAC airports have a number of different visual docking guidance systems in service. Instructions for use of the differing systems are not clear, nor are they presented in an easily accessible format in the AIP and Jeppesen documents.

SAFETY ACTION

From this investigation the Bureau issues the following Safety Advisory Notice:

SAN 960061

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation suggests that the Federal Airports Corporation:

- (i) reviews the positioning of side marker boards at gates used by international operators. The review should ensure that the boards are sufficiently visible to the pilot to permit full understanding before the aircraft moves into the parking position; and
- (ii) reviews the number of different types of visual docking guidance systems in use at both domestic and international terminals under its jurisdiction. The review should aim to reduce the number of different systems in use and to standardise the presentation of the system to users.