

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199501324**

**British Aerospace Plc
BAe 146-300**

26 April 1995

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199501324	Occurrence Type:	Incident
Location:	Maroochydore		
State:	QLD	Inv Category:	4
Date:	Wednesday 26 April 1995		
Time:	1340 hours	Time Zone	EST
Highest Injury Level:	None		
Aircraft Manufacturer:	British Aerospace Plc		
Aircraft Model:	BAe 146-300		
Aircraft Registration:	VH-EWS	Serial Number:	E3197
Type of Operation:	Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger Scheduled		
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil		
Departure Point:	Sydney NSW		
Departure Time:	1210 EST		
Destination:	Maroochydore QLD		

Approved for Release: Wednesday, March 13, 1996

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

When the crew of the aircraft listened to the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) before commencing their descent, there was no advice that an instrument approach could be necessary. After initial contact with Maroochydore Tower, the crew were cleared to descend to 3,000 ft. The controller co-ordinated another IFR aircraft and one VFR aircraft to give the regular public transport jet priority. However, the Aerodrome Controller did not advise the crew to expect an instrument approach but gave them the option of a DME Arrival or a 18 VOR/DME approach via the 10 DME arc. As the aircraft was still at 4,000 ft and close to the aerodrome, the crew accepted the only viable option of a 18 VOR/DME approach.

The aircraft did not become visual at the minimum descent altitude and the crew elected to divert to Brisbane where a 19 ILS approach was flown to a safe landing.

The captain later complained of the lack of operational information, "indecision" by the ADC, and no advice of an amended terminal area forecast (TAF), special forecast (SPECI) or advice from Brisbane Approach that an instrument approach would be required.

ANALYSIS

The captain's complaint about the lack of operational information regarding an "expect instrument approach" message is valid. He misunderstood the ADC's offer of a choice of instrument approaches as indecision.

The Bureau of Meteorology reviewed the forecasting aspects and conceded that the Maroochydore TAF should have continued with INTER which would have alerted the pilot to expect weather difficulties and to plan for it by carrying extra fuel.

The crew cramped their approach by descending to only 4,000 ft when they had been cleared to descend to 3,000 ft. They apparently did not remember the clearance even though the automatic voice recording tape revealed that they had acknowledged the 3,000 ft clearance.

SAFETY ACTION

Airservices Australia's Maroochydore procedures were modified on 17 May 1995 to include an "expect instrument approach" message in the ATIS when appropriate.

