

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199500706**

**Piper Aircraft Corp
Archer**

11 March 1995

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number: 199500706

Occurrence Type: Accident

Location: Torquay

State: VIC

Inv Category: 4

Date: Saturday 11 March 1995

Time: 1030 hours

Time Zone: ESuT

Highest Injury Level: Minor

Injuries:

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None	Total
Crew	0	0	1	0	1
Ground	0	0	0	0	0
Passenger	0	0	1	0	1
Total	0	0	2	0	2

Aircraft Manufacturer: Piper Aircraft Corp

Aircraft Model: PA-28-181

Aircraft Registration: VH-BRY

Serial Number: 28-7790155

Type of Operation: Non-commercial Pleasure/Travel

Damage to Aircraft: Substantial

Departure Point: Moorabbin VIC

Departure Time:

Destination: Torquay VIC

Crew Details:

Role	Class of Licence	Hours on		
		Type	Hours	Total
Pilot-In-Command	Private		1557.0	2327

Approved for Release: Wednesday, March 15, 1995

Prior to departure the pilot rang the owner of the airstrip to get information on the strip and permission to land. He was told that there were powerlines on approach to the 180 degree strip and the 090 degree strip. He overflowed the airfield on arrival and noted there was a light easterly breeze so decided to land on the 090 degree strip which has a published length of 910 metres in the AOPA directory. The strip also has a displaced threshold which the pilot observed.

On final approach he noted that the strip seemed short. The strip surface was grass and the pilot thought it may have been wet. He therefore slowed the aircraft and selected full flap while keeping power on, aiming to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markings. Approaching the end of the strip the pilot believed he must have been past the powerline although he had not actually seen it. He lowered the nose to touch down on the displaced threshold and at that point hit the powerline. The aircraft then hit the ground heavily, sustaining substantial damage.

During the investigation the owner of the airstrip advised that the strip was 900 metres fence to fence. Landing into the east there was 680 metres available due to the displaced threshold at the approach end. After the accident the pilot said he noted that the powerline was in fact over the "turning area" at the approach end of the strip and the poles were some distance apart, remote from the final approach path.

The day after the accident the electricity supplier installed marker devices on the powerline.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot was warned about the presence of a powerline on the approach end of the strip he was using but did not ensure that he sighted it prior to making his landing approach.
2. Although he had not sighted the powerline, on short final approach he made an assumption that he must have passed it and so lowered the nose to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markers.
3. The pilot "dragged the aircraft in with power" on a low final approach profile instead of flying a normal glidepath.
4. The powerline was not fitted with any warning marker devices.