

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199602348**

**Cessna Aircraft Company
Citation II**

24 July 1996

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199602348	Occurrence Type:	Incident
Location:	50km NNW Melbourne, Aerodrome		
State:	VIC	Inv Category:	4
Date:	Wednesday 24 July 1996		
Time:	1422 hours	Time Zone	EST
Highest Injury Level:	None		

Aircraft Manufacturer:	Cessna Aircraft Company		
Aircraft Model:	550		
Aircraft Registration:	VH-KTK	Serial Number:	5500339
Type of Operation:			
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil		
Departure Point:	Essendon, Vic.		
Departure Time:	1415 EST		
Destination:	Bankstown, NSW		

Approved for Release: Friday, October 18, 1996

The crew of a Cessna 550 aircraft had planned for a flight from Essendon, Vic to Bankstown, NSW at flight level (FL) 370. The aircraft departed and was given an initial altitude restriction of FL 200 by air traffic control (ATC). The crew were transferred to Melbourne Inner North control and the controller, having no conflicting traffic in the projected flight path of the C550, issued a climb instruction to FL 370. The pilot thought that the controller had said FL 300 and read back FL 300. This incorrect read back was not detected by the controller, who had indicated a read back of FL 370 on his flight progress strip.

Shortly after, the Inner North controller transferred the crew of the C550 to the en-route sector, Melbourne Sector 2. On first contact with Sector 2, the crew reported that they were on climb to FL 300. The Sector 2 controller considered this to be an unusual level and immediately contacted the Inner North controller to confirm the assigned cruising level. He was told that this was FL 370. The Sector 2 controller then asked the crew of the C550 if they would prefer FL 370 and, on receiving a positive reply, issued a climb instruction for the crew to climb to FL 370. This was correctly read back by the pilot and the flight proceeded to Bankstown without further incident.

It is normal operating practice for Sector 2 control to not have any planned levels on their flight progress strips. All aircraft coming into this sector are already under radar control and this rule reduces co-ordination between sectors and the number of level changes that may need to be recorded on the strip.

SIGNIFICANT FACTOR

The pilot of the C550 and the Inner North controller did not exercise sufficient vigilance in their radio listening techniques.

