

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199702801**

**Beech Aircraft Corp
King Air
de Havilland Canada
Dash 8**

01 September 1997

Readers are advised that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing transport safety. Consequently, Bureau reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purposes.

Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

Investigations commenced after 1 July 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). Reports released under the TSI Act are not admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceedings.

NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199702801 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: 4km NNE Brisbane, Aerodrome
State: QLD **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Monday 01 September 1997
Time: 1412 hours **Time Zone** EST
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Manufacturer: de Havilland Canada
Aircraft Model: DHC-8-102
Aircraft Registration: VH-TNX **Serial Number:** 033
Type of Operation: Air Transport Domestic Low Capacity Passenger Scheduled
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Brisbane QLD
Departure Time: 1415 EST
Destination: Blackwater QLD

Aircraft Manufacturer: Beech Aircraft Corp
Aircraft Model: C90
Aircraft Registration: VH-FDW **Serial Number:** LJ-1011
Type of Operation: Non-commercial Aerial Ambulance
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Brisbane QLD
Departure Time: 1418 EST
Destination: Charleville QLD

Approved for Release: Thursday, September 4, 1997

Circumstances

The aerodrome controller had cleared one aircraft for takeoff. The intention was to have the following aircraft cleared for takeoff when the first aircraft had gained adequate distance and was turning away from the initial departure track. The second aircraft was allowed to depart about one minute after the first. This was too soon as the controller was unable to maintain visual separation due to both aircraft being on the same track, away from the controller's view. There was also insufficient distance between the two aircraft to provide the required radar separation standard. Separation was positively established after the first aircraft turned to a new heading.

