Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199700092

Boeing Co
B767

06 January 1997

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Aviation Safety Investigation Report

199700092

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

Occurrence Number:	199700092	**Occurrence Type:**	Incident
Location:	10km S Sydney, Instrument Landing System		
State:	NSW	**Inv Category:**	4
Date:	Monday 06 January 1997		
Time:	0840 hours	**Time Zone**	ESuT
Highest Injury Level:	None		

Aircraft Manufacturer:	Boeing Co		
Aircraft Model:	767-277		
Aircraft Registration:	VH-RMF	**Serial Number:**	22694
Type of Operation:	Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger Scheduled		
Damage to Aircraft:	Nil		
Departure Point:	Melbourne Vic		
Departure Time:	0843 ESuT		
Destination:	Sydney NSW		

Approved for Release: Wednesday, October 1, 1997

FACTUAL INFORMATION

The training pilot was conducting training for a pilot in command who was new to the Boeing 767 aircraft and its electronic cockpit concept. Under instructions from the training pilot, the trainee inserted the expected approach and landing information into the flight management computer (FMC), whilst the aircraft was maintaining cruise altitude. This expectation was based on the training pilot's previous experience, where a RIVET 4 STAR with a CULLERIN transition for a landing on runway 34R was normally applied to aircraft arriving from Melbourne.

There were no runway allocations issued to the crew until approximately seven minutes after commencing the descent. At this time they were first given the information that they were being vectored to left base for a runway 34L independent visual approach. This was acknowledged by the crew. They were advised again during the descent sequence that they would be landing on runway 34L. The crew acknowledged this instruction as well.

After the crew was instructed to continue for a visual approach to runway 34L, the aircraft was observed to track to intercept the runway 34R extended centre-line. Eventually, the crew was advised that they appeared, on radar, to be tracking for the incorrect runway. They adjusted the flight path to intercept the extended centreline for runway 34L and completed an uneventful landing.

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation has previously recommended to Airservices Australia and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in interim recommendation IR950213 of 2 January 1996, that aircrew read back runway assignments, especially in parallel runway operations. The responses (July 1996) to this recommendation advised that a complete review of phraseology was underway to bring Australian phraseology into line with ICAO, as far as practicable. Both organisations expected that the results from this review would address BASI concerns regarding runway readback. This review was not complete at the time of the occurrence.

ANALYSIS

The training pilot was concentrating on instructing the new pilot in the duties associated with operating the Boeing 767 and did not become alerted to the assignment of a runway that was different to his expectation. Had he been required to read back the runway allocation, it is probable that he would have recognised the unexpected runway and the need to update the data in the aircraft's FMC.