Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199800551

Cessna Aircraft Company C150

20 February 1998

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Aviation Safety Investigation Report

199800551

Occurrence Number: 199800551 **Occurrence Type:** Accident
Location: Camden, Aerodrome
State: NSW **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Friday 20 February 1998
Time: 1625 hours **Time Zone** ESuT
Highest Injury Level: Minor
Injuries:

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None	Total
Crew	0	0	1	0	1
Ground	0	0	0	0	0
Passenger	0	0	1	0	1
Total	**0**	**0**	**2**	**0**	**2**

Aircraft Manufacturer: Cessna Aircraft Company
Aircraft Model: 150M
Aircraft Registration: VH-TUC **Serial Number:** 15075915
Type of Operation: Non-commercial Pleasure/Travel
Damage to Aircraft: Destroyed
Departure Point: Camden NSW
Departure Time: 1525 ESuT
Destination: Camden NSW

Crew Details:

Role	Class of Licence	Hours on Type	Hours Total
Pilot-In-Command	Private	70.6	71

Approved for Release: Friday, March 6, 1998

The foreign Private Pilot was conducting a local flight in the Camden area, following a flight review three days earlier.

At the time of departure the control tower was manned. Throughout the day the wind had been from the south-west, favouring runway 24. By the time aircraft returned for a landing the tower had closed down. The Camden ATIS, which had earlier nominated runway 24 for landing, had been changed on closedown to provide a standard message. This indicated that the control zone was reclassified as Class G airspace, and that Mandatory Broadcast Zone procedures applied. The preferred runway direction was 06. No wind information was provided.

The pilot said that he listened to the ATIS well before his return to Camden, to reduce his workload during the subsequent approach. He understood that runway 24 was still in use. Later, when he returned for a landing, he was unable to see the wind indicator and elected to make an approach to runway 24, using 10 degrees of flap.

Ground observers subsequently saw the aircraft travelling along runway 24 at a very low height, with the pilot apparently attempting to land. When it reached a position some 3/4 along the runway the observers saw the aircraft adopt a high nose attitude and attempt to climb away. The aircraft continued in a high nose attitude, at low forward speed, towards rising ground to the west of the aerodrome. It became apparent that the angle of climb was insufficient to overcome the terrain. The aircraft was then observed to strike trees and disappear.

The aircraft came to rest in the front yard of a house, after colliding with a number of trees. Both occupants were able to escape with minor injuries. A subsequent examination concluded that the aircraft had been capable of normal operation at the time of the accident.

An investigation found that in the 30 minutes after the tower closed down, there had been a significant wind shift. At 1600, the time of closedown, the recorded wind direction and velocity was 300/13 kt. The next reading at 1630 showed the wind had changed to 100/12 kt. The effect of that wind shift was to create a substantial downwind component on runway 24.

Witnesses indicated that the wind had changed shortly after 1600, just before the pilot attempted his landing approach. The description of the event provided by the pilot, and other observers, was consistent with the pilot attempting to land the aircraft on a runway with a substantial downwind component. The angle of climb during the subsequent go-around was also adversely affected by the downwind component, and was insufficient to overcome the rising terrain.