

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199800462**

**Centrum Naukowo-Produkcyjne-PZL
M-18B**

10 February 1998

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199800462	Occurrence Type: Incident
Location: Tamworth, Aerodrome	
State: NSW	Inv Category: 4
Date: Tuesday 10 February 1998	
Time: 1042 hours	Time Zone: ESuT
Highest Injury Level: None	

Aircraft Manufacturer: Centrum Naukowo-Produkcyjne-PZL	
Aircraft Model: M-18B	
Aircraft Registration: VH-PHO	Serial Number:
Type of Operation: Non-commercial Business	
Damage to Aircraft: Nil	
Departure Point:	
Departure Time:	
Destination: Tamworth NSW	

Approved for Release: Friday, September 4, 1998

The pilot of VH-PHO was not familiar with procedures in the Tamworth Control Zone (CTR). He had obtained a clearance from the tower controller to enter the CTR at 3,000 ft and had been instructed to report at 5 NM. After reporting at this position, the pilot was instructed to maintain 3,000 ft and to join the circuit upwind for runway 12 Right. At this time, there were four aircraft in the circuit. The pilot of PHO was then asked by to report sighting an aircraft on the upwind leg one mile ahead. He reported that he had the traffic sighted and was instructed to follow that aircraft. A short time later, the controller observed PHO descending and tracking for a mid-downwind position. This action conflicted with VH-YTQ which was on the downwind leg. The pilot of YTQ reported manoeuvring to avoid PHO. In response to aquery from the controller, the pilot of PHO reported that he was below 2,500 ft.

The pilot of PHO did not fully understand the procedure for upwind circuit entry. Further, he believed that the instruction to follow YTQ meant that he was cleared to descend from 3,000 ft. The pilot indicated that he operated inside controlled airspace infrequently.

Investigation revealed that the relevant publications do not include a definition for the term 'follow'.

SAFETY ACTION

As a result of this occurrence, the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation is investigating a perceived safety deficiency relating to the use of "sight and follow" procedures by air traffic controllers.

Any safety output issued as a result of this analysis will be published in the Bureau's Quarterly Safety Deficiency Report.

