

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199800460**

**Boeing Co
B767**

07 February 1998

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Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199800460 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: Brisbane, Aerodrome
State: QLD **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Saturday 07 February 1998
Time: 1723 hours **Time Zone** EST
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Boeing Co
Manufacturer:
Aircraft Model: 767-338ER
Aircraft Registration: VH-OGK **Serial Number:** 25316
Type of Operation: Air Transport High Capacity International Passenger
Scheduled
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point: Brisbane Qld
Departure Time:
Destination: Bangkok, Thailand

Approved for Release: Monday, June 22, 1998

Prior to issuing a takeoff clearance the controller checked that the runway was clear. Takeoff was rejected when the crew of VH-OGK saw a vehicle on a taxiway and entering the runway. The aircraft exited via the next available taxiway and returned to the runway end for an uneventful departure.

A pest control contractor had been escorted to an aircraft parking area on the domestic apron to fumigate a number of aircraft. He was also informed that another aircraft to be treated was in the maintenance hangar on the other side of the airport. He indicated that he would travel to the hangar via the public roads outside the airport and that he would leave the airport via Gate 1, through which he had entered. He also indicated that he knew the location of the airline's operations office. No airline supervision was provided while the contractor did his work.

On completion of the work on the apron the contractor decided to travel to the hangar via the perimeter road inside the airport. He ultimately arrived at the hangar and completed the task there. No supervision was provided by hangar staff as they were not aware the contractor did not have an airside licence. The contractor departed the hangar intending to return to gate 1 via the perimeter road. While driving along the taxiway from the hangar he missed the turn to the perimeter road and crossed the holding point to the runway. This was when the aircraft crew observed the vehicle and rejected the takeoff. A short time later, the vehicle was intercepted by an airport safety officer.

Procedures required that all persons who do not hold an 'Airside Drives Authority' be escorted and supervised at all times while airside. This requirement was not complied with in this instance. As an additional safety measure, a 'Safety Information Note' has been prepared for issue to all airside visitors.