Aviation Safety Investigation Report 199003090

Robinson R22-Beta

5 August 1990

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at <u>www.atsb.gov.au</u>.

This accident w	as not formally in	i congattu t	Jy the Dureau			
Occurrence Nu	imber: 19900309	199003090			Occurrence Type: Accident	
Location:	Near Lor	Near Lorraine Station QLD				
Date:	5 August	5 August 1990			Time: 725	
Highest Injury	Level: Nil					
Injuries:						
Ū		Fatal	Serious	Minor	None	
	Crew	0	0	1	1	
	Ground	0	0	0	-	
	Passenge	r 0	0	0	1	
	Total	0	0	0	2	
Aircraft Details: Registration: Serial Number: Operation Type: Damage Level: Departure Point: Departure Time: Destination:	VH-HIW 706 Aerial Work Substantial Yambungan QLD					

This accident was not formally investigated by the Bureau.

Approved for Release: 25th October 1990

Circumstances:

During the flight the engine surged without warning and the pilot elected to land in a cleared area, to investigate the engine problem. The engine failed completely during the latter stage of the approach resulting in a heavy landing short of the cleared area. Subsequent investigation by the pilot revealed that the auxiliary fuel tank was completely empty. The main fuel gauge indicated that the main fuel tank was full of fuel. The two fuel tanks cannot be selected individually and fuel from both is supplied simultaneously. On this occasion it appears that only fuel from the auxiliary fuel tank reached the carburettor. The duration of the flight is consistent with this assumption. Examination by the company maintenance organisation revealed that a plastic hose in the main fuel tank vent line was pinched, possibly during the accident. Maintenance had been carried out before the previous flight, which had lasted 40 minutes. However, the work entailed the removal of the auxiliary fuel tank during which the main fuel vent line was not moved. No other fault was found.