Aviation Safety Investigation Report 198703511

Hiller UH-12E

2 October 1987

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 198703511 Occurrence Type: Accident

Location: Bulleringa Station (70 km NNE Georgetown) QLD **Date:** 2 October 1987 **Time:** 1050

Highest Injury Level: Serious

Injuries:

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None
Crew	0	0	1	1
Ground	0	0	0	-
Passenger	0	1	1	0
Total	0	1	1	1

Aircraft Details: Hiller UH-12E

Registration: VH-FFT **Serial Number:** 5116

Operation Type: Aerial Work (Aerial Survey)

Damage Level: Substantial

Departure Point: Red R Camp (65 km N Georgetown) QLD

Departure Time: N/K

Destination: Red R Camp (65 km N Georgetown) QLD

Approved for Release: April 11th 1988

Circumstances:

The aircraft was cruising at an altitude of about 300 feet above ground level when the pilot heard a loud bang, then felt a severe vibration. The engine continued to operate for about two to three seconds before stopping. Because of the unsuitable terrain over which the aircraft was flying, the pilot was forced to land into trees and the aircraft rolled on its side. An inspection of the engine found that the number 3 connecting rod had failed. The failure was initiated by galling between the big end bearing and the connecting rod, inducing a fatigue failure of the connecting rod. Specialist opinion indicates that the engine was improperly rebuilt following a bulk strip some 200 hours earlier, in that excessive clearance was permitted between the crankshaft and big end bearing.