

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199002039**

VC Buzzard Arrow 2

30 April 1990

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199002039

Occurrence Type: Accident

Location: Erskine Park NSW

Date: 30 April 1990

Time: 1030

Highest Injury Level: Serious

Injuries:

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None
Crew	0	1	0	0
Ground	0	0	0	-
Passenger	0	0	1	0
Total	0	1	1	0

Aircraft Details: VC Buzzard Arrow 2

Registration: N/A

Serial Number: N/K

Operation Type: Private

Damage Level: Substantial

Departure Point: Orchard Hills NSW

Departure Time: 1000

Destination: Orchard Hills NSW

Approved for Release: 1st August 1991

Circumstances:

The owner of the weight-shift controlled aircraft was being given dual instruction in circuit procedures. This involved making normal approaches followed by a low level go-around. During the fourth go-around, at a height of about 50 feet, the engine suddenly stopped. The instructor took over the controls and attempted a landing in a sparsely wooded area adjacent to the landing strip, but was unable to prevent the aircraft from colliding with a tree and striking the ground heavily. A specialist examination failed to reveal any defect with the engine or fuel system. The reason for the engine stoppage could not be positively established. However, the ROTAX 532 engine was fitted with a single ignition system controlled by an unguarded toggle switch mounted on a console in the forward cockpit. The circumstances of the engine stoppage were consistent with the ignition switch being inadvertently bumped off by the front seat pilot.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. The engine stopped at a critical stage of the go-around. The reason for the stoppage could not be positively established.
2. Unfavourable terrain for forced landing.

Recommendations:

The Australian Ultralight Federation (AUF) should require ignition switches be fitted with guards to prevent inadvertent movement on all AUF registered aircraft