

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
198502515**

Britten Norman BN2A-20

3 February 1985

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 198502515
Location: Wilton NSW
Date: 3 February 1985
Highest Injury Level: Nil
Injuries:

Occurrence Type: Accident

Time: N/A

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None
Crew	0	0	1	1
Ground	0	0	0	-
Passenger	0	0	0	11
Total	0	0	0	12

Aircraft Details: Britten Norman BN2A-20
Registration: VH-IGT
Serial Number:
Operation Type: Private (Parachuting)
Damage Level: Substantial
Departure Point: Wilton NSW
Departure Time: N/A
Destination: Wilton NSW

Approved for Release: April 17th 1986

Circumstances:

During the take-off roll the aircraft did not achieve flying speed by the point where it was normally expected to become airborne. The pilot abandoned the take-off and applied maximum braking, but was unable to prevent the aircraft over-running the strip. The aircraft broke through the boundary fence and came to rest in a small ditch. The reason the aircraft did not achieve flying speed could not be positively determined. In this aircraft type, it is important that the elevator trim is correctly set for take-off. If nose-down trim is inadvertently applied, excessive rearward pressure is required on the control column in order to raise the nose. However, the trim position set by the pilot was not established. When the take-off attempt was abandoned, there was probably sufficient strip remaining to stop the aircraft. However, the brake linings and discs were worn to the extent where full brake effectiveness could not be obtained.