

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199100039**

**Britaero 146 - 300
Airbus A300 - B4-600**

13 July 1991

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199100039
Location: Sydney NSW
Date: 13 July 1991
Highest Injury Level: Nil
Injuries:

Occurrence Type: Incident
Time: 935

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None
Crew	0	0	0	0
Ground	0	0	0	-
Passenger	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	0

Aircraft Details:	Britaero 146 - 300	Airbus A300 - B4-600
Registration:	VH-EWS	VH-YMK
Serial Number:	E3197	556
Operation Type:	Regular Public Transport	Regular Public Transport
Damage Level:	Nil	Nil
Departure Point:	Sydney NSW	Sydney NSW
Departure Time:	N/A	
Destination:	Hamilton Island QLD	Perth WA

Approved for Release: 16th October 1991

Circumstances:

VH-EWS was departing from runway 16 at Sydney for Hamilton Island, followed shortly after by VH-YMK for Perth. The DEPARTURE Radar Controllers on duty at the Sydney Area Approach Control Centre (AACC), believed that a breakdown in the radar separation standard had occurred between the two aircraft shortly after take-off. The initial DEPARTURE instructions given to the Sydney Control Tower for VH-YMK were 'Cancel SID turn right heading 170 maintain 3 000'. The DEPARTURE sequence was subsequently changed twice with two aircraft VH-HVA and VH-EWS sequenced ahead of VH-YMK. Immediately following the issue of the final DEPARTURE instruction for VH-EWS, the instruction 'and YMK can be unrestricted' was passed by DEPARTURES to the Tower. The Tower understood the instruction to mean cancel the previous DEPARTURE instruction, and the aircraft may now track via the cleared SID with no altitude restriction. The

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. There was a breakdown in co-ordination between the Departures and Tower Controllers.
2. There was a different expectation and understanding of the departure instruction between the Departures and Tower Controllers.