

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
198702377**

Avions Pierre Robin R2160

06 January 1987

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

This accident was not subject to an on scene investigation.

Occurrence Number: 198702377 **Occurrence Type:** Accident
Location: Bass Point (2km SE Wollongong) NSW
Date: 06 January 1987 **Time:** N/K
Highest Injury Level: Nil
Injuries:

	Fatal	Serious	Minor	None
Crew	0	0	2	2
Ground	0	0	0	-
Passenger	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	0	2

Aircraft Details: Avions Pierre Robin R2160
Registration: VH-NXY
Serial Number:
Operation Type: Aerial Work (Dual Instruction)
Damage Level: Substantial
Departure Point: Wollongong NSW
Departure Time: N/K
Destination: Wollongong NSW

Approved for Release: July 8th 1987

Circumstances:

The student was undertaking his first instructional flight. At about 2000 feet during the climb towards the training area, the engine failed completely. A successful forced landing was carried out, however during the landing roll the gear struck a number of rocks. Initial investigation revealed a defect in the fuel cock selector mechanism, in that, irrespective of the cockpit indication, the fuel supply cock remained closed. The cable connecting the fuel shut off control in the cockpit to the fuel cock was deformed to the extent that the cock remained in the closed position. A note in the aircraft Flight Manual requires the cockpit control to be lockwired, as the manufacturer had evidently not intended that the control would be frequently manipulated. However, the instructor was not aware of the Flight Manual requirement, and had demonstrated the shut off control on numerous occasions over the past two years. He stated that he had not used the control before the flight in question, and enquiries did not reveal who might have operated the control in the period following the previous flight of the aircraft.