Contents

Summary **1**

Information sources **2**

Narrative **3**
Iron Prince 3
The incident 3
Pisces 6
Post incident actions 7

Comment and Analysis **9**
General 9
Pisces 10
Analysis 12

Conclusions **15**

Submissions **17**

Subsequent action **19**

Details of Iron Prince **21**

Details of Pisces **23**

Illustration
Portion of chart Aus 348 showing position of vessel 11

Summary

On Saturday 17 June 1995, the Australian bulk carrier Iron Prince collided with the fishing vessel Pisces to the west of Cape Nelson, Victoria at 0644 Australian Eastern Standard Time. The weather at the time was clouded sky with passing showers and gale force winds with a heavy sea and swell.

Iron Prince was on passage from Hay Point, Queensland, to Whyalla, South Australia, with a cargo of coal. The bridge watchkeepers did not see the fishing vessel in sufficient time to take full avoiding action.

Pisces, engaged in gill net shark fishing, was lying at anchor in proximity to the western end of its streamed nets. No lookout was being kept, the crew being asleep and, as the anchor light had failed, the lights being shown provided less chance of the vessel being seen by ships approaching from well abaft the beam.

After the collision, Iron Prince turned about and escorted Pisces, which had sustained damage but was still able to proceed safely, to Portland harbour.

No one was injured in the incident and there was no pollution.

Information sources

Master, Mate and Watch Integrated Rating of Iron Prince

Skipper and deckhand of Pisces

Special Services Unit of the Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne.

Portion of chart Aus 348 reproduced by permission of the Hydrographic Office, RAN.

Note:

Times, unless otherwise stated, are given in Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST).

Narrative

Iron Prince

Iron Prince is a four hold, 21,735 tonnes deadweight bulk carrier, built in 1981 at the Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries yard at Kure, Japan, and owned by BHP Transport Limited. The vessel has an overall length of 164.33 metres, a beam of 22.92 metres, a summer load draught of 9.958 metres and is equipped with three cargo cranes, located along the centre line. Bridge navigational equipment includes a GPS and two Kelvin Hughes radars, one of which, a Nucleus 6000 incorporating ARPA, was newly installed on 10 May 1995.

The vessel is manned by an Australian crew of 18, comprising a master, three mates, four engineers, seven integrated ratings and three catering staff. The three mates work a three watch, '4 on, 8 off' system at sea, while in port the 2nd and 3rd mates change to a two watch, '6 on, 6 off' watch and the mate changes to 'day work'. An integrated rating is assigned to each bridge watch, to perform lookout and helmsman duties.

The three cargo cranes, located in a fore and aft line on the centre line, with their solid structures extending higher than the wheelhouse, at sea create a blind sector for the watchkeepers on the bridge. In order that other vessels and craft are not approached undetected, it is necessary for the watchkeepers to frequently move from one side of the wheelhouse to the other.

The incident

Iron Prince sailed from Hay Point, Queensland, at 1410 on Saturday 10 June 1995, having loaded 20,518 tonnes of coal for Whyalla, South Australia. The voyage south along the Queensland and NSW coasts and then westward through the eastern Bass Strait progressed smoothly. Wilson's Promontory was passed at 1130 on Friday 16 June and at noon the weather was logged as being fine and clear with a heavily overcast sky and the wind westerly force 3.

During the afternoon of 16 June, the wind backed to the west-south-west and increased to force 6 to 7, the seas increased to moderate to rough and there were frequent rain squalls. The wind backed further during the late afternoon and evening and when the vessel was off Cape Otway, at 2200, was recorded as being from the south-south-west at gale force 8 to severe gale force 9.

At 2230, the Master wrote his night orders, which instructed that the course to be steered was 286°(T) until Cape Nelson light was bearing north at six miles, when course was to be altered to 297°(T), allowing set/gyro error as found to maintain the track. The Master also instructed the officers of the watch not to let the vessel get inside (north of) the track when passing Cape Nelson. Clocks were to be retarded 30 minutes during the night to Australian Central Standard Time (ACST).

The gale force winds, heavy seas and rain squalls continued through the early hours of 17 June. Iron Prince was rolling heavily, up to

20-25 degrees, yawing about five degrees in the beam seas and heavy southerly swell and was frequently shipping water over the port side. Visibility was moderate to good, but was reduced to between one and two miles in the rain squalls. Occasionally the moon showed through breaks in the cloud.

During the 12-4 watch, the 2nd Mate saw only two other vessels, the bulk carrier River Yarra, which had been overtaken and was two miles astern at midnight, and one fishing vessel out on the port side, about halfway through the watch. The bright working lights of the latter were clearly visible, but it was not picked up by the vessel's radar.

The Mate, following his normal practice, arrived on the bridge a few minutes early for his watch and made himself a cup of coffee before discussing the situation and going through the watch hand-over procedures with the 2nd Mate. Lady Julia Percy Island was abeam to starboard; the course being steered was 284° to make good the required 286°, allowing -2° leeway, and the vessel was making good a speed of between 11.5 and 12 knots. River Yarra at this time was about 10 or 12 miles astern and, although showing on the radar, was no longer visible.

Having taken over the watch, the Mate went about his normal routine, moving from side to side of the wheelhouse keeping a lookout, and plotting the vessel's position on the chart every 30 minutes. The only other ship apparent in the area was the overtaken River Yarra. Cape Nelson light became visible at 14 miles distance.

As a result of the heavy sea, the radar display was considerably affected by sea clutter to a range of about twelve miles, however the passing rain squalls did not have a lasting affect.

As the wheelhouse port side door was closed, being the weather door, the IR lookout took up station on the starboard bridge wing, moving into the wheelhouse during rain squalls, also occasionally to look at the radar screen.

Iron Prince was south of Cape Nelson shortly after 0520 (ACST), at which time the vessel was about three cables (556 metres) north of the course line. The Mate, therefore, did not alter course to 297°, as instructed in the Master's night orders, but maintained the 284° heading, to bring the vessel back to the course line and to counter the northerly leeway caused by the gale force south-south-westerly winds.

At about 0530 (ACST), the IR left the bridge to call the catering staff, returning after about five minutes. On his return, the Mate quickly made himself a cup of coffee in the curtained-off chartroom area, then returned to the fore part of the wheelhouse.

At 0600 (ACST) the Mate plotted the vessel's position on the chart, which indicated that Iron Prince was seven cables (1300 metres) south of the course line drawn on the chart. However, he decided to maintain the 284° heading for a while longer, until past Cape Duquesne.

A few minutes after 0600 (ACST) both the Mate, who was standing near the centre line, and the IR, who was standing in the starboard side of the

wheelhouse, saw a small, flashing white light bearing about four points on the port bow. The IR reported the light to the Mate and moved over to the centre of the wheelhouse. Looking at the light through binoculars, the IR thought the light was probably marking a cray pot and moved back to the starboard side.

The Mate continued to look at the light through binoculars, trying to determine what it was, the light occasionally being hidden by the sea and swell. After about two or three minutes the flashing light was on the port beam and at this time the Mate saw a second, similar light, again about four points on the port bow. Also about this time, the IR saw a faint white light fine on the starboard bow, which he reported to the Mate. Thinking it to be another cray pot light, he looked through binoculars and, after about half a minute, was able to make out the silhouette of a fishing vessel, single mast forward and deckhouse aft, ahead of the vessel and headed across the bow, the light showing from atop the deckhouse. He immediately called to the Mate, who went straight to the starboard side of the wheelhouse, looked at the light through binoculars and also saw the silhouette of a fishing vessel. The Mate's impression, from his quick look at the fishing vessel, was that the light was showing from within the deckhouse.

Quickly appraising the situation and realising that a collision was imminent and unavoidable, the Mate ran to the steering console, switched over from automatic to manual mode and put the wheel hard over to port, so as to minimise the impact. The IR moved over to the steering console with the Mate and stood by to execute further helm orders. The Mate then returned to the starboard side of the wheelhouse, so as to be able to watch the fishing vessel, now level with the bow/no.1 hatch, at an estimated 50 metres off.

Although the wheel was hard to port, because of the sea condition, the vessel responded only slowly. At a time noted by the Mate as being 0614 (ACST) the two vessels came into contact, the bow of the fishing vessel coming into contact with Iron Prince's starboard side plating towards the after end of no.4 hold, at an angle of about 60 degrees. Watching from above, the Mate could not see any lights at all on the fishing vessel.

As soon as the two vessels came into contact, the Mate ordered 'hard a' starboard', to try and swing the stern clear, but heard the crunching of timber, indicating a second contact. When the fishing vessel had passed clear astern, the Mate ordered 'port 20', to start turning Iron Prince about to port and, at 0616 (ACST) he telephoned the Master and called the fishing vessel on VHF16.

The Master arrived on the bridge almost immediately, having already been up and dressed and at about 0620 (ACST) the fishing vessel was seen to switch on two bright deck working lights. After being appraised of the situation by the Mate, the Master took over control at 0623 (ACST), giving instructions to the IR to circle the fishing vessel so that its condition could be ascertained.

The fishing vessel was called repeatedly on VHF16, but there was no response until 0638 (ACST) when the

skipper reported that his vessel had been damaged, but was not taking in water and there were no casualties. He also advised Iron Prince that he would proceed to Portland and the Master advised the skipper that Iron Prince would stand by in case assistance was needed.

At 0636 (ACST) while attempting to make contact with the fishing vessel on VHF, the Master transmitted a message to MRCC, Canberra, advising them of the incident, giving the position, according to the GPS, as 38° 28.1′S 141° 17.5′E.

Pisces

Pisces is a 14.08 metre timber fishing vessel, having a single mast in the fore part and a deckhouse in the after part. The vessel is equipped with modern Furuno electronic navigation aids, '72' marine radar, GP-1250 GPS, GD-180 Mk II colour video plotter (electronic chart) and video sounder.

The vessel is operated out of Portland by the owner/ skipper, who normally employs one deckhand, and is used mainly for gill net shark fishing. Two nets are used, each three metres deep and 1,250 metres long, with floats attached to the upper edge and weights to the lower edge, so that they deploy vertically from the sea bed. A recovery line, with a marker buoy at the upper end, is attached to each end of each net. Attached to each marker buoy is a small light fitting, which utilises two standard 'D' torch batteries and which exhibits a flashing white light.

The nets are deployed in a straight line, running in the general direction of the tide, which helps keep the nets reasonably tight. The nets are usually hauled after being deployed for a period of six hours, the catch being sorted, cleaned and stowed as the net is hauled aboard. As soon as this work is completed, the nets are redeployed. During the six hour periods that the nets are deployed, Pisces is anchored in close proximity to the last marker buoy and the skipper and deckhand have a meal and get some sleep in the small cabin aft of, and below, the wheelhouse. It is normal practice for both the skipper and the deckhand to sleep at the same time. At night, an anchor light is exhibited at the masthead, but no deck lights are shown because, with the engine stopped, they would drain the batteries and it would not be possible to restart the engine.

Normally, the skipper stays out fishing for one week and he had sailed from Portland at 1600 on Monday 14 June 1995 to fish off Cape Nelson. On this occasion, in addition to the deckhand, he took a friend on board, who had expressed a wish to go along 'for the experience'. Because the cabin is small and fitted with only two bunks, the friend had to bunk-down on the wheelhouse deck.

The fishing proved to be good and the skipper returned to Portland on 16 June to unload the catch, sailing again straight afterwards, at 1730. The skipper returned to the Cape Nelson area, and deployed the nets at about 1930. Instead of waiting for the usual six hours, the skipper decided to haul in the nets after only an hour and a half.

The wind had been increasing during the day and by the evening was

blowing at about 20 knots, with quite a high sea running. However, the skipper had worked in much rougher seas off Tasmania and Pisces was a good sea boat, riding well, so he did not consider returning to Portland.

The nets were redeployed, working westward, at 0130 on 17 June, after which Pisces was anchored close to the western-most net marker buoy, in position by GPS 38° 27.9′S 141° 17.8′E (259° x 11.75 miles from Cape Nelson lighthouse). As the anchor light had failed during the evening of 16 June, the skipper left the navigation lights switched on, with the exception of the stern light, which had not been working for some time and for which the skipper had substituted a deck light, located on the aft bulkhead of the deckhouse. The three men had something to eat and then went to bed at about 0230, the nets being due to be hauled in at 0730.

At a time they thought to be about 0700, all three men were woken by a noise which to them sounded as if Pisces was striking against rocks. The skipper scrambled up into the wheelhouse, closely followed by the deckhand. Right ahead of them they could see the stern of a vessel and realised they had been hit. Very much shaken, the skipper put a call out over the VHF 'I've been hit - I've been hit' and switched on the two deck working lights, located on the front of the wheelhouse.

The three men then went out on deck and checked everything, to see what damage had been caused by the collision. Although the stem bar had been pushed to starboard and the port side bulwark pushed inboard and upwards, Pisces did not appear to be taking in any water. The mast had been pushed over, but not right down and was swaying dangerously as the vessel rolled.

The skipper contacted the vessel, which had turned about after the collision, on VHF16. He informed them no one had been injured, that although damaged, Pisces was not taking water and he intended proceeding to Portland. He then used his mobile telephone to contact his father, to let him know what had happened. Before getting under way, the three men pulled down and secured the mast over the starboard bow.

The other vessel identified itself as the Iron Prince, and the skipper was informed that Iron Prince would escort Pisces to Portland.

Post incident actions

After the exchange of information, the skipper of Pisces set course to pass close to Cape Nelson, while the Master of Iron Prince shaped courses to keep further to seaward. Initially, Pisces' deck lights were clearly visible to those aboard Iron Prince and, looking through binoculars, the Mate was also able to see that vessel's green sidelight.

At 0738, the Master was able to contact Portland Harbour Control on VHF, to inform them of what had happened and that Iron Prince was escorting Pisces to Portland. At 0745, the skipper called Iron Prince on VHF and informed the Master that Pisces was taking water in the forecastle, but the pump was coping.

With the arrival of daylight, at about 0730 (Sunrise 0752), those on Iron

Prince totally lost sight of Pisces, the fishing vessel being concealed by the heavy sea and swell. However, the skipper gave the Master regular progress reports, reporting that he was half a mile off Cape Nelson at 0838. At 0900, the skipper informed the Master that, provided the swell was not too high, he intended passing between Danger Point and Lawrence Rocks. Checking with the Portland Harbour Master, the Master was advised that there was a heavy swell off Danger Point and this information was passed to the skipper, who then kept to seaward of the rocks.

Pisces passed Lawrence Rocks at 0943, after which time Iron Prince lost VHF contact with the fishing vessel. The next information the Master received was at 1009, when Pisces was sighted by Portland Harbour Control.

Pisces entered Portland harbour at 1014 and Iron Prince was released to resume passage to Whyalla.

Comment and Analysis

General

The collision between Iron Prince and Pisces came about because Pisces was not detected, either visually or by radar, in sufficient time for effective avoiding action to be taken by the officer of the watch aboard Iron Prince.

The Special Services Unit of the Bureau of Meteorology, Melbourne, provided the investigating officer with an analysis of the weather and sea conditions at the time of the collision. The wind was from the south-south-west at 30/35 knots, gusting 40/45 knots, the significant wave height was around four metres and the southerly swell height around four metres to six metres. The period of the dominant swell peaks would have been in the region of six to eight seconds. Visibility was good, but this would have been reduced in rain showers.

The bridge of Iron Prince was appropriately manned by an officer of the watch and a rating, both of whom were keeping a lookout, both visually and by radar. The fact that both saw the flashing marker buoy light, at four points on the port bow, prior to sighting the light on Pisces, indicates that both were alert.

At no time, either before or after the collision, was Pisces indicated on Iron Prince's radar. The heavy sea and swell were causing considerable sea clutter on the radar screen, which would have masked any intermittent small target return there may have been from Pisces.

Being of wooden construction, and not carrying a radar reflector, Pisces would not present a good radar target. In the sea and swell conditions existing at the time of the collision, Pisces would have been hidden from view, both to observers and radar, for much of the time.

When riding at anchor, Pisces normally exhibits a single anchor light from the top of the mast, the highest point. Under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (the regulations), this light has to be visible all around, through 360°, at a distance of at least two miles. However, this light had failed during the evening of 16 June and, because of its inaccessibility in rough weather, the skipper, in lieu, exhibited the steaming lights.

The white masthead light for a vessel the size of Pisces is required to be visible at a distance of at least three miles. However, those on Iron Prince saw only a single, dim white light on Pisces, they did not see a red sidelight, which indicates Iron Prince approached on Pisces' port quarter.

The vessel's stern light (visibility requirement two miles) is located on top of and at the after end of the wheelhouse. However, this light also was not working and the skipper stated he had switched on a deck light, a light he considered to be much brighter than the stern light, located on the after bulkhead and about one metre lower than the stern light. The Mate, on the other hand, stated that he saw no lights at all on Pisces as it passed along the

side of Iron Prince. Whereas very little glow might be seen from the small sized masthead and port side lights, when viewed from above and abaft the beam, a deck light on the aft bulkhead would be expected to illuminate the stern area.

The lights being shown by Pisces on the night of 16/17 June 1995, were not those prescribed in the regulations for a vessel at anchor and greatly reduced the chances of early detection by a vessel approaching from astern or on the quarter.

The importance of maintaining and showing the correct, regulation lights, and of keeping the glasses clear of salt and grime so as not to reduce their effectiveness, in order that a vessel can be readily seen by others in all weather and sea conditions, cannot be over emphasised.

Pisces

Pisces was built and licenced as a USL Code Class 3b vessel, a seagoing fishing vessel for use in all areas up to and including Offshore Operations, restricted to 100 nautical miles seaward of the coastline. The minimum safety manning for the vessel, under the USL Code and where the skipper also holds the appropriate MED 3 engineering qualification, is two.

The 24-hour work schedule operated by the crew makes it extremely difficult to arrange sufficient sleep periods and also maintain the lookout required by the regulations. The normal practice on board such vessels is for both the skipper and the deckhand to sleep at the same time and, contrary to the regulations, for no lookout to be kept. Although a third person was on board at the time of the incident, the work schedule was the same and that person was not experienced enough to be a substitute for either the skipper or the deckhand in the fishing activity.

It is just as important for small vessels to not only keep a lookout, but also to be seen, especially in rough sea conditions, when the vessels should be made as conspicuous as possible.

The regulations allow for vessels to make light signals to attract the attention of another vessel, provided that such light signals cannot be mistaken for any other signal or aid to navigation. However, it should be noted that high intensity intermittent lights or revolving lights, such as strobes, are expressly excluded.

Pisces has four flood lights mounted on the mast and two flood lights mounted on the forward side of the deckhouse, which would be ideal for the purpose of attracting attention. These deck lights are powered by the fishing vessel's 24V battery system, which is constantly charged by the engine, but with the engine stopped, the lights drain the batteries in about three to four hours. As the 24V battery system is also the power source for starting the engine, this precludes the use of the deck lights for a prolonged period while the engine is stopped.

There is no requirement that such vessels should be equipped with a generator of sufficient power to run the deck flood lights while the engine is stopped at sea. The provision of such equipment, however, would appear to be appropriate.



Portion of chart Aus 348 showing positions of vessels

Vessels of wooden construction are very poor radar targets and can go undetected by ships' radars, particularly in rough sea conditions. Radar reflectors can help increase the probability of a vessel's detection by radar and should always be carried.

Analysis

When the Mate, looking through binoculars, saw the silhouette of Pisces, close ahead, fine on the starboard bow and at right angles to Iron Prince's course, he reacted quickly and instinctively. He put the wheel hard a'port, in an effort 'to reduce the impact'.

Although going hard a'port caused the bow to swing away from Pisces, because a ship turns about its pivotal point, initially the stern would have moved to starboard of the track, towards Pisces. Also, Iron Prince was making leeway, to starboard.

The Mate considered that when Pisces was abreast the bow, it was about 50 metres to starboard, which should have been sufficient for Iron Prince to pass clear. If the distance off was not over-estimated, it is possible that either Pisces was sprung forward by its anchor rope or Iron Prince fouled the anchor rope, which parted as a result of the collision, and pulled Pisces into the ship's side.

From the positions the Mate had plotted on the chart, between 0500 and 0530 (ACST) Iron Prince, steering 284°, made good a course of 287.6° and between 0530 and 0600 (ACST) a course of 292°. Had the Mate done nothing, with the stated position of Pisces on the starboard bow when first seen, it is possible that Iron Prince would have run the fishing vessel down, striking it with the stem.

The Pisces skipper had marked the GPS positions of the end marker buoys and his anchor position on the Furuno electronic plotter. These indicate that the nets were deployed along the 50 metre depth contour and that Pisces was anchored in position 38° 27.99′S 141° 17.72′E (corrected to Australian Geodetic Survey).

The Mate aboard Iron Prince was utilising visual bearings, radar bearings and radar distances for plotting the vessel's position on the chart. The 0600 and 0616 (ACST) positions place Iron Prince about nine cables, or about 1670 metres inshore of Pisces and its nets. The visual bearing (083°) of Cape Nelson light and distance off by radar (11.4 miles) plotted on the chart at 0623 (ACST) is also north of the Pisces position.

However, the GPS position given to MRCC Canberra by the Master at 0623 (ACST), 38° 28.1′S 141° 17.5′E, seven minutes after the collision and after Iron Prince had turned about to port, was very close south-west of the Pisces GPS position. Also, Iron Prince's track made good between 0500 and 0530 (ACST) projected, passes between Pisces and the western most net marker buoy.

A note on chart Aus 348 states that positions obtained by GPS need to be adjusted 0.09′ southward and 0.08′ westward to agree with the chart. After adjustment, the 0623 GPS–derived position placed Iron

Prince 0.99′ south and 0.63′ west of the position obtained by visual bearing and radar distance. The Pisces positions had been plotted some six hours before the incident, therefore, this discrepancy between GPS–derived and terrestrial observation positions would appear to be more than an isolated localised phenomenon.

Although the fact that the Mate had not altered course off Cape Nelson, allowing for the set and drift as experienced up to that time (3.6°), was not a causal factor, it did have an indirect bearing on the collision. The use of parallel indexing on the radar, rather than reliance upon positions obtained at half-hourly intervals, would have given early indication of whether the allowance for set was sufficient and would have assisted compliance with the Master's night order not to let the vessel get inside the track.

Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident and should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.

1. The manning on the bridge of Iron Prince was appropriate and the visual lookout alert. However, the lights being shown by Pisces were not seen in sufficient time for full avoiding action to be taken.

2. The lights being shown by Pisces on the night of 16/17 June 1995, were not those prescribed in the regulations for a vessel at anchor and greatly reduced the chances of early detection by a vessel approaching from astern or on the quarter.

3. There was no lookout being kept aboard Pisces.

4. The minimum safe manning requirement for Pisces, as detailed in the Uniform Shipping Laws Code and the State of Victoria marine regulations, makes the maintaining of a lookout at all times impractical.

4. The electrical supply, as required by regulation, aboard Pisces, was inadequate to provide sustained power to the deck lights when the engine was stopped.

5. The timber construction of Pisces made the vessel's detection by radar unlikely in the prevailing heavy sea conditions.

6. The Master of Iron Prince, in making contact with Pisces, in advising the authorities of the collision and in escorting Pisces to Portland, acted appropriately after the incident.

Submissions

Under sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report, or part of a report, relates to a person's affairs to a material extent, the Inspector must, if it is reasonable to do so, give the person a copy of the report or the relevant part of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a person may provide written comments or information relating to the report.

The report was sent to the Master, Mate and Watch IR of Iron Prince and to the skipper and deckhand of Pisces.

A submission was received from the skipper of Pisces, concerning the time when the anchor light failed, and the text has been amended accordingly.

Subsequent action

When Pisces underwent repairs after the collision, the skipper installed a 240V generator and deck lighting system, to ensure good deck illumination and conspicuity at all times.

Details of Iron Prince

Flag	Australian
Lloyd's Number	8018041
Year of build	1981
Type	Geared bulk carrier
Owner	BHP Transport
Builder	Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Ind.
Classification	Det Norske Veritas
Length overall	164.33 metres
Beam	22.86 metres
Summer draught	9.958 metres
GRT	15,071
NRT	7353
Summer deadweight	21,735
Engine	2SA 6cyl Sulzer 6620 kW
Crew	18 Australian

Details of Pisces

Identification number	UMI
Year of build	1977
Home port	Apollo Bay, Victoria
Owner	Ballinger Pty Ltd.
Construction	Timber
Type	Gill net shark/cray fishing vessel
USL Code category	3b
Length	14.08 metres
Beam	5 metres
Tonnage	26
Engine	134.28 kW
Crew	2 Australian