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# Summary

On 22 February 1995, tropical cyclone 'Bobby' was moving in a west-south-westerly direction off the north-west coast of Australia, gradually increasing in intensity.

At 0600 on 23 February, Bobby was located 136 nautical miles to the north of Dampier and, as a safety precaution, vessels lying at anchor in Dampier Roads were instructed to weigh anchor and proceed to sea.

The Maltese flag, 61,297 deadweight tonnes bulk carrier Bulkazores, one of six vessels at anchor, was the first vessel to clear the anchorage. The Master took the vessel two miles beyond port limits and then hove-to, to ride out the developing storm.

At 0722 on 24 February, the Master of Bulkazores advised Dampier Port Control that Bulkazores was being set towards the shore and, at 1026, the

vessel took the ground close to Kendrew Island.

Bulkazores refloated at 1633, at high water, and the Master, on advice from the Harbour Master, let go the starboard anchor. Bulkazores then safely rode out the remainder of the storm. After inspection by divers, the vessel was moved on 28 February, to a position close to Dampier public wharf.

An inspection by divers indicated extensive scratching and paint removal, but only relatively minor indentations in the bottom plating. On 2 March, after an internal inspection confirmed that no tanks had been ruptured, the Classification Society declared Bulkazores fit to load cargo.

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority's Senior Marine Surveyor, Karratha, was appointed as an investigator under regulation 6 of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations to undertake the field investigation.

# Information sources

Master of Bulkazores.

Harbour Master and Deputy Harbour  
Master, Port of Dampier.

Burns Philp Shipping, Dampier.

Bureau of Meteorology, Special  
Services Unit, Perth.

## **Acknowledgements**

Portions of charts Aus 741 and  
Aus 4060 reproduced by permission of  
the Hydrographic Office, RAN.

The Inspector gratefully acknowledges  
the co-operation of the the Australian  
Maritime Safety Authority in releasing  
the Senior Marine Surveyor, Karratha,  
to conduct the field investigation.

# Narrative

## Bulkazores

Bulkazores is a Maltese flag bulk carrier, built at Sakai, Japan, in December 1977, having an overall length of 225 metres, a breadth of 32.2 metres and a deadweight of 61,297 tonnes at a summer draught of 12.45 metres. The vessel is manned by a crew of 28, comprising Croatian master, chief and first engineers, and Filipino mate, junior officers and ratings.

The vessel's operator, Bulkitalia Overseas Monaco of Monte Carlo, has a policy of contracting Oceanroutes (USA) to provide ocean weather routing advice to its ship masters.

## The voyage 20–22 February 1995

During the evening of 20 February 1995, Bulkazores passed southward through the Lombok Strait, on passage in ballast from Singapore to Dampier, where it was to load a cargo of about 54,500 tonnes of iron ore for Qinhuang Dao in the Peoples Republic of China. The vessel entered the Australian Ship Reporting Area, on passing latitude 12° South, at 1100 on 21 February and the Master duly sent a 'Sailing Plan' report to MRCC Canberra.

From 15 February 1995, the Master received telexed information from the vessel's agent at Dampier, updating the ship berthing schedule. This schedule indicated that Bulkazores and the bulk carrier Anna were due to arrive at the

Dampier pilot about the same time, late on 22 February. At 1458 on 21 February, the agent telexed the Master 'Competing vessel "Anna" ETA 2300/22. First to arrive will POB\* 0630/25 second to arrive will POB 0230/26. Please try to arrive first.'

At 0821 on 21 February, the Master had received a telex from Oceanroutes, advising him of a developing tropical depression, located off Cape Voltaire, in the north of Western Australia. Ten hours later, at 1818, the Master received advice from Oceanroutes to 'reduce speed and alter course to south-south-east, to allow the tropical depression to pass 100 nautical miles ahead of the vessel'. As the depression was about 360 miles to the east-south-east of Bulkazores and as the weather at the vessel was good, the Master decided not to act on the advice and informed Oceanroutes accordingly. At 2317, he received a telex from Oceanroutes advising him that 'Satellite imagery shows that this system is quite well organised' and, as he had decided to maintain course and speed, he must now make best speed to Dampier.

The depression continued to intensify during the night, moving west-south-westerly off the coast, and developed to tropical cyclone proportions. At 0847 on 22 February, the Master received a telexed 'tropical cyclone' advice from Oceanroutes, with the recommendation that he proceed direct to Dampier with best speed. Throughout the day, the Master received a number of gale and storm warnings, issued by the Bureau of Meteorology, Perth, all indicating that tropical cyclone 'Bobby' was moving

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\* POB - Pilot on board

west-south-west at 10 knots and intensifying.

Bulkazores arrived in the Dampier Roads late in the evening of 22 February, anchoring at 2300, four hours ahead of Anna. At this time the wind was from the south-south-east, force 6, and the barometer steady at 1003 hpa. The vessel's draught was 5.8 metres forward and 6.4 metres aft, ballast being carried in the fore peak tank, the aft peak tank and the wing and double bottom ballast tanks, but not in no.4 hold, which also serves as a heavy weather ballast tank.

## The incident

By 0530 on 23 February, tropical cyclone Bobby had moved to a position 135 miles north of Dampier and had changed direction to south-west. Dampier Port Control advised the vessels lying at anchor in the Roads of the approaching tropical cyclone and, as a safety precaution, instructed them to weigh anchor and proceed to sea. Bulkazores was the first vessel to clear, getting under way at 0630.

The Master took Bulkazores, at half ahead, to a position two miles beyond the port limits, then hove-to, on a north-easterly heading, to ride out the threatening gale. The wind at this time was from the east at near gale force 7 (28 to 33 knots), the barometer at 1000 hpa and falling slowly.

The wind remained from the east for the rest of the morning and early afternoon, gradually increasing in strength to strong gale force 9 (41 to 47 knots) by noon, while the barometer continued to fall. In mid afternoon, the

wind shifted to the east-north-east, after which the barometer steadied at 994 hpa and in the early evening the wind eased to gale force 8 (34 to 40 knots).

The Master maintained the main engine at half ahead and maintained Bulkazores on a generally north-easterly heading until early evening, when he altered course to 030°. From the time of first heaving-to, Bulkazores was first set to the east, for about 3.5 miles, then between 1200 and 2000, four miles westward, and then between 2000 and 2400, four miles eastward.

The wind freshened slightly during the late evening and shortly after midnight shifted to the north-east. The barometer then started to fall and the wind to increase, becoming 986 hpa and storm force 10 (48 to 55 knots) respectively by 0600 on 24 February and 985 hpa and violent storm force 11 (56 to 63 knots) by 0800.

From midnight 23 February, Bulkazores was again set westward, but after 0200 on 24 February, the vessel started to be set to the south-west. At 0440, the Master increased engine speed to full ahead, but this had little effect on the direction of drift and at 0500 he instructed the engineers to change from diesel fuel to heavy oil and to work up to full sea speed. However, at 0520, at which time Bulkazores was only 4.8 miles north of shoal water, the vessel started to be set to the south.

In an effort to change the direction of drift, the Master altered course to 090°, but this only increased the southerly



rate of drift and so he brought Bulkazores around to port, to head due north. With the vessel just 2.5 miles from shoal water, the direction of drift changed to the west-south-west, parallel to the line of shoal water off Rosemary Island.

At 0722, the Master made contact with Dampier Port Control on VHF, gave them Bulkazores' position as a radar bearing and distance of the Sea Buoy, and informed them that Bulkazores was being driven by the wind. At 0745, the Dampier Port Control duty officer was able to identify the radar echo of Bulkazores amongst the heavy sea clutter on the radar screen. He commenced to plot the vessel's movement, doing so until it became screened by Rosemary Island, at about 0900.

At 0850, the Master was advised by Dampier Port Control to let go the anchors, but he considered that it would be too dangerous to send men out on deck.

At 0940, Bulkazores lost steerage, failing to respond to hard to port rudder, and the bow fell to starboard, off the wind. The vessel again started to be driven south, towards shoal water and Kendrew Island, a small island to the west of Rosemary Island. Bulkazores touched the bottom at 1025 and was hard aground on a heading of 045° at 1030, in a position half a mile south-west of Kendrew Island.

Driven firmly aground, Bulkazores remained quite steady, with little movement. The Master maintained contact with Dampier Port Control and requested that the vessel's owner be

advised. The Dampier Port Control duty officer also advised MRCC, Canberra and the Marine Division of the Western Australian Department of Transport. Emergency and oil response teams were placed on alert and pollution control equipment was despatched to Dampier as a precautionary measure. The wind conditions, 70 to 80 knots as indicated by the vessel's anemometer, ruled out evacuation of the crew by helicopter, but the Master confirmed that they were safe.

By noon, the wind had veered to the north and the barometer had dropped to 982 hpa. Then, as the afternoon progressed, the barometer started to rise, the wind shifted to the north-west and by 1600 had eased from hurricane to storm force strength.

At 1615, Bulkazores started rolling and pitching and at 1630, the time of predicted high water, refloated and the Master asked Dampier Port Control for a course to steer to safe water. The duty officer asked the Master which navigation chart he was using and, learning that the Master was not using the large scale chart, advised him to anchor, giving him a safe position two miles to the south-east of the grounding position.

Bulkazores anchored, as advised, at 1700 and safely rode out the remainder of the cyclone, the wind continuing to decrease during the night, to become force 7 by 0500 on 25 February.

At about 0600 on 25 February, the Master was advised by the Mate that there was oil on the water around the vessel's stern. He went to see for himself, then advised Dampier Port

Control. Checking again, the Master found that the oil patch, extending about 50 metres, had detached itself from the vessel and no further oil appeared.


The Dampier Harbour Master, accompanied by a diving company representative, boarded the vessel from a helicopter at 0730 on 25 February and ascertained that the vessel was safe and had not been holed during the time it was aground. Satisfied that the vessel was not in any danger and in a safe anchorage, the Harbour Master instructed the Master that Bulkazores should remain where it was until divers had been able to conduct an inspection of the vessel's bottom plating.

Divers conducted an initial inspection on 26 February but, due to a two-metre sea running and murky water, were



unable to carry out a detailed inspection. On instructions from the Harbour Master, the crew of Bulkazores transferred fuel oil bunkers from Nos. 5 and 6 centre double bottom tanks, the apparent area of greatest damage, to Nos. 2 and 3 centre double bottom tanks and deballasted to achieve a draught of 4.5 metres forward and 5.5 metres aft.

Accompanied by an offshore supply vessel, Bulkazores was then moved on 28 February, via the shallower waters of the Dampier Archipelago, to a position close to the Dampier public wharf.

On 2 March 1995, after further internal and external inspection of the hull, the Classification Society surveyor declared Bulkazores to be 'in class' and sound in all respects to load its cargo.



Tracks of Bulkazores and cyclone Bobby

 Cyclone Bobby  
 Bulkazores

# Comment

## Tropical Cyclone Bobby

Tropical cyclone Bobby developed from an area of localised low pressure that formed over the Timor Sea. The area of low pressure moved in a west-south-westerly direction, initially at 15 knots and slowly intensified and at 2000 on 20 February, the low pressure area was located off Admiralty Gulf. At 0800 on 21 February it was located north of King Sound, by which time it had developed into a tropical depression, with a central pressure of 1000 hpa and was considered likely to develop into a tropical cyclone.

By 2000 on 21 February, the tropical low had moved to a position 100 miles north-west of Cape Leveque and was still moving west-south-west, but had slowed to about 10 knots. The Bureau of Meteorology Tropical Cyclone Warning Centre, Perth, issued a gale warning at this time.

The tropical low was designated tropical cyclone Bobby in a gale warning issued by the Bureau at 0700 on 22 February. The pressure at the centre by this time had dropped to 995 hpa, while the movement was still to the west-south-west at 10 knots.

Bobby continued to move in a west-south-westerly direction, at about 10 knots, until about 2000 on 22 February, when it changed direction to the south-west and started to slow down. At 0600 on 23 February, it was located 126 miles north of Dampier, slowing


and intensifying. By 2100 on 23 February, Bobby had intensified to 955 hpa while its speed had dropped to about four knots and at about this time it changed direction to the south.

At about 0300 on 24 February, 'Bobby's' direction changed to the south-south-east, but at about 0600, when it was just 60 miles north-west of Dampier, its movement changed back to the south. Bobby maintained a southerly direction until about 1200, by which time it had moved to a position 54 miles to the west, and slightly south of Dampier. It then moved south-westerly, parallel to the coast, for about six hours before again changing direction to the south, and crossed the coast just to the east of Onslow, at its greatest intensity (930 hpa), at about 2200 on 24 February. Thereafter it continued to move south, and later south-east, diminishing in intensity.

## Tropical cyclone avoidance

A knowledge of the characteristics of and avoidance procedures for tropical revolving storms (tropical cyclones in the southern hemisphere) is a part of basic seamanship and is a requirement under the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (Appendix to Regulation II/2, paragraph 6[b])

Tropical cyclone movement and avoidance procedures for vessels are well documented in such publications as the British Admiralty Sailing Directions (Pilots), The Mariner's Handbook and the HMSO publication Meteorology for Mariners.



Section of Dampier Port Control plot of cyclone Bobby

In the southern hemisphere, tropical cyclones generally move in a west-south-westerly direction and then change to a south-easterly direction. Those that develop off the north-west coast of Australia occasionally maintain a west-south-westerly direction into the South Indian Ocean, but usually turn and cross the coast line north of 23° South latitude. The cyclone season is from November to April, with maximum cyclone occurrence during the months of January, February and March.

The 'dangerous semicircle' of tropical cyclones moving off the north-west coast of Australia lies on the southern, landward side of the tropical cyclone's track and is the sector that the mariner should endeavour to avoid. A vessel caught close to land in this semicircle has the added danger of being caught on a lee shore.

Modern technology, satellite imagery and satellite communications, removes the guesswork regarding tropical cyclone position and movement, ship masters being provided with regular and reliable information. In addition, a number of commercial enterprises offer a weather routing service, providing ship masters with advice on weather and sea conditions and recommending routes and courses to avoid adverse conditions and so expedite the voyage. All of this makes the ship master's task much easier, but the basic principles of good seamanship still apply. The position and movement of tropical cyclones, and the local weather conditions all need to be carefully monitored and, wherever possible, close encounter with tropical cyclones should be avoided.

## **Decisions and actions of Master**

The Master first received advice of the formation of a tropical low on the morning of 21 February. In the evening, he received further advice that indicated that the tropical low was developing and the recommendation that he reduce speed and alter course to the south-south-east, to allow the depression to pass 100 miles ahead of Bulkazores.

Based on the weather conditions at the vessel at that time, south-westerly winds of force 4 (11 to 16 knots) the Master decided to maintain course and speed for Dampier.

At the time he received the second message, the developing depression was 340 miles to the east-south-east of Bulkazores and therefore indication of a tropical disturbance would not be present. Tropical cyclones are very local meteorological disturbances, with gale force winds usually not extending much more than 150 miles from the centre, even when the cyclone is fully developed. Weather conditions 340 miles from the centre were not appropriate criteria on which to make a decision. Having received the recommendation to take avoiding action, the decision making process should have taken into consideration the fact that it was the middle of the cyclone season and therefore there was the possibility of a tropical cyclone developing. Also, the fact that tropical cyclones move in a west-south-westerly direction in that area, means that movement of a cyclone is towards Dampier.

Dampier, like most ports where a number of vessels may be waiting to load cargo, governs the order of berthing according to the date and time of a vessel's arrival at the pilot station. During the afternoon of 21 February, before he had received the advice from Oceanroutes to take avoiding action, the Master received a request from the agent to try to arrive ahead of 'competing vessel Anna'. Although the Master stated that his decision was based purely on his observations of the weather, it is considered that this request would have been a significant influencing factor behind the Master's decision not to heed the advice of Oceanroutes.

It is considered that the Master would have been prudent to have acted upon the initial recommendation made by Oceanroutes and to have taken avoiding action, rather than maintaining course and speed to Dampier.

The first advice that the Master received that a tropical cyclone had in fact developed was at 0839 on 22 February. At this time Bulkazores was 195 miles from Dampier Sea Buoy and tropical cyclone Bobby, moving west-south-westwards at an estimated eight knots, was bearing about 078° at a distance of about 170 miles from Bulkazores. Although Bobby was now abaft Bulkazores' port beam, the vessel had not yet crossed the cyclone's projected track, in fact it did not do so until about four hours later, at about 1300. The Master was therefore in a position to reverse his course, to allow Bobby to pass before he continued his passage to Dampier. It is interesting to

note, however, Oceanroutes' recommendation at that time was that he proceed direct to Dampier with best speed. Oceanroutes were invited to provide the rationale behind their recommendation, but declined to comment. It is considered that this advice was only reasonable provided the cyclone could be expected to maintain its west-south-westerly movement and not change direction towards Dampier.

The Master received three more telex messages on 22 February, concerning Bobby, a gale warning at 1114 and storm warnings at 1233 and 1855. Even as late as 1233 on 22 February, at which time Bobby was located about 150 miles west-north-west of Bulkazores, the Master still had the opportunity to reverse course and take the vessel clear.

When Bulkazores received instructions from Dampier Port Control at 0600 on 23 February, Bobby was located 136 miles due north of Dampier and was now moving south-west at 10 knots. This change in direction should have indicated to the Master that Bobby might be about to swing to the south, towards the coast, in fact it was this change in direction that caused Dampier Port Authority to instruct the vessels anchored in the Roads to put to sea. Of the six ships lying in Dampier Roads, four steamed off to the north-east as soon as they had cleared the Sea Buoy and whereas a fifth returned to the anchorage, it too proceeded north-eastwards after again being ordered to leave. The Master of Bulkazores, however, decided to heave-to just outside port limits.

The Master claimed to have taken action to avoid tropical cyclones on a number of occasions in the past. On this occasion, despite his stated earlier experiences of tropical cyclones, he displayed a fundamental error of judgement.

By noon on 23 February, Bulkazores was experiencing gale to severe gale force winds, which had been blowing steadily from the east for more than eight hours, which should have indicated to the Master that Bobby was closing. At 1300, the Master received a telex message indicating that Bobby had swung further towards the south and was now moving south-south-westwards, but he did not alter his plans, remaining hove-to within eight miles of shoal water.

It is apparent that Bulkazores' difficulties started shortly after 0200 on 24 February. Up until that time, the vessel had been set roughly eastwards and westwards, but from about 0200 on 24 February the vessel started to be set south-westwards. Realising the problem, the Master increased engine speed to full ahead at 0440 and to full sea speed at 0500, but despite this, Bulkazores started to be set almost due south. At this time, Bobby was located just 57 miles west-north-west of Bulkazores and was moving south-south-easterly.

At 0620, with the wind from the north-east at storm force 10 and the vessel setting to the south, the Master altered course to 090° (east), in the hope that the vessel would be set to the south-west, to keep the vessel clear of the shoal water north of Rosemary Island.

It is obvious that the Master did not make any calculations before carrying out this manoeuvre, had he done so, he would have seen that this manoeuvre would increase the southerly drift, as indeed occurred. Once the effect of this manoeuvre was appreciated, the Master altered course to head north, which slowed the southerly set. From about 0722, Bulkazores started to be set to the south-west, probably due to the effect of the tide and current, and this removed the immediate concern about being driven onto the shoals.

However, at about 0900, Bulkazores again started to be set to the south. Bobby had paused in its track, but was now moving south, just over 40 miles to the west of Bulkazores. The hurricane force winds, now blowing from the north-north-east, drove Bulkazores onto the shoals to the west of Rosemary Island, just half a mile from Kendrew Island.

Bulkazores was driven south, towards shoal water on two occasions, between 0500 and 0720 on 24 February and between 0900 and the time of grounding. The Master said that he did not let go the anchors because it was too dangerous to send the crew forward. However, after Bulkazores refloated at 1630 on 24 February, members of the crew did venture forward and the vessel was safely brought to anchor.

Whereas the wind and sea conditions at the time of the grounding were probably near their most severe, the conditions between 1630 and 1700 were very similar to those that were experienced between 0500 and 0700.

According to the investigating officer, the Master was very composed and self confident. The Dampier Port Control duty officer gained the same impression talking to the Master over the VHF radio at the time of the incident.

At no time does the Master appear to have discussed the situation with his officers, his decisions being based entirely on his own judgement. Had he discussed the probable movement of first the tropical depression and then cyclone Bobby with his navigating officers, then at least the possibility of being caught on a lee shore, and the measures to avoid such a situation, should have been considered and perhaps later acted upon.

Similarly, had the Master taken his officers and the bosun into his confidence at 0600 on 24 February, when it became obvious that at full sea speed Bulkazores was still being driven by the wind and sea, it is possible that the vessel could have been anchored at that time. The water depth was around 35 metres (19 fathoms), a suitable depth for anchoring and, with sufficient scope of cable, the anchors may have held.

The Master had conducted the ballast passage from Singapore in the normal ballast condition, wing and double bottom ballast tanks filled. After

receiving warnings of the tropical cyclone developing and moving towards the Dampier area, at no time, particularly whilst the weather conditions were still fair, did the Master consider filling no.4 cargo hold with seawater ballast, the normal heavy weather ballast condition. Even if Bobby maintained its west-south-westerly movement, it was likely that Dampier would still experience strong winds. Filling no.4 hold would have added an additional 10,900 tonnes of ballast, increasing the vessel's draught by between 1.75 and 2 metres. This would have decreased the vessel's windage area, improved the effectiveness of the propeller and may have made all the difference to the vessel being able to maintain headway, even at the height of the storm. The indicated berthing schedule, which gave Bulkazores about 60 hours waiting time in Dampier Roads anchorage, provided ample time for this additional ballast to be pumped out once Bobby had passed clear. Any concerns the Master may have had that the time required to discharge ballast from no.4 hold would delay cargo operations were unfounded.

As the Master had decided to proceed directly to Dampier, instead of taking avoidance measures, it would have been prudent for him to have ballasted no.4 hold before sea and weather conditions deteriorated.

# Conclusions

These conclusions identify the different factors contributing to the incident, not for the purpose of apportioning blame or liability, but for identifying areas where mariners need to exercise extreme caution and proper planning and bridge resource management in order to prevent a similar occurrence.

The grounding of Bulkazores in shoal water off Kendrew Island, Western Australia, on 24 February 1995, was caused by poor seamanship, in that Bulkazores did not clear the area when the tropical cyclone changed direction and moved towards the Dampier Archipelago, as a result of which the vessel came within the dangerous semicircle of the cyclone and was trapped on a lee shore.

Other decisions and actions, both before Bulkazores arrived at Dampier

and after it was instructed to leave Dampier Roads anchorage, are considered to have contributed to the incident:

The initial recommendation of the weather routing consultant was disregarded, probably in order that Bulkazores would arrive before a competing vessel and, apparently, without taking into account the known behaviour of tropical cyclones off the north-west coast of Australia and their propensity to curve towards the coast.

Despite ample early indication of the probability of strong winds and rough seas being encountered near the coast, additional ballast was not taken in no.4 hold before the weather deteriorated.

The Master relied solely on his own judgement, at no time did he discuss his course of action with his officers, to gain other opinions as to the dangers posed by the cyclone and the appropriate action to be taken.

# Submissions

Under sub-regulation 16(3) of the Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations, if a report, or part of a report, relates to a person's affairs to a material extent, the Inspector must, if it is reasonable to do so, give the person a copy of the report or the relevant part of the report. Sub-regulation 16(4) provides that such a person may provide written comments or information relating to the report.

The report was sent to the Master of Bulkazores, who provided a written submission, providing comment on a number of issues. He submitted that:

When Bulkazores cleared the Dampier anchorage - *'the idea was to head north-eastward ... rather than just heave-to just outside port limits'*;

With reference to his actions and discussions with the crew - *'Within the bonds of being responsible as a master for virtually everything on board own*

*judgement is essence. ... In fact anchoring at an earlier stage was considered and reviewed with the staff, but ruled out as a 'suicide mission'. As the Master I have been responsible for the crew safety, lifes included and I could not afford to gamble with (them).'*

With reference to additional ballast - *'... aware of possibility to encounter tropical disturbance enroute filling No.4 was considered to minimize windage area etc..., however filling ballast at open sea exposed to beam swell present, hence considerable rolling versus effects of free surface, ruled out as unprudent. Obviously the problem was how to fill the hold safely rather than speculations how to deballast it.'*

Whereas the contents of the Master's submission are noted, they are at considerable variance with his original statements to the investigating field officer and the Inspector considers that the fundamental causes of the incident, and the lessons to be learned therefrom, remain unchanged.

# Details of vessel

<b>Name</b>	Bulkazores (ex N L Trader)
<b>Flag</b>	Malta
<b>Lloyd's Number</b>	7617216
<b>Year of Build</b>	1977
<b>Place of build</b>	Sakai, Japan
<b>Type</b>	Bulk carrier
<b>Owner</b>	Azores Shipping Co. Ltd., Malta
<b>Operator</b>	Bulkitalia Overseas Monaco, Montecarlo
<b>Classification Society</b>	Lloyd's Register of Shipping
<b>Length overall</b>	225 m
<b>Breadth</b>	32.2 m
<b>Summer draught</b>	12.45 m
<b>Gross Tonnage</b>	34,705
<b>Nett Tonnage</b>	19,198
<b>Summer deadweight</b>	61,297 tonnes
<b>Engines</b>	Sulzer 8RND76, 11936 kW
<b>Crew</b>	28 — 3 Croatian, 25 Filipno

# Berthing Information Telexed to the Master

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DATE	WAST	TEXT
15.2.95	1609	SHIPPING SCHEDULE  Dao Yao Shan      +2300/22 Callisto            PM/22 Bulk Azores        PM/23 Anna                /23
17.2.95	1712	SHIPPING SCHEDULE  Da Yao Shan        +2000/22 Callisto            PM/22 Bulk Azores        AM/22 Anna                /23  PLS ADV TIME REQD FOR DEBALLASTING WITH REQUIRED BERTHING DRAFTS OF F/4.00 A/6.15
20.2.95	1401	SHIPPING SCHEDULE  Da Yao Shan        +1600/22 Callisto            PM/22 Anna                2300/22 Bulk Azores        0100/23
21.2.95	1458	COMPETING VESSEL 'ANNA' ETA 2300/22. FIRST TO ARRIVE WILL POB 0630/25 SECOND TO ARRIVE POB 0230/26. PLEASE TRY TO ARRIVE FIRST.
22.2.95	0930	EXPECT POB 1030/25 COMPETING VESSEL 'ANNA' ETA 0100/23

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