

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report  
199503192**

**Airbus  
A300-B4-203**

**28 September 1995**

Readers are advised that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigates for the sole purpose of enhancing transport safety. Consequently, Bureau reports are confined to matters of safety significance and may be misleading if used for any other purposes.

Investigations commenced on or before 30 June 2003, including the publication of reports as a result of those investigations, are authorised by the Executive Director of the Bureau in accordance with Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920.

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**NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at [www.atsb.gov.au](http://www.atsb.gov.au).**

The Bureau did not conduct an on scene investigation of this occurrence. The information presented below was obtained from information supplied to the Bureau.

**Occurrence Number:** 199503192                      **Occurrence Type:** Incident  
**Location:** Brisbane, Aerodrome  
**State:** QLD    **Inv Category:** 4  
**Date:** Thursday 28 September 1995  
**Time:** 1113 hours                                      **Time Zone** EST  
**Highest Injury Level:** None

**Aircraft** Airbus  
**Manufacturer:**  
**Aircraft Model:** A300-B4-203  
**Aircraft Registration:** VH-TAC                      **Serial Number:** 157  
**Type of Operation:** Air Transport Domestic High Capacity Passenger  
Scheduled  
**Damage to Aircraft:** Nil  
**Departure Point:**  
**Departure Time:**  
**Destination:** Brisbane QLD

**Approved for Release:** Tuesday, March 12, 1996

A utility vehicle was instructed by the surface movement controller to hold at taxiway A4 holding point which is clear of runway 01. At the same time an A300 was landing on runway 01 and was expected to exit the runway via taxiway A4S, a high speed exit. However, the aircraft continued past this exit, and as it became obvious that it would now exit at taxiway A4 where the vehicle was stopped, the vehicle driver was instructed to vacate the taxiway. The driver reacted by driving across the runway, passing beneath the wing of the aircraft as it entered the taxiway. The driver misunderstood the instruction and was under the impression that he was cleared to cross the runway. The company has undertaken to re-brief all drivers with reference to clearance requirements.