ATSB Annual Report 2024–25

Australian Government

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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Cover image

ATSB investigators examine the wreckage of a Pitts S1-11X aircraft following a collision with terrain accident at the 2025 Australian International Airshow at Avalon Airport, Victoria in March 2025 (AO-2025-017).

About this report

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau 2024–25 Annual Report outlines performance against the outcome and program structure in the Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts Portfolio Budget Statements 2024–25.

Guide to the report

Section 1 Chief Commissioner's review

Section 2 Agency overview

Section 3 Report on performance

Section 4 Significant safety investigations

Section 5 Formal safety issues and actions

Section 6 Financial statements

Section 7 Management and accountability

Section 8 Appendices

Other Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) publications, as well as information about the ATSB, are available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

If you have any enquiries about any aspect of the report, please contact:

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

GPO Box 321

Canberra ACT 2601

Email: atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au

This annual report is available online at:
www.atsb.gov.au/atsb-annual-reports and www.transparency.gov.au/.

Letter of transmittal

Australian Government
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

ATSB

Chief Commissioner

Our reference: 2025-049

31 October 2025

The Hon Catherine King MP
Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Minister

I am pleased to present the annual report of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) for the year ended 30 June 2025.

This report has been prepared for the purposes of section 46 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act), which requires that an annual report be given to the entity's responsible Minister for presentation to the Parliament.

This report includes the entity's audited annual financial statements as required by subsection 43(4) of the PGPA Act. It also includes the entity's annual performance statements as required under section 39 of the PGPA Act.

In accordance with section 10 of the PGPA Act, and as required by subsection 17AG(2) of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014, I certify that:

- the ATSB prepared fraud and corruption risk assessments and fraud and corruption control plans
- the ATSB had appropriate mechanisms to prevent, detect, investigate, record and confidentially report suspected fraud and corruption
- I took all reasonable measures to appropriately deal with fraud relating to the ATSB.

Yours sincerely

Angus Mitchell
Chief Commissioner / Chief Executive Officer

12 Moore Street
Canberra ACT 2601
Australia

GPO Box 321
Canberra
ACT 2601

Chiefcommissioner@atsb.gov.au

www.atsb.gov.au
@atsbgovau

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Section 1 –

Chief Commissioner's Review

Chief Commissioner's review

On behalf of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), I am pleased to present the ATSB Annual Report 2024–25. This was a significant year as we celebrated the 25th anniversary of our establishment on 1 July 1999. As we have for each of those 25 years, in 2024–25 we continued delivering on our purpose of improving transport safety for all Australians.

During the year, we focused on the direction contained in the **Minister's Statement of Expectations 2023 to 2025**, and the priorities as detailed in the **ATSB Strategic Plan**. Through our strategic plan we aim to:

- influence positive transport safety outcomes through independently identifying and sharing safety concerns and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action
- further position the ATSB as Australia's national transport safety investigator, maximising safety outcomes across transport sectors through growth and innovation
- be an enduring and adaptable organisation that delivers on its mission across changing environments by investing in its people, systems and partnerships.

Some of the actions taken during the year demonstrating our progress in line with these goals included:

- increasing engagement and awareness through investment in stakeholder relationships and the promotion of safety messages through **videos** and **animations**
- prioritising the release of timely information from our investigations through prioritising the publication of **preliminary** and interim reports
- continuing to strengthen our partnership with RMIT University to provide a **centre-of-excellence** for transport safety investigation with the roll-out of the Graduate Diploma in Transport Safety Investigation postgraduate qualification
- strengthening our relationships with our **counterparts internationally** to improve accident investigation capability and compliance with international protocols and obligations.

In 2024–25 the ATSB published 142 safety-related products.

In 2024–25, the ATSB published 142 safety-related products, including 67 final investigation reports, 10 preliminary and interim reports, 46 occurrence briefs, 14 safety promotion videos, and 5 safety advisory notices covering the aviation, marine and rail modes of transport.

Significant investigations completed during the year included:

- **Gold Coast – Aviation tourism.** In April 2025, we released the final report into the midair collision between 2 Eurocopter EC130 helicopters conducting scenic flights on the Gold Coast in early January 2023 (AO-2023-001). The investigation made 28 findings, identified 12 safety issues, and resulted in the release of 2 safety advisory notices. The investigation stressed a number of key safety messages including the potential for unintended consequences when managing changes in aviation operations, and the correct fitment and wearing of seatbelts in helicopter tourism operations.
- **Cloncurry – Aviation fire spotting.** In June 2025, the final report was released into the pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain of a Gulfstream fire surveillance aircraft, south-east of Cloncurry, Queensland, on 4 November 2023 (AO-2023-053). The report, supported by a safety promotion video, underscored the dangers of operational practices which circumvent critical safety defences, and the insidious and deadly potential of altitude hypoxia.
- **Sydney – Marine SOLAS.** Our investigation of a near grounding of the bulk carrier Portland Bay off Royal National Park, south of Sydney in July 2022 (MO-2022-006), resulted in the ATSB issuing formal recommendations to one federal and 2 state government agencies and a salvage operator. The investigation, released in May 2025, identified 9 safety issues, and found a key factor in the prolonged exposure of the ship and its crew to stranding was the extensive delay in tasking the state's nominated ocean-going emergency towage vessel.
- **Brisbane – Rail passenger.** In June 2025, we released a final report (RO-2023-004) into a signal passed at danger (SPAD) involving a Brisbane suburban passenger train that passed a stop signal after its driver was briefly impaired. The investigation highlighted the potential limitations of automatic warning system (AWS) alerts to prevent SPAD events. The investigation resulted in one safety recommendation being issued to the operator.

Our investigations over the year uncovered a total of **90 safety issues** – factors that if unaddressed have the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations. Of those safety issues identified, 57% were addressed through appropriate safety action, and a further 10% were partially addressed. Where identified safety issues were not effectively mitigated, the ATSB had cause to make 19 formal **safety recommendations** to the owners of those safety issues. We will continue to monitor the responses of the risk owners, with the objective of influencing them to take further effective safety action.



Central to our ability to achieve significant outcomes from our investigations are our dedicated staff. During the year we continued working to ensure everyone at the ATSB is supported and valued for their important roles in improving transport safety through implementing several development and wellbeing initiatives. These initiatives have also led to significant improvements in our Australian Public Service (APS) employee census results across all areas of employee **engagement**, **communication** and **wellbeing**.

Our staff are also supported by my fellow Commission members Mr Gary Prosser, Mr Peter Wilson and Ms Julie Bullas. I thank them for their expertise and advice in shaping ATSB investigation reports, which is central to delivering on our role as Australia's national transport safety investigator.

As we transition into the 2025–26 period, we will continue to focus on the implementation of our strategic plan with a particular focus on improving the **efficiency** and **effectiveness** of our operations. We will continue to build our relationships with key stakeholders, including regulators, state governments, industry, and international counterparts. Similarly, we will focus on maintaining our positive APS employee census results by investing further in leadership development, data and innovation to ensure our staff have the appropriate tools and resources to do their jobs.

I look forward to continuing to work with government and all our stakeholders to ensure we are best positioned to effect safety improvements well into the future.

Angus Mitchell

Chief Commissioner and CEO

Section 2 –

Agency overview

About the ATSB

The ATSB is an independent statutory agency established under the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* (TSI Act). The ATSB improves safety and public confidence in aviation, marine and rail transport. We do this through:

- undertaking independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences
- safety data recording, analysis and research
- influencing safety action.

In accordance with the TSI Act, the ATSB cannot apportion blame, assist in determining liability or, as a general rule, assist in court proceedings. The ATSB's sole focus is the prevention of future accidents and the improvement of transport safety. The ATSB is also required to be independent, in the interests of avoiding conflicts of interest and external interference in its role. We focus on improving transport safety for the greatest public benefit in the aviation, rail and marine modes of transport. In prioritising the public benefit, we consider:

- the safety of passengers and crew on an aircraft, train or ship, aiming to prevent deaths and serious injuries
- significant financial costs that can result from an accident, including where there is significant damage to public infrastructure
- impact on the national economy.

The ATSB is part of the Australian Government's Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts portfolio. Within the portfolio are other transport agencies, with roles focused on delivering an efficient, sustainable, competitive, safe and secure transport system for all transport users, through regulation, service delivery, policy development and safety investigations.

Cooperation with the transport industry

The TSI Act requires the ATSB to cooperate with government agencies, private organisations and individuals with transport safety functions and responsibilities, or that may be affected by ATSB transport safety activities.

We work collaboratively with the aviation, rail and marine industries, as well as with transport regulators and governments at state, national and international levels, to improve transport safety standards for all Australians.

The ATSB engages with several other entities within the Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts portfolio, including the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Airservices Australia, Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and the National Transport Commission. The ATSB also cooperates with equivalent national bodies in other countries and international organisations with responsibilities for worldwide transport safety standards. For rail transport safety, the ATSB engages with the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR), the Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) in New South Wales, and the Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI) in Victoria.

The ATSB actively targets communications to ensure that transport industry stakeholders understand the importance of no-blame investigations. To cultivate a strong reporting culture within the transport industry, we promote confidentiality and protection for sensitive safety information provided during the course of an investigation.

Our investigations

Our independent investigations seek to establish the safety factors that contributed to an accident or incident and to identify safety issues for action by organisations with responsibility for managing that risk. Safety issues are factors that have the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations and are a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or operating environment. Directing our resources to investigations with the potential to uncover safety issues ensures we have the greatest safety impact.

The ATSB does not have powers to force operators, manufacturers or regulators to take action. Instead, the ATSB relies on its ability to influence the actions and decisions of others through its authority, knowledge, position and relationships. We continually build relationships with others to support safety action, and we have stakeholders willing to advocate for our safety messaging. When we are concerned that not enough is being done to address safety issues, we will campaign for action to prevent future accidents.

Mandatory occurrence reporting

The TSI Act requires any responsible person who has knowledge of any accident or serious incident (or any immediately reportable matter) to report it as soon as it is reasonably practicable. Immediately reportable matters also require a written notification within 72 hours, as do safety incidents (or routine reportable matters).

While the terms of this requirement may seem broad, the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2021 (TSI Regulations) provide a list of persons who, by the nature of their qualifications, experience or professional association, would be likely to have knowledge of an immediate or routine reportable matter for their mode of transport.

In addition, responsible persons are not required to report a transport safety matter if they believe, on reasonable grounds, that another responsible person has already reported, or is in the process of reporting, that matter.

The ATSB maintains a 24-hour service to receive notifications, including a toll-free telephone number (for immediately reportable matters in all modes). In aviation, a secure online form for written notifications is available on the ATSB website. In rail, all immediately notifiable matters are reported to the ONRSR, which then report to the ATSB. The written notifications are provided to the ATSB via reporting to ONRSR. In marine, both immediately reportable and routine reportable matters are reported to the ATSB via AMSA.

Generally, the ATSB safety reporting team receives more than 15,000 notifications of safety occurrences per year. These are spread over aviation, marine and rail. Inevitably, there are duplicate notifications and some of the notifications submitted are about matters not required to be reported under the TSI Act. Nevertheless, each one is reviewed and recorded.

While not all reported occurrences are investigated, the details of each occurrence are retained within the national aviation occurrence database maintained by the ATSB. These records are a valuable resource, providing a detailed overview of transport safety in Australia. The searchable public version of the aviation occurrence database is available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au and contains data from July 2003 onwards. The online database is used by industry, academics, the media and regulators to search and research past events.

Aviation

The ATSB investigates accidents and incidents involving Australian civil-registered aircraft and foreign aircraft that occur in Australia. It does so in a manner consistent with the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention 1944) Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Annex 13).

The ATSB also assists with overseas agency investigations involving Australian registered, operated or manufactured aircraft, and may assist with foreign aircraft if an overseas investigation authority seeks assistance and the ATSB has suitable resources available. The ATSB may also have observer status in important overseas investigations. This provides valuable opportunities to learn from overseas organisations and to benchmark knowledge and procedures against counterpart organisations.

The ATSB cooperates with organisations that are best placed to improve safety, such as CASA, Airservices Australia and the Defence Flight Safety Bureau (DFSB), as well as aircraft manufacturers and operators. The ATSB also works collaboratively with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts and other safety agencies to assist the Australian Government in implementing transport safety initiatives.

ATSB investigators examine the engine of a light aircraft near Wedderburn Aerodrome, New South Wales

Marine

The ATSB investigates accidents and incidents involving Australian registered ships anywhere in the world, and foreign ships in Australian waters or en route to Australian ports.

The ATSB works cooperatively with international regulatory authorities, AMSA and other transport safety investigation agencies, as well as ship owners and operators.

Marine investigations are conducted in a manner consistent with the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Casualty Investigation Code.

The ATSB publishes and distributes a range of marine transport safety reports and safety educational material to the international maritime community, the IMO, educational institutions, and maritime administrators in Australia and overseas.

From 1 July 2018, AMSA's role as a regulator extended to include service delivery for all domestic commercial vessels (DCVs) as part of the Council of Australian Governments' 2011 national maritime reforms. The national reforms did not include funding for the ATSB to conduct DCV investigations, so the ATSB marine jurisdiction continues to be limited to interstate and overseas shipping.

ATSB investigators photograph the damaged containers on board the cargo vessel APL England

Rail

ATSB rail safety investigations rely on a combination of funding and resourcing from the Commonwealth and state governments. We have collaboration arrangements in place for resourcing from OTSI in New South Wales and OCI in Victoria. The Queensland Government has committed to funding until June 2026 for investigations in Queensland. Other states and territories have not opted into similar arrangements. We are working with governments to provide future certainty around resourcing for a national capability.

The ATSB works cooperatively with organisations such as ONRSR and rail operators – all of whom share a responsibility to improve safety.

ATSB investigators inspecting a train

Specialist investigation capabilities

Material failure analysis

The ATSB maintains in-house capabilities for examining any physical evidence relating to transport safety investigations. The group of engineering specialists comprises experts across multidisciplinary engineering fields to conduct forensic analysis of components and structures from aviation, rail and marine occurrences at the ATSB engineering facility in Canberra. The experts collaborate with other ATSB investigators, external stakeholders and subject matter experts from similar agencies around the world to provide detailed insight into the complex set of technical factors that contribute to transport safety occurrences.

Data recovery and performance

The ATSB maintains a centre of excellence for aviation, marine and rail 'black box' data recovery and analysis. Flight data recorders, cockpit voice recorders, quick access recorders, ground proximity warning systems, voyage data loggers and train data loggers can all be downloaded and analysed at the ATSB.

The data from other electronics installed in aircraft, such as GPS, mobile phones and digital cameras, can also be recovered using in-house chip recovery expertise.

Human factors

The ATSB has investigators with qualifications and specialist expertise in the capabilities and limitations of human performance in relation to the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of products and systems. Human factors are a core component of every ATSB safety investigation, and this area includes the examination of elements such as decision-making, focus of attention, the role of workload and fatigue management.

Licensed aircraft maintenance engineers

The ATSB employs several investigators with a background as licensed aircraft maintenance engineers to undertake the technical work necessary for investigations into aviation accidents and incidents. These investigators apply their extensive industry knowledge of systems of maintenance, airworthiness control, repair and overhaul of aircraft structures and systems to identify any airworthiness-related factors that contributed to an occurrence or safety issue.

Other transport specialists

ATSB investigators come from a variety of backgrounds and have a range of specialist skills, which are combined to ensure investigations are considered from multiple angles. In addition to those mentioned above, specialists on staff at the ATSB include:

- pilots
- aeronautical, mechanical and civil engineers
- ship captains and officers
- ship engineers
- train drivers
- rail signal and system experts
- researchers and safety analysts.

Where specific subject matter expertise does not exist in-house, the ATSB may contract specialist resources. This includes, for example, medical experts in the aviation, rail and marine transport modes.

Site survey

The strength of the ATSB investigation analysis, and its findings, rests on the ability to collect as much data as possible about and from an accident. In addition to the expertise of its investigators, the ATSB incorporates technology to collect and process information about accident sites. This technology includes laser scanning and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) combined with high accuracy differential GPS data to produce a range of outputs, including high accuracy accident site maps, 3D models of accident sites and vehicles, and videos to support the investigation team, safety messaging and stakeholder engagement.

As new technologies, software and equipment become available, the ATSB seeks to embrace their use to provide investigators with the best available tools.

Priorities for investigation

The ATSB focuses on transport safety as the highest priority. In 2024–25, the ATSB gave priority to transport safety investigations that had the potential to deliver the best safety outcomes for the travelling public. A Statement of Expectations from the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Development and Local Government, provided to the ATSB, set the direction for the ATSB to give priority to transport safety investigations with the highest potential to deliver the greatest public benefit through improvements to transport safety.

The evolution in the ATSB mission from focusing on the travelling public to driving safety that is for the greatest public benefit is necessary to reflect the contribution the ATSB makes to preventing loss of life, as well as avoiding significant local, state and national economic costs that can be associated with an accident. The ATSB is not resourced to investigate every single accident or incident that is reported but allocates priorities within the transport modes to ensure that investigation effort achieves the best outcomes for safety improvement. The ATSB recognises that there is often more to be learned from serious incidents and patterns of incidents, and gives focus to these investigations, as well as specific accident investigations.

Actioning reported occurrences

The TSI Act requires specified people and organisations to report to the ATSB on a range of safety occurrences (called ‘reportable matters’). Reportable matters are defined in the TSI Regulations.

In principle, the ATSB can investigate any of these reportable matters, or any ‘transport safety matter’ as defined in section 23 of the TSI Act. In practice, they are actioned in one of 3 ways to contribute to ATSB functions:

1. A reported occurrence that suggests a safety issue may exist will be investigated (occurrence investigation), and may involve an on-site component. A transport safety matter identified across a number of occurrences in ATSB data or through investigative analysis that suggests a safety issue may exist can also be investigated as a safety study. Investigations may lead to the identification/confirmation of the safety issue and will set out the case for safety action to be taken in response.

2. A reported occurrence with significant consequences or risk where there is no suggestion of a systemic underlying safety issue may benefit from a short investigation or a factual occurrence brief report for safety education and promotion, and enable a richer dataset for future safety analysis, to identify safety issues or trends (such as inclusion in a safety study).
3. A reported occurrence that provides an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation will be published as an occurrence brief. Occurrence briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification, and any follow-up enquiries. Occurrence briefs are not conducted under the TSI Act.

Basic details of an occurrence, based primarily on the details provided in the initial occurrence notification, will be recorded in the ATSB occurrence database to be used in future safety analysis to identify safety issues and trends (including safety studies), and in aviation, will be available in the online searchable occurrence database.

Aviation broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigation resources to be consistent with the following broad hierarchy of aviation operation types:

1. Passenger transport operations and medical transport operations (including positioning flights):
    - » air transport operations (scheduled or non-scheduled), balloon transport operations, mining fly-in-fly-out operations, scenic flights/joy flights, parachuting operations, future advanced air mobility passenger carrying operations, and aerial work operations that carry passengers who are not crew members
    - » flights formerly known as air ambulance operations, Royal Flying Doctor Service flights and patient transport/transfer services using aircraft operated by state and territory ambulance services.
2. Non-passenger commercial aircraft operations (including positioning flights):
    - » aerial work operations such as surveying, spotting, surveillance, agricultural operations, aerial photography; search and rescue operations; flying training activities
    - » cargo transport operation
    - » large (greater than 150 kg) or medium (25–150 kg) RPAS or RPAS which is type certificated.
3. Recreational flying, ‘private’ general aviation, and flights where the pilot shares equally in costs with passengers (cost sharing).
4. Higher-risk personal recreation/sports aviation/experimental aircraft operations.
5. Small and very small RPAS, uncrewed balloons.

The ATSB endeavours to investigate all fatal accidents involving VH-registered powered aircraft, subject to the potential transport safety learnings and resource availability.

Marine broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigative resources to be consistent with the following broad hierarchy of marine operation types:

1. Passenger operations.
2. Freight and other commercial operations.
3. Non-commercial operations.

Rail broad hierarchy

The ATSB allocates its investigative resources to be consistent with the following hierarchy of rail operation types:

1. Mainline operations that impact on passenger services.
2. Freight and other commercial operations.
3. Non-commercial operations.

Decisions will take into account whether the necessary funding from state and territory governments has been made available.

Level of response

The level of investigative response is determined by resource availability and factors such as those detailed below. These factors (expressed in no particular order) may vary in the degree to which they influence ATSB decisions to investigate and respond. Factors include:

- the anticipated safety value of an investigation, including the likelihood of furthering the understanding of the scope and impact of any safety system failures
- the likelihood of safety action arising from the investigation, particularly of national or global significance
- the existence and extent of fatalities/serious injuries and/or structural damage to transport vehicles or other infrastructure
- the unique value an ATSB investigation will provide over any other investigation by industry, regulators or police
- funding from state and territory governments in rail
- obligations or recommendations under international conventions and codes
- the nature and extent of public interest – in particular, the potential impact on public confidence in the safety of the transport system
- the existence of supporting evidence, or requirements, to conduct a special investigation based on trends
- the relevance to identified and targeted safety programs
- the extent of resources available, and projected to be available, in the event of conflicting priorities
- the risks associated with not investigating – including consideration of whether, in the absence of an ATSB investigation, a credible safety investigation by another party is likely
- the timeliness of notification
- the training benefit for ATSB investigators.

Range of investigation and other products

The ATSB produces a final report for all its investigations. Reports communicate important safety issues, safety actions and information, and provide transparency into the ATSB investigation process.

The main products are occurrence investigations, occurrence briefs, safety studies, and statistical and educational reports. The ATSB also produces an up to date online searchable aviation occurrence database and summaries of concerns raised via the REPCON (confidential reporting) system and their resulting safety actions.

Occurrence investigations

Occurrence investigations typically examine a single accident or incident in detail. The sequence of events and factual background information are documented, and findings are presented along with a safety analysis to explain those findings. These investigations may identify safety issues – ongoing systemic risks to safety – and the safety actions taken by organisations to address these safety issues. The ATSB may also issue formal safety recommendations.

Occurrence briefs

Occurrence briefs are concise reports that detail the facts surrounding a transport safety occurrence, as received in the initial notification, and any follow-up enquiries. They provide an opportunity to share safety messages in the absence of an investigation. Occurrence briefs are not conducted under the TSI Act.

Safety studies

Safety studies typically investigate multiple occurrences of a similar nature, or a potential or emerging safety issue. Conducted as an investigation under the TSI Act, they aim to uncover safety issues through the analysis of occurrence and other data.

Investigation levels

The ATSB response to reported safety matters is classified by the depth of the investigation into contributing safety factors. This generally also reflects the level of resources and/or time they require, as well as their complexity. The following safety investigation levels were used by the ATSB for occurrence investigations and safety studies in 2024–25. Each level presented below (in order) builds on the previous level.

Short investigations

Short investigations are limited-scope and can be office-based or field-based investigations conducted under the TSI Act. Investigation activities generally include sourcing photos and documentation of any transport vehicle damage and/or the accident site, interviews with involved parties, the collection of documents such as procedures, and internal investigations by manufacturers and operators. Occurrences investigated are normally simple and usually for common accidents and incidents. A short summary report of up to 8 pages will be produced, which includes a description of the sequence of events, generally limited to contextual factual information, a short analysis and findings.

Findings include safety factors (events and conditions that increase risk), which are generally limited to those relating to the occurrence. Any proactive safety actions taken by industry will also be reported. Short investigations usually require only one ATSB staff member.

Defined investigations

Defined investigations may involve in-the-field activity or may be conducted as an office-based investigation. They require numerous ATSB resources and result in an agreed-scope product with a limited set of findings and a defined-size report. Evidence collected for defined investigations can also include recorded information, multiple interviews, analysis of similar occurrences, and a review of procedures and other risk controls related to the occurrence or set of occurrences. Occurrences investigated are generally less complex accidents and incidents.

Investigation reports are typically about 20 pages, with an expanded analysis to support the broader set of findings that may also include safety factors not directly contributing to the occurrence. Defined investigations may also identify safety issues (safety factors with an ongoing risk) relating to ineffective or missing risk controls. Identified safety issues are documented in the investigation report, along with proactive safety action taken by industry and ATSB safety recommendations.

Systemic investigations

Systemic investigations generally involve in-the-field activity, and a range of ATSB and possibly external resources. They are less confined in scope and will involve a significant effort collecting evidence across many areas. The breadth of the investigation will often cover multiple organisations. Occurrences and sets of occurrences investigated normally involve very complex systems and processes. In addition to investigating failed and missing risk controls, systemic investigations also investigate the organisational processes, systems, cultures and other factors that relate to those risk controls, including from the operator, regulator, and certifying and standards authorities. Systemic investigations result in substantial reports, often with several safety issues identified.

Major investigations

Major investigations are reserved for very significant accidents and are likely to involve significant ATSB and external resources and additional one-off government funding. They result in a comprehensive report.

Confidential reporting

The ATSB operates the voluntary and confidential reporting scheme (REPCON) for the aviation, rail and marine industries. Any person within these industries, or member of the travelling public, may submit a REPCON report of a reportable safety concern.

The scheme is designed to capture safety concerns, including unsafe practices, procedures and risk controls within an organisation or affected part of the industry.

Each reported safety concern is assessed and de-identified by the ATSB by removing all personal details concerning the reporter and any individual named in the report. This de-identified text is passed back to the reporter, who must authorise the content before the REPCON can proceed.

The de-identified text is then forwarded to the relevant organisation that is best placed to address the safety concern. The organisation's response will then be forwarded to the relevant regulator for further action, as deemed necessary.

The aim of the REPCON scheme is to encourage safety action to address the reported safety concerns. This can include variations to standards, orders, practices and procedures, or an education campaign. The ATSB may use the de-identified version of the reported safety concern to issue an information brief or alert bulletin to whichever organisation is best placed to take safety action in response to the safety concern. The ATSB publishes the outcome of each REPCON on its website.

International cooperation

The ATSB is committed to close engagement with its international counterpart agencies and relevant multilateral organisations. In line with Australian Government policy, the ATSB places a specific emphasis on engagement with countries in the Asia Pacific region. In 2024–25, the ATSB deepened its relationships with the aviation sector across the Pacific through the delivery of the Australia-Pacific Partnerships for Aviation Program (the Pacific Program). This program strengthens safety investigations and promotes regional aviation safety though training and capability enhancement. Under the Pacific Program, the ATSB assisted Tonga in delivering its first ever independent accident investigation report in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) on 26 June 2025, following an aircraft incident in December 2023. The ATSB also supported Vanuatu in its investigation into an accident in July 2024.

The ATSB maintained close relationships with Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, with investigators from both countries successfully completing the Graduate Certificate in Transport Safety Investigation at RMIT University in Melbourne. While in Australia, they also undertook placements at the ATSB.

The ATSB is actively represented in international fora across all 3 transport modes. The ATSB is heavily involved in the work of the ICAO, specifically the ICAO Accident Investigation Panel and the Asia Pacific Accident Investigation Group. The ATSB also contributes actively to the IMO subcommittee on Implementation of IMO Instruments and International Technical Co-operation Programme, and is a core member of the Railway Accident Investigation International Forum. The ATSB is an active member of the multi-modal International Transportation Safety Association (ITSA) for state investigation agencies.

The ATSB continues to make its expertise and resources widely available in support of transport safety. Every year, the ATSB cooperates with international aviation investigation agencies, in accordance with clause 5.18 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, by appointing accredited representatives to their investigations that involve an Australian registered aircraft, an Australian operator or an Australian manufacturer.

Organisational structure



Figure 1: ATSB organisational structure, 2024–25

Commission and Executive **Management Team**

Chief Commissioner and **Chief Executive Officer**

Mr Angus Mitchell

Angus Mitchell has extensive experience in organisational leadership and management, maritime operations and safety investigation.

He joined the ATSB from Maritime Safety Queensland, where as General Manager he oversaw the safe and efficient movement of vessels into and out of Queensland's 21 ports, and was responsible for compliance activities and safety investigations for Australia's largest recreational maritime fleet.

During his tenure, Maritime Safety Queensland was recognised with an Australian Industry and Shipping Award for its role in managing international shipping throughout the COVID-19 pandemic and supporting the welfare and safety of international seafarers.

Prior to leading Maritime Safety Queensland, Mr Mitchell was the Executive Director of NSW Maritime, where he oversaw Australia's largest state's primary maritime regulatory, investigative and compliance agency. He has also served as Deputy Harbour Master – Operations for Sydney Ports, where he was responsible for managing day-to-day port operations for both Sydney Harbour and Port Botany.

Angus is a former officer of the Royal Australian Navy having seen service in operational, policy and international roles. He is an Indonesian linguist and commenced his 5-year term as ATSB Chief Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer on 2 September 2021.

Commissioner

Mr Gary Prosser

Gary Prosser has over 40 years' experience in the maritime industry, coming from a seagoing career and serving on a wide variety of Australian ships in both the international and domestic trades. He was part of the inaugural intake to the Australian Maritime College (AMC) in 1980 and went on to lecture at the college.

For a number of years, Mr Prosser managed offshore supply vessel operations in Bass Strait prior to moving to Tasmania where he headed the Polar Division of P&O Australia managing Antarctic and Marine Science Vessels for the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) and the CSIRO.

Initially joining AMSA in 1997, Mr Prosser had a variety of senior management roles with the authority and was appointed Deputy Chief Executive Officer in 2007.

In 2009, Mr Prosser was elected as Secretary General of IALA, headquartered in Paris, prior to returning to AMSA in 2015 and retiring in 2019.

In addition to his maritime qualifications, Mr Prosser has a Bachelor of Education degree and is a member of the Australian Institute of Company Directors.

Mr Prosser was appointed as an ATSB Commissioner in October 2019.

Commissioner

Mr Peter Wilson

Peter Wilson commenced his professional piloting career with Qantas in 1985. Over the following 20 years, Mr Wilson held a number of key senior management appointments, including Senior Check Captain Boeing 767, General Manager of Boeing 767 Operations and General Manager of Airbus A330 Operations.

Mr Wilson also held the senior executive appointments as Qantas' Chief Pilot and Chief Operating Officer.

Since retiring from Qantas, Mr Wilson has worked as a professional consultant, served as the interim CEO and Chief Operating Officer of Tigerair, and held other senior executive appointments more broadly.

Mr Wilson was appointed an ATSB Commissioner in August 2023.

Commissioner

Ms Julie Bullas

Julie Bullas has significant operational experience and achievements in rail safety and rail regulation at the state and national level.

Before joining the ATSB Commission, Ms Bullas served for 10 years as Executive Director, Policy, Reform and Stakeholder Engagement at the ONRSR; before which she was project director for the National Rail Safety Regulator Project.

Prior to working with the national rail regulator, Ms Bullas was the road/rail interface specialist for Queensland Rail and the Director of Rail Safety for Queensland Transport.

Ms Bullas was appointed an ATSB Commissioner in October 2023.

Chief Operating Officer

Mr Colin McNamara

Colin McNamara joined the APS in 2004. Prior to this, he served as a General Service Officer in the Australian Army and was awarded the Australian Active Service Medal in 1999.

Prior to his appointment as the ATSB Chief Operating Officer, Mr McNamara managed a range of corporate functional areas, including human resources, governance, finance, communications, ICT business services, international and major projects. Mr McNamara continues to play a critical role in contributing to the strategic direction of the ATSB, and in achieving relevant objectives of the Australian Government.

Mr McNamara holds several professional qualifications in personnel management and a graduate qualification in Transport Safety Investigation through RMIT University.

Outcome and program structure

Outcome

The ATSB has one outcome – Improved transport safety in Australia, including through:

- independent 'no blame' investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences
- safety data recording, analysis and research
- influencing safety action.

We have one program which contributes to achieving this outcome.

Program 1.1 – Improved transport safety for the greatest public benefit

The ATSB works actively with the aviation, marine and rail industries, transport regulators and governments at a local, state, national and international level to improve transport safety standards for the greatest public benefit. Investigations and related activities seek to influence safety action for the public benefit.

There are 3 core objectives which arise from the ATSB functions under the TSI Act:

1. Independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety incidents

Independent investigations that are selective and systemic, and which focus on future safety rather than on blame, increase stakeholder awareness and action on safety issues, and foster industry and public confidence in the transport system.

2. Safety data recording, analysis and research

Timely receipt and assessment of transport accident and other safety occurrence notifications allows the ATSB to identify and refer safety issues at the earliest opportunity. The maintenance and analysis of a body of safety information (including transport safety data, safety study and occurrence investigation reports) enables stakeholders and researchers to gain a better understanding of safety trends and safety issues.

3. Influencing safety action

Awareness and understanding of transport safety issues is increased through a range of activities, including consultation, education, and the dissemination of occurrence investigation and safety study findings and recommendations. These contribute to the national and international body of safety knowledge and foster action for the improvement of safety systems and operations.

How the ATSB reports

In addition to requirements under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (PGPA Rule), subsection 63A of the TSI Act requires that the annual report must also include the following:

- prescribed particulars of transport safety matters investigated by the ATSB during the period
- a description of investigations conducted by the ATSB during the period that the Chief Commissioner considers raise significant issues in transport safety.

The ATSB observes and complies with Resource Management Guide No 135—*Annual reports for non-corporate Commonwealth entities* issued by the Department of Finance.

This annual report details ATSB performance against the program objectives, deliverables and key performance indicators (KPIs) published in the **ATSB Corporate Plan 2024–25**. The ATSB annual report also includes audited financial statements in accordance with the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act).

Section 3 –

Report on performance

This section reviews the ATSB's non-financial performance for 2024–25. This includes an overview of results against the performance criteria set out in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2024–25 and the ATSB Corporate Plan 2024–25. It also details the activities we have undertaken to achieve our purpose.

Statement of preparation

I, as the accountable authority of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, present the annual performance statement of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the year ended 30 June 2025, as required under paragraph 39(1)(a) of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act). In my opinion, this annual performance statement is based on properly maintained records, accurately reflects the performance of the entity, and complies with subsection 39(2) of the PGPA Act.

Chief Executive Officer

31 October 2025

Overview of performance

As set out in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2024–25, the ATSB purpose is defined by its mission statement:

Improve transport safety for the **greatest public benefit through our independent investigations and influencing safety action.**

In reference to the public benefit, the ATSB focuses on the public interest:

- where the safety of passengers and workers on an aircraft, train or ship is concerned
- when it comes to the significant costs that can result from an accident, particularly where there is significant damage to public infrastructure or an impact on the national economy.

The Annual Performance Statements provide a detailed overview of our non-financial performance in achieving our purpose for the reporting period. This completes the performance cycle commenced with the publication of the Portfolio Budget Statements 2024–25 and the Corporate Plan 2024–25.

When measuring our performance, our performance results are assessed against the following criteria:

	Achieved	Applies if all elements of the target have been met
	Substantially achieved	Applies if elements have been predominantly met, or if results are within 5% of the target
	Not achieved	Applies if no elements of the target have been met

Where a performance measure has more than one target, each target is equally weighted. A result is applied to each target and then an average is calculated to give the overall performance result for the measure. Where an average cannot be easily determined (i.e. for a measure with 2 targets that are substantially achieved and achieved), the lower of the 2 performance results will apply.

Our performance

For 2024–25, out of the 6 performance measures, 4 performance targets were achieved, one was substantially achieved, and one was not achieved. Table 1 provides a summary of these results.

Table 1: Results against key performance criteria

Performance measure	Target for 2024–25	Result	Result
1. Number of safety issues that are addressed through safety action.	65% of safety issues addressed in the last financial year 85% of safety issues addressed in the previous financial year	**63% of safety issues identified in 2024–25 adequately addressed through safety action** **86% of safety issues identified in 2023–24 adequately addressed through safety action**	**Substantially achieved** 
2. Number of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed by ATSB that identify safety issues.	65% of investigations identify a safety issue	**84% of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues**	**Achieved** 

Performance measure	Target for 2024–25	Result	Result
3. Percentage of all investigations that identify at least one safety issue not already identified by others.	50% of systemic and defined investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues not identified by others	**81% of systemic, defined, and safety study investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues not identified by others**	**Achieved**
4. On an average annual basis, the ATSB will conduct around twice the number of investigations as it has available investigators.	90 active investigations	**An average of 95.4 active investigations**	**Achieved**
5. Median time to complete investigations.	Short: 6 months	**8.5 months**	**Not achieved**
	Defined: 12 months	**20.5 months**	
	Systemic: 18 months	**21.6 months**	
6. Number of changes to ATSB published investigation findings over the previous financial year.	Zero	**Zero**	**Achieved**

Performance at a glance



The ATSB commenced 64 new occurrence investigations and one safety study during 2024–25, while continuing to improve safety through the completion of 67 occurrence investigations and one safety study. The high-profile **investigations** completed during the year included:

- In April 2025, the ATSB released its final report into the midair collision between 2 Eurocopter EC130 helicopters conducting scenic flights on the Gold Coast in early January 2023 (AO-2023-001). The investigation made 28 findings, identified 12 safety issues, and resulted in the release of 2 safety advisory notices. Supported by a world-leading cockpit visibility study (detailed below) and a safety promotion video, the investigation stressed a number of key safety messages including the potential for unintended consequences when managing changes in aviation operations, and the correct fitment and wearing of seatbelts in helicopter tourism operations.

- In June 2025, the final report was released into the pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain of a Gulfstream fire surveillance aircraft, south-east of Cloncurry, Queensland, on 4 November 2023 (AO-2023-053). The report, supported by a safety promotion video, underscored the dangers of operational practices which circumvent critical safety defences, and the insidious and deadly potential of altitude hypoxia.
- The ATSB's investigation of a near grounding of the bulk carrier *Portland Bay* off Royal National Park, south of Sydney in July 2022 resulted in the ATSB issuing formal recommendations to 3 government agencies and a salvage operator. The investigation, released in May 2025, identified 9 safety issues, and found a key factor in the prolonged exposure of the ship and its crew to stranding was the extensive delay in tasking the state's nominated ocean-going emergency towage vessel.

The ATSB also completed a significant **safety study**:

- Cockpit Visibility Study supporting AO-2023-001 – midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023.

The ATSB continued efforts to progress a number of other higher profile large accident **investigations** during the year. These investigations included:

- The collision with water of a Cessna Caravan floatplane on take-off from Rottnest Island on 7 January 2025.
- An engine failure during take-off involving a Boeing 737 at Sydney Airport on 8 November 2024
- Container ship *Maersk Shekou*'s collision with the tall ship STS *Leeuwin II* at the Port of Fremantle on 30 August 2024
- A level crossing collision involving *The Ghan* passenger train and a road train north of Alice Springs on 15 September 2024.

The investigations above drew heavily on ATSB resources during 2024–25. The effort expended, which was an investment in the quality of the outcomes, has affected timeliness targets. Because a number of investigations involve multiple stakeholders and complex evidentiary and analysis issues, this can have an adverse effect on our ability to achieve KPIs.

Over the last 3 years, the Portfolio Budget Statements announced one-off funding increases to provide for approximately 15 additional Average Staffing Level (ASL) and improvements to the ATSB investigation management system. While the ATSB has funds for these additional resources and capital investment, the ATSB is enhancing its operational capability, efficiency, and improving performance outcomes.

During the financial year, we undertook a review of our KPIs. The KPIs reported against in this performance statement will change for the 2025–26 financial year. The ATSB will retain a KPI to demonstrate effectiveness by reporting on safety action taken by the transport industry against safety issues identified in its investigations. The ATSB will have revised KPIs in support of sharing safety information in a timely manner. This includes publishing reports every 12 months following the commencement of an investigation.

Annual Performance Statements

The following tables summarise ATSB performance against key indicators published in the Portfolio Budget Statements 2024–25 and Corporate Plan 2024–25.

Performance measure 1

Desired outcome

Improve transport safety for the greatest public benefit through independent investigations and influencing safety action.

Table 2: ATSB performance against indicator 1

Performance criterion			
Number of safety issues that are addressed through safety action.			
Target	**Result**		**Achieved**
65% of safety issues addressed in the last financial year	**63% of safety issues identified in 2024–25 adequately addressed through safety action**		✖
85% of safety issues addressed in the previous financial year	**86% of safety issues identified in 2023–24 adequately addressed through safety action**		✔
Overall performance result	**Substantially achieved**		▬
Detail			
Year	**Number identified**	**Number addressed**	**Percentage addressed**
2024–25	88	54.5	63%
2023–24	69	59.0	86%
2022–23	57	51.5	90%
2021–22	56	50.5	90%

Analysis

To be effective against the ATSB's purpose, safety action needs to be taken once safety issues are identified by ATSB investigations. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB to influence entities to address identified safety issues and therefore improve transport safety.

Safety issues:

- can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations
- are characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time.

Some safety issues will take time to be actioned by stakeholders depending on their complexity, as well as the capability and capacity of the relevant stakeholder. We expect that some safety issues not actioned in the year they are identified will be addressed over the ensuing year or years. It is likely the percentage of addressed safety issues for 2024–25 will continue tracking towards the 65% target throughout next year as some larger safety actions take time for stakeholders to complete. It is noted that in 2024–25 there was an increase in the number of safety issues identified compared to previous years.

There also needs to be some tolerance for a minority of safety issues identified not being actioned. The ATSB does not have powers to force operators, manufacturers and regulators to take action – the ATSB relies on its ability to influence.

Further details of the safety issues identified and actioned are in **Section 5 – Formal safety issues and actions.**

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes safety issues published in the financial year from occurrence and safety study investigations by the ATSB, and rail occurrence investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria. The figures do not include safety issues which have been closed (no longer relevant). The number of safety issues addressed calculation includes safety issues that have been adequately addressed (count of 1), and partially addressed (count of 0.5).

Previous annual reports did not include the half count of partially addressed safety issues, so numbers quoted here will be slightly higher than previously published.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 16.

Performance measure 2

Desired outcome

Identify safety issues additional to those identified by industry and government safety agencies for the greatest public benefit through ATSB occurrence investigations and safety studies.

Table 3: ATSB performance against indicator 2

Performance criterion				
Number of systemic, defined and safety study investigations completed by ATSB that identify safety issues.				
Target	**Result**			**Achieved**
65% of investigations identify a safety issue	**84% of systemic, defined and safety study investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues**			✓
Detail				
Investigation type	**Year**	**Number completed**	**Number with safety issues**	**Percentage with safety issues**
Defined investigations (including defined safety studies)				
All modes	2024–25	23	19	83%
	2023–24	15	11	73%
	2022–23	19	15	79%
	2021–22	24	10	42%
Systemic investigations (including systemic safety studies)				
All modes	2024–25	8	7	88%
	2023–24	7	7	100%
	2022–23	6	6	100%
	2021–22	8	8	100%

Analysis

To be effective against the ATSB's purpose, the ATSB needs to demonstrate value through the identification of safety issues. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB in identifying safety issues so that others can act and therefore improve transport safety.

Safety issues can be identified in both occurrence investigations and safety studies when they are conducted at a defined or systemic level. Short investigations have a limited scope that do not include the investigation of safety issues. Defined investigations are likely to include safety issues, and systemic investigations will very likely identify several safety issues.

Improvements to investigation management processes in 2020–21 resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of defined and systemic investigations which identify a safety issue compared with the level achieved prior to the improvements.

Investigations published in 2024–25 with identified safety issues are summarised in **Section 4 – Significant safety investigations.**

Further details of all the safety issues identified in 2024–25 are included in **Section 5 – Formal safety issues and safety actions.**

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study[1] investigations conducted by ATSB at the defined and systemic levels. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Note, previous ATSB annual reports reported 'complex investigations' to refer to the combination of 'defined' and 'systemic' investigations.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 16.

Performance measure 3

Desired outcome

Identify safety issues additional to those identified by industry and government safety agencies for the greatest public benefit through ATSB occurrence investigations and safety studies.

Table 4: ATSB performance against indicator 3

Performance criterion		
Percentage of all investigations that identify at least one safety issue not already identified by others.		
Target	**Result**	**Achieved**
50% of systemic and defined investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues not identified by others	**81% of systemic, defined and safety study investigations completed in 2024–25 identified safety issues not identified by others**	✔
Detail		
Investigation type	**Year**	**Percentage with safety issues**
All modes	2024–25	81%
	2023–24	82%
	2022–23	72%
	2021–22	53%

Analysis

To be effective against the ATSB's purpose, the ATSB needs to demonstrate value and relevance through the identification of safety issues not already identified by others. As an independent agency, the ATSB can investigate where others cannot. This performance criterion measures the effectiveness of the ATSB in identifying systemic safety issues across transport systems so that others can act and therefore improve transport safety.

As described in performance measure 2 above, 26 of the 31 defined and systemic investigations completed in 2024–25 identified at least one safety issue. Of those 26 investigations, 25 had at least one safety issue that was identified by the ATSB before the safety issue owner. This demonstrates that ATSB investigations that identify safety issues are adding value to transport safety beyond what others in the industry can do for themselves.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study investigations[1] conducted by ATSB at the defined and systemic levels. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Analysis of investigations counts those containing at least one safety issue that was confirmed as being identified first by the ATSB.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 16.

[1] Safety study investigations were previously referred to as research investigations conducted under the TSI Act.

Performance measure 4

Desired outcome

Efficiently use resources to conduct investigations through selective investigation processes and project management discipline.

Table 5: ATSB performance against indicator 4

Performance criterion		
On an average annual basis, the ATSB will conduct around twice the number of investigations as it has available investigators.		
Target	**Result**	**Achieved**
90 active investigations	**An average of 95.4 active investigations**	✓
Detail		

Figure 2: Average number of investigations compared to investigators

Analysis

To be efficient in achieving the ATSB's purpose, the ATSB needs to ensure that resources are prioritised to investigations with the broadest safety effect on transport systems. This performance criterion measures the efficiency of the ATSB in balancing investigation demand (the number of investigations commenced each year) and capacity (resources available to complete investigations).

The target is consistent with resourcing and investigation output expectations for similar investigation agencies internationally.

During 2024–25, the ATSB averaged 95.4 active investigations, or 2.1 investigations per investigator. This is within the expected results for this KPI. The ATSB expects this average to continue considering the availability of investigative resources and the number of investigations taken on by the ATSB.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system and workforce planning records.

Methodology: Includes ATSB occurrence and safety study[2] investigations. Excludes all investigations that involved assistance to an investigation conducted by an external party. Also excludes educational, data, occurrence briefs and other published projects done by investigators. The number of active investigations is calculated for each day of the year and then averaged across the financial year. This is divided by the number of available ATSB investigators, calculated per month. Investigators may be unavailable due to extended leave, training or diversion to enabling projects.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 17.

Performance measure 5

Desired outcome

ATSB safety-related information is shared in a timely manner for the benefit of those needing awareness of relevant hazards, risks and trends or taking safety action, through publishing information in accordance with committed timeframes.

Table 6: ATSB performance against indicator 5

Performance criterion			
Median time to complete ATSB investigations.			
Target		**Result**	**Achieved**
Short investigations	6 months	8.5 months	✖
Defined investigations	12 months	20.5 months	✖
Systemic investigations	18 months	21.6 months	✖
Detail			
Investigation type	**Year**	**Percentage with safety issues**	**Median time to complete investigations (in months)**
Short investigations			
All modes	2024–25	37	8.5
	2023–24	40	8.9
	2022–23	34	10.4
	2021–22	28	8.2
Defined investigations			
All modes	2024–25	22	20.5
	2023–24	15	15.4
	2022–23	19	15.9
	2021–22	23	19.9
Systematic investigations			
All modes	2024–25	8	21.6
	2023–24	6	29.3
	2022–23	5	33.1
	2021–22	8	38.3

[2] Safety study investigations were previously referred to as research investigations conducted under the TSI Act.

Analysis

This performance criterion focuses on the timeliness of the final ATSB investigation products. Where there is relevant confirmed information available earlier than the final report, the ATSB also strives to publish preliminary and interim investigation reports (not measured in this KPI). Timely sharing of safety information is important for our stakeholders with responsibility for managing risk.

For systemic and short investigations, the ATSB has seen a downward trend of lower median investigation age at time of publishing over the past 3 or more years. While published targets have not been met this financial year, various efficiency improvements that have been implemented can be seen to be effective and are likely to continue to improve timeliness of completing investigations into future years.

The median time taken to complete defined investigations increased over the last year but had steadily decreased over the previous 3 reporting periods. Of the larger investigations, defined levels reflect the majority of investigations completed by the ATSB each year.

The median time taken for short investigations reduced from the previous financial year (by 0.4 months), and continues the generally downward trend toward the 6-month target, but was still above target. As the median time for short investigations has been consistently above target since the removal of the dedicated short investigation team, the ATSB introduced a team focused on short investigations in February 2023. This has influenced an improvement in timeliness despite a greater number of investigations in this category.

Systemic investigations have continued to have a reduced median time, with the quickest median for the past 4 years recorded in 2024–25, although still above target. Very large investigations take many resources and prolonged effort that affects the timeliness of all investigations. The ATSB will continue to commit to focusing investigators on high-profile investigations and restricting active investigations to 2 per investigator available on average to help manage timeliness, but has also instigated tighter controls over the allocation of investigator resources to systemic investigations to ensure timeliness is improved in future years.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence investigations conducted by ATSB. The figures do not include rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and Chief Investigator Transport Safety (CITS) Victoria, nor assistance to investigations conducted by an external party. Calculation of median time is from decision to investigate to publication.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 17.

Performance measure 6

Desired outcome

Investigations of transport occurrences and safety studies are defendable to ensure industry and government confidence in ATSB work, through the use of evidence-based and systemic investigation processes.

Table 7: ATSB performance against indicator 6

Performance criterion			
Number of changes to ATSB published investigation findings over the previous financial year.			
Target		**Result**	**Achieved**
Zero		Zero	✓
Detail			
Investigation type	**Year**	**TSI Act investigations completed**	**Number of changes to published findings**
Short investigations			
All modes	2024–25	37	0
	2023–24	40	0
	2022–23	34	0
	2021–22	30	0
Defined investigations			
All modes	2024–25	23	0
	2023–24	16	0
	2022–23	21	0
	2021–22	26	0
Systematic investigations			
All modes	2024–25	9	0
	2023–24	8	0
	2022–23	8	0
	2021–22	10	0

Analysis

The ATSB is committed to ensuring that all published investigations are factually accurate, defendable and evidence-based, with the accuracy of the public record for all investigation findings continuing to be maintained. Accuracy of investigation findings remains integral to ensuring industry and government confidence in ATSB safety information in order to take action to improve transport safety.

Data source: The ATSB investigation management system.

Methodology: Includes occurrence and safety study investigations conducted by ATSB and rail investigations conducted on behalf of the ATSB by OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria. Analysis includes the review of any changes to findings after the final investigation report was published during the previous financial years.

Reference: 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements, page 214; 2024–25 Corporate Plan, page 17.

Independent ‘no-blame’ investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences

This section describes ATSB’s performance relating to its role as the independent ‘no-blame’ transport safety investigator.

Aviation investigations

In 2024–25, the ATSB initiated 56 aviation occurrence investigations, one safety study and 46 occurrence briefs. In addition, ATSB investigators were involved in 3 accredited representative investigations and 3 external investigations that commenced during the year.

During this reporting period, the ATSB completed 55 aviation occurrence investigations (7 systemic, 15 defined and 33 short investigations). In addition to this, the ATSB completed 46 occurrence briefs, 7 accredited representative investigations and 7 external investigations.

ATSB investigators examine the wreckage of a Pitts S1-11X, which collided with terrain during an aerobatic flight display accident at the Avalon Airshow in March 2025 (source: Jonathan Williams)

Marine investigations

In 2024–25, the ATSB commenced 6 marine occurrence investigations. During this reporting period, the ATSB completed one systemic, 5 defined and one short marine occurrence investigation. In addition, the ATSB also completed 2 occurrence briefs.

The ATSB launched an investigation into the collision between the 333 meter Singapore-flagged container ship Maersk Shekou *and the STS* Leeuwin II *in Fremantle's inner harbour on the morning of 30 August 2024 (source: Fremantle Ports)*

Rail investigations

In 2024–25, the ATSB commenced 2 rail occurrence investigations. In addition, OCI initiated one investigation, and OTSI initiated one investigation.

During this reporting period, the ATSB completed 2 defined and 3 short rail occurrence investigations. OCI completed one systemic and one defined investigation, and OTSI completed 2 defined occurrence investigations.

The ATSB began an investigation into a level crossing collision between The Ghan *passenger train and road train, 50 km north of Alice Springs, Northern Territory, on 15 September 2024 (source: ABC News – Xavier Martin)*

Occurrence briefs

Occurrence briefs provide the opportunity to share important safety messaging and information with industry and the public in the absence of an investigation. They are a short factual summary to detail the circumstances surrounding an occurrence, which only uses information gathered during the initial notification, and from any follow-up information with relevant parties.

In 2024–25, the ATSB completed 48 occurrence briefs (46 aviation and 2 marine). Eighteen of the briefs were completed within 6 weeks.

Preparedness for a major accident

Being prepared to respond quickly and effectively to a major aviation, rail or marine accident is a key function of the ATSB. To maintain preparedness, the ATSB participates in exercises to test the effectiveness of those response arrangements, including airport and airline exercises.

The ATSB also maintains a Major Investigation Preparedness Plan (MIPP) that includes a comprehensive suite of procedures and information. The MIPP and preparedness activities ensure that the ATSB is ready to respond effectively to a major transport accident.

The ATSB participated in the Bendigo Airport's emergency exercise on 11 June 2025

Safety data recording, analysis and research

This section describes ATSB performance relating to its role in safety data recording, analysis and research.

Safety analysis and research

The ATSB safety analysis and research team was established in 2023. The team brought together skills and expertise from across the ATSB to provide focused attention to safety research. In 2024–25, the ATSB commenced one defined safety study: analysis of aircraft accident survivability (AS-2025-001).

In addition, it is also managing one large ongoing safety study, Review of aviation safety aspects of aerial firefighting in Australia (AS-2021-015), which will comprise 4 published reports.

The ATSB continued a data analysis capability expansion program in 2024–25 by:

- providing data to the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics for a shared multi-agency aviation data platform
- providing bulk birdstrike data to ICAO
- rebuilding external data reports for industry based on the ATSB Investigation Management System (AIMS)
- building a new enterprise data platform
- building and enhancing Power BI reports into AIMS to allow easy access to data by all ATSB staff
- maintaining the aviation occurrence searchable database on the ATSB website.

Throughout 2024–25, the safety analysis and research team completed over 21 data requests for external stakeholders.

Occurrence data held by the ATSB continued to support active aviation occurrence investigations. During 2024–25, data analysis helped to inform investigation decision-making, determine the investigation scope, inform investigation conclusions and safety issue risk assessments, and document past occurrences of similar incidents. The team completed over 50 data analysis requests for internal use to support investigations and governance functions.

Online aviation database

The ATSB National Aviation Occurrence Database contains de-identified information on aviation accidents and incidents in a searchable format. The database has been designed to be flexible to allow searches for most information, including date range, aircraft and operation type, injury level, occurrence category and type, location, and airspace type and class. Users can search aviation occurrence statistics from the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au/avdata.

In 2024–25, the National Aviation Occurrence Database had 25,435 page views.

Data recovery and performance

The ATSB data recovery and vehicle performance specialists maintain support and readiness for the recovery, download and analysis of recorded data from a variety of damaged and undamaged sources across the aviation, rail and marine transport modes. During this reporting period, the ATSB continued to support external agencies by providing assistance to:

- the Transport Accident Investigation Commission New Zealand to recover and analyse data from cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) and flight data recorders (FDRs) for multiple incidents
- the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee to recover data from a damaged GPS unit
- the Civil Aviation Authority of Vanuatu to recover and analyse data from damaged onboard devices and other externally recorded data sources
- the Defence Flight Safety Bureau in support of the MRH-90 Taipan helicopter accident investigation
- the Victoria Police with a damaged GPS unit from a Recreational Aviation Australia (RAAus) registered aircraft
- the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee with analysis of recorded marine and aviation data.

In addition, data recovery and performance specialists provided technical input across a variety of investigations. A selection of tasks included:

- Recovery of data from saltwater immersed avionics and engine monitoring systems for analysis. Combining this data with multiple witness videos to produce investigation animations in relation to the ongoing investigation into the collision with water involving Cessna 208 Caravan, VH-WTY, Thomson Bay, Rottnest Island, Western Australia (AO-2025-001).
- Analysis of flight and aircraft performance data to determine the likely aircraft performance during the flight as part of the investigation into the pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Gulfstream 695A, VH-HPY, 55 km south-east of Cloncurry Airport, Queensland (AO-2023-053).
- Analysis of flight data and developing investigation animations relating to the ongoing investigation into the incorrect configuration events involving Embraer 190LR, VH-A2T, near Olympic Dam Airport, South Australia, on 4 February 2025 and Embraer E190, VH-A2V, near The Granites Airport, Northern Territory, on 8 March 2025 (AO-2025-010).
- Download and analysis of a Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) along with animation in relation to ongoing investigation into the collision involving container ship *Maersk Shekou* and tall ship STS *Leeuwin II*, Fremantle, Western Australia (MO-2024-001).
- Data and video analysis in relation to ongoing investigation of level crossing collision between a freight train and a truck at the Barrier Highway level crossing, near Cutana, South Australia (RO-2023-009).

Disassembly of integrated avionics device



Material failure analysis

The ATSB has expertise and specialised facilities to enable the detailed examination of physical evidence, allowing for significant insights into the causes of factors of transport safety occurrences. During 2024–25, transport safety investigators with engineering specialist backgrounds provided technical input and analysis across a variety of investigations. A selection of tasks included:

- Completion of the investigation into the in-flight tail rotor blade failure and tail assembly separation involving Robinson Helicopter R22, on 26 February 2022 (AO-2022-010).
- Examination and analysis of the antenna and related components from the investigation into the midair collision involving 2 Eurocopter EC130 helicopters on 2 January 2023 (AO-2023-001).
- Examination and testing of the rivets recovered from a DHC-1 MK 22 Chipmunk involved in a collision with terrain on (AO-2024-013), which resulted in the release of a safety advisory notice advising use of incorrect rivets (AO-2024-013-SAN-01).
- Examination and analysis of damaged nose wheel steering components from the investigation into the wheels-up landing involving a Beechcraft King Air B200 on 13 May 2024 (AO-2024-031).
- Examination of components recovered from the ongoing investigation into the landing gear malfunction and collision with water involving de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver (AO-2024-055).
- Detailed examination of tail rotor components recovered from the ongoing investigation into the Aérospatiale AS332L1 loss of control and collision with terrain on 22 November 2024 (AO-2024-060).

Throughout this reporting period, the ATSB also continued to support external agencies by providing assistance to:

- the New South Wales Police Force in the onsite technical examination components recovered from a TL ultralight Sting S4
- Victoria Police in the examination of components from a BRM Aero Bristell Classic
- CASA in the examination of an antenna installation from a Saab 34B aircraft
- RAAus in the examination of components recovered from an Aeropilot Legend 600 aircraft.

Documenting evidence in the laboratory

Mandatory occurrence reporting

The ATSB safety reporting team received 14,609 aviation notifications, 541 marine notifications and 724 rail notifications in the form of telephone calls, emails and website contacts, relating to events in 2024–25.

In 2024–25, aviation notifications were processed into 4,433 occurrences and included in the ATSB online occurrence database.

Confidential voluntary reporting

In 2024–25, the ATSB confidential reporting scheme (REPCON) received 198 notifications (of which 64 were classified as REPCONs). Of these 198 notifications, 152 concerned aviation (48 REPCONs), 26 concerned rail (14 REPCONs) and 20 concerned marine (2 REPCONs).

Of the 125 REPCON reports completed in 2024–25, 60 (48%) resulted in safety action by stakeholders.



De-identified REPCONs, including responses from named parties and regulators and safety actions, are published on the ATSB website for aviation atsb.gov.au/repcon/aviation, marine atsb.gov.au/repcon/marine and rail atsb.gov.au/repcon/rail.

Aviation example: Five passengers occupying a row of 3 seats in a commercial jet airline flight (RA2024-00178)

The reporter raised a safety concern in relation to 5 passengers occupying a row of 3 seats in a [Operator] [aircraft].

The reporter's family comprised 2 adults and 2 infants, and there was an adult passenger seated in the third seat in the row next to them. The reporter queries how a total of 5 passengers can be seated in a row of 3 seats when there would be only 4 oxygen masks available should they be required.

The operator confirmed the incident occurred during a large IT outage which led to major disruptions, including the booking error which did not get noticed by kiosk staff or cabin crew. The operator outlined and undertook multiple safety actions such as updating standard operating procedures, exploring digital options to introduce an engineering control for this type of event, sending out an internal communication to all cabin crew, and updating the cabin crew procedures manual. The regulator received a comprehensive briefing from the operator in response to the issue, allowing them full oversight of the actions taken in response to the REPCON.

Rail example: Known track fault near [Location] (RR2024-00024)

The reporter raised a safety concern in relation to a known track fault near a bend that could potentially result in passenger injury or a train derailment. The reporter stated the small section of track has a kink at a low spot which leads to high-speed passenger trains dipping and lurching violently, and that although multiple hazard reports were submitted to the Rail Infrastructure Manager (RIM) and the concern raised with the rolling stock operator's regional management team, there has been no improvement. The reporter also queried why a temporary speed restriction has not been implemented as a mitigation measure.

As a result of the REPCON, the rolling stock operator conducted an onboard inspection by track maintenance personnel which confirmed track geometry faults and liaised with the RIM to ensure spot repairs were completed and production surfacing planned. A temporary speed restriction was also implemented as necessary. The regulator confirmed they met with the RIM and were satisfied the issue at the location was rectified.

Influencing safety action

This section describes ATSB performance relating to its role in influencing safety action during the reporting period.

Industry engagement and events

The ATSB works to build awareness of its functions and enhance its reputation through communication and stakeholder engagement activities. This is vital to ensure the industry is receptive to safety messaging and that the ATSB meets its aim of fostering public awareness of transport safety. The ATSB continues its strong record of engagement with industry through:

- participation in consultative forums with industry and other safety agencies
- representation at conferences and events
- bilateral engagement with operators, associations and other stakeholders
- active involvement in safety education forums.

The ATSB regularly participates in national and international conferences and industry events where doing so presents an opportunity to share safety messages and engage with relevant stakeholders.

2025 Australian International Airshow

The importance of installing ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast), on-board recording devices and carbon monoxide detectors were just some of the safety messages shared with attendees at the ATSB's exhibition and engagement stand at the Australian International Airshow at Avalon Airport, Victoria, held across late February and early March 2025.

Over the 3 trade days, ATSB staff engaged with a wide range of visitors from across the aviation industry, including aviation associations, OzRunways, Australian Space Agency, large and small airline operators, Victoria Police and other emergency services personnel, CASA, RAAus and a variety of pilots.

The ATSB's small, branded engagement stand in one of the 4 trade halls proved quite popular with a range of stakeholders. A series of ATSB YouTube videos played on a large television screen, while a display case with small pieces of wreckage from 2 recent accidents proved great conversation starters with curious passers-by.

Across the 3 days, ATSB staff rotated through engaging with stakeholders at the stand. A highlight was the demonstration of our virtual reality set-up on day one, which gave people the chance to walk through a non-fatal accident scene involving a Boeing 737 firebombing aircraft.

Contending with the roar of Super Hornet and F-35 jet engines combined with random pyrotechnic explosions while talking with stakeholders, this engagement proved to be a positive and a valuable exercise, based on feedback from industry and ATSB staff.

The ATSB has registered its interest with airshow organisers for another display stand at the 2027 event.

The ATSB exhibition and engagement stand at the 2024 Australian International Airshow at Avalon Airport

CASA safety forums

The ATSB continued to work collaboratively with CASA as a regular participant at its range of aviation safety forums held around the country in 2024–25.

In joining with Airservices Australia, Bureau of Meteorology and Department of Defence, the ATSB presented to a range of aviation industry participants at CASA AvSafety and Sector Safety Risk Profile (SSRP) seminars held around the country.

During these events, the ATSB continued its focus on encouraging the fitment and use of ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft, while also referencing the Australian Government's ADS-B rebate scheme.

ATSB and CASA staff together at the 2025 Australian International Airshow in March 2025

Rail safety conferences

The ATSB continued to influence rail safety in 2024–25 through its attendance and presentations at 16 stakeholder and industry events.

- Key external engagements with the rail industry included ATSB presentations at the:
- Railway Accident Investigation International Forum (RAIIF)
- Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board (RISSB) Rail Safety Conference
- Heavy Haul Rail 2025 conference
- Australasian Railways Association (ARA) AusRail Conference.

Heavy Haul Rail Conference

ATSB Manager Legal, Governance and Strategic Policy, Patrick Hornby, presented at the Heavy Haul Rail Conference in Perth in late March 2025. He spoke about how the ATSB carries out rail investigations and supports the rail industry to understand the ATSB's role in undertaking independent no-blame investigations.

This engagement was part of the ATSB's Rail Action Plan, which includes working to enhance our profile in the rail industry and to showcase how the ATSB makes a difference to improving safety.

ATSB General Counsel, Patrick Hornby, giving a presentation at the 2025 Heavy Haul Rail Conference in Perth in March 2025

RISSB Rail Safety Conference

The ATSB continued its participation at the annual RISSB Rail Safety Conference in May 2025 in Sydney, participating in panel session discussions, delivering a presentation and networking with those in the rail industry.

The ATSB presented on how ATSB investigations contribute to change in rail, and joined industry delegates on 2 panel sessions which were part of a mock trial analysing the engagements of different stakeholders following a notifiable occurrence.

This year's conference saw about 350 delegates register for the conference with industry leaders from 60 rail organisations.

ATSB General Counsel, Patrick Hornby (left), participates in the RISSB Rail Safety Conference in May 2025

Marine safety conferences

The ATSB continued to influence marine safety in 2024–25 through its attendance and presentations at 13 stakeholder and industry events.

- Key external engagements with the marine industry included ATSB presentations at the:
- Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia (MAIFA)
- Australasian Marine Pilots Institute – Ports and Pilotage Conference 2025
- AMSA Navigation Safety Advisory Group Meeting
- New Zealand Maritime Pilots Association Conference.

Other industry engagement

The ATSB harnessed video conferencing and other digital technology to continue its engagement with industry at conferences and forums, where practicable.

In 2024–25, the ATSB participated in 90 external industry engagement events, including (in addition to those already mentioned):

- Asia Pacific Coroners Society Conference
- Australian Association for Unmanned Systems' RPAS in Australian Skies Conference
- Australian Aviation Wildlife Hazard Group Workshop
- Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investigators Regional Air Safety Seminar
- Australian Airports Association (AAA) Emergency and Safety Forum
- CASA GO-SAFE (Ground Operations – Safety Forum)
- Flight Safety Foundation International Air Safety Summit
- International Transportation Safety Association Annual Conference
- International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) Group Annual Conference
- LifeFlight Engineering Safety Day
- Northern Territory Cattlemen's Association Annual Conference Aviation Safety Panel
- NSW Police Force Western Region aviation accident investigation training
- Pilatus Owners and Pilots Association Australasia Convention
- Ports Australia Working Group
- Ports Australia Risk and Resilience Conference
- Regional Aviation Association of Australia (RAAA) Technical Working Group
- Safeskies Conference
- Sport Aviation Safety Forum.

The ATSB also hosted a number of industry visitors to its head office in Canberra throughout the year, providing an opportunity for representatives from the aviation, marine and rail sectors to meet key staff, and tour the technical facilities and multimedia studio.

Senior Transport Safety Investigator presenting at the Whitsunday Coast Airport aerodrome emergency planning exercise in November 2024

SafetyWatch

The ATSB SafetyWatch initiative highlights the broad safety concerns that come from ATSB investigation findings and occurrence data reported by industry.

The ATSB encourages the transport industry to give heightened attention to the following priority areas (where more can be done to improve safety):

- reducing the collision risk around non-towered airports
- reducing passenger injuries in commercial ballooning operations
- reducing the severity of injuries in accidents involving small aircraft.

The SafetyWatch priorities are profiled on the ATSB website (atsb.gov.au/safetywatch) and are highlighted by investigation reports as appropriate.

SafetyWatch logo is used in investigation reports with safety messages relevant to the watch list

Social media

The ATSB continued to make effective use of its social media platforms to engage with the transport industry, the media and the travelling public during 2024–25. The ATSB measured and analysed the overall number of engagements with its published content, with a continued focus on producing and publishing video content.

As at 30 June 2025, ATSB social media followers included:

- Facebook: 43,687 (an increase of 32% on 2023–24)
- LinkedIn: 23,423 (an increase of 8% on 2023–24)
- X (formerly Twitter): 9,315 (a decrease of 2% on 2023–24)
- YouTube: 6,990 (an increase of 157% on 2023–24)
- Instagram: 3,367 (an increase of 24% on 2023–24)
- Threads: 708 (an increase of 54% on 2023–24).

Media engagement

Working with the media is critical to the ATSB's ability to influence safety improvements, to communicate the ATSB's role in transport safety and to engender public confidence in transport safety.

Most transport accidents, especially those involving serious injuries and fatalities, attract considerable media attention, often nationally and internationally. The ATSB proactively engages with media to ensure that the ATSB's role in accident investigation is understood, to provide assurance to the general public that the appropriate government agency has been engaged to uncover the contributing factors to an accident, and to share safety messages and learnings from our investigations.

The ATSB media strategy includes making our Chief Commissioner and senior leadership available for media interviews and appearances, holding media stand-ups on-site at major accident scenes, and hosting press conferences in support of significant investigation report releases.

A significant example was the media conference and background briefing held on the Gold Coast in April 2025 to support the public release of the ATSB final report from its investigation into the midair collision of 2 EC130 scenic flight helicopters. This accident attracted strong national and international media attention.

To help ensure media coverage was well informed and highlighted key safety messaging from the report, the ATSB invited media to a background briefing, where the investigation team briefed journalists on the nature of the accident, the ATSB investigation, including its processes and methodologies, demonstrated some of the technologies used to support the investigation, and contextualised the investigation report's findings.

This was followed by an on-camera stand-up with the Chief Commissioner, where journalists were able to ask questions about the investigation.

A transport safety investigator briefs media on the Gold Coast midair accident investigation

Chief Commissioner Angus Mitchell addressing media for the release of the Gold Coast midair accident investigation final report

Other media highlights for the ATSB during 2024–25 included:

- multiple stand-ups at Rottnest Island following a fatal accident involving a floatplane aircraft carrying international tourists in January 2025
- on-site media stand-up at the Australian International Airshow, Avalon, in March 2025 following an aerobatic aircraft accident during the air show flying display
- a media briefing and stand-up in Brisbane in June 2025 to support the release of the ATSB's investigation report from an accident involving a fire-scanning aircraft near Cloncurry.

The ATSB recognises that mainstream and trade media coverage is a means of reaching key audiences, from industry stakeholders and safety professionals to the travelling public.

As such, each ATSB investigation report release is supported by a press release, social media posts and an email to the ATSB subscriber list. The ATSB may also proactively organise or reactively facilitate media interviews for outlets that have appropriate audiences for an ATSB investigation report's safety messaging.

Education

As Australia's national transport safety investigator, the ATSB is committed to influencing safety with valuable lessons from its investigation findings, research activities and occurrence reports, which can help improve transport safety and, ultimately, save lives.

In 2024–25, the ATSB continued to embrace the use of video content to highlight its safety messaging for the benefit of industry and the travelling public. The ATSB produced 14 new educational and promotional videos during the reporting period, which were published on its YouTube and other social media channels.

The most viewed new video highlighted the findings from our investigation into the collision with a building involving Robinson R44 II helicopter in Cairns, Queensland, which occurred on 12 August 2024. The video, titled 'R44 helicopter collision with a building in Cairns' has been viewed more than 106,000 times on YouTube. This particular video largely contributed to the largest increase in followers of our YouTube channel in 2024–25.

A screen capture showing the animation of the R44 collision with a building in Cairns from the supporting video

In April 2025, a safety promotional video was produced to support the final report's release into our investigation of the midair collision between 2 Eurocopter EC-130B4 helicopters conducting scenic flights on the Gold Coast in early January 2023. The video provided valuable lessons to flight crews, operators and other organisations conducting high-frequency scenic operations to improve safety.

The video extensively used a range of high-fidelity 3D animations with great effect to detail how the collision occurred and the correct way to wear a 4-point seatbelt, while highlighting key safety messaging from the report. The video has been viewed more than 77,000 times on our YouTube channel.

A screen capture of the animation that showed the correct way for flight crew and passengers to fit a 4-point seatbelt (this image from the animation was demonstrating how not to fit a 4-point seatbelt)

The ATSB published a supporting video with its release of an interim report into the collision involving container ship *Maersk Shekou* and tall ship STS *Leeuwin II*, which occurred at Fremantle, Western Australia, on 30 August 2024.

The video, which was one of the 4 published during the year on our maritime safety investigations, had over 18,000 views on YouTube. Footage included in the video was used extensively by a number of media outlets which covered the report's release.



A screen capture from the video showing the collision occurring between the container ship Maersk Shekou *and tall ship STS* Leeuwin II

ATSB continued to promote the benefits of fitting and using ADS-B transmitting, receiving and display devices in all general and recreational aviation aircraft during 2024–25, including the promotion of the government's rebate program to encourage voluntary fitment of the technology.

In conjunction with the AMSA, the ATSB updated its video, titled 'ADS-B rebate: closes 31 May 2027', to promote the ADS-B rebate program. The video also highlighted the benefits of improved search and rescue by AMSA's Joint Rescue Coordination Centre for aircraft in distress, as well as improved pilot situational awareness when using ADS-B IN with aural and visual alerts.



The ATSB, in conjunction with AMSA, continued its promotion of the government's ADS-B rebate program through an educational video to encourage fitment of the technology in general and recreational aircraft

The ATSB was involved in supporting the TrackSAFE Foundation's Rail Safety Week campaign in August 2024, which again focused on educating all road users and pedestrians of their responsibilities when approaching and using a level crossing.

The ATSB published a news story on its website and via its social media channels to echo the 'Expect the unexpected – watch out for trains' theme of Rail Safety Week 2024.



A screen grab of the ATSB's website promoting Rail Safety Week 2024

Website

The atsb.gov.au website continues to be the principal communication channel for the ATSB. In 2024–25, the ATSB website supported 1,971,916 page views and 784,548 user sessions.

The website's most viewed page in 2024–25 was the list view of our aviation investigations. The page was viewed 214,492 times, comprising 11% of the website's total views for the year.

The ATSB continually evolves and develops its website to meet audience needs and to accommodate new and emerging technologies. Throughout the year, the ATSB made further improvements to the navigation and filtering features on the website, while improving the phone and tablet device user experience.

Partnership with RMIT University

In 2025, through our strategic partnership with RMIT, we proudly launched the Graduate Diploma in Transport Safety Investigation.

This qualification enables professionals working in transport safety-related roles across the transport sector to build the skills required to plan, manage and participate in the accident investigation process of air, rail and marine vehicles and associated systems.

The Graduate Diploma in Transport Safety incorporates 4 units of study:

- Specialist Engineering Techniques – covering primarily materials failure and an extensive array of data recovery applications and techniques
- Advance Accident Investigation Fundamentals – building on the Graduate Certificate course as applied to more complex accident scenarios
- Investigating Safety Management Systems – covering techniques applied to more systemic type investigations
- choice of one elective – from a wide range of subjects/courses geared towards advanced engineering applications and/or research techniques.

The delivery of the Graduate Certificate and the Graduate Diploma in Transport Safety Investigation is an important milestone in advancing industry capability and professional education in transport safety.

Regional cooperation

The ATSB has a program of regional engagement, underpinned by the ATSB's reputation as a world-leading transport safety investigation agency. This content addresses the deliverable to produce a report on the transport safety contribution of this engagement.

In support of the Australian Government transport safety agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, the ATSB takes a leading role in the ICAO Asia Pacific Accident Investigation Group (AIG), for which Australia is Chair, and the Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia. The ATSB is also a core member of the Railway Accident Investigation International Forum.

The ATSB places a specific emphasis on engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. In Indonesia, the ATSB's ongoing involvement is supported through the Australian Government Indonesia Transport Safety Assistance Package (ITSAP). The ATSB's engagement with Papua New Guinea (PNG) is consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Transport Sector. The ATSB deepened its relationship with countries across the Pacific through the establishment of its Pacific Program.

Indonesia

Under the ITSAP program, funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the ATSB aims to provide capability development to the National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), the Indonesian agency responsible for the investigation of aviation, rail, marine and land transport accidents and incidents.

During 2024–25, the ATSB delivered the following capability development activities with the NTSC:

- Provision of NTSC investigator training, including training on the download of aviation and marine recording devices.
- Professional development, including sponsoring 2 NTSC investigators to complete the Graduate Certificate in Transport Safety Investigation at RMIT University and placements at the ATSB Canberra office.

Papua New Guinea

The ATSB and the PNG Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) continued to cooperate on matters listed within the Transport Safety Investigation Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Transport Sector between the Government of Australia and the Government of Papua New Guinea.

During 2024–25, the ATSB sponsored 3 PNG AIC investigators to complete the Graduate Certificate in Transport Safety Investigation at RMIT University, preceded by a placement at the ATSB Canberra Office.

Investigators from PNG AIC and NTSC touring the ATSB media studio in Canberra

Pacific Program

Established in 2024–25, the ATSB's Pacific Program is funded through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Australia-Pacific Partnerships for Aviation (P4A) program.

The ATSB has developed and is delivering a suite of face-to-face and virtual training packages and will continue to work with Pacific States to build their technical expertise to conduct accident investigations and respond to local aviation incidents and accidents and promote regional aviation safety.

Under the Pacific Program, the ATSB assisted Tonga in delivering its first independent accident investigation report as well as supported Vanuatu in their investigation into an accident in July 2024.

ATSB representatives with Tonga Deputy Prime Minister and Tonga Civil Aviation Office representatives

International Civil Aviation Organization

In 2024–25, ATSB staff continued to be involved in ICAO meetings and working groups. This included membership of the Accident Investigation Panel, which meets at the ICAO office in Montreal each year to advance the contents of Annex 13 and associated guidance material for the benefit of all ICAO member states.

The ATSB contributed to the ICAO Asia Pacific Region Accident Investigation Group, where Australia continued in its role as Chair, represented by an ATSB Director of Transport Safety.

At the annual meeting, held in Thailand in 2024, the ATSB ran educational workshops for regional state investigation authorities on Bloodborne Pathogen Awareness, Critical Incident Stress Management and correctly classifying serious incidents in line with Annex 13 requirements.

ATSB representatives at the ICAO Regional Office in Bangkok with representatives from PNG and Tonga

International Maritime Organization

The ATSB actively engaged with the IMO, and in July 2024, the ATSB participated in the meeting of the IMO Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III-10) as well as the IMO's International Technical Co-operation Programme (ITCP) in London.

Australia's delegation at the 10th meeting of the IMO's Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments (III-10) in London

Railway Accident Investigation International Forum

The ATSB is a core member of the Railway Accident Investigation International Forum and presented at the forum's first meeting in Japan in 2024. The ATSB presented 2 case studies to demonstrate its analysis methodology and participated in a panel discussion.

ATSB Chief Commissioner, Angus Mitchell (left) at the 1st Railway Accident Investigation International Forum with agency heads from Taiwan, Japan and Singapore

Financial performance update

This section should be read in conjunction with the ATSB audited financial statements for 2024–25 that appear in **Section 6** of this report.

The ATSB operates as a separate non-corporate Commonwealth entity, having been established on 1 July 2009.

The ATSB recorded a deficit after income tax on continuing operations of $1.23 million (2023–24: $1.29 million) as reported within the Statement of Comprehensive Income. The operating surplus was $0.30 million (2023–24: $0.44 million) as reported within Note 3.2 Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements of the financial statements. This includes adjustments for depreciation, amortisation, principal repayments for leased assets and changes in the asset revaluation reserve. The ATSB new capital requirements are detailed in its Departmental Capital Budget published in the 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements. Over time, ATSB estimated capital injections fall short of the deficits associated with the non-funding of depreciation and amortisation. Without adequate capital injections by the government, this presents a challenge to the ATSB in maintaining its underlying equity and asset capability going forward.

A comparatively small amount of our funding is for rail. Under an intergovernmental framework for rail safety, the majority of the ATSB's resourcing is meant to be provided by state/territory governments. Queensland is the only active participant in this model that currently provides an appropriation. New South Wales and Victoria maintain their own independent accident investigators. The other states and territories are not actively financing rail safety investigations under the envisaged model. As the ATSB seeks to manage its resourcing under the limitations of this model there are rail accidents and serious incidents that are not able to be investigated by the ATSB. The ATSB is working with governments to provide greater certainty around its role in the future.

As part of the 2025–26 Budget, the ATSB again received a one-off additional appropriation compromising $3.9 million in operating funds to increase the average staffing level to 110 and to meet the legislative and international obligations of the organisation.

The ATSB also receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for technical assistance and capacity building in transport safety investigation in Indonesia. In 2024–25, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade allocated funding for the ATSB to provide support to investigations in Tonga and Vanuatu.

Table 8: Summary of financial performance and position

	2024–25 $M	2023–24 $M
Revenue from government	26.1	25.3
Own-source income	5.1	4.7
Total income	**31.2**	**30.0**
Employee expenses	20.2	18.7
Supplier expenses	9.5	9.7
Depreciation and amortisation	2.6	2.8
Finance costs	0.1	0.1
Total expenses	**32.4**	**31.3**

		2024–25 $M	2023–24 $M
Operating surplus/(deficit)		(1.2)	(1.3)
Financial assets	A	14.1	14.1
Non-financial assets	B	13.6	11.8
Liabilities	C	20.4	18.0
Net Assets – A + B – C		**7.3**	**7.9**

Section 4 –

Significant safety investigations

The following is a summary of some significant safety investigations the ATSB completed and published during 2024–25 across aviation, rail and marine. These investigations identified a number of important safety issues. This section has been prepared to meet the requirements of subsection 63A(b) of the TSI Act.

Aviation

Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023 (AO-2023-001)

What happened

Three passengers and one pilot were fatally injured and a second pilot and 5 passengers were seriously injured in the midair collision of 2 Eurocopter EC130 helicopters on the Gold Coast on 2 January 2023, a week after the operator started using the helicopters for its scenic flight operation from the Sea World theme park.

In the months prior to the accident, the operator had made changes to improve its tourism product, including commissioning the use of a second helipad location, known as the park pad, the introduction of the larger EC130 helicopters, and new hangar and office facilities.

Over time, these changes undermined risk controls used to manage traffic separation and created a conflict point between launching and departing helicopters, which is where the 2 helicopters collided.

What we found

The ATSB investigation found that the operator's safety management system did not effectively manage the safety risk present in its aviation operation, and when numerous changes were introduced, did not implement processes to consider whether they would affect the overall safety of their flights.

The report describes that in the lead-up to the collision, an inbound call from the arriving helicopter failed to register with the pilot of the departing helicopter, who was busy loading passengers on the park pad at the time. Once passenger loading was complete, a ground crew member advised the pilot of the departing helicopter that the airspace was clear.

However, this advice was no longer accurate by the time the helicopter took off more than 20 seconds later, as the inbound helicopter was continuing its approach to land. In addition, restrictions on manoeuvring at the park pad and the angles of closure of the 2 helicopters, limited the visibility for the departing pilot to identify the approaching helicopter.

The pilot of the inbound helicopter had earlier sighted the departing helicopter on the park pad, but had assessed it as not being a threat, and expected to be alerted by a 'taxiing' radio call if that condition changed, which would then be their cue to arrange separation.

The ATSB found faults in the radio antenna of the departing helicopter which likely prevented broadcast of the taxi call. Without the taxiing call being received, the pilot of the inbound helicopter, who was likely focusing on their landing site, had no trigger to reassess the status of the departing helicopter as a collision risk.

A visibility study conducted by the ATSB, which cross-validated onboard flight data with footage from multiple cameras onboard and outside the helicopters, confirmed that both pilots' view of the other helicopter was limited in the lead-up to the accident.

This limited visibility combined with both pilots' competing priorities and understanding the airspace was clear, led to the midair collision as both helicopters passed through the conflict point created by the introduction of a second helipad 9 months earlier.

While the operator did have in place a system of radio calls, hand signals and visibility devices that was intended to alert pilots of the presence of another helicopter, the investigation found that system to have significant flaws.

Safety issues and action

The report details that the operator took a number of safety actions in response to the accident. These included introducing a 'pad boss', a new ground staff position to provide pilots with traffic advisory information, displaying positional information of other aircraft (using ADS-B in) on a map display in its helicopters (using iPads with electronic flight bags), new radio call protocols, and fitting its helicopters with strobe lighting and applying high visibility paint on main rotor blades.

However, the ATSB issued 4 safety recommendations to Sea World Helicopters to address remaining safety issues. These recommendations included:

- formal consideration of the design of conflict points to identify opportunities for further risk controls or their elimination
- developing objectives within its safety management system to focus on aviation safety risk
- improving change management processes
- clarifying its change management procedure to capture the introduction of additional helicopters.

Occupant survivability was another key focus of the investigation, which found that passengers' seatbelts were incorrectly fitted due to the interaction of their lifejackets with their seatbelts.

The investigation report notes that there is no readily available guidance, either from lifejacket manufacturers or regulatory authorities, regarding the correct fitment and use of constant wear lifejackets when occupants are using multipoint seatbelts.

The 2 helicopters came to rest on a sandbar

Pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Gulfstream 695A, VH-HPY, 55 km south-east of Cloncurry Airport, Queensland, on 4 November 2023 (AO-2023-053)

What happened

The pilot of a fire surveillance aircraft that collided with terrain near Cloncurry, north-west Queensland, on 4 November 2023, was almost certainly hypoxic due to a known defect with the aircraft's pressurisation system.

The twin turboprop Gulfstream 695A, operated by AGAIR, had taken off from Toowoomba to map fire zones near Mount Isa, with a pilot and 2 camera operators on board. Early in the accident flight, the pilot had descended from 28,000 ft to 15,000 ft for about 6 minutes, before climbing back to 28,000 ft.

Later, while the aircraft was nearing Cloncurry at 28,000 ft, both power levers were probably reduced, possibly with the intention of undertaking a similar descent profile. This caused the aircraft's speed to decay, before it ultimately entered a steep, descending, anticlockwise turn.

At around 10,500 ft the aircraft transitioned from the steep descent into an unrecoverable aerodynamic spin, until it impacted terrain, fatally injuring all on board. The transition from steep descent to unrecoverable spin was almost certainly due to pilot control inputs made in an unsuccessful attempt to regain controlled flight.

What we found

The ATSB found the onset of hypoxia during the flight significantly degraded the pilot's ability to safely operate the aircraft, and it is possible that at stages the pilot also experienced some loss of consciousness.

Air traffic control recordings of the pilot's speech during the accident flight demonstrated significant and progressive impairment, including slowed, stuttering and flat speech, operational mistakes and signs of confusion.

Examination of maintenance documentation and relevant internal correspondence confirmed the aircraft had a long-term intermittent defect with the pressurisation system. At times this manifested as a reduced maximum attainable cabin differential pressure, exposing the cabin occupants to a relative altitude known to induce hypoxia.

Safety issues and action

The intermittent defect was known about by the operator's senior management, who attempted to have it rectified. However, they did not formally record the defect, communicate it to the safety manager, undertake a formal risk assessment of it, or provide explicit procedures to pilots for managing it.

Instead, management personnel participated in and encouraged the practice of continuing operations in the aircraft at a cabin altitude of 19,000 ft, and as such required the use of oxygen, without access to a suitable oxygen supply.

Correspondence and flight data showed the accident pilot had normalised the practice of managing the intermittent pressurisation issue by undertaking short descents to lower altitudes, and by using the aircraft's emergency oxygen system. This represented a practice of using a critical safety system designed for emergency use only, in order to continue a commercial activity.



The accident aircraft had taken off from Toowoomba and was en route to map fire zones near Mount Isa

Controlled flight into terrain involving Boeing 737-3H4 Fireliner, N619SW Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023 (AO-2023-008)

What happened

'Bomber 139', a Boeing 737 converted as a large air tanker, impacted a ridgeline after completing a drop while extending a fire-retardant containment line during a bushfire-fighting task in the Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023.

After striking the ridgeline, the aircraft cleared a small line of foliage before impacting the ground a second time and then sliding to rest. The 2 pilots on board were able to evacuate through a cockpit window before the aircraft was consumed by a post-impact fire.

What we found

The ATSB's investigation found that the aircraft was conducting a drop at a low height and airspeed over descending terrain, which required the use of the idle thrust engine power setting and a high rate of descent. Towards the end of the drop, the aircraft's height and airspeed decayed as it approached rising terrain that had not been detected, and was not expected, by the aircraft captain.

While the aircraft's thrust levers had been advanced mid-way through the drop, there was insufficient time for engine power to increase to allow the aircraft to climb away and safely clear the ridgeline crossing the aircraft's exit path.

The report notes the ridgeline had likely not been detected as the captain, who was the pilot flying, had declined a 'Show Me' run from the Birddog aircraft, had conducted right hand circuits (restricting their visibility of the target area as they were seated in the left seat on the

flightdeck), likely had no visibility of the ridgeline during the go-around from the first drop, and was led by the Birddog to the target through smoke on the second drop.

Not detecting the rising terrain likely contributed to the captain allowing the aircraft to enter a low energy state during the drop. Further, the co-pilot did not identify nor announce any deviations during the retardant drop, which could have alerted the aircraft captain to the low-energy state of the aircraft.

Notably, the operator and tasking agency had not published a minimum drop height for large air tankers. This resulted in the co-pilot, who did not believe there was a minimum drop height, not making any announcements about the aircraft's low energy state prior to the collision.

The accident occurred when the aircraft was conducting a second drop after releasing three-quarters of its retardant load on the prior run. The operator's practice of the pilots recalculating, and lowering, their target drop speed after a partial load drop also contributed to the aircraft's low energy state.

Safety issues and action

The investigation found that neither the operator nor the relevant Western Australian Government departments had published a drop height for large air tankers (whereas the US Forest Service has a minimum large air tanker drop height of 150 ft). This meant that aircraft captains could exercise their own judgement for drop heights to improve accuracy.

Bomber 139 was operating in Australia under a contract with the National Aerial Firefighting Centre, which did not impose a minimum drop height, but required the operator to comply with the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of the member state for the aircraft's nominated operational base, in this case Western Australia. In turn, the Western Australia large air tanker SOPs did not impose a minimum drop height limit.

Since the accident Coulson Aviation implemented a minimum drop height of 200 ft for its airtankers, while the Western Australian Department of Fire and Emergency Services and the Department of Biodiversity, Conservation and Attractions are amending procedures to incorporate drop heights, including a large airtanker drop height of 200 ft.

Meanwhile, at a national level, the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council, the parent organisation for the National Aerial Firefighting Centre, has undertaken to develop national large air tanker SOPs.



The 737 struck a ridgeline during a fire retardant drop

Rail

Signal passed at danger involving passenger train TE43, between Fortitude Valley and Bowen Hills, Queensland, on 24 May 2023 (RO-2023-004)

What happened

During the morning peak on 24 May 2023, a suburban passenger train passed a stop signal between Brisbane's Fortitude Valley and Bowen Hills stations when its driver (who later tested positive for COVID-19) was impaired by a sudden sneezing fit.

The driver identified the signal as they went past it and applied the emergency brake, with the train stopping 64 m beyond the signal. The driver then made an emergency radio call to network control. The next signal was also at stop, providing protection to the rear of the next train, which was about 300 m in front.

What we found

The ATSB's investigation found the driver had acknowledged an AWS alert as the train approached the stop signal, but did not then recognise the signal at stop, or later recall acknowledging the AWS alert.

This was likely influenced by the habitual nature of AWS alerts, which were the same for all types of restricted indications and frequently presented during traffic congestion, as well as the driver's brief impairment.

Safety issues and action

The ATSB's investigation also found that due to inherent constraints in Queensland Rail's signalling system, the network control officer was not alerted to the SPAD by a SPAD alarm, and would therefore not have been able to intervene.

In these situations, the final report notes, the emergency response is reliant on the driver self-reporting the SPAD to the network control officer, a control which is ineffective in scenarios where the driver misses the limit of authority.

The ATSB's investigation found Queensland Rail's risk register for SPADs did not assess the inherent constraints in the signalling system demonstrated by this incident. As such, the ATSB recommended that Queensland Rail review the risk associated with a SPAD in these circumstances and consider any risk controls that may be appropriate.

The train images superimposed on the aerial view of the track are not their precise location. Source: Google Earth and Queensland Rail, annotated by the ATSB

Level crossing irregularity involving freight train 1MP9 at Torrens Road, Ovingham, South Australia, on 7 December 2020 (RO-2020-021)

What happened

A late addition to a signal team's daily work plan, unnecessary complexity, and insufficient inspection and testing contributed to a freight train travelling through a busy Adelaide level crossing without boom gates active.

During trackwork as part of the electrification of Adelaide's Gawler rail line, a subcontracted signal team was tasked with temporary alterations at a number of level crossings, including the installation of jumper cables to ensure protections – boom gates and lights – still activated when required.

Midway through the day on 7 December 2020, having already actioned work on 2 planned level crossings, the signal team was asked to perform work at the Torrens Road crossing. This was an unplanned addition to what was discussed in the pre-work briefing that day, placing additional demands on the signal team with short notice.

What we found

Notably, the required work at Torrens Road also included 2 superfluous temporary jumper wires, unnecessarily increasing the complexity of the task and placing further work demand on the signal team, who then inadvertently installed one end of a jumper wire into the incorrect terminal. Testing did not identify the error and this, combined with other signal works, meant the boom gates and warning lights did not activate when a containerised freight train travelled towards the level crossing a short time later.

The freight train's driver saw the boom gates still open, and traffic on the road ahead, and initiated emergency braking but was unable to stop the train before entering the level crossing, only narrowly missing a number of road vehicles. The locomotive continued to travel a further 260 m before stopping, and trailing freight wagons stopped on the level crossing, blocking the passage of road traffic.

In addition to the factors which contributed to the incorrect installation of the jumper cable, the methodology adopted by the signal team when implementing the Torrens Road inspection and test plan did not ensure independence between the installation and verification tasks. This resulted in the wiring error not being corrected and remaining in the control circuit, potentially affecting the correct operation of the level crossing warning equipment.

Safety issues and action

In response to the incident, the principal contractor for the Gawler Rail Electrification Project, Acciona, undertook a risk assessment of the level crossing alteration works in consultation with the project stakeholders. This resulted in new controls being incorporated into the work method. These controls included the potential for road closures when wiring alterations are required to facilitate trackwork.

In addition to the specific factors contributing to the incident, the investigation found the South Australian Passenger Transport Authority approved a package of inspection and test plan procedures that did not specify any requirement for testing to verify and validate the safety integrity of the altered level crossing control circuits.

The effectiveness of any testing undertaken to control risk and assure the safety integrity of the rail infrastructure for trains operating on the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) network – like the one involved in this incident – relied solely on the methodology adopted by the subcontracted signal team on the day. In response, South Australia's Rail Commissioner amended work instructions relating to work such as that involved in this incident.

Wagons blocking the level crossing after the train came to a stop

Marine

Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022 (MO-2022-006)

What happened

The bulk carrier *Portland Bay* had been berthed at Port Kembla, New South Wales, on 3 July 2022 when deteriorating adverse weather made it unsafe for it to remain in port, and the harbourmaster and ship's master decided that the ship should sail and remain at sea until the weather improved.

After leaving Port Kembla, the ship remained much closer to the coast than the 50 nautical miles prescribed by the ship's procedures. Then early in the morning of 4 July, while drifting and slowly steaming just 12 miles from the coast, the ship's main engine developed mechanical problems. This loss of propulsive power in prevailing gale force winds, very rough seas and a heavy swell, effectively disabled *Portland Bay*, and the ship began to drift toward the rocky coast.

Delays with the ship's master initially reporting the incident were then compounded when New South Wales authorities did not immediately pass on the information to the national response authority, the AMSA. It was only after several emergency broadcasts and a radio plea for assistance that a harbour tug was dispatched, which arrived nearly 5 hours after the ship was first disabled.

By the time that tug, which did not have an operational towing winch or a suitable towline, arrived, *Portland Bay*'s master had made emergency use of both anchors one mile off the rocky shoreline of Royal National Park. The ship's anchors, while not designed to hold the ship in these severe conditions, prevented a catastrophic stranding on the rocky shore. Fortunately, the anchors reduced the ship's progress towards the coast until 2 more harbour tugs arrived, about 5 hours after it was anchored.

In the following hours, these 2 tugs began towing the ship away from the coast, but some time later, the towline of one of the tugs failed and *Portland Bay* again began drifting towards the shore, now off Cronulla. The ship's master was forced for a second time to deploy both anchors. Even with both anchors deployed and one tug connected, the ship did not hold its position, and it continued to slowly move towards the coastline overnight.

What we found

The ATSB's investigation found a key factor in the prolonged exposure of the ship and its crew to stranding, was the extensive delay in tasking the state's nominated ocean-going emergency towage vessel, *Svitzer Glenrock*.

The Port Authority of NSW had assumed control to lead the response, with AMSA and NSW Maritime as support agencies. The initial request to AMSA for *Svitzer Glenrock* to be activated was made around midday on the first day by the Port Authority. However, this first request was lost between the 2 agencies' incident control rooms and was not followed up for many hours.

It was not until after the towing attempt had failed and a further 2 requests were made that AMSA tasked *Svitzer Glenrock*, almost 13 hours after the emergency began. Around 30 hours after *Portland Bay*'s master had reported its disablement followed by MAYDAY broadcasts and the emergency anchoring, *Svitzer Glenrock* arrived after a voyage of 90 nautical miles from Newcastle in very rough weather.

Safety issues and action

On the following day, more than 48 hours after the emergency developed, the ship was towed into Port Botany for refuge and repairs. The ATSB's investigation identified 8 safety issues associated with the emergency response, highlighting confusion and inefficient coordination between the multiple agencies involved.

Portland Bay*'s master made emergency use of both anchors one mile off the rocky shoreline of Royal National Park*

Breakaway occurrences involving OOCL *Brisbane* and CMA CGM *Bellini*, **Port of Brisbane, Queensland, on 16 May and 20 May 2022, respectively (**MO-2022-004)

What happened

The ATSB investigated 2 separate breakaways of container ships berthed at the Port of Brisbane after an unprecedented stretch of rainfall resulted in significant freshwater inflows into the Brisbane River following several controlled water releases from dams located upriver. This resulted in strong currents through the Port of Brisbane, at the mouth of the river, which added strain to the mooring lines holding ships berthed there.

On 16 May 2022, the container ship OOCL *Brisbane* broke away from berth 10 at Fisherman Islands. Four days later, another container ship, CMA CGM *Bellini*, broke away from berth 6. Fortunately, the ships were brought under control in both cases, and there were no injuries or substantial damage in either incident.

What we found

The ATSB investigation found that both breakaways occurred due to the strong currents following the high rainfall combined with the interaction forces created when a second container ship passed alongside and then berthed ahead of each vessel. The high ebb current speeds and the interaction forces introduced by other vessels resulted in the mooring limits for both ships being exceeded.

In the case of the OOCL *Brisbane*, all the ship's mooring lines parted or paid out, and it moved into the Brisbane River before being assisted by tugs. CMA CGM *Bellini*'s forward mooring lines parted, and its bow drifted off the wharf before it too was assisted by tugs to be secured alongside.

In the course of its investigation, the ATSB identified that Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ), the regulator, and the Poseidon Sea Pilots (PSP), Brisbane's pilotage provider, did not have a process to jointly and effectively identify the hazards to shipping and pilotage that were outside normal environmental conditions, and to properly assess the associated risks.

Safety issues and action

Since the incidents, PSP and MSQ have collaborated with a range of stakeholders to improve extreme weather event planning and response, and to establish a formal channel to identify and risk assess hazards to shipping outside of normal environmental conditions. This has included the establishment of the Port of Brisbane Maritime Emergency Working Group, with guidelines developed for the group's role in responding to port emergencies.

Three additional current meters have been installed in the river, adding to the one installed prior to the incident, and additional meters are planned. Data from these meters will be provided by MSQ to key stakeholders, including PSP.

Finally, PSP has provided input for changes to MSQ's standard port procedures, including the joint development of procedures for movements to and from various berths under flood conditions, using MSQ's bridge/ship simulator.

OOCL Brisbane *breaking away from its berth*

Section 5 –

Formal safety issues and actions

This section details the safety issues, recommendations and safety advisory notices identified and released during the reporting period. It also highlights the responses to safety issues and safety recommendations closed during the period. This section has been prepared to meet the requirements of subsection 63A(a) of the TSI Act.

ATSB investigations primarily improve transport safety by identifying and addressing safety issues. Safety issues are events or conditions that increase safety risk and:

- can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations
- are characteristics of an organisation or a system, rather than of a specific individual, or operational environment at a specific point in time.

Safety issues will usually refer to an organisation's risk controls, or to a variety of internal and external organisational influences that impact the effectiveness of its risk controls. They are factors for which an organisation has some level of control and responsibility and, if not addressed, will increase the risk of future accidents.

The ATSB prefers to encourage stakeholders to take proactive safety action to address safety issues identified during an investigation. However, the ATSB may use its powers under the TSI Act to make a formal safety recommendation either during or at the end of an investigation. Safety recommendations are made when the ATSB remains concerned that a safety issue has not been adequately addressed by the relevant organisation.

When safety recommendations are issued, they clearly describe the safety issue of concern, but they do not provide instructions or opinions on a preferred corrective action. Like equivalent overseas organisations, the ATSB has no power to enforce the implementation of its recommendations. It is a matter for the organisation to which an ATSB recommendation is directed to assess the costs and benefits of any means of addressing a safety issue, and act appropriately.

When the ATSB issues a safety recommendation to a person, organisation or agency, they must provide a written response within 90 days. That response must indicate whether they accept the recommendation, any reasons for not accepting part or all of the recommendation, and details of any proposed safety action to address the recommendation.

The ATSB can also issue a Safety Advisory Notice (SAN) suggesting that an organisation, or an industry sector, consider a safety issue and take appropriate action. There is no requirement for a formal response to a SAN.

Safety issues are broadly classified in terms of their level of risk:

Critical safety issue

Other safety issue

- Critical safety issue – associated with an intolerable level of risk and generally leading to the immediate issue of a safety recommendation unless corrective safety action has already been taken.
- Other safety issue – associated with a risk level regarded as unacceptable unless it is kept as low as reasonably practicable. Where there is a reasonable expectation that safety action could be taken in response to reduce risk, the ATSB will issue a safety recommendation to the appropriate agency when proactive safety action is not forthcoming.

All ATSB safety issues and associated safety actions, along with the most recent status, are published on the ATSB website for all investigation reports released since July 2010.

Safety issues identified through ATSB investigations

In 2024–25, the ATSB (and OTSI NSW and OCI Victoria on behalf of the ATSB) identified safety issues as outlined in Table 9. There were no critical safety issue identified, and a total of 90 other safety issues were identified. All safety issues are risk assessed by the ATSB.

Table 9: Number of safety issues identified in 2024–2025

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total
Critical	0	0	0	0
Other	53	22	15	90
Total	**53**	**22**	**15**	**90**

Once safety action has been undertaken, the ATSB conducts another risk assessment of the safety issue. When the post-action risk assessment results in either an acceptable level of risk or a risk as low as reasonably practicable, the safety issue status is categorised as ‘adequately addressed’.

The 2024–25 Portfolio Budget Statements and 2024–25 Corporate Plan include a KPI focusing on the timeframe in which safety issues are addressed by the responsible stakeholder. The targets for this KPI are:

- 65% of safety issues are addressed in the last financial year
- 85% of safety issues are addressed in the previous financial year.

Refer to Table 2 in **Section 3** for an overview and analysis of these results.

Status of safety issues identified in 2024–25

The breakdown of safety issues, by transport mode, is summarised in Table 10.
Over two-thirds of the safety issues identified during 2024–25 have been either adequately or partially addressed as at 30 June 2025.

Table 10: Status of other safety issues identified in 2024–25

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total	Percentage
Adequately addressed	36	7	8	**51**	57%
Partially addressed	3	2	4	**9**	10%
Not addressed	0	0	1	**1**	1%
No longer relevant	2	0	0	**2**	2%
Safety action still pending	12	13	2	**27**	30%
Total	**53**	**22**	**15**	**90**	**100%**

The following tables document each safety issue identified in 2024–25 and its status assigned by the ATSB at 30 June 2025, along with the justification for that status.

Aviation

Table 11: Aviation – safety issues identified in 2024–25

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2022-019 Interrupted engine start and evacuation involving Saab 340B, VH-ZRK, at Melbourne Airport, Victoria, on 5 April 2022		
AO-2022-019-SI-01: Regional Express did not provide flight crew or ground crew recurrent training to review the hand signals required to communicate with each other, including those used in an emergency.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The publishing of notices and additional training provided more opportunities for the flight and ground crew to become familiar with hand signals, including those used in an emergency. This would improve their knowledge retention and subsequent recall of these signals, if required.
AO-2022-065 Air traffic controller incapacitation, Brisbane, Queensland, on 9 December 2022		
AO-2022-065-SI-03: Likely due to an underlying lack of resources within Airservices Australia, there was an over-reliance on tactical changes to manage the roster. As a result, cumulative fatigue was not being effectively managed strategically and an over-reliance on tactical principles did not identify or manage fatigue risks arising from the work schedule.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Airservices has confirmed that operational staffing numbers have increased for the North Queensland Terminal Control Unit (TCU) group, and overall across the business. The ATSB is satisfied that the higher staffing numbers will reduce the likelihood of future gaps in the strategic rostering process.
AO-2022-065-SI-04: Although Airservices Australia's fatigue assessment and control tool (FACT) had the means of identifying situational factors that influenced fatigue, it had limited effectiveness as supervisors were not identifying low workload as a fatigue hazard.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB considers the guidance provided and training, in conjunction with the Fatigue Risk Management System trial, adequately addresses this safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023		
AO-2023-001-SI-01: Sea World Helicopters' standard inbound call from Porpoise Point was not a reliable alert for a pilot on the ground while boarding and interacting with passengers. Where collision risk on departure existed, a pilot on the ground would highly likely be focused on cabin preparation at the time of that inbound call.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety issue is addressed through the new procedures for sterile cockpit operations which will support monitoring of radios, and supporting the inbound call with an additional call on early final approach further reduces the probability of a pilot missing a call due to customer interactions.
AO-2023-001-SI-02: Sea World Helicopters' procedure did not require ground crew to monitor the airspace up to the time of the helicopter departing the helipad. As the presence of hazards behind the helicopter could change significantly within a short space of time, helicopters routinely departed without current hazard information from ground crew.	Closed-Adequately addressed	As a risk control, implementation of the continued presence of an observer who is in direct communication with the pilot will reduce risk associated with this safety issue.
AO-2023-001-SI-03: Reopening the park pad in March 2022 created an increased risk of collision with traffic operating from the existing heliport. The conflict point was placed at a location where: » there was a higher workload for both pilots » both pilots needed to consider the effect of helicopter downwash on surface traffic » it was less likely that an inbound pilot would notice a change in the status of a helicopter on the ground » it was more difficult for an outbound pilot to acquire traffic » helicopters would close on each other vertically and laterally, decreasing likelihood of detection » the operator's airborne collision avoidance systems would not provide traffic advisories.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-001-SI-04: Sea World Helicopters' documented procedures for communication between inbound and outbound helicopters were not specific to their usual operation and location, and permitted a reactive model of separation, increasing the likelihood that an outbound pilot would not form awareness of relevant traffic. While some company pilots made proactive calls during final approach, this was not a standard practice.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The operator's procedures now require a proactive call on final approach from inbound pilots.
AO-2023-001-SI-05: Following the change in ownership of Sea World Helicopters, changes to the operation gradually degraded existing controls of enhanced communication and in-cockpit traffic display that informed team situation awareness, and the controls were eventually withheld without formal analysis of the change. This reduced opportunity for company pilots to form and maintain awareness of each other's position and intentions.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The operator has provided risk controls and reinforced them through updated and reissued job hazard analyses.
AO-2023-001-SI-06: Sea World Helicopters was reliant on common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) calls, ground crew advice and pilot visual detection of aircraft to ensure separation in VH-XH9 and VH-XKQ. Available additional controls for enhancing alerted see-and-avoid and reducing the risk of collision were not implemented.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The safety action taken by the operator implements additional controls to enhance see-and-avoid and will support pilot's implementation of see-and-avoid.
AO-2023-001-SI-07: Sea World Helicopters' implementation of their safety management system (SMS) did not effectively manage aviation safety risk in the context of the operator's primary business. Additionally, their objectives were non-specific, and the focus of safety management was primarily ground handling and work health and safety (WHS) issues. This limited the operator's ability to ensure that aviation safety risk was as low as reasonably practicable.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-001-SI-08: Sea World Helicopters' change management process, conducted prior to reopening the park pad, did not encompass the impact of the change on the operator's existing scenic flight operations. Crucially, the flight paths and the conflict point they created were not formally examined, therefore limitations of the operator's controls for that location were not identified.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
AO-2023-001-SI-09: Sea World Helicopters commenced operations with EC130 helicopters without a formal change management process. Implementation of the operator's documented procedures would have increased the likelihood of formal consideration of various risk controls, including controls that were previously applied for the introduction of aircraft.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
AO-2023-001-SI-10: At the time of park pad assessment, CASA's guidance documents for establishment of helipads did not prompt assessment of flight path interaction with other already established traffic.	Closed-Adequately addressed	If an assessment of a new or existing helipad follows the updated CASA guidance, it would now prompt operators to assess flight path interaction and simultaneous operation and deconflict where necessary, reducing the risk of midair collision.
AO-2023-001-SI-12: Sea World Helicopters did not have documented procedures or guidance on the correct fitment of aircraft seatbelts in conjunction with constant wear lifejackets. As a result, on-the-job training provided to ground crew included incorrect fitting practices, leading to passengers being routinely incorrectly restrained. This increased the risk of injury to passengers in the event of an accident.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The operator has developed procedures and included these in its training.
AO-2023-001-SI-13: Sea World Helicopters' passenger safety briefing system, comprising a passenger safety briefing video supplemented by safety cards and ground crew advice had limited, inconsistent and incorrect information about correct fitment of seatbelts, location and emergency operation of the EC130 doors, and the emergency brace position.	Closed-Partially addressed	Updates to the operator's safety briefing system have addressed limited and inconsistent information about the EC130 doors and the emergency brace position. While the fitment of seatbelts in the operator's safety briefing is not consistent with guidance and does not describe the requirement to ensure the lap portion of the seatbelt remains low and tight, other actions taken by the operator have reduced the risk that a passenger will be incorrectly restrained.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-008 Controlled flight into terrain involving Boeing 737-3H4 Fireliner, N619SW, Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023		
AO-2023-008-SI-01: The Coulson Aviation practice of recalculating the target retardant drop speed after a partial drop reduced the post-drop stall speed and energy-height safety margins.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The amendment to the Coulson Aviation Flight Operations Manual to prohibit the recalculation (lowering) of drop speeds following a partial load drop should adequately address this safety issue.
AO-2023-008-SI-02: Coulson Aviation and the relevant Western Australian Government departments had not published a minimum retardant drop height in their respective operating procedures for large air tankers. Consequently, the co-pilot (pilot monitoring), who did not believe there was a minimum drop height, did not alert the aircraft captain (pilot flying) to a drop height deviation prior to the collision.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The amendment to the Coulson Aviation Flight Operations Manual to prescribe a minimum target drop height should adequately address this safety issue.
AO-2023-008-SI-03: Coulson Aviation and the relevant Western Australian Government departments had not published a minimum retardant drop height in their respective operating procedures for large air tankers. Consequently, the co-pilot (pilot monitoring), who did not believe there was a minimum drop height, did not alert the aircraft captain (pilot flying) to a drop height deviation prior to the collision.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The amendment to the Western Australian Aerial Fire Suppression Procedures to incorporate drop heights should adequately address this safety issue.
AO-2023-008-SI-04: The Coulson Aviation crew resource management practice of limiting the pilot monitoring (PM) announcements to deviations outside the target retardant drop parameter tolerances increased the risk of the aircraft entering an unrecoverable state before the PM would alert the pilot flying.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The Coulson Aviation Fixed Wing Flight Operations Bulletin 24-1 introduces the requirement to brief the drop height prior to each drop, standardised callouts for approaching the briefed drop height and standardised callouts for deviations above and below the briefed drop height. This addresses the safety issue raised by the ATSB.
AO-2023-008-SI-05: Australian states and territories that engage in Large Air Tanker (LAT) operations have developed their own separate SOPs for LATs and aerial supervision assets. This can result in safety requirements being omitted or misunderstood by the different tasking agencies, such as a minimum drop height, resulting in inconsistencies in the development and application of LAT SOPs.	Open-Safety action pending	The ATSB acknowledges the commitment to safety action by the Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council through the National Aerial Firefighting Centre Strategic Committee. The ATSB will monitor the progress of the Aviation Safety Group in the development of national LAT SOPs and will re-assess the safety issue once completed.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-020 In-flight fire and cabin smoke involving Saab 340A, VH-KDK, 114 km east-north-east of Cobar, New South Wales, on 23 April 2023		
AO-2023-020-SI-01: Saab did not include the smoke curtain fitment in pre-flight documentation for the cargo-configured Saab 340 aircraft to inform flight crew of this difference from the passenger-configured version.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Saab has revised the aircraft operations manual to highlight the fitment of the smoke curtain when carrying cargo in the cargo compartment and has released the revised checklists through the Saab portal. This will ensure that aircraft operators can access the revised information to be included in operators' pre-flight checklists.
AO-2023-020-SI-02: The Pel-Air and Rex Saab 340 flight crew operating manuals did not include reference to the location and operation of the cross-valve handle or the operation and use of the smoke curtain.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Pel-Air has ceased conducting freight operations using the Saab 340 aircraft and has since sold the aircraft. Accordingly, the safety issue is no longer relevant to Pel-Air. Rex has amended the internal inspection checklist within the Saab 340 FCOM to highlight to their flight crews the required cross-valve handle position prior to flight. The ATSB is satisfied that the safety action undertaken has adequately addressed the safety issue for Rex.
AO-2023-020-SI-03: Rex did not ensure its flight crews received training in the differences between passenger and freight-configured Saab 340 aircraft, prior to being scheduled to fly freight operations.	Closed-No longer relevant	The requirement for Rex to provide their flight crews with type-specific training on the cargo-configured Saab 340 no longer exists. Pel-Air Aviation, who operated the cargo-configured Saab 340 aircraft, have ceased operating that variant.
AO-2023-029 Fuel starvation and forced landing involving Cessna 310R, VH-DAW, about 5 km south-east of Derby Airport, Western Australia, on 20 June 2023		
AO-2023-029-SI-01: Broome Aviation's operations manual did not include a procedure for recording inflight fuel calculations. As a result, pilots adopted varying methods for fuel monitoring, leading to reduced assurance of accurate fuel management.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Broome Aviation has implemented inflight fuel management procedures that address the safety issue.
AO-2023-029-SI-02: During the 8-month period from November 2022 until the accident, Broome Aviation provided its pilots transitioning to operating the Cessna 310 with limited supervision, guidance and support, including management of the fuel system.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Broome Aviation has implemented a new check and training system and has adequately shown the system is currently being used for pilot training. The head of flying operations has also exhibited a proactive involvement in pilot supervision, showing a commitment to maintaining standards and ensuring effective oversight.
AO-2023-029-SI-03: Aircraft defects were not written on the maintenance release, leading to several defects not being rectified or managed.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Broome Aviation has implemented a revised defect reporting system with specific requirements. In addition to regular safety meetings to review aircraft defects and ensure pilots are adhering to the defect reporting procedure, this safety action adequately addresses the identified issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-029-SI-04: Broome Aviation pilots experienced pressure not to report aircraft defects on maintenance releases, and many pilots also experienced or observed pressure from individuals within the company management to conduct flights in aircraft with defects that they considered made the aircraft unsafe for flight.	Closed-Partially addressed	Positive steps have been taken by Broome Aviation, but their effectiveness in addressing the safety issue will depend on how they are embraced and executed over time. As such, the ATSB will close the safety issue as partially addressed and rely on the continued efforts of the operator, and surveillance activities by CASA, to adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2023-036 Midair collision involving Jabiru J430, VH-EDJ and Piper PA-25-235, VH-SPA, Caboolture Airfield, Queensland, on 28 July 2023		
AO-2023-036-SI-01: The Caboolture Gliding Club had a regular practice of using runway 06 for some flights, including during periods of light traffic on runway 11/29. This increased the risk of collision as Caboolture was a non-controlled aerodrome relying on alerted see-and-avoid principles, and there was a stand of trees obstructing pilots' vision of intersecting runways.	Closed-Adequately addressed	New procedures implemented by the Caboolture Aero Club, which are being followed by the Caboolture Gliding Club, should significantly reduce instances of aircraft operating simultaneously on intersecting runways.
AO-2023-036-SI-03: The Caboolture Aero Club did not effectively manage or inform pilots of the risk presented by trees and buildings around the airfield that prevented pilots from being able to see aircraft on intersecting runways and approach paths.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The new procedures implemented should significantly reduce instances of aircraft operating simultaneously on intersecting runways.
AO-2023-036-SI-04: CASA guidance for pilots using non-controlled aerodromes did not clearly define the active runway. The guidance did not provide practical advice to pilots using a secondary runway, and in some situations, it was contrary to existing regulations.	Open-Safety action pending	The ATSB believes that the changes described by CASA in improving the guidance material and removing the term 'active' will adequately address this safety issue once they are implemented.
AO-2023-050 Aircraft separation issue during take-off involving Lancair, VH-VKP, and De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited DHC-8-315, VH-TQZ, Mildura Airport, Victoria, on 29 September 2023		
AO-2023-050-SI-01: Due to topography and buildings at Mildura Airport, aircraft are not directly visible to each other on the threshold of runways 09, 27 and 36. The lack of a requirement for mandatory rolling calls increased the risk of aircraft not being aware of each other immediately prior to take-off.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Mildura Airport has advised that as of 4 April 2024, a permanent Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) has been declared for Mildura Airport requiring mandatory rolling calls by all aircraft. This will increase the situational awareness of all pilots in the vicinity of Mildura Airport and alert them to aircraft about to take off and reduce the risk of potential aircraft collision on the aerodrome.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-050-SI-02: The QantasLink radio procedure required Dash 8 flight crews to use the VHF COM 2 radio to broadcast and receive on local frequencies during operations at non-controlled aerodromes. This reduced the ground-based transmission and reception strength, and therefore reduced the likelihood of other aircraft receiving calls in some circumstances.	Closed-Partially addressed	The interchange of departure transmissions to VHF COM 1 from VHF COM 2 for Mildura Airport will reduce the risk of pilots of QantasLink and other aircraft missing radio broadcasts on the ground at Mildura. The ATSB acknowledges that QantasLink has done a risk assessment of the safety issue across all non-controlled aerodromes and that assessment identified additional threats. The ATSB notes, however, QantasLink has not provided an assessment of how these threats are considered to pose a higher risk than the existing aircraft collision risk identified in the safety issue. The ATSB believes that the risk assessment may be benefited by examining aerodromes other than Mildura that exhibit similar risk factors, namely, radio shielding, visual obstructions and/or multiple runways. Furthermore, the risk assessment did not take into account the newly introduced advice from the aircraft manufacturer in 2 flight operations service letters.
AO-2023-050-SI-03: De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited did not publish any guidance to operators of Dash 8 aircraft on the transmission and reception performance limitations of VHF COM 2 radios for ground-based communications.	Closed-Adequately addressed	On 6 December 2024, De Havilland Canada released 2 flight operations service letters to operators recognising that VHF COM 1 may provide better ground-based signals to other stations either on the ground or in the air. ATSB believes that the proactive release of the flight operations service letters to inform operators of the limitations of the aircraft radio systems is sufficient for ATSB to conclude that the safety action taken by De Havilland Canada was appropriate and timely and considers this safety issue adequately addressed.
AO-2023-051 Loss of control and in-flight break-up involving Robinson R66, VH-KFT, near Hawks Nest, New South Wales, on 26 October 2023		
AO-2023-051-SI-01: The Robinson Helicopter pilot's operating handbook sections for operation in high winds or turbulence did not warn of the potential for turbulence-induced low-G, and rapid right roll, particularly at high airspeed, or provide guidance for appropriate control inputs in response to a turbulence-induced low-G situation. This increased the risk of pilots encountering low-G independent of control inputs, and an in-flight break-up.	Open-Safety action pending	Robinson Helicopter Company advised that it was currently reviewing and revising the pilot's operating handbooks, including the applicable safety notices, to improve guidance on the low-G condition, flight in turbulent conditions, and pilot distraction.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2023-051-SI-02: The asymmetric horizontal stabiliser design in the Robinson R22, R44 and R66 models significantly contributed to the uncommanded right roll rate during low-G conditions and the risk of an in-flight break-up.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The action taken by Robinson Helicopter Company to develop and maximise fitment of an improved horizontal stabiliser addresses the safety issue.
AO-2023-053 Pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Gulfstream 695A, VH HPY, 55 km south-east of Cloncurry Airport, Queensland, on 4 November 2023		
AO-2023-053-SI-01: The Airservices Australia hypoxic pilot emergency checklist did not contain guidance on ceasing the emergency response. This increased the risk that a controller may inappropriately downgrade the emergency response during a developing hypoxic scenario.	Open-Safety action pending	
AO-2023-053-SI-02: AGAIR Gulfstream 690 and 695 aircraft were operated with known defects without being recorded on the aircrafts' maintenance releases, likely as a routine practice. For VH-HPY, the absence of documented historical information limited the ability to assess the operational impact of the pressurisation defect and the effectiveness of maintenance rectification activities	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB considers that the changes described by AGAIR in engaging and continuing airworthiness management organisation (CAMO) and new head of aircraft airworthiness and maintenance control (HAAMC), along with improvements to procedures and training, will likely adequately address this safety issue.
AO-2023-053-SI-03: The AGAIR aircraft VH-HPY pressurisation system could not reliably attain the required cabin altitude during flight due to a known, long-term, unresolved intermittent defect. AGAIR management personnel were aware of the defect and, through a combination of inaction, encouragement and, in some instances, direct involvement, permitted the aircraft to continue operations at an excessive cabin altitude.	Closed-No longer relevant	VH-HPY was destroyed in the accident, so the safety issue specific to this aircraft no longer exists.
AO-2023-053-SI-04: AGAIR management exercised ineffective operational control over the line scanning activities. As a result, the ongoing intermittent pressurisation defect was not formally recorded, the issues with the aircraft were not communicated to the AGAIR safety manager, and the hazardous practice of operating the aircraft at a cabin altitude that required the use of supplemental oxygen, without access to a suitable oxygen supply, was allowed to continue.	Open-Safety action pending	While the ATSB recognises the changes implemented by AGAIR to date, the actions taken do not address, in full, the matters raised within the safety issue. Specifically, the response does not address the oversight of delegated functions by the head of flying operations, the reporting of safety occurrences and hazards within the organisation's safety management system, the communication of known safety matters to the safety manager, and procedural adherence by line pilots and management personnel.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2024-007 Incorrect configuration involving Embraer E190, VH-UYI, near Honiara International Airport, Solomon Islands, on 23 February 2024		
AO-2024-007-SI-03: Alliance Airlines flight crews were regularly changing the speed selector knob setting during the take-off run. This was contrary to Embraer's guidance, and Alliance Airline's own standard operating procedures manual. This increased the risk of distraction during a critical phase of flight.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Flight crews will receive targeted instruction emphasising that no adjustments to the speed selector knob are to be made during the take-off roll, with compliance monitored through analysis of flight data and assessed during recurrent check and training. The ATSB is satisfied that these actions adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2024-007-SI-04: Likely due to a training deficiency, Alliance Airlines flight crews' conduct of the 'Before start' procedures and 'Pre-take-off' brief review were not being performed effectively to ensure the speed selector knob was correctly set and checked, which increased the risk of a low-speed event after take-off.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Alliance Airlines is enhancing training and procedural guidance to reinforce the correct setting and verification of the speed selector knob. Flight crews will also receive targeted refresher training through a dedicated simulator training module, emphasising correct procedural discipline for conducting pre-take-off reviews. The ATSB is satisfied that these actions adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2024-007-SI-05: Consistent with Embraer's airplane operations manual, the Alliance Airline's pre-flight procedure required flight crew to unnecessarily initially set the speed knob to 'manual'. This increased the risk of the aircraft departing with the incorrect speed mode selected.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Alliance Airlines has amended its E190 SOPMs to remove any reference to setting manual speed during pre-flight procedures. Additionally, any reference to the practice of the right-seat pilot setting manual speed at 80 knots during the after-shutdown flow will be discontinued, with recurrent training and check events to reinforce compliance with correct procedure. The ATSB is satisfied that these actions adequately address the safety issue.
AO-2024-011 Loss of control and collision with terrain involving Beechcraft E55, VH-OMD, Cowra Airport, New South Wales, on 11 April 2024		
AO-2024-011-SI-01: Fly Oz's asymmetric training procedure involved failing one engine using the mixture control without confirmation the engine was subsequently restarted, rather than reducing throttle to simulate zero thrust in accordance with the Beechcraft E55 Airplane Flight Manual. This increased the risk of undetected asymmetric operation during descent and landing and the associated loss of control.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Fly Oz has amended its multi-engine training to simulate engine failures only using throttle (not mixture).
AO-2024-032 Turbulence event and cabin crew injury involving Boeing 737, VH-VYK, 36 km south-east of Brisbane Airport, Queensland, on 4 May 2024		
AO-2024-032-SI-01: Qantas lacked a procedure to ensure cabin crew fitness was assessed after a significant injury. This increased the risk that a crew member could continue to operate while being unfit for duty.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB acknowledges that the introduction of medical assessment guidelines, which includes unrestrained crew during a moderate turbulence event to be implemented by Qantas reduces the risk associated with this safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2024-035 Flight below minimum altitude involving Boeing 737, PK-LDK, 19 km south of Canberra Airport, New South Wales, on 14 June 2024		
AO-2024-035-SI-01: Batik Air did not ensure that flight crew completed all CTAF training prior to them operating flights into Australia where the use of these procedures could be require	Closed-Adequately addressed	Batik Air issued internal notices providing information on CTAF and traffic information by aircraft (TIBA) procedures. A special flight crew briefing was also conducted with details and lessons from this incident. Batik Air also added practical components to the theoretical CTAF training already in place. All flight crew assigned to Australian operations have undergone this training and Batik Air has incorporated this training into its annual flight crew training program. This safety action should provide Batik Air crews operating services to Australia with the knowledge required to operate into non-controlled aerodromes using CTAF procedures. The action taken should also ensure that all Batik Air flight crew operating Australian services have undertaken CTAF training and will undertake the training at regular intervals, thereby adequately addressing the safety issue.
AO-2024-045 Loss of control in flight involving Leonardo Helicopters AW139, VH-EXK, 19 km east of Longford Heliport, Victoria, on 2 August 2024		
AO-2024-045-SI-01: Esso Australia did not have a procedure for a helicopter recovery from inadvertent instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) during hoist operations or recovery procedures for enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) alerts or advisories.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB acknowledges the introduction of a prescribed low-level inadvertent meteorological recovery procedure and the associated training to be implemented by Esso Australia reduces the risk associated with this safety issue.
AO-2024-049 Collision with terrain during go-around involving Cessna U206F, VH-TDQ, 39 km south-east of Moora, Western Australia, on 1 September 2024		
AO-2024-049-SI-01: The operator's pre-flight passenger briefing did not include the demonstration of, and pilots were not trained how to operate, the emergency exit via the cargo door with the flaps extended.	Open-Safety action pending	FlyWA had not trained its pilots to operate the emergency cargo door while flaps where extended and their pre-flight passenger briefing did not include a demonstration on the operation of the emergency exit with the flap extended.
AO-2024-049-SI-02: The aircraft did not have the modifications detailed by CASA for Cessna 206 emergency exits, increasing the likelihood of impeded egress during emergency situations.	Open-Safety action pending	Fly Esperance PTY LTD is in the process of investigating the various supplemental type certificates (STCs) mentioned in the report, to see which will be best suited to VH-TDQ in order to improve egress from the aircraft in the event of flaps being deployed. ATSB acknowledges the due process being undertaken by the operator and awaits further communication from the operator to action the pending safety action.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
AO-2024-056 Runway excursion involving GippsAero GA8, VH-IDM, Whitsunday Airport (Shute Harbour), Queensland, on 2 November 2024		
AO-2024-056-SI-01: The training, supervision and checking flights conducted by Wave Air did not identify that an excessive approach speed was routinely being used by the pilot during the final approach to land.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The changes to the training program and appointment of a new head of training and checking should ensure that knowledge gaps, including those associated with approach and landing procedures, are identified and corrected.
AO-2024-056-SI-02: Wave Air's weight and balance system used an incorrect empty weight moment arm to calculate the aircraft's centre of gravity, and passengers were not weighed in accordance with their procedures.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The operator's safety action will enable accurate weight and balance assessments.
AO-2024-056-SI-03: The decision height for assessing whether an aircraft met Wave Air's stabilised approach criteria was too low.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Raising the decision height for assessing whether an approach is stabilised significantly increases the time available to reduce excess airspeed and the distance from the ground/obstacles during a go-around.
AO-2024-061 Entry to a closed taxiway involving Pilatus PC-12/47E, VH-FXJ, Adelaide Airport, South Australia, on 4 November 2024		
AO-2024-061-SI-01: The Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Part 139 (Aerodromes) Manual of Standards 2019 section relating to the temporary closure of a taxiway at night did not: » provide a recommendation that when operating on an aerodrome with significant obscuring background lighting, consideration be given to increasing the span of unserviceability lights, similar to the recommendation provided for markers to cross the entire closed area » specify that both markers and unserviceability lights were required.	Open-Safety action pending	CASA is currently developing Advisory Circular (AC) 139.C-15 v1.0 – Safe planning and conduct for aerodrome works and has undertaken to include guidance on the use of both unserviceability cones and lights to designate closed taxiways at night. That guidance will include consideration of the detrimental effect background lighting can have on identifying closed infrastructure. CASA also advised the review will include consideration of the use of reflective markings on cones used at night.

Marine

Table 12: Marine – safety issues identified 2024–25

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2022-003 Breakaway and grounding of CSC *Friendship*, Port of Brisbane, Queensland, on 27 February 2022		
MO-2022-003-SI-01: MSQ did not have structured or formalised risk or emergency management processes or procedures. Consequently, MSQ was unable to adequately assess and respond to the risks posed by the river conditions and current exceeding operating limits and ensure the safety of berthed ships, port infrastructure or the environment, and avoid CSC *Friendship*'s breakaway.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-003-SI-02: PSP's safety management system for pilotage operations did not have procedures or processes to manage predictable risks associated with increased river flow or pilotage operations outside normal conditions. This, in part, resulted in PSP not considering risks due to the increased river flow properly and not taking an active role until after the breakaway.	Closed-Adequately addressed	PSP, in collaboration with MSQ, developed a set of structured emergency evacuation procedures to respond to increased flow in the Brisbane River. These procedures were supplemented with generic emergency evacuation procedures that can be used as a guide for any berth in the port. The PSP pilotage operations safety management system was updated to include these procedures as well as training requirements to support them. These actions, along with improved PSP relations with MSQ, adequately address the safety issue.
MO-2022-003-SI-03: Ampol's assessment of risk to the ship and facility did not consider water speed in excess of the design and safety limits for the ship and berth mooring arrangements.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The completion of an internal investigation enabled the defining of conditions for the safe operation of the product's wharf under various wind and river current operating conditions. Along with improved relations with port authorities, these actions adequately address the safety issue.
MO-2022-004 Breakaway incidents involving OOCL *Brisbane* and CMA CGM *Bellini* in the Port of Brisbane, Queensland, on 16 May and 20 May 2022, respectively		
MO-2022-004-SI-01: MSQ and PSP did not have a process to jointly and effectively identify and risk assess the hazards to shipping and pilotage that were outside normal environmental conditions.	Closed-Adequately addressed	MSQ and PSP have established formal procedures for involving key port stakeholders in collaborative risk assessment of the hazards to shipping and pilotage associated with significant weather events. These procedures should result in appropriate controls being identified and implemented by the responsible stakeholders to mitigate risks to port safety posed by any future weather events. The outlined safety action therefore adequately addresses the safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2022-005 Near grounding of *Rosco Poplar*, off Bond Reef, Hydrographers Passage, Queensland, on 4 May 2022		
MO-2022-005-SI-01: The check pilot system was ineffective in providing the AMSA assurance of the competency of coastal pilots, mainly due to the inconsistent and unreliable application of assessment standards between different check pilots. Further, AMSA had not implemented a system to identify the inconsistent application of standards or the trends in assessment outcomes readily apparent in the data that it had held for many years.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of Portland Bay, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022		
MO-2022-006-SI-01: Portland Bay's manager, Pacific Basin Shipping, did not provide the master advice about notifying authorities as per the ship's safety management system emergency procedures, instead focusing on the engineering matters. This probably led to the master delaying the notification and the request for tug assistance.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The proactive safety action taken by Pacific Basin Shipping includes revised emergency procedures, emergency drills outside of office hours, a fleetwide circular disseminating lessons learned from this incident across the company and a training video based on this incident as a case study that, among other subjects, highlights the importance of early notifications. Collectively, the actions taken are assessed as having adequately addressed this safety issue.
MO-2022-006-SI-02: The AMSA's Maritime Assistance Services procedures to support the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies were not effectively implemented. Consequently, there was a 12-hour delay in tasking the state's nominated emergency towage vessel, *Svitzer Glenrock*, which significantly prolonged the emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006-SI-03: Port Authority of NSW procedures to comply with its Port Safety Operating Licence and the NSW Coastal Waters Marine Pollution Plan were not effectively implemented. This resulted in delays to the required notifications and incident response, which contributed to prolonging the emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2022-006-SI-04: The Port Authority of NSW did not have a proper and correct understanding of its responsibilities for emergency response under its operating licence and relevant state plans. This contributed to the inadequate coordination of emergency towage, salvage and refuge, which were critical for the single, integrated and comprehensive response required and significantly prolonged the emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006-SI-05: Transport for NSW (NSW Maritime), as the statutory agency responsible for ensuring that New South Wales was prepared to respond to an incident in accordance with the state's plan that it maintained, had not effectively met this obligation. This resulted in the long delay in New South Wales assuming control of the incident and contributed to the inadequate coordination of the emergency response required for a single, integrated and comprehensive response and significantly prolonged the emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006-SI-06: The AMSA's process to issue directions was inefficient and resulted in excessive time to issue directions allowing *Portland Bay* to enter Port Botany as a place of refuge. While this delay did not further prolong the emergency, such delays increase risk in time-critical situations.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006-SI-07: The AMSA had not adequately managed the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies and annual exercises required to prepare for such incidents had not been conducted for 4 years before the incident. This probably resulted in the ineffective implementation of its Maritime Assistance Services procedures, the inefficient process for issuing directions and inadequate coordination of the incident with state authorities.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2022-006-SI-08: The AMSA, with direct control of key national emergency response arrangements, did not have the required understanding of its central role in any response, regardless of location. Consequently, its support to, and coordination with, the control agency in relation to emergency towage, salvage and refuge was inadequate, inconsistent with National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies principles of a single, integrated and comprehensive response and significantly prolonged the emergency.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-006-SI-09: United Salvage was severely limited in its ability to provide the required salvage services as it did not own, operate or directly control any towage vessels for which it relied on towage providers. This limitation was not made clearly known to *Portland Bay*'s master, owners or managers or involved authorities to allow them to properly assess whether the most suitable towage vessels, including the emergency towage vessel, had also been promptly deployed for salvage and emergency response.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-007 Grounding of *Hagen Oldendorff*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 9 April 2022		
MO-2022-007-SI-01: The Pilbara Ports Authority's port user guidelines and procedures did not reflect the best practice escort towage guidance detailed in the port's draft escort towage strategy and business continuity plan. The detail of these improved towage practices, designed to reduce the risk of channel blockages, were also not integrated into the Port Hedland Pilots' safety management system and were consequently inconsistently applied by pilots.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The integration of the recommended towage allocation, practices and guidelines of the escort towage strategy into the port user guidelines and procedures document should adequately address this safety issue.
MO-2022-007-SI-02: The Pilbara Ports Authority's port user guidelines and procedures did not reflect the best practice escort towage guidance detailed in the port's draft escort towage strategy and business continuity plan. The detail of these improved towage practices, designed to reduce the risk of channel blockages, were also not integrated into the Port Hedland Pilots' safety management system and were consequently inconsistently applied by pilots.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The integration of the recommended towage allocation, practices and guidelines of the port's adopted escort towage strategy into the Port Hedland Pilots safety management system should adequately address this safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2022-007-SI-03: Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-007-SI-04: Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2022-007-SI-05: Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.
MO-2023-002 Steering failure and contact with navigational beacon involving CMA CGM *Puccini*, Port Melbourne, Victoria, on 25 May 2023		
MO-2023-002-SI-01: The ship's managers' (CMA CGM) safety management system procedures and guidance for steering gear operation across its fleet were ambiguous and did not clarify the different terminology to those commonly used by the industry. This increased the risk of incorrect configuration of the steering gear, which occurred on board CMA CGM *Puccini*.	Open-Safety action pending	To be advised.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
MO-2023-003 Grounding of pilot launch PV *Corsair* in Port Phillip Heads (near Point Lonsdale), Victoria, on 5 October 2023		
MO-2023-003-SI-01: The safety management system for *Corsair* did not include detailed guidance and reference material for the safe navigation of Port Phillip Heads, the effective use of launch navigational equipment and the role of the launch deckhand in supporting safe navigation.	Closed-Partially addressed	The completed and proposed update of pilot launch guidelines includes additional material to promote consistent launch navigation and reduce the likelihood of single person navigational error.
MO-2023-003-SI-02: Documentation supporting the training and competency assessment of launch coxswains was limited in detail and training records were incomplete.	Closed-Partially addressed	Crew training has been expanded to include the delivery of resource management training to pilot launch crew. This training should promote the use of all available resources for launch navigation including navigation equipment and all members of the launch crew.

Rail

Table 13: Rail – Safety issues identified in 2024–25

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
RO-2020-001 Derailment of freight train 4MC2 and subsequent impact with passenger train 8630 at Barnawartha, Victoria, on 29 January 2020		
RO-2020-001-SI-01: ARTC's systems for management of track lateral stability did not lead to identification of the location as a special location potentially vulnerable to track instability.	Closed-Partially addressed	The updated procedures standardise the planning for stability management and introduce a dedicated engineering team to reduce variability in information collection, data analysis and decision-making for assuring track stability. A commitment has also been made to explore technology options to support the measurement of rail stress-free temperature as an input to track stability management.
RO-2020-020 Level crossing irregularities involving freight train 3PM7 at Werribee, Victoria, on 4 December 2020		
RO-2020-020-SI-01: Changed level crossing isolation arrangements were not effectively reflected in program documentation, nor effectively disseminated to all those potentially affected. An earlier internal audit of the project also identified instances of scope changes not being documented.	Closed-Partially addressed	The updated project management framework includes explicit instructions for the test and commissioning plans for project signalling works. This project management framework is supported by an updated project assurance framework and associated procedures developed by the network's accredited rail operator. The combination of these safety actions should reduce the likelihood of inadvertent disruption to level crossing protection during project works.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
RO-2020-020-SI-02: Metro Train Melbourne standards and procedures did not specifically address requirements associated with fuse removal and securement in safety critical scenarios.	Closed-Partially addressed	The published safety notice to project staff includes advice on compliance with design documentation and highlights appropriate practices for removing and handling fuses. These safety critical practices will also be included in updates to standards and procedures. Further action is also underway to develop national competency standards for those involved in signalling works and implement training to these standards.
RO-2020-020-SI-03: There was probably no independent check of the isolation arrangements installed on the night of 29 November. An earlier internal audit of the project also reported instances of testers in charge checking their own work.	Closed-Partially addressed	Interim measures included explicit instruction regarding test and commissioning plans and associated independent testing. Updated and new procedures will embed explicit instructions for the independent checking of project signalling works.
RO-2020-021 Level crossing irregularity involving freight train 1MP9 at Torrens Road, Ovingham, South Australia, on 7 December 2020		
RO-2020-021-SI-03: The South Australian Passenger Transport Authority approved a package of inspection and test plan procedures that did not specify any requirement for tests to verify and validate the safety integrity of the altered level crossing control circuits. The effectiveness of inspection and test plan procedure to control risk and provide assurance the signalling system functioned safety for trains operating on the ARTC network relied solely on the methodology adopted by the subcontracted signal team on the day.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The ATSB is satisfied the Rail Commissioner has addressed this safety issue through the modification of relevant procedures and the program for modification of level crossing controls to reduce the potential for an error when inserting a jumper [bridge].
RO-2021-012 Collision between a passenger train and a motor vehicle, near West Dapto Road level crossing, Kembla Grange, New South Wales, on 20 October 2021		
RO-2021-012-SI-01: Sydney Trains Security Control Centre Operator was not alerted to tampering of the cameras at Kembla Grange station that monitored the West Dapto Road Level crossing.	Open-Safety action pending	Sydney Trains advised that tamper alarms on level crossing cameras were to be installed as part of an extensive capital program commencing in 2015. During installation it was found that vibration from passing rail traffic was generating a large volume of false alarms. The tamper alarms were subsequently disabled. CCTV software has subsequently upgraded to allow use of a centralised server-based analytics engine to provide alarm functionality, and trials are underway.
RO-2021-012-SI-03: Sydney Trains Security Control Centre SOP contained conflicting instructions on incident response, which were not aligned with the Sydney Trains Network Incident Management Plan.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Sydney Trains advised to address conflicting instructions and they have amended procedures to route all priority calls to the Network Incident Manager (NIM). OTSI/ATSB is satisfied that this will adequately address the safety issue.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
RO-2022-001 Collision between banking locomotives and grain train 5446, near Werris Creek, New South Wales, on 6 January 2022		
RO-2022-001-SI-01: Southern Shorthaul Railroad's (SSR's) training and assessment did not include coupler functionality and the process to ensure correct coupling had occurred. Further, an underpinning procedure for the stretch test (effectively coupled) process did not exist.	Closed-Adequately addressed	ATSB/OTSI is satisfied that SSR's updated work instructions and training materials in relation to automatic coupler functionality, and the process for determining a positive coupling has occurred, has adequately addressed the safety issue.
RO-2022-001-SI-02: SSR's emergency response procedures did not include requirements for banking locomotive operations.	Closed-Adequately addressed	ATSB/OTSI is satisfied that SSR's updated emergency response work instructions for the sudden loss of brake pipe pressure during banking operations has adequately addressed the safety issue.
RO-2022-001-SI-03: The risk assessments conducted by SSR for shunting and banking operations did not include consultation consisting of effective and meaningful engagement with all relevant stakeholders. This increased the potential that risks could be missed during the risk assessment process.	Closed-Adequately addressed	ATSB/OTSI is satisfied that SSR's updated consultation process requirements in relation to material changes impacting rail safety workers has adequately addressed the safety issue.
RO-2023-003 Collision between a truck and V/Line train 7727, Barwon Terrace level crossing, South Geelong, Victoria, on 3 April 2023		
RO-2023-003-SI-01: V/Line inspection regime did not identify that the interface between the unsealed road and Barwon Terrace level crossing was a safety risk. Inspections did not extend to the routine review of any changing road conditions that may heighten risk.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The updated level crossing inspection regime includes a specific requirement to assess, and report on, potentially hazardous road access points to the rail track. This should increase the likelihood of changed adverse road access conditions being identified during the regular inspection of level crossing protection equipment.
RO-2023-004 Signal passed at danger involving passenger train TE43, between Fortitude Valley and Bowen Hills, Queensland, on 24 May 2023		
RO-2023-004-SI-01: The SPAD alarm for CS025 did not alert the network control officer when train TE43 passed the signal at stop. This was due to a known limitation of the universal train control (UTC) system, which was not considered in the way Queensland Rail managed the risk of SPADs.	Open-Safety action pending	Queensland Rail provided extracts from its risk registers to manage SPAD events dated in 2021. These registers had not been updated since the occurrence and did not assess inherent UTC system conditions that may lead to risk controls being ineffective.

Safety issue	Status	Status justification
RO-2023-004-SI-02: The AWS provided the same audible alarm and visual indication to a driver on the approach to all restricted indications. The potential for habituation, and the absence of a higher priority alert when approaching a signal displaying a red aspect, reduced the effectiveness of the AWS to prevent SPADs. This placed substantial reliance on procedural or administrative controls to prevent SPADs, which are fundamentally limited in their usefulness.	Closed-Not addressed	While Queensland Rail has taken actions in relation to the prevention of SPAD occurrences, these actions do not address the identified issue. However, given the substantial difficulty in widespread modification of the AWS technology to distinguish between the alerts that occur in response to signals with a red aspect compared to other restricted signals, and noting the system will be in place for many years to come, the safety issue will be closed as not addressed. The ATSB notes that safety action taken in response to safety issue RO-2023-004-SI-01 provides an opportunity to assess if the controls in place are appropriate to address the continued risk posed by this issue.
RO-2024-001 Safeworking incident involving MTM trains 3148 and 7255, Ferntree Gully, Victoria, on 25 February 2024		
RO-2024-001-SI-01: At Upper Ferntree Gully (and some other parts of the Metro Trains Melbourne network), the issuing of a caution order did not require validation by a second person.	Closed-Adequately addressed	The updated procedure introduces an additional layer of decision-making prior to a local signaller issuing permission for a train to pass a signal at stop. This validation by a second qualified person should reduce the likelihood of single-person error.
RO-2024-001-SI-02: Rules and procedures associated with managing trains between Bayswater and Upper Ferntree Gully were inconsistently applied and gaps in the recording protocols at Ringwood probably impacted the effectiveness of the administrative systems.	Closed-Adequately addressed	Safety actions taken include procedural simplification and stronger signaller training to better assure consistent implementation of signalling procedures. These procedural updates are specifically directed at line sections managed by local signallers, such as existed at Upper Ferntree Gully.

Proactive safety action, safety advisor notices and recommendations

The ATSB influences safety action through the release of safety issues, recommendations and advisory notices raised. The following tables detail those safety advisory notices and safety recommendations released during the reporting period as well as action taken by stakeholders to close recommendations.

Table 14: Number of safety actions prompted in 2024–25

Safety issue risk	Aviation	Marine	Rail	Total
Proactive safety action	34	14	17	65
Safety advisory notice	5	0	2	7
Safety recommendation	5	13	1	19
Total	**44**	**27**	**20**	**91**

Safety recommendations closed in 2024–25

Aviation

Table 15: Aviation – safety recommendations closed in 2024–25

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2014-032 In-flight upset, inadvertent pitch disconnect, and continued operation with serious damage involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH-FVR, 47 km west-south-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 20 February 2014**
Safety issue	The aircraft manufacturer did not account for the transient elevator deflections that occur as a result of the system flexibility and control column input during a pitch disconnect event at all speeds within the flight envelope. As such, there is no assurance that the aircraft has sufficient strength to withstand the loads resulting from a pitch disconnect.
Number	AO-2014-032-SR-014
Organisation	Avions de transport régional (ATR)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that ATR complete the assessment of transient elevator deflections associated with a pitch disconnect as soon as possible to determine whether the aircraft can safely withstand the loads resulting from a pitch disconnect within the entire operational envelope. In the event that the analysis identifies that the aircraft does not have sufficient strength, it is further recommended that ATR take immediate action to ensure the ongoing safe operation of ATR42/72 aircraft.
Released	24/05/2019
Final action date	22/02/2024

Aviation	Safety details
Final action	In response to an email sent on 16 February 2024 requesting an update on ATR response to ATSB recommendations, ATR coordinated a teleconference to provide an update on some internal considerations being made with respect to the recommendations. In that teleconference, ATR reported that it had conducted a 'bow tie' analysis that indicated several solutions they considered could address the recommendations that involved varying levels of design change/modification. ATR stressed that these were only internal considerations that were going to be put to senior management in the coming weeks.
Investigation	**AO-2014-032 In-flight upset, inadvertent pitch disconnect, and continued operation with serious damage involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH-FVR, 47 km west-south-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 20 February 2014**
Safety issue	The design of the ATR 72 pitch control system resulted in limited tactile feedback between the left and right control columns, reducing the ability of one pilot to detect that the other pilot is making control inputs. In addition, there were no visual or auditory systems to indicate dual control inputs.
Number	AO-2014-032-SR-057
Organisation	Avions de transport régional (ATR)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that ATR assess the operational risk associated with limited tactile feedback between left and right control columns in the context of no visual or auditory systems to indicate dual control inputs.
Released	24/05/2019
Final action date	25/11/2024
Final action	On 26 June 2019, ATR stated that 'ATR considers that the Safety Recommendation AO-2014-032-SR-057 is addressed.' There have been no updates or responses from ATR regarding this Safety Recommendation since June 2019.
Investigation	**AO-2014-032 In-flight upset, inadvertent pitch disconnect, and continued operation with serious damage involving ATR 72 aircraft, VH-FVR, 47 km west-south-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales, on 20 February 2014**
Safety issue	Flexibility in the ATR 72's pitch control system between the control columns results in a change in the aircraft's longitudinal handling qualities and control dynamics when dual control inputs are made. This could result in an aircraft-pilot coupling event where flight crew may find it difficult to control the aircraft. (Safety issue)
Number	AO-2014-032-SR-058
Organisation	Avions de transport régional (ATR)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that ATR perform a detailed review of the effects of dual control inputs on the aircraft's longitudinal handling qualities and control dynamics to determine if there are any detrimental effects that could lead to difficulty in controlling the aircraft throughout the approved flight envelope and operational range. Any issues identified should be appropriately dealt with.
Released	24/05/2019
Final action date	26/06/2019

Aviation	Safety details
Final action	The safety issue that induced this safety recommendation identifies the flexibility in the ATR72's pitch control system between the control columns as a specific issue in the aircraft's longitudinal handling qualities. This is relying on ATSB's interpretation of 'Etkin's' curves displacement in the case of dual input. The design assumption on all large commercial transport aircraft is one 'pilot flying'. As provided in previous comments, standard operating procedures are set up to preclude occurrence of dual input. Whatever the location of the system interconnection point is, dual input will induce a modification of the Etkin's curve. The Etkin's curves will be modified in case of any dual input, whatever the configurations (rigid or flexible). This modification might be equivalent: for the event under investigation, the 3.34 g load experienced in the longitudinal axis (before the declutch) have been obtained through dual application on the commands in the same direction. In this case, the Etkin's curve modification will be of the same order for flexible and rigid control column interconnection system. Moreover, the aircraft response was consistent with the flight crew inputs during the event. Aircraft-pilot coupling (pilot-induced oscillation) is a recognised phenomenon within the industry. ATR has addressed, for example, during the ATR operators Flight Safety Conference the in-service experience of large rudder inputs during landing roll resulting in larger than expected aircraft movements. The consequences of dual input would need to be taken into account as one pilot will react nonlinearly to the other pilot input. The system to consider in the coupling phenomenon for this case is the system considering <Aircraft-Other Pilot> and not only the <Aircraft>. This is fully described in the document reference 98 mentioned in the provided draft report (Aviation Safety and Pilot Control – Understanding and preventing Unfavourable Pilot-Vehicle Interactions). Therefore, the note 99 of the draft report is also applicable to rigid systems and is thus independent of the location of the interconnection point. Based on all these points, the design of ATR aircraft does not result in particular and specific issues when dual control inputs are made. The probability it would result in an aircraft-pilot coupling event where flight crew may find it difficult to control the aircraft is the same than for any aircraft with a more rigid system. As already expressed, dual control inputs are to be avoided as per CRM (Crew Resource Management) practices. ATR recommends ATSB reformulating the safety recommendation in order to focus on enhancement of training on effective CRM. In this spirit and to address this safety recommendation, ATR released the AOM42/72/2016/03 and revised the FCOM/AFM/QRH to raise crew awareness regarding the potential detrimental effect of uncoordinated crew input and/or large and aggressive flight control input at high speed. ATR considers that the safety recommendation AO-2014-032-SR-058 is addressed.
Investigation	**AO-2016-166 Runway excursion involving Boeing 737, VH-VUI, at Darwin Airport, Northern Territory, on 6 December 2016**
Safety issue	Category I runways that are wider than 50 m and without centreline lighting are overrepresented in veer-off occurrences involving transport category aircraft landing in low visibility conditions. The installation of centreline lighting on wider category I runways is recommended but not mandated by the International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 14.
Number	AO-2016-166-SR-013
Organisation	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the ICAO review the effectiveness of Annex 14, recommendation 5.3.12.2 (for the installation of runway centreline lighting on Category I runways that are wider than 50 m), given that Category I runways that are wider than 50 m and without centreline lighting are over-represented in veer-off occurrences involving transport category aircraft landing in low visibility conditions.

Aviation	Safety details
Released	15/05/2019
Final action date	19/07/2019
Final action	On 19 July 2019, the ICAO stated: The Visual Aids Working Group (VAWG) of the Aerodrome Design and Operation Panel (ADOP) discussed the issue and concluded that the proposal to upgrade the requirement in paragraph 5.3.12.2 from a Recommendation to a Standard may not be the best solution in light of several concerns such as the cost benefit of such a proposal. Some States, including Australia, had adopted ICAO Recommendations into their national regulations such as the provision in question. In addition, being a joint civil/military aerodrome, there was concern if facilities and services had, in fact, been provided in accordance with Annex 14, Volume I requirements. Giving due cognizance that coordination is paramount between the civil and military components of joint-use civil/military aerodromes, the Manual on Certification of Aerodromes (Doc 9774) specifies that the regulations of a State should include provisions for the use of military aerodromes by civil aircraft as part of its regulatory framework for aerodrome certification.
Investigation	**AO-2016-166 Runway excursion involving Boeing 737, VH-VUI, at Darwin Airport, Northern Territory, on 6 December 2016**
Safety issue	The absence of centreline lighting and the 60 m width of runway 11/29 at Darwin result in very limited visual cues for maintaining runway alignment during night landings in reduced visibility.
Number	AO-2016-166-SR-014
Organisation	Darwin Airport Operator
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Darwin International Airport address the risk of very limited visual cues for maintaining runway alignment during night landings in reduced visibility that arise from the combination of the absence of centreline lighting and the 60 m width of runway 11/29 at Darwin.
Released	15/05/2019
Final action date	6/03/2025
Final action	On 6 March 2025, Darwin International Airport advised that the installation of 45m runway edge lighting, high-intensity approach lighting and sequenced flashing lights had been completed.
Investigation	**AO-2017-118 Collision with water involving a de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver aircraft, VH-NOO, at Jerusalem Bay, Hawkesbury River, New South Wales, on 31 December 2017**
Safety issue	Annex 6 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and numerous other accidents, have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in important safety issues not being identified, which may remain a hazard to current and future passenger-carrying operations.
Number	AO-2017-118-SR-048
Organisation	International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Recommendation	The ATSB recognises that the ICAO has developed technical standards for lightweight recorders and airborne image recorders. However, despite the known benefits for the identification of safety issues, the fitment of such devices for passenger-carrying aircraft with a maximum take-off weight less than 5,700 kg is not mandated. The ATSB recommends that the ICAO takes safety action to consider the safety enhancement of these devices to passenger-carrying operations.

Aviation	Safety details
Released	29/01/2021
Final action date	17/09/2024
Final action	The report of the fourteenth meeting of the Flight Recorder Specific Working Group (FLIRECSWG/14) held in Montréal, Canada from 19 to 21 September 2023 was published on 12 April 2024. Agenda Item 3.1 LIGHTWEIGHT FLIGHT RECORDERS (REF: JOB CARD FLIRECSWG.009.04) 3.1.1 The member nominated by Australia, presented the FLIRECSWG/14 – WP/3, Fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. The working paper highlighted the recommendation made to ICAO in 2021 as a result of the ATSB investigation of a high-profile fatal accident involving a passenger-carrying aircraft of maximum take-off weight (MTOW) less than 5,700 kg. It requested that the FLIRECSWG consider expanding the scope of the job card FLIRECSWG.009 to include fitment of flight recorders for not only turbine-engine powered but to all commercial passenger-carrying small aircraft (MTOW less than 5,700 kg), specifically, a mandate to retrofit all small aircraft involving commercial passenger-carrying operations taking into consideration the recent improved technologies. 3.1.2 The Chairperson briefed that Transport Canada had started to change the regulations in relation to light weight recorders for commercial operated aircraft with maximum take-off weight less than 5,700 kg including the business jet operations and flight trainings. The initial requirement was retrofit but the draft regulations had got back a huge number of comments. The biggest push-back came from the business corporate jet. He reminded that the context of light weight recorders should comply with ED-155. The Chairperson highlighted that within Canada the regulations are specific as to voice recordings or on-board video being privileged. They should be installed but not controlled by flight crew. They should start and stop when powers apply. 3.1.3 A concern was raised with regard to mandate of retrofitting taking into account the long retrospective process and its high cost. It was noted that EASA regulations for light weight recorders are limited to turbine-engine powered aircraft plus commercial operations carrying more than 9 passengers. A view was expressed that disconnecting propulsion type was a very important point as the new propulsion type such as electrically powered aircraft are coming up, especially for the range of MTOW less than 5,700 kg. Making a connection to passengers at least would be from a safety perspective. 3.1.4 An example of specific niche was provided that the US recommended that the health operation involved aircraft be equipped with flight recorders as FAA recognized that retrofit would have been very difficult to achieve. In the UK, also only a niche of State operations involved aircraft was recommended to have audio and data recording. 3.1.5 It was agreed by the group that going retrofit even with Recommended Practices in Annex 6 would be unlikely to be achieved, in particular if the scope goes beyond the turbine-engine powered. At the same time, the group recognized that the current standard limiting to turbine-engine powered is too restrictive and agreed that a proposal could be developed to recommend having a flight data monitoring (FDM) equipment installed for this category of aircrafts as a starting point. It was noted that the US has recommendations to have FDM equipment installed or FDM programme developed. 3.1.6 In addition, the group discussed the possibility of equipage of AIR system in the lightweight aircraft. A variety of views were expressed on this topic and agreed to keep the dialog open for the next meeting of the FLIRECSWG. No further action was added to job card FLIRECSWG.009.04 5 Lightweight flight recorders. Current action 9876 Gather statistics related to audio recordings in support of accident and incident investigations of small aircraft engaged in commercial operations with single pilot crew remained with delivery proposed for Q4 2025.

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2017-118 Collision with water involving a de Havilland Canada DHC-2 Beaver aircraft, VH-NOO, at Jerusalem Bay, Hawkesbury River, New South Wales, on 31 December 2017**
Safety issue	Australian civil aviation regulations did not mandate the fitment of flight recorders for passenger-carrying aircraft under 5,700 kg. Consequently, the determination of factors that influenced this accident, and other accidents, have been hampered by a lack of recorded data pertaining to the flight. This has likely resulted in the non-identification of safety issues, which continue to present a hazard to current and future passenger-carrying operations.
Number	AO-2017-118-SR-049
Organisation	Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that CASA consider mandating the fitment of onboard recording devices for passenger-carrying aircraft with a maximum take-off weight less than 5,700 kg.
Released	29/01/2021
Final action date	19/09/2024
Final action	On 19 September 2024, following provision of the ICAO Flight Recorder Specific Working Group (FLIRECSWG/14) meeting minutes, CASA advised that: CASA reaffirms its previous response that CASA will continue to monitor ICAO research and standards development in relation to in-flight recording devices. CASA will consider actions as necessary in response to any ICAO recommendations that include performance standards and airworthiness aspects that will enhance aviation safety. Given that response from the ICAO FLIRECSWG/14, CASA would welcome closure of the safety recommendation. As stated, CASA will monitor any research and standards development that arises from ICAO FLIRECSWG/15 and any action items delivered post December 2025.
Investigation	**AO-2020-010 Collision with water involving Textron Aviation Inc. (Cessna) 206, VH-AEE, near Happy Valley, Fraser Island, Queensland, on 29 January 2020**
Safety issue	The Cessna 206 procedure for ditching and forced landing states that the flaps are to be extended to 40°. While that permits the aircraft to land at a slower speed, it also significantly restricts emergency egress via the cargo door. However, there is no warning about that aspect in the ditching or forced landing pilot's operating handbook emergency procedures.
Number	AO-2020-010-SR-017
Organisation	Textron Aviation
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Textron Aviation takes safety action to address the procedure for ditching and forced landing in the pilot operating handbook to ensure pilots are aware that extending the flaps beyond 10° will significantly restrict emergency egress via the cargo door.
Released	8/07/2021
Final action date	26/11/2024
Final action	Textron aviation released Service Bulletin SEB-11-05 on 25 November 2024. This is a mandatory service bulletin to be complied with at the next 100-hourly/ annual inspection or within 12 calendar months. The service bulletin requires the installation of a placard on the cockpit panel or another location directly visible to the pilot while seated. The placard reads 'Warning Flap positions of 10 degrees or greater may impede evacuation from the cargo door. Failure to adhere to all safety instructions can result in bodily injury or death'.

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2021-005 Cabin depressurisation involving Airbus A330, VH-EBK 235 NM (435 km) south-west of Adelaide, South Australia, on 5 February 2021**
Safety issue	The mitigations introduced by Airbus to counter the design limitation associated with the A330 cabin pressure control systems were ineffective because: » changes to the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT alert operational procedure did not ensure appropriate management of the fault » the service bulletin had very limited uptake in the A330/A340 global fleet.
Number	AO-2021-005-SR-16
Organisation	Airbus
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Airbus takes safety action to address the effectiveness of the mitigations to the design limitation associated with the A330 cabin pressure control systems.
Released	21/03/2023
Final action date	17/05/2024
Final action	In April 2024, Airbus released Operational Engineering Bulletin (OEB) 57 to increase A330 flight crew awareness of the operational requirements for the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT procedure application. This 'white' OEB directed flight crews to apply the CAB PR EXCESS CAB ALT procedure even if not confirmed by data presented on the CAB PRESS systems display page. Additionally, Airbus has proposed training sessions for all affected operators to provide details on this OEB. A 'white' OEB is issued by Airbus in circumstances where non-compliance may have a significant impact on the efficient operations of the aircraft. OEBs are published in the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) for the A330. When preparing for a flight, the flight crew must know what OEBs are applicable to that aircraft, the specific entry conditions for applying these OEBs, and the cockpit and systems effects of the OEB when applied to the aircraft. An OEB is applicable until a permanent corrective solution is installed on the aircraft. The corrective solution for OEB57 is the implementation of Service Bulletin A330-21-3163 (a 'recommended' upgrade to A320, A330 and A340 aircraft pressurisation systems, designed to prevent a cabin depressurisation from a similar cabin pressure controller (CPC) pressure sensor fault). Airbus has commenced a number of programs designed to increase fleet penetration of this Service Bulletin, including commercial incentives for implementation of the Service Bulletin by operators, as well as other supporting and monitoring programs. When an aircraft's CPCs have incorporated the Service Bulletin, OEB57 will be removed from that airframe.
Investigation	**AO-2022-007 Runway excursion involving Raytheon B200, VH-MVP, Lord Howe Island Airport, New South Wales, on 18 February 2022**
Safety issue	The occurrence flight used a distance measuring equipment arrival procedure to establish a visual approach in unsuitable visibility conditions. The investigation identified a number of similar approaches conducted by the operator in marginal visibility conditions. Using this approach method, rather than a straight in instrument approach, significantly reduced obstacle clearance assurance for both an approach and any potential missed approaches, and increased the risk to both the operators and other aircraft through the use of a non-standard circuit procedure.
Number	AO-2022-007-SR-18
Organisation	EASTERN AIR LINK PTY LTD

Aviation	Safety details
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Eastern Air Link address the safety issue, through provision of guidance and training to flight crew concerning the safest option in the selection of an approach method when weather conditions are marginal for the conduct of a visual approach.
Released	24/05/2023
Final action date	26/06/2024
Final action	The ATSB was advised that, following the recent appointments of new Head of Flight Operations and Head of Training and Checking, Eastern Air Link revisited the occurrence involving VH-MVP in February 2022. To avoid potential misinterpretation of the previous text, that review resulted in further amendments to 2 sections of the exposition. The amended sections, and changes, were as follows: » The general guidance on selection and use of the 2 approach procedure types for approach and landing was clarified. When selecting whether to use a visual or instrument approach procedure, the pilot-in-command (PIC) was to select the safest approach procedure based on, amongst other safety related matters, the actual or forecast weather conditions expected at the destination airport. If conditions were marginal for the use of a visual approach procedure, the preference was for the PIC to use an instrument approach procedure. Further, when conducting an instrument approach, those procedures were to be applied until minima or through any subsequent missed approach, however, a transition from instrument approach to visual approach procedures was permissible provided visual reference was established and could be maintained to the circling area of the destination airport. » A note at the end of the stabilised approach requirements concerning the likelihood of transient deviations was amended. The note clarified that, when reasonably anticipated, such transient deviations should be specifically briefed.
Investigation	**AO-2022-029 Flight control systems occurrence involving Boeing 737-800, VH-YFZ, Gold Coast Airport, Queensland, on 27 April 2022**
Safety issue	Failure of the inboard programming roller cartridge was due to undetected fatigue cracking that occurred in an area that was not included in the detailed flap actuation system inspection.
Number	AO-2022-029-SR-13
Organisation	The Boeing Company
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that The Boeing Company takes safety action to increase the detection of fatigue cracks in the roller cartridges of 737-800 aircraft prior to failure.
Released	19/12/2022
Final action date	24/02/2024

Aviation	Safety details
Final action	Boeing provides recommended inspection intervals for the outboard aft flap, including the affected roller cartridge, in maintenance task cards that suggest inspection intervals of 6600 flight cycles or 36 months, whichever occurs first. The final inspection interval for these components is defined by each operator individually, and approved by the regulatory agency for that operator. After learning of this report from the ATSB, Boeing performed a review of the outboard aft flap roller cartridge to determine the history of similar failures, the accumulated time on the affected airframes, and the effect (if any) the failure had on the successful completion of the flight. The ATSB final report references 10 similar occurrences that were identified in that review, some of which included failures of the roller itself (which is covered by a different inspection). In each of the reported events, the flight crew noticed and corrected for slight changes in airplane roll control, but otherwise completed their scheduled flights to their destination without further issue. These outcomes align with Boeing's prior safety analysis for this failure, which identified a very low risk of impact to the continued safety of flight. When evaluating the rate of these occurrences across the total accumulated hours of the 737 fleet, Boeing's review showed that the failure rate for this component remains below the maximum allowed by the FAA for airplane certification. In light of these results, Boeing's review of the available data showed that the current design of the roller cartridge ensures the flap system remains damage tolerant and ensures the safety of flight, and that no changes are required to the current design or maintenance program for the component.
Investigation	**AO-2023-008 Controlled flight into terrain involving Boeing 737-3H4 Fireliner, N619SW, Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023**
Safety issue	The Coulson Aviation crew resource management practice of limiting the PM announcements to deviations outside the target retardant drop parameter tolerances increased the risk of the aircraft entering an unrecoverable state before the PM would alert the pilot flying.
Number	AO-2023-008-SR-33
Organisation	Coulson Aviation
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Coulson Aviation takes safety action to address their crew resource management procedures for retardant drops to reduce the risk of the aircraft entering an unrecoverable state before the pilot monitoring alerts the pilot flying.
Released	6/11/2024
Final action date	31/01/2025
Final action	Earlier this year [2024], Coulson Aviation developed a procedure for standardised calls made during the approach to the drop height as well as deviations from the drop height. The enclosed Fixed Wing Flight Operations Bulletin 24-1, Standardized Callouts for Target Drop Height (Bulletin), was developed and reviewed during the ground school component of the Spring Training Program. The Bulletin was issued, and the procedures were implemented during the tactical training component of Spring Training Program.
Investigation	**AR-2013-107 Engine failures and malfunctions in light aeroplanes 2009 to 2014**

Aviation	Safety details
Safety issue	Thicker 7/16 inch diameter through bolts, fitted to newer Jabiru engines and some retrofitted engines, have had limited service to date to confirm early indications that they reduce this risk. Retrofitting engines with thicker through bolts has only been recommended for aircraft involved in flight training by JSB031 issue 3. Most light aircraft in service with Jabiru engines continue to use 3/8 inch diameter engine through bolts which, even after upgrades in accordance with Jabiru service bulletins JSB031 issues 1 and 2, remain at an elevated risk of fracturing within the service life of the bolt, leading to an engine failure or malfunction in flight.
Number	AR-2013-107-SR-055
Organisation	JABIRU AIRCRAFT PTY LTD
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Jabiru Aircraft Australia takes further safety action to ensure that all owners of Jabiru engines that have not been manufactured with new configuration 7/16 inch diameter through-bolts, or modified in accordance with Jabiru Service Bulletin JSB031-3 have access to, and are encouraged to upgrade to: » the 7/16 inch diameter through-bolt configuration, or » any other alternative produced to replace the existing 3/8 inch diameter through-bolt configuration (including newly developed through-bolts incorporating aspects to alleviate the effects of thermal expansion and damp resonant vibrations).
Released	9/03/2016
Final action date	18/10/2024
Final action	Jabiru issued JSB031-3 in January 2015. In short, JSB031-3 is applicable to GEN2 engines and mandated for those operating in flying schools. The service bulletin requires the replacement of 3/8 inch through bolts each 500 hours or an upgrade to the 7/16 inch through bolts. The service bulletin was mandated only for flying schools as the evidence pointed to the particular usage pattern of flying schools being a significant contributor to failures. Since the release of that service bulletin, there have been three occurrences of through-bolt failures noted in the ATSB database. Given the nature of these failures, it is highly likely that if they do occur, that they will be explicitly noted, and so it is with reasonable confidence these are noted as the only through bolt failures in the period 2015–22 (8 years). This compares to 21 failures in the period 2009–14 (6 years). Jabiru can also advise that the 3/8 inch through-bolts with dampeners were released to production in December 2015. In reviewing the service record since January 2015, Jabiru's conclusion is that the combination of availability of the 7/16 inch through bolts, the dampened 3/8 inch bolts and the management of risk via JSB031-3 has successfully and significantly reduced the risks identified in AR-2013-107-SR-055 to an acceptable level.

Marine

Table 16: Marine – safety recommendations closed in 2024–25

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2018-011 Fire on board *Iron Chieftain*, Port Kembla, New South Wales, on 18 June 2018**
Safety issue	The capability of Fire and Rescue NSW to effectively respond to a shipboard fire in Port Kembla, was limited by: » a lack of specialised marine firefighting expertise » outdated marine training for firefighters » relative inexperience in shipboard firefighting associated with the rarity of major shipboard fires » an absence of marine-specific firefighting resources and aids for use by first responders.
Number	MO-2018-011-SR-014
Organisation	Fire and Rescue NSW
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Fire and Rescue NSW takes further action to address the limited marine firefighting capability in Port Kembla due to the lack of specialised marine firefighting expertise, experience, updated training and resources.
Released	11/05/2021
Final action date	30/12/2024
Final action	On 30 December 2024, Fire and Rescue NSW advised the ATSB of the following safety action progress: » A public safety training package unit of competency for response to marine emergencies (PUAFIR304 Respond to Marine Emergencies) has been adopted within Fire and Rescue NSW's scope as a registered training organisation. This unit of competency covers the skills and knowledge required to work as a member of a team under supervision when responding to marine emergencies and applies to personnel required to respond to an incident involving a marine structure or vessel including those that may involve fire and hazardous materials. » The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) has developed and published a Marine Firefighting Capability guideline (AFAC Marine Firefighting Capability guideline). The guideline aims to identify considerations for AFAC member agencies when planning for and managing their capability for response to maritime events involving fires onboard vessels alongside hazardous and noxious substances incidents onboard vessels, on water or in inland waterways. The guideline outlines considerations for planning for and managing a marine incident within port limits and in state or inland waters and details the suggested knowledge and understanding required to deliver capability, in the complex and unique environment, associated with commercial vessels. » Fire and Rescue NSW will publish a Standard Operational Guideline for marine firefighting based on the AFAC guideline. The Fire and Rescue NSW guideline will be progressed through the required industrial consultation, health and safety consideration, and organisational approval process before being formally adopted as Fire and Rescue NSW firefighting doctrine.

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2021-002 Fire on board BBC *Rhonetal*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 25 March 2021**
Safety issue	BBC *Rhonetal*'s management company, Briese Schiffahrts, had not effectively implemented the shipboard safety management system procedures to prevent the fire, which was the tenth such fire on a company ship in the past 14 years, and the fourth investigated by the ATSB, identifying similar contributing factors.
Number	MO-2021-002-SR-01
Organisation	BRIESE HEAVYLIFT GMBH & CO KG
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Briese Heavylift takes safety action to ensure safety management system procedures for hot work on board ships that it manages are effectively implemented.
Released	21/09/2022
Final action date	6/07/2023
Final action	On 6 July 2023, Briese Heavylift advised that it had implemented a new SMS procedure for hot work which included specific instructions for fire watch. The company also issued an accompanying ISM circular to its fleet of ships, describing the use of new firefighting equipment for fire watch duties, including training material for new IFEX firefighting equipment. The company also advised that it had communicated with its clients regarding the packaging of cargos in fire retardant materials.
Investigation	**MO-2021-002 Fire on board BBC *Rhonetal*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 25 March 2021**
Safety issue	BBC *Rhonetal*'s management company, Briese Schiffahrts, had not effectively implemented the shipboard safety management system procedures to prevent the fire, which was the tenth such fire on a company ship in the past 14 years, and the fourth investigated by the ATSB, identifying similar contributing factors.
Number	MO-2021-002-SR-02
Organisation	Briese Schiffahrts GmbH
Recommendation	The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that Briese Schiffarhts takes safety action to ensure safety management system procedures for hot work on board ships that it manages and ones managed by its subsidiary companies are effectively implemented.
Released	21/09/2022
Final action date	6/07/2023
Final action	On 6 July 2023, Briese Schiffahrts advised that it had implemented a new SMS procedure for hot work which included specific instructions for fire watch. The company also issued an accompanying ISM circular to its fleet of ships, describing the use of new firefighting equipment for fire watch duties, including training material for new IFEX firefighting equipment. The company also advised that it had communicated with its clients regarding the packaging of cargos in fire retardant materials.

Rail

Table 17: Rail – safety recommendations closed in 2024–25

Rail	Safety details
Investigation	**RO-2021-004 Derailment of freight train 4BM4, Nana Glen, New South Wales, on 25 February 2021**
Safety issue	Neither ARTC or PN provided guidance for train crew to respond to extreme wet weather events or floodwater in the rail corridor. There was no guidance for when trains should stop or report if there was water on the track formation, covering the ballast, sleepers or the rail.
Number	RO-2021-004-SR-19
Organisation	Pacific National
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Pacific National develops guidance for train crew to respond to and report extreme wet weather events or floodwater in the rail corridor.
Released	6/06/2023
Final action date	12/09/2024
Final action	Pacific National advised that 47% (858) of their train drivers had completed the training module and the rollout was continuing.
Investigation	**RO-2021-004 Derailment of freight train 4BM4, Nana Glen, New South Wales, on 25 February 2021**
Safety issue	Neither ARTC or PN provided guidance for train crew to respond to extreme wet weather events or floodwater in the rail corridor. There was no guidance for when trains should stop or report if there was water on the track formation, covering the ballast, sleepers or the rail.
Number	RO-2021-004-SR-20
Organisation	Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that ARTC develops guidance for train crew to respond to and report extreme wet weather events or floodwater in the rail corridor.
Released	6/06/2023
Final action date	21/12/2023

Rail	Safety details
Final action	ARTC established an internal working committee comprising representatives from the Safety, Operations, and Engineering management teams from across the business to develop the reporting criteria and related responses outlined in the guideline. This resulted in a proposed guideline that is simple, straightforward and flexible to be applied across ARTC's network in alignment with the reporting and responding requirements for conditions affecting the ARTC Rail Network as mandated by the respective Network Rules and Procedures. A collaborative approach with key stakeholders, including rail operators, ensured that their valuable feedback was incorporated into the guideline. Open communication was maintained with all key stakeholders, including regular updates and notifications of significant milestones. Risk assessments associated with the introduction of the guidelines were systematically carried out to proactively manage potential risks and promptly resolve issues raised. To ensure effective communication of the guidelines, a briefing document was provided to Rail Operators and an online e-learning package was developed. This e-learning resource is designed to educate rail traffic crew and network controllers on the requirements, aiding in their understanding, and tracking completion. The guideline for rail traffic crew reporting in Extreme Wet Weather and Flooding was published on ARTC's intranet at the end of October 2023. This was notified through a Train/SAFE notice to Rail Operators, who are responsible for briefing rail traffic crew and to ensure they undertake the e-learning package by the end of the calendar year.

Safety recommendations released in 2024–25

Aviation

Table 18: Aviation – safety recommendations released in 2024–25

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023**
Safety issue	Sea World Helicopters commenced operations with EC130 helicopters without a formal change management process. Implementation of the operator's documented procedures would have increased the likelihood of formal consideration of various risk controls, including controls that were previously applied for the introduction of aircraft.
Number	AO-2023-001-SR-37
Organisation	Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd clarifies their change management procedure so that the introduction of additional helicopters and other potentially disruptive changes are captured by change and risk management processes to ensure aviation safety is maintained or improved.
Released	9/04/2025
Investigation	**AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023**
Safety issue	Sea World Helicopters' implementation of their SMS did not effectively manage aviation safety risk in the context of the operator's primary business. Additionally, their objectives were non-specific, and the focus of safety management was primarily ground handling and WHS issues. This limited the operator's ability to ensure that aviation safety risk was as low as reasonably practicable.

Aviation	Safety details
Number	AO-2023-001-SR-38
Organisation	Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd develops appropriate policy and actionable objectives within its safety management system to bring the focus of the safety management system to management of aviation safety risk.
Released	9/04/2025
Investigation	**AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023**
Safety issue	Sea World Helicopters' change management process, conducted prior to reopening the park pad, did not encompass the impact of the change on the operator's existing scenic flight operations. Crucially, the flight paths and the conflict point they created were not formally examined, therefore limitations of the operator's controls for that location were not identified.
Number	AO-2023-001-SR-40
Organisation	Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd improves change management processes by ensuring assessments are expanded beyond the area of change to the wider organisation. Additionally, the operator should test assumptions and perform risk analysis to support risk-focused decision-making, to ensure new opportunities to control risk are identified and existing risk controls are maintained.
Released	9/04/2025
Investigation	**AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023**
Safety issue	Reopening the park pad in March 2022 created an increased risk of collision with traffic operating from the existing heliport. The conflict point was placed at a location where: » there was a higher workload for both pilots » both pilots needed to consider the effect of helicopter downwash on surface traffic » it was less likely that an inbound pilot would notice a change in the status of a helicopter on the ground » it was more difficult for an outbound pilot to acquire traffic » helicopters would close on each other vertically and laterally, decreasing likelihood of detection » the operator's airborne collision avoidance systems would not provide traffic advisories.
Number	AO-2023-001-SR-41
Organisation	Sea World Helicopters Pty Ltd
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Sea World Helicopters formally considers the design of conflict points within its operation and identifies opportunity for mitigation of risk, with a view to eliminating conflict points, or ensuring administrative controls give pilots the best opportunity to identify conflicting traffic and ensuring that the risk is as low as reasonably practicable.
Released	9/04/2025

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2023-008 Controlled flight into terrain involving Boeing 737-3H4 Fireliner, N619SW, Fitzgerald River National Park, Western Australia, on 6 February 2023**
Safety issue	The Coulson Aviation crew resource management practice of limiting the PM announcements to deviations outside the target retardant drop parameter tolerances increased the risk of the aircraft entering an unrecoverable state before the PM would alert the pilot flying.
Number	AO-2023-008-SR-33
Organisation	Coulson Aviation
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Coulson Aviation takes safety action to address their crew resource management procedures for retardant drops to reduce the risk of the aircraft entering an unrecoverable state before the pilot monitoring alerts the pilot flying.
Released	6/11/2024

Marine

Table 19: Marine – safety recommendations released in 2024–25

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2022-003 Breakaway and grounding of CSC *Friendship*, Port of Brisbane, Queensland, on 27 February 2022**
Safety issue	MSQ did not have structured or formalised risk or emergency management processes or procedures. Consequently, MSQ was unable to adequately assess and respond to the risks posed by the river conditions and current exceeding operating limits and ensure the safety of berthed ships, port infrastructure or the environment, and avoid CSC *Friendship*'s breakaway.
Number	MO-2022-003-SR-32
Organisation	Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that MSQ takes further safety action to address the safety issue through adequately structured and formalised risk management processes and procedures to manage emergencies.
Released	9/09/2024
Investigation	**MO-2022-005 Near grounding of *Rosco Poplar*, off Bond Reef, Hydrographers Passage, Queensland, on 4 May 2022**
Safety issue	The check pilot system was ineffective in providing the AMSA assurance of the competency of coastal pilots, mainly due to the inconsistent and unreliable application of assessment standards between different check pilots. Further, AMSA had not implemented a system to identify the inconsistent application of standards or the trends in assessment outcomes readily apparent in the data that it had held for many years.
Number	MO-2022-005-SR-01
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the AMSA takes safety action to identify and address factors limiting the effectiveness of its check pilot framework as a system for coastal pilot competency assurance.
Released	26/07/2024

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	The AMSA's Maritime Assistance Services procedures to support the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies were not effectively implemented. Consequently, there was a 12-hour delay in tasking the state's nominated emergency towage vessel, *Svitzer Glenrock*, which significantly prolonged the emergency.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-01
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the AMSA takes further safety action to address this safety issue in conjunction with action to address the other safety issues addressed to AMSA in this report.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 202**
Safety issue	Port Authority of NSW procedures to comply with its Port Safety Operating Licence and the NSW Coastal Waters Marine Pollution Plan were not effectively implemented. This resulted in delays to the required notifications and incident response, which contributed to prolonging the emergency.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-02
Organisation	Port Authority of NSW
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the Port Authority of NSW takes safety action to adequately address this safety issue.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	The Port Authority of NSW did not have a proper and correct understanding of its responsibilities for emergency response under its operating licence and relevant state plans. This contributed to the inadequate coordination of emergency towage, salvage and refuge, which were critical for the single, integrated and comprehensive response required, and significantly prolonged the emergency.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-03
Organisation	Port Authority of NSW
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the Port Authority of NSW takes safety action to adequately address this safety issue.
Released	15/05/2025

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	Transport for NSW (NSW Maritime), as the statutory agency responsible for ensuring that New South Wales was prepared to respond to an incident in accordance with the state's plan that it maintained, had not effectively met this obligation. This resulted in the long delay in New South Wales assuming control of the incident and contributed to the inadequate coordination of the emergency response required for a single, integrated and comprehensive response, and significantly prolonged the emergency.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-04
Organisation	NSW Maritime, Transport for NSW
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Transport for NSW (NSW Maritime) takes safety action to adequately address this safety issue and ensure that New South Wales is prepared to effectively respond to an incident in accordance with the state's plan.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	The AMSA, with direct control of key national emergency response arrangements, did not have the required understanding of its central role in any response, regardless of location. Consequently, its support to, and coordination with, the control agency in relation to emergency towage, salvage and refuge was inadequate, inconsistent with National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies principles of a single, integrated and comprehensive response and significantly prolonged the emergency.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-05
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that AMSA completes the safety action proposed to address this safety issue in conjunction with action to address the other safety issues addressed to AMSA in this report.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	The AMSA had not adequately managed the National Plan for Maritime Environmental Emergencies and annual exercises required to prepare for such incidents had not been conducted for 4 years before the incident. This probably resulted in the ineffective implementation of its Maritime Assistance Services procedures, the inefficient process for issuing directions and inadequate coordination of the incident with state authorities.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-06
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that AMSA progresses safety action to address this safety issue in conjunction with action to address the other safety issues addressed to AMSA in this report.
Released	15/05/2025

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	United Salvage was severely limited in its ability to provide the required salvage services as it did not own, operate or directly control any towage vessels for which it relied on towage providers. This limitation was not made clearly known to *Portland Bay*'s master, owners or managers or involved authorities to allow them to properly assess whether the most suitable towage vessels, including the emergency towage vessel, had also been promptly deployed for salvage and emergency response.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-07
Organisation	United Salvage
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that United Salvage takes safety action to address this safety issue by ensuring that its capabilities and limitations to provide professional salvage services are made clearly known to the master, owners and managers of the ship to be salved under a salvage agreement.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-006 Propulsion failure and near stranding of *Portland Bay*, on the coast 22 km south of Port Botany (Sydney), New South Wales, on 4 July 2022**
Safety issue	The AMSA's process to issue directions was inefficient and resulted in excessive time to issue directions allowing *Portland Bay* to enter Port Botany as a place of refuge. While this delay did not further prolong the emergency, such delays increase risk in time-critical situations.
Number	MO-2022-006-SR-08
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that AMSA takes safety action to adequately address this safety issue.
Released	15/05/2025
Investigation	**MO-2022-007 Grounding of *Hagen Oldendorff*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 9 April 2022**
Safety issue	Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.
Number	MO-2022-007-SR-34
Organisation	Lloyd's Register
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Lloyd's Register take steps to approach the International Association of Classification Societies and seek safety action to address the risk associated with a single point of failure in electrical power supply for ship's rudder angle indicators.
Released	20/12/2024

Marine	Safety details
Investigation	**MO-2022-007 Grounding of *Hagen Oldendorff*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 9 April 2022**
Safety issue	Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.
Number	MO-2022-007-SR-35
Organisation	Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA)
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the AMSA provide the necessary support and assistance to the Liberia Maritime Authority in its efforts to seek safety action at the IMO aimed at addressing the risk associated with a single point of failure in electrical power supply for ship's rudder angle indicators.
Released	20/12/2024
Investigation	**MO-2022-007 Grounding of *Hagen Oldendorff*, Port Hedland, Western Australia, on 9 April 2022**
Safety issue	Although *Hagen Oldendorff*'s steering and rudder angle indicator systems complied with the applicable rules and regulations, neither the SOLAS regulations, nor the rules of the ship's responsible classification society, Lloyd's Register, mandated protection of the ship's rudder angle indication systems against a single point of failure in electrical power supply, nor did they require installation of audible or visual alerts to notify the bridge team of a power failure affecting the indicators.
Number	MO-2022-007-SR-36
Organisation	Liberia Maritime Authority
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that the Liberia Maritime Authority takes steps to formally raise this safety issue with the IMO to seek safety action aimed at addressing the risk associated with a single point of failure in electrical power supply for ship's rudder angle indicators.
Released	20/12/2024

Rail

Table 20: Rail – safety recommendations released in 2024–25

Rail	Safety details
Investigation	**RO-2023-004 Signal passed at danger involving passenger train TE43, between Fortitude Valley and Bowen Hills, Queensland, on 24 May 2023**
Safety issue	The SPAD alarm for CS025 did not alert the network control officer (NCO) when train TE43 passed the signal at stop. This was due to a known limitation of the UTC system, which was not considered in the way Queensland Rail managed the risk of SPADs.
Number	RO-2023-004-SR-01
Organisation	Queensland Rail
Recommendation	The ATSB recommends that Queensland Rail reviews the risk associated with a SPAD in circumstances where the inherent constraints of the UTC system do not alert the NCO and the driver does not self-report, and any additional risk controls that may be appropriate for the current signalling system.
Released	18/06/2025

Safety advisory notices released in 2024–25

Aviation

Table 21: Aviation – safety advisory notices released in 2024–25

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2023-001 Midair collision involving Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XH9, and Eurocopter EC130 B4, VH-XKQ, Main Beach, Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2023-001-SAN-02
Organisation	Aviation research and testing organisations
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB encourages those organisations capable of research to determine a correct method of wearing a constant wear lifejacket with a multipoint seatbelt, while ensuring the correct function of each.
Released	2025-04-09
Investigation	**AO-2023-050 Aircraft separation issue during take-off involving Lancair, VH-VKP, and De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited DHC-8-315, VH-TQZ, Mildura Airport, Victoria, on 29 September 2023**
Safety issue	AO-2023-050-SI-03
Number	AO-2023-050-SAN-01
Organisation	Operators of De Havilland DHC-8 aircraft
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB advises all operators and crew of De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited DHC-8 (Dash 8) aircraft to consider the use of VHF COM 1 radios for ground-based communication while operating at non-controlled aerodromes, to improve radio transmission and reception with other stations.
Released	30/05/2025

Aviation	Safety details
Investigation	**AO-2024-013 Collision with terrain involving Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico DHC-1 MK 22 Chipmunk, VH-POR, at Jandakot Airport, Western Australia, on 26 April 2024**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	AO-2024-013-SAN-01
Organisation	DHC 1 Chipmunk maintainers and owners
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB advises DHC-1 Chipmunk maintainers and owners to be aware that fitment of incorrect specification rivets where the upper structure between the front and rear cockpits attaches to the gussets on either side could significantly compromise the crashworthiness of the aircraft. Those conducting work on aircraft must ensure modifications are carried out to the required specification, or during maintenance returned to that specification.
Released	11/09/2024
Investigation	**AO-2024-049 Collision with terrain during go-around involving Cessna U206F, VH-TDQ, 39 km south-east of Moora, Western Australia, on 1 September 2024**
Safety issue	AO-2024-049-SI-01
Number	AO-2024-049-SAN-01
Organisation	Cessna 206 Owners and Operators
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB advises Cessna 206 pilots and operators that due to the difficulties occupants have encountered egressing the rear cargo door as identified in several transport safety investigations, to ensure they are familiar with CASA-issued Airworthiness Bulletin 52-006, and ensure passengers are provided with a thorough safety briefing demonstrating the cargo door emergency egress when the wing flaps remain in the extended position.
Released	30/06/2025
Investigation	**AO-2024-049 Collision with terrain during go-around involving Cessna U206F, VH-TDQ, 39 km south-east of Moora, Western Australia, on 1 September 2024**
Safety issue	AO-2024-049-SI-02
Number	AO-2024-049-SAN-02
Organisation	Operators and pilots of Cessna 206 with the double cargo door
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB strongly encourages operators and owners to review Transport Canada Airworthiness Directive CF-2020-10, and consider either the removal of a middle row seat to improve rear seat occupants' access to the pilot's forward left cabin door or the fitment of approved Cessna 206 emergency exit modifications to reduce the risk created by the extended flap preventing the immediate and unobstructed use of the rear cargo doors during an emergency exit.
Released	30/06/2025

Marine

No marine safety advisory notices released in 2024–25.

Rail

Table 22: Rail – safety advisory notices released in 2024–25

Rail	Safety details
Investigation	**RO-2022-001 Collision between banking locomotives and grain train 5446, near Werris Creek, New South Wales, on 6 January 2022**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	RO-2022-001-SAN-01
Organisation	Rolling stock operators
Safety advisory notice	Knowledge of the design features of automatic couplers, their differences and limitations, particularly with regards to locking mechanisms, is key to understanding the importance of conducting a positive stretch test at the conclusion of a coupling manoeuvre. The ATSB advises that rolling stock operators should ensure their operational staff are advised and assessed on coupler locking design features which assist in maintaining a knuckle in an unlocked state and methods required to ensure the knuckle has again locked after coupling has occurred.
Released	20/08/2024
Investigation	**RO-2022-001 Collision between banking locomotives and grain train 5446, near Werris Creek, New South Wales, on 6 January 2022**
Safety issue	N/A
Number	RO-2022-001-SAN-02
Organisation	Rail transport operators
Safety advisory notice	The ATSB strongly encourages rail transport operators, and registered training organisations acting on their behalf, to review and validate their rail safety worker competency assessments. This is to ensure these assessment tools, processes and judgements are reliably meeting the principles and requirements of competency-based training and assessment.
Released	20/08/2024

Section 6 –

Financial statements

Australian Government
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

ATSB

Financial Statements 2024-25

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S REPORT

To the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government

Opinion

In my opinion, the financial statements of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (the Entity) for the year ended 30 June 2025:

(a) comply with Australian Accounting Standards – Simplified Disclosures and the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Financial Reporting) Rule 2015*; and

(b) present fairly the financial position of the Entity as at 30 June 2025 and its financial performance and cash flows for the year then ended.

The financial statements of the Entity, which I have audited, comprise the following as at 30 June 2025 and for the year then ended:

- Statement by the Chief Commissioner and Chief Financial Officer;
- Statement of Comprehensive Income;
- Statement of Financial Position;
- Statement of Changes in Equity;
- Cash Flow Statement; and
- Notes to the Financial Statements, comprising material accounting policy information and other explanatory information.

Basis for opinion

I conducted my audit in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards, which incorporate the Australian Auditing Standards. My responsibilities under those standards are further described in the *Auditor's Responsibilities for the Audit of the Financial Statements* section of my report. I am independent of the Entity in accordance with the relevant ethical requirements for financial statement audits conducted by the Auditor-General and their delegates. These include the relevant independence requirements of the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board's APES 110 *Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (including Independence Standards)* (the Code) to the extent that they are not in conflict with the *Auditor-General Act 1997*. I have also fulfilled my other responsibilities in accordance with the Code. I believe that the audit evidence I have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for my opinion.

Accountable Authority's responsibility for the financial statements

As the Accountable Authority of the Entity, the Chief Commissioner is responsible under the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (the Act) for the preparation and fair presentation of annual financial statements that comply with Australian Accounting Standards – Simplified Disclosures and the rules made under the Act. The Chief Commissioner is also responsible for such internal control as the Chief Commissioner determines is necessary to enable the preparation of financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

In preparing the financial statements, the Chief Commissioner is responsible for assessing the ability of the Entity to continue as a going concern, taking into account whether the Entity's operations will cease as a result of an administrative restructure or for any other reason. The Chief Commissioner is also responsible for disclosing, as

applicable, matters related to going concern and using the going concern basis of accounting, unless the assessment indicates that it is not appropriate.

Auditor's responsibilities for the audit of the financial statements

My objective is to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements as a whole are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error, and to issue an auditor's report that includes my opinion. Reasonable assurance is a high level of assurance, but is not a guarantee that an audit conducted in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards will always detect a material misstatement when it exists. Misstatements can arise from fraud or error and are considered material if, individually or in the aggregate, they could reasonably be expected to influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.

As part of an audit in accordance with the Australian National Audit Office Auditing Standards, I exercise professional judgement and maintain professional scepticism throughout the audit. I also:

- identify and assess the risks of material misstatement of the financial statements, whether due to fraud or error, design and perform audit procedures responsive to those risks, and obtain audit evidence that is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for my opinion. The risk of not detecting a material misstatement resulting from fraud is higher than for one resulting from error, as fraud may involve collusion, forgery, intentional omissions, misrepresentations, or the override of internal control;
- obtain an understanding of internal control relevant to the audit in order to design audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the Entity's internal control;
- evaluate the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates and related disclosures made by the Accountable Authority;
- conclude on the appropriateness of the Accountable Authority's use of the going concern basis of accounting and, based on the audit evidence obtained, whether a material uncertainty exists related to events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the Entity's ability to continue as a going concern. If I conclude that a material uncertainty exists, I am required to draw attention in my auditor's report to the related disclosures in the financial statements or, if such disclosures are inadequate, to modify my opinion. My conclusions are based on the audit evidence obtained up to the date of my auditor's report. However, future events or conditions may cause the Entity to cease to continue as a going concern; and
- evaluate the overall presentation, structure and content of the financial statements, including the disclosures, and whether the financial statements represent the underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.

I communicate with the Accountable Authority regarding, among other matters, the planned scope and timing of the audit and significant audit findings, including any significant deficiencies in internal control that I identify during my audit.

Australian National Audit Office

Rahul Tejani
Executive Director
Delegate of the Auditor-General

Canberra
30 September 2025

STATEMENT BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

In our opinion, the attached financial statements for the year ended 30 June 2025 comply with subsection 42(2) of *the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013* (PGPA Act), and are based on properly maintained financial records as per subsection 41(2) of the PGPA Act.

In our opinion, at the date of this statement, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau will be able to pay its debts as and when they fall due.



Angus Mitchell
Chief Commissioner
30 September 2025



Krishna Kumar
Chief Financial Officer
30 September 2025

Statement of Comprehensive Income

for the period ended 30 June 2025

Description	Notes	2025 $'000	2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
NET COST OF SERVICES				
Expenses				
Employee benefits	1.1A	**20,195**	18,673	20,566
Suppliers	1.1B	**9,470**	9,666	9,298
Depreciation and amortisation	2.2A	**2,642**	2,829	2,177
Finance costs	1.1C	**139**	70	22
Write-down and impairment of other assets	1.1D	**10**	10	-
Total expenses		**32,456**	31,248	32,063
Own-source income				
Revenue from contracts with customers	1.2A	**1,812**	1,438	1,469
Other revenue	1.2B	**3,338**	3,243	3,732
Total own-source revenue		**5,150**	4,681	5,201
Gains				
Other gains	1.2C	**16**	8	-
Total gains		**16**	8	-
Total own-source income		**5,166**	4,689	5,201
Net cost of services		**(27,290)**	(26,559)	(26,862)
Revenue from government	1.2D	**26,064**	25,270	26,064
(Deficit) before income tax on continuing operations		**(1,226)**	(1,289)	(798)
(Deficit) from continuing operations		**(1,226)**	(1,289)	(798)
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME				
Items not subject to subsequent reclassification to net cost of services				
Changes in asset revaluation surplus		**-**	-	-
Total comprehensive (loss)		**(1,226)**	(1,289)	(798)

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.
The budget variances commentary has been included before the overview and notes.

Statement of Financial Position

as at 30 June 2025

Description	Notes	2025 $'000	2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
ASSETS				
Financial assets				
Cash and cash equivalents	2.1A	**144**	386	240
Trade and other receivables	2.1B	**13,959**	13,704	7,996
Accrued revenue		**-**	-	9
Total financial assets		**14,103**	14,090	8,245
Non-financial assets[1]				
Buildings	2.2A	**9,004**	6,520	5,856
Heritage and cultural	2.2A	**16**	16	16
Plant and equipment	2.2A	**2,447**	2,853	3,016
Computer software	2.2A	**1,528**	1,741	2,895
Prepayments		**639**	636	593
Total non-financial assets		**13,634**	11,766	12,376
Total assets		**27,737**	25,856	20,621
LIABILITIES				
Payables				
Suppliers	2.3A	**357**	505	504
Other payables	2.3B	**3,959**	4,207	-
Total payables		**4,316**	4,712	504
Interest bearing liabilities				
Leases	2.4A	**9,731**	7,085	6,115
Total interest bearing liabilities		**9,731**	7,085	6,115
Provisions				
Employee provisions	4.1A	**6,390**	6,160	5,840
Total provisions		**6,390**	6,160	5,840
Total liabilities		**20,437**	17,957	12,459
Net assets		**7,300**	7,899	8,162
EQUITY				
Contributed equity		**8,097**	7,470	8,097
Reserves		**1,146**	1,146	1,146
Retained surplus		**(1,943)**	(717)	(1,081)
Total equity		**7,300**	7,899	8,162

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

[1] Right-of-use assets are included in the buildings and plant and equipment asset categories.

Statement of Changes in Equity

for the period ended 30 June 2025

Description	Notes	2025 $'000	2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
CONTRIBUTED EQUITY				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**7,470**	6,099	7,470
Transactions with owners				
Contributions by owners				
Departmental capital budget		**627**	1,371	627
Total transactions with owners		**627**	1,371	627
Closing balance as at 30 June		**8,097**	7,470	8,097
RETAINED EARNINGS				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**(717)**	572	(283)
Adjusted opening balance		**(717)**	572	(283)
Comprehensive income				
Deficit for the period		**(1,226)**	(1,289)	(798)
Total comprehensive income		**(1,226)**	(1,289)	(798)
Closing balance as at 30 June		**(1,943)**	(717)	(1,081)
ASSET REVALUATION RESERVE				
Opening balance as at 1 July				
Balance carried forward from previous period		**1,146**	1,146	1,146
Closing balance as at 30 June		**1,146**	1,146	1,146
Comprehensive income				
Other comprehensive income		**-**	-	-
Total comprehensive income		**-**	-	-
Closing balance as at 30 June		**1,146**	1,146	1,146
Total Equity as at 30 June		**7,300**	7,899	8,162

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

Cash Flow Statement

for the period ended 30 June 2025

Description	Notes	2025 $'000	2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
OPERATING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Appropriations		**25,628**	24,218	26,064
Sale of goods and rendering of services		**1,612**	5,198	1,469
Net GST received		**653**	637	-
Other		**339**	269	-
Total cash received		**28,232**	30,322	27,533
Cash used				
Employees		**19,853**	17,840	20,566
Suppliers		**7,056**	7,211	5,566
Interest payments on lease liabilities		**139**	70	22
Other		**326**	3,934	-
Total cash used		**27,374**	29,055	26,154
Net cash from operating activities		**858**	1,267	1,379
INVESTING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Proceeds from sales of property, plant and equipment		**-**	-	-
Total cash received		**-**	-	-
Cash used				
Purchase of property, plant and equipment		**219**	425	627
Purchase of computer software		**529**	31	-
Total cash used		**748**	456	627
Net cash used by investing activities		**(748)**	(456)	(627)
FINANCING ACTIVITIES				
Cash received				
Proceeds from Contributed Equity		**766**	437	627
Total cash received		**766**	437	627
Cash used				
Principal payments of lease liabilities		**1,118**	1,102	1,379
Total cash used		**1,118**	1,102	1,379
Net cash used by financing activities		**(352)**	(665)	(752)
Net increase/(decrease) in cash held		**(242)**	146	-
Cash and cash equivalents at the beginning of the reporting period		**386**	240	240
Cash and cash equivalents at the end of the reporting period	2.1A	**144**	386	240

The above statement should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes.

Budget Variances Commentary

The explanations provide a comparison of the original budget as presented in the 2024-25 Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) to the 2024-25 final outcome as presented in accordance with Australian Accounting Standards for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). The Budget is not audited.

Variances are considered to be 'major' based on the following criteria:
- the variance between budget and actual is greater than 10%: and
- the variance between budget and actual is greater than 2% of total expenses or total own-source revenues: or
- the variance between budget and actual is below this threshold but is considered important for the reader's understanding or is relevant to an assessment of the discharge of accountability and to an analysis of performance of the agency.

In some instances, a budget has not been provided for in the PBS, for example, non-cash items such as asset revaluations and sale of assets adjustments. Unless the variance is considered to be 'major' no explanation has been provided.

Explanations of major variances	Affected line items (and statement)
Expenses The variance between the budget and 2024-25 actual is mainly related to the underspend in staffing due to recruitment delays and a slight overspend in IT related supplier costs and property operating expenses.	**Statement of Comprehensive Income** Expenses - Suppliers Expenses - Employee benefits
Income The variance is related to the recognition of Pacific Program revenue which was not in the original budget. This is offset by a small decrease in Resources Received Free of Charge mainly due to lower than budgeted investigation activities undertaken both by NSW and Victoria investigation bodies.	**Statement of Comprehensive Income** Own-source revenue - Revenue from contracts with customers
Financial Assets The variance between the budget and 2024-25 actual is mainly related to the additional receivables from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) for the Pacific Program which was not budgeted for and the delays in improvement to Core Enterprise Management System.	**Statement of Financial Position** Financial assets - Cash and cash equivalents Financial assets - Trade and other receivables
Non-Financial Assets The variance between the budget and 2024-25 actual for Buildings is mainly related to the recognition of the new Brisbane Lease. The other variances in Plant and Equipment and Computer Software mainly related to less than budgeted expenses on Brisbane Fitouts and delays in improvement to Core Enterprise Management System.	**Statement of Financial Position** Non-financial assets - Buildings Non-financial assets - Plant and equipment Non-financial assets - Computer software

Budget Variances Commentary (continued)

Explanations of major variances	Affected line items (and statement)
Payables The variance between the budget and the 2024-25 actual is mainly attributable to higher than expected other payables compared to the original budget and due to unspent amount received from DFAT as part of the Pacific Program.	**Statement of Financial Position** Payables - Other payables
Statement of Changes in Equity Total equity is less than projected in the budget mainly due to the differences between the actual and budgeted operating result, with the larger variance identified above.	**Statement of Changes in Equity**
Cash Flow Statement Variances in the Cash Flow Statement are broadly consistent with the variances explained above for income and expenses.	**Cash Flow Statement**

Overview

The ATSB is an Australian Government controlled not-for-profit entity. The objective of the entity is to improve transport safety in Australia through: independent 'no blame' investigation of transport safety accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data recording, analysis and research; and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action. ATSB's central office is located at 12, Moore Street, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory. It has field offices in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth.

The Basis of Preparation

The Financial Statements are required by:

a) section 42 of the *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013*

The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with:

a) *Public Governance, Performance and Accountability (Financial Reporting) Rule 2015* (FRR); and

b) Australian Accounting Standards and Interpretations – including simplified disclosures for Tier 2 Entities under AASB 1060 issued by the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) that apply for the reporting period.

The financial statements have been prepared on an accrual basis and in accordance with the historical cost convention, except for certain assets and liabilities at fair value. Except where stated, no allowance is made for the effect of changing prices on the results or the financial position. The financial statements are presented in Australian dollars.

New Accounting Standards

There was one amending standard that was issued prior to the signing of the statement by the Chief Commisioner and Chief Financial Officer, was applicable to the current reporting period and did not have a material effect on the ATSB's financial statements:

Standard/ Interpretation	Nature of impending change/s in accounting policy and likely impact on initial application
AASB 2022-10 Amendments to Australian Accounting Standards – Fair Value Measurement of Non-Financial Assets of Not-For-Profit Public Sector Entities	This standard amends AASB 13 Fair Value Measurement for fair value measurements of non-financial assets of not-for-profit public sector entities not held primarily for their ability to generate net cash inflows. This standard also adds implementation advice and relevant illustrative examples for fair value measurements of non-financial assets of not-for-profit public sector entities not held primarily for their ability to generate net cash inflows.

Taxation

The entity is exempt from all forms of taxation except Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

Events After the Reporting Period

There were no events subsequent to 30 June 2025 that had the potential to significantly affect the ongoing structure and financial activities of the ATSB.

Note 1 - Financial Performance

This section analyses the financial performance of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for the year ended 30 June 2025

1.1 Expenses

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
1.1A: Employee benefits		
Wages and salaries	**15,215**	14,011
Superannuation		
Defined contribution plans	**1,995**	1,703
Defined benefit plans	**736**	702
Leave and other entitlements	**1,895**	2,045
Separation and redundancies	**229**	-
Other employee expenses	**125**	212
Total employee benefits	**20,195**	18,673

Accounting Policy
Accounting policies for employee related expenses is contained in the People and Relationships section.

1.1B: Suppliers		
Goods and services supplied or rendered		
Investigation services	**3,364**	3,279
Information technology	**2,868**	3,068
Other property services	**417**	456
Contracted services	**513**	431
Travel	**774**	743
Training and conferences	**153**	317
Communications	**179**	179
Audit fees	**150**	158
Office rent - short term leases	**176**	82
Publications and printing	**41**	24
Consultants	**147**	307
Legal	**76**	70
Other	**502**	413
Total goods and services supplied or rendered	**9,360**	9,527
Goods supplied	**860**	1,077
Services rendered	**8,500**	8,450
Total goods and services supplied or rendered	**9,360**	9,527
Other suppliers		
Workers compensation expenses	**110**	139
Total other suppliers	**110**	139
Total suppliers	**9,470**	9,666

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.2A, 2.4A and 3.2.

1.1 Expenses (continued)

Accounting Policy
Short-term leases and leases of low-value assets
The ATSB has elected not to recognise right-of-use assets and lease liabilities for short-term leases of assets that have a lease term of 12 months or less and leases of low-value assets (less than $10,000). The ATSB recognises the lease payments associated with these leases as an expense on a straight-line basis over the lease term.

	2025	2024
	$'000	$'000
1.1C: Finance costs		
Interest on lease liabilities	**139**	70
Total finance costs	**139**	70

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.2C, 2.2A, 2.4A and 3.2.

Accounting Policy
All borrowing costs are expensed as incurred.

1.1D: Write-down and impairment of other assets		
Impairment on intangible or tangible assets	**10**	10
Total write-down and impairment of other assets	**10**	10

1.2 Own-Source Revenue and Gains

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
Own-Source Revenue		
1.2A: Revenue from contracts with customers		
Rendering of services	**1,812**	1,438
Total revenue from contracts with customers	**1,812**	1,438

Accounting Policy
Revenue from the sale of goods is recognised when control has been transferred to the buyer.

AASB 15 *Revenue from Contracts with Customers* has been applied to all new and uncompleted contracts from the date of initial application.

The following is a description of principal activities from which the ATSB generates its revenue:

- Government appropriations
- International programmes of work
- Cost recovery rail investigations

The ATSB's revenue in relation to its international programmes and cost recovery activities are agreement based and within scope for AASB 15. There are separate agreements, with separate terms, based on performance over time obligations and point in time obligations.

The transaction price is the total amount of consideration to which the ATSB expects to be entitled in exchange for transferring promised goods or services to a customer. The consideration promised in a contract with a customer may include fixed amounts, variable amounts, or both.

Receivables for goods and services, which have 30 day terms, are recognised at the nominal amounts due less any impairment allowance account. Collectability of debts is reviewed at end of the reporting period.

1.2B: Other revenue		
Resources received free of charge		
Remuneration of auditors[1]	**54**	54
Investigation Services	**3,284**	3,189
Total other revenue	**3,338**	3,243

[1] The ANAO does not provide any other services to ATSB.

Accounting Policy
Resources Received Free of Charge
Resources received free of charge are recognised as revenue when, and only when, a fair value can be reliably determined and the services would have been purchased if they had not been donated. Use of those resources is recognised as an expense. Resources received free of charge are recorded as either revenue or gains depending on their nature.

1.2 Own-Source Revenue and gains (continued)

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
Gains		
1.2C: Other gains		
Gain from sale of assets	**16**	8
Total other gains	**16**	8

Accounting Policy

Sale of Assets

Gains from disposal of assets are recognised when control of the asset has passed to the buyer.

1.2D: Revenue from Government		
Departmental appropriations	**26,064**	25,270
Total revenue from Government	**26,064**	25,270

Accounting Policy

Revenue from Government

Amounts appropriated for departmental appropriations for the year (adjusted for any formal additions and reductions) are recognised as Revenue from Government when the ATSB gains control of the appropriation, except for certain amounts relating to activities that are reciprocal in nature, in which case revenue is recognised only when it has been earned. Appropriations receivable are recognised at their nominal amounts.

Note 2 - Financial Position

This section analyses the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's assets used to conduct its operations and the operating liabilities incurred as a result.

2.1 Financial Assets

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
2.1A: Cash and cash equivalents		
Cash on hand or on deposit	**144**	386
Total cash and cash equivalents	**144**	386

Accounting Policy

Cash is recognised at its nominal amount. Cash and cash equivalents includes:

a) cash on hand; and

b) demand deposits in bank accounts with an original maturity of 3 months or less that are readily convertible to known amounts of cash and subject to insignificant risk of changes in value.

2.1B: Trade and other receivables		
Goods and services receivables		
Goods and services	**1**	58
Total goods and services receivables	**1**	58
Appropriations receivables		
Appropriation receivable	**13,869**	13,572
Total appropriations receivables	**13,869**	13,572
Other receivables		
Statutory receivables	**89**	74
Total other receivables	**89**	74
Total trade and other receivables (gross)	**13,959**	13,704
Total trade and other receivables (net)	**13,959**	13,704

Trade and other receivables have been assessed for impairment and none was identified.

Goods and services receivable were assessed for expected credit loss. It was expected to be $0 (2024: $0)

Credit terms for goods and services were within 20 days (2024: 20 days)

Accounting Policy

Financial assets

Trade receivables and other receivables that are held for the purpose of collecting the contractual cash flows where the cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest, that are not provided at below-market interest rates, are subsequently measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method adjusted for any loss allowance.

2.2 Non-Financial Assets

2.2A: Reconciliation of the Opening and Closing Balances of Property, Plant and Equipment and Intangibles

Reconciliation of the opening and closing balances of property, plant and equipment for 2025

	Buildings	Heritage & Cultural	Plant & Equipment	Computer Software[1]	Total
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
As at 1 July 2024					
Gross book value	**9,317**	**16**	**3,725**	**4,068**	**17,126**
Accumulated depreciation, amortisation and impairment	**(2,797)**	**-**	**(872)**	**(2,327)**	**(5,996)**
Total as at 1 July 2024	**6,520**	**16**	**2,853**	**1,741**	**11,130**
Additions					
Purchase	**-**	**-**	**219**	**-**	**219**
Internally developed	**-**	**-**	**-**	**529**	**529**
Right-of-use assets [2]	**3,733**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**3,733**
Write-downs and Impairments recognised in net cost of services [3]	**-**	**-**	**(1)**	**(9)**	**(10)**
Depreciation and amortisation	**-**	**-**	**(607)**	**(733)**	**(1,340)**
Depreciation on right-of-use assets	**(1,285)**	**-**	**(17)**	**-**	**(1,302)**
Other movements of right-of-use assets	**36**	**-**	**-**	**-**	**36**
Total as at 30 June 2025	**9,004**	**16**	**2,447**	**1,528**	**12,995**

	Buildings	Heritage & Cultural	Plant and Equipment	Computer Software	Total
	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000	$'000
Total as at 30 June 2025 represented by					
Gross book value	**13,093**	**16**	**3,943**	**4,588**	**21,640**
Accumulated depreciation, amortisation and impairment	**(4,089)**	**-**	**(1,496)**	**(3,060)**	**(8,645)**
Total as at 30 June 2025	**9,004**	**16**	**2,447**	**1,528**	**12,995**
Carrying amount of right-of-use assets	**9,004**	**-**	**105**	**-**	**9,109**

[1] The carrying amount of computer software includes $1,508k internally generated and $20k purchased software.

[2] The carrying amount of buildings ROU assets represents the value of new Brisbane office lease signed during the financial year.

[3] The ATSB Management ensured that the appropriate assessments were made for impairment, useful lives and the valuation of non-financial assets at 30 June 2025.

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.4A and 3.2.

Revaluation of non-financial assets

All revaluations were conducted in accordance with the revaluation policy stated at Note 5.3. The ATSB previously engaged CBRE Pty Ltd to undertake a revaluation of all Plant and Equipment and Computer Equipment assets with effect at 30 June 2023.

In 2024-25, the ATSB engaged Grays Valuers to perform a desktop materiality review of Non-Financial assets and revealed that there are no significant material differences between the carrying amount and Fair values of ATSB's assets a at 30 June 2025.

Accounting Policy

Assets are recorded at cost on acquisition except as stated below. The cost of acquisition includes the fair value of assets transferred in exchange and liabilities undertaken. Financial assets are initially measured at their fair value plus transaction costs where appropriate.

Assets acquired at no cost, or for nominal consideration, are initially recognised as assets and income at their fair value at the date of acquisition, unless acquired as a consequence of restructuring of administrative arrangements. In the latter case, assets are initially recognised as contributions by owners at the amounts at which they were recognised in the transferor's accounts immediately prior to the restructuring.

Asset Recognition Threshold

Purchases of property, plant and equipment are recognised initially at cost in the statement of financial position, except for purchases costing less than $5,000 excluding GST, which are expensed in the year of acquisition (other than where they form part of a group of similar items which are significant in total).

Leased Right of Use (ROU) Assets

Leased ROU assets are capitalised at the commencement date of the lease and comprise of the initial lease liability amount, initial direct costs incurred when entering into the lease less any lease incentives received. These assets are accounted for by Commonwealth lessees as separate asset classes to corresponding assets owned outright, but included in the same column as where the corresponding underlying assets would be presented if they were owned.

On initial adoption of AASB 16 the ATSB has adjusted the ROU assets at the date of initial application by the amount of any provision for onerous leases recognised immediately before the date of initial application. Following initial application, an impairment review is undertaken for any ROU lease asset that shows indicators of impairment and an impairment loss is recognised against any ROU asset that is impaired. Leased ROU assets continue to be measured at cost after initial recognition in Commonwealth agency, General Government Sector and Whole of Government financial statements.

Revaluations

Following initial recognition at cost, property, plant and equipment (excluding ROU assets) are carried at fair value (or an amount not materially different from fair value) less subsequent accumulated depreciation and accumulated impairment losses. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets did not differ materially from the assets' fair values as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends upon the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets.

Revaluation adjustments are made on a class basis. Any revaluation increment is credited to equity under the heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reversed a previous revaluation decrement of the same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit. Revaluation decrements for a class of assets are recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reversed a previous revaluation increment for that class.

Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date is eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the asset and the asset restated to the revalued amount.

Depreciation

Depreciable property, plant and equipment assets are written-off to their estimated residual values over their estimated useful lives to the ATSB using, in all cases, the straight-line method of depreciation.

Depreciation rates (useful lives), residual values and methods are reviewed at each reporting date and necessary adjustments are recognised in the current, or current and future reporting periods, as appropriate.

Depreciation rates applying to each class of depreciable asset are based on the following useful lives:

	2025	2024
Plant & Equipment	3-10 years	3-10 years
Computer Equipment	4 years	4 years
Office Equipment	3-10 years	3-10 years
Heritage & Cultural	100 years	100 years

The ATSB has items of property, plant and equipment that are heritage and cultural assets that have limited useful lives and are depreciated.

The depreciation rates for ROU assets are based on the commencement date to the earlier of the end of the useful life of the ROU asset or the end of the lease term.

Impairment

All assets were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2025.

All cash-generating assets and assets held at cost, including intangibles and ROU assets, were assessed for impairment at 30 June 2025. Where indications of impairment exist, the asset's recoverable amount is estimated and an impairment adjustment made if the asset's recoverable amount is less than its carrying amount. For non-cash generating assets held at fair value, the recoverable amount is expected to be materially the same as fair value at 30 June 2025.

Derecognition

An item of property, plant and equipment is derecognised upon disposal or when no further future economic benefits are expected from its use or disposal.

Heritage and Cultural Assets

The ATSB has a Pegasus Mark II Propellor from a Supermarine Walrus aircraft. The Supermarine Walrus was a British single-engine amphibious biplane reconnaissance aircraft first flown in 1933.

The ATSB has classified this item as a heritage and cultural asset as its primary purpose relates to its heritage and cultural significance.

Intangibles

The ATSB's intangibles comprise of purchased software and internally developed software for internal use. These assets are carried at cost less accumulated amortisation and accumulated impairment losses.

Software is amortised on a straight-line basis over its anticipated useful life. The useful lives of the ATSB's softwares are five years.

All software assets were assessed for indications of impairment as at 30 June 2025.

2.3 Payables

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
2.3A: Suppliers		
Trade creditors and accruals	**91**	144
Accrued expenses	**266**	361
Total suppliers	**357**	505
2.3B: Other payables		
Salaries and wages	**575**	470
Superannuation	**89**	68
Unearned income	**3,295**	3,669
Total other payables	**3,959**	4,207

Accounting Policy
Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or services have been received (irrespective of having been invoiced). Settlement is usually made within 20 days.

Parental Leave Payments Scheme
Amounts received under the Parental Leave Payments Scheme by the ATSB not yet paid to employees were presented gross as cash and a liability (payable). The total amount received under this scheme was $0 (2024: $10,734).

2.4 Interest Bearing Liabilities

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
2.4A: Leases		
Lease Liabilities		
Buildings	**9,624**	6,962
Plant and equipment	**107**	123
Total leases	**9,731**	7,085
Maturity analysis - contractual undiscounted cash flows		
Within 1 year	**1,434**	1,275
Between 1 to 5 years	**5,526**	5,020
More than 5 years	**3,595**	4,127
Total leases [1]	**10,555**	10,422

The above lease disclosures should be read in conjunction with the accompanying notes 1.1B, 1.1C, 1.2C, 2.2A and 3.2.

[1] The total contractual undiscounted cash flows include the new Brisbane lease amounted to $4.33m.

The ATSB has applied AASB 16 for all leases except short term leases as described in Note 1.1 and the cash outflow for leases for the year ended 30 June 2025 was $1.257m (2024: $1.172m).

Accounting Policy

For all new contracts entered into, the ATSB considers whether the contract is, or contains a lease. A lease is defined as 'a contract, or part of a contract, that conveys the right to use an asset (the underlying asset) for a period of time in exchange for consideration'.

Once it has been determined that a contract is, or contains a lease, the lease liability is initially measured at the present value of the lease payments unpaid at the commencement date, discounted using the interest rate implicit in the lease, if that rate is readily determinable, or the department's incremental borrowing rate.

Subsequent to initial measurement, the liability will be reduced for payments made and increased for interest. It is remeasured to reflect any reassessment or modification to the lease. When the lease liability is remeasured, the corresponding adjustment is reflected in the right-of-use asset or profit and loss depending on the nature of the reassessment or modification.

Note 3 - Funding

This section identifies the Australian Transport Safety Bureau's funding structure.

3.1 Appropriations

3.1A: Annual appropriations ('recoverable GST exclusive')

Annual appropriations for 2025

	Annual appropriation $'000	Adjustments to appropriation[1] $'000	Total appropriation $'000	Appropriation applied in 2025 (current and prior years) $'000	Variance $'000
Departmental					
Ordinary annual services	**26,064**	**1,541**	**27,605**	**27,411**	**194**
Capital budget	**627**	**-**	**627**	**766**	**(139)**
Total departmental	**26,691**	**1,541**	**28,232**	**28,177**	**55**

[1] PGPA Act Section 74 receipts.

Annual Appropriations for 2024

	Annual appropriation $'000	Adjustments to appropriation[1] $'000	Total appropriation $'000	Appropriation applied in 2024 (current and prior years) $'000	Variance[2] $'000
Departmental					
Ordinary annual services	25,270	5,091	30,361	25,475	4,886
Capital Budget	1,371	-	1,371	456	915
Total departmental	26,641	5,091	31,732	25,931	5,801

[1] PGPA Act Section 74 receipts and also includes a funding amount of $3.669m received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Pacific Program.

[2] The variance between appropriations and appropriations applied in 2023-24 is due to a combination of underspend on Pacific Program, overspends within supplier expenses, accrued supplier invoices and a delay with the finalisation of capital projects.

3.1B: Unspent annual appropriations ('recoverable GST exclusive')

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
Departmental		
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24		12,384
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24 (DCB)	**422**	1,189
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2023-24 (Cash at Bank - 30 June)	**-**	386
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2024-25	**12,820**	-
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2024-25 (DCB)	**627**	-
Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2024-25 (Cash at Bank - 30 June)	**144**	-
Total departmental	**14,013**	13,959

3.2 Net Cash Appropriation Arrangements

	2025	2024
	$'000	$'000
Total comprehensive loss as per the Statement of Comprehensive Income	**(1,226)**	(1,289)
Plus: depreciation/amortisation expenses funded through Appropriations	**1,340**	1,621
Plus: depreciation of right-of-use assets	**1,302**	1,208
Less: principal repayments - leased assets	**(1,118)**	(1,102)
Net Cash Operating Surplus	**298**	438
Changes in Asset Revaluation Reserve	**-**	-
Operating Surplus	**298**	438

From 2010-11, the Government introduced net cash appropriation arrangements where revenue appropriations for depreciation/amortisation expenses ceased. Entities now receive a separate capital budget provided through equity appropriations. Capital budgets are to be appropriated in the period when cash payment for capital expenditure is required.

The inclusion of depreciation/amortisation expenses related to ROU leased assets and the lease liability principal repayment amount reflects the cash impact on implementation of AASB 16, it does not directly reflect a change in appropriation arrangements.

Note 4 - People and Relationship

This section describes a range of employment and post-employment benefits provided to our people and our relationships with other key people.

4.1 Employee Provisions

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
4.1A: Employee provisions		
Leave	**6,390**	6,160
Total employee provisions	**6,390**	6,160

Accounting policy

Liabilities for 'short-term employee benefits' (as defined in AASB 119 *Employee Benefits*) and termination benefits expected within twelve months of the end of reporting period are measured at their nominal amounts.

Other long-term employee benefits are measured as net total of the present value of the defined benefit obligation at the end of the reporting period minus the fair value at the end of the reporting period of plan assets (if any) out of which the obligations are to be settled directly.

Leave

The liability for employee benefits includes provisions for annual leave and long service leave.
The leave liabilities are calculated on the basis of employees' remuneration at the estimated salary rates that will be applied at the time the leave is taken, including the entity's employer superannuation contribution rates to the extent that the leave is likely to be taken during service rather than paid out on termination.

The liability for long service leave has been determined by reference to the Australian Government Shorthand Method outlined in the FRR as at 30 June 2025. The estimate of the present value of the liability takes into account attrition rates and pay increases through promotion and inflation.

Separation and Redundancy

A provision is made for separation and redundancy benefit payments. The entity recognises a provision for termination when it has developed a detailed formal plan for the terminations and has informed those employees affected that it will carry out the terminations.

Superannuation

The ATSB's staff are members of the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme (CSS), the Public Sector Superannuation Scheme (PSS), the PSS accumulation plan (PSSap), or other superannuation funds held outside the Australian Government.

The CSS and PSS are defined benefit schemes for the Australian Government. The PSSap is a defined contribution scheme.

The liability for defined benefits is recognised in the financial statements of the Australian Government and is settled by the Australian Government in due course. This liability is reported in the Department of Finance's administered schedules and notes.

The ATSB makes employer contributions to the employees' defined benefit superannuation scheme at rates determined by an actuary to be sufficient to meet the current cost to the Government. The ATSB accounts for the contributions as if they were contributions to defined contribution plans.

4.2 Key Management Personnel Remuneration

Key management personnel (KMP) are those persons having authority and responsibility for planning, directing and controlling the activities of the ATSB, directly or indirectly, including any director (whether executive or otherwise) of that entity.

The ATSB has determined the KMP to be the Chief Commissioner and Chief Operating Officer who the Chief Commissioner considers to be KMP because of their responsibilities and the nature of their work. KMP is reported in the table below:

	2025 **$'000**	2024 $'000
Short-term employee benefits	**805**	752
Post-employment benefits	**87**	82
Other long-term employee benefits	**19**	18
Total key management personnel remuneration expenses[1]	**911**	852

The total number of KMP that are included in the above table is 2 individuals (2024: 2 individuals).

[1] The above key management personnel remuneration excludes the remuneration and other benefits of the Portfolio Minister. The Portfolio Minister's remuneration and other benefits are set by the Remuneration Tribunal and are not paid by the ATSB.

4.3 Related Party Disclosures

Related party relationships:

The ATSB is an Australian Government controlled entity. Related parties to this entity are KMP including the Portfolio Minister and Executive, their close family members, and other Australian Government entities.

Transactions with related parties:

Given the breadth of Government activities, related parties may transact with the government sector in the same capacity as ordinary citizens. Such transactions include the payment or refund of taxes, receipt of a Medicare rebate or higher education loans. These transactions have not been separately disclosed in this note.

Significant transactions with related parties can include:

- the payments of grants or loans;
- purchases of goods and services;
- asset purchases, sales transfers or leases;
- debts forgiven; and
- guarantees.

Giving consideration to relationships with related entities, and transactions entered into during the reporting period by the ATSB, it has been determined that there are no related party transactions to be separately disclosed (2024: Nil).

Note 5 - Managing Uncertainties

This section analyses how the Australian Transport Safety Bureau manages financial risks within its operating environment.

5.1 Contingent Assets and Liabilities

Quantifiable contingencies

At 30 June 2025, the ATSB had no quantifiable contingencies (2024: Nil).

Unquantifiable contingencies

At 30 June 2025, the ATSB had no unquantifiable contingencies (2024: Nil).

Accounting Policy
Contingent liabilities and contingent assets are not recognised in the statement of financial position but are reported in the notes. They may arise from uncertainty as to the existence of a liability or asset or represent an asset or liability in respect of which the amount cannot be reliably measured. Contingent assets are disclosed when settlement is probable but not virtually certain and contingent liabilities are disclosed when settlement is greater than remote.

5.2 Financial Instruments

	2025	2024
	$'000	$'000
5.2A: Categories of financial instruments		
Financial assets at amortised cost		
Cash and cash equivalents	**144**	386
Trade and other receivables	**1**	58
Total financial assets at amortised cost	**145**	444
Total financial assets	**145**	444
Financial liabilities		
Financial liabilities measured at amortised cost		
Trade creditors	**91**	144
Accrued expenses	**266**	361
Total financial liabilities measured at amortised cost	**357**	505
Total financial liabilities	**357**	505

5.2 Financial Instruments (continued)

Accounting Policy

Financial assets

In accordance with AASB 9 *Financial Instruments*, the ATSB classifies its financial assets in the following categories:

a) financial assets at fair value through profit or loss;
b) financial assets at fair value through other comprehensive income; and
c) financial assets measured at amortised cost.

The classification depends on both the ATSB's business model for managing the financial assets and contractual cash flow characteristics at the time of initial recognition. Financial assets are recognised when the ATSB becomes a party to the contract and, as a consequence, has a legal right to receive or a legal obligation to pay cash and derecognised when the contractual rights to the cash flows from the financial asset expire or are transferred upon trade date.

Financial Assets at Amortised Cost

Financial assets included in this category need to meet two criteria:

1. the financial asset is held in order to collect the contractual cash flows; and
2. the cash flows are solely payments of principal and interest (SPPI) on the principal outstanding amount.

Amortised cost is determined using the effective interest method.

Effective Interest Method

Income is recognised on an effective interest rate basis for financial assets that are recognised at amortised cost.

Impairment of Financial Assets

Financial assets are assessed for impairment at the end of each reporting period based on Expected Credit Losses, using the general approach which measures the loss allowance based on an amount equal to lifetime expected credit losses where risk has significantly increased, or an amount equal to 12-month expected credit losses if risk has not increased.

The simplified approach for trade, contract and lease receivables is used. This approach always measures the loss allowance as the amount equal to the lifetime expected credit losses.

A write-off constitutes a derecognition event where the write-off directly reduces the gross carrying amount of the financial asset.

Financial liabilities

Financial liabilities are classified as either financial liabilities 'at fair value through profit or loss' or other financial liabilities. Financial liabilities are recognised and derecognised upon 'trade date'.

Financial Liabilities at Amortised Cost

Financial liabilities, including borrowings, are initially measured at fair value, net of transaction costs. These liabilities are subsequently measured at amortised cost using the effective interest method, with interest expense recognised on an effective interest basis.

Supplier and other payables are recognised at amortised cost. Liabilities are recognised to the extent that the goods or services have been received (and irrespective of having been invoiced).

5.3 Fair Value Measurement

	2025	2024
	$'000	$'000
5.3 Fair value measurement		
Non-financial assets		
Heritage and cultural	**16**	16
Property, plant and equipment	**2,342**	2,731
	2,358	2,747

Accounting Policy

The ATSB has Heritage and Cultural, and Property, Plant and Equipment assets and the fair value for each asset is measured at market selling price, or depreciated replacement cost in isolated instances where no market prices or indicators are available for specialised, diagnostic equipment.

Following initial recognition at cost, property, plant and equipment are carried at fair value. Valuations are conducted with sufficient frequency to ensure that the carrying amounts of assets do not differ materially from the asset's fair value as at the reporting date. The regularity of independent valuations depends on the volatility of movements in market values for the relevant assets.

The ATSB previously engaged CBRE Pty Ltd to undertake a revaluation of all plant and equipment assets with effect at 30 June 2023 and confirm that the models developed comply with AASB 13 *Fair Value Measurement*.

In 2024-25, the ATSB engaged Grays Valuers to perform a desktop materiality review of Non-Financial assets and revealed that there are no significant material differences between the carrying amount and Fair values of ATSB's assets as at 30 June 2025.

Revaluation adjustments were made on a class basis. Any revaluation increment was credited to equity under the heading of asset revaluation reserve except to the extent that it reversed a previous revaluation decrement of the same asset class that was previously recognised in the surplus/deficit. Revaluation decrements for a class of assets were recognised directly in the surplus/deficit except to the extent that they reversed a previous revaluation increment for that class.

Any accumulated depreciation as at the revaluation date was eliminated against the gross carrying amount of the asset and the asset was restated to the revalued amount.

The ATSB's property, plant and equipment assets under the fair value hierarchy, are valued at Level 3. The ATSB Management ensured that the appropriate assessments were made for impairment, useful lives and the valuation of non-financial assets at 30 June 2025.

Note 6 - Other information

6.1 Current/non-current distinction for assets and liabilities

6.1A: Current/non-current distinction for assets and liabilities

	2025 $'000	2024 $'000
Assets expected to be recovered in:		
No more than 12 months		
Cash and cash equivalents	144	386
Trade and other receivables	13,959	13,705
Prepayments	627	618
Total no more than 12 months	**14,730**	14,709
More than 12 months		
Land & Building	9,004	6,520
Heritage and cultural	16	16
Plant and equipment	2,447	2,853
Computer software	1,528	1,741
Prepayments	12	18
Total more than 12 months	**13,007**	11,148
Total assets	**27,737**	25,857
Liabilities expected to be settled in:		
No more than 12 months		
Suppliers	357	505
Other payables	3,959	4,207
Leases	1,434	1,275
Employee provisions	2,329	2,030
Total no more than 12 months	**8,079**	8,017
More than 12 months		
Leases	8,297	5,811
Employee provisions	4,061	4,131
Total more than 12 months	**12,358**	9,942
Total liabilities	**20,437**	17,959

Section 7 –

Management and accountability

Corporate governance

The Commission

The ATSB is governed by a Commission, comprising a Chief Commissioner (who is also the CEO and accountable authority) and 3 part-time Commissioners.

The Commission provides guidance on the selection of accidents and other safety incidents to be investigated. The Commission is responsible for exercising the power to publish accident investigation reports. It also supports the ATSB in encouraging safety action ahead of final reports.

The Commission operates within the corporate governance framework of the ATSB Commission Governance Manual. The manual sets out the Commission's legislative requirements, parliamentary and ministerial accountability, membership and functions, administrative policies and procedures, and reporting obligations.

The Commission meets at least 4 times a year and manages ATSB business through regular teleconferences and electronic communications in accordance with its obligations under the TSI Act and its agreed policies.

Functional Reference Group

The ATSB Functional Reference Group (FRG) plays an advisory role to the CEO, and the Commission (when requested). The FRG meets fortnightly to discuss strategic management issues and priorities. The FRG consisted of the Chief Commissioner, the Chief Operating Officer, the Directors of Transport Safety and the Heads of each Corporate Services functional area.

Audit and Risk Committee

The Audit and Risk Committee provides independent assurance and advice to the Chief Commissioner (as well as to the Commission and FRG) on ATSB financial and performance reporting responsibilities, risk oversight and management, and system of internal control. The Audit and Risk Committee consists of an independent chair and 2 independent members. The committee held 4 meetings throughout the financial year, in September and December 2024, and April and June 2025.

In 2024–25, the committee advised and provided assurance on a range of matters, including the ATSB:

- Internal Audit Annual Program
- enterprise risk management, fraud control, corruption, and business continuity frameworks
- performance reporting
- financial statement preparations
- work health and safety management
- compliance with the PGPA Act and the associated Rule
- internal audit governance framework – including the Internal Audit Charter.

The ATSB Audit and Risk Committee Charter is available on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/audit-and-risk-committee-charter.

Table 23: Audit committee (2024–25)

Member name	Qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience	Number of meetings attended/ total number of meetings	Total annual remuneration $ (GST inc)
Michael Stapleton (Chair) Appointed March 2025	» Master of Professional Accounting » Bachelor of Business (Public Admin) » 46 years' experience across public and private sector organisations	2/4	7,790.84
Cindy Briscoe Appointed March 2025	» Bachelor of Computing Studies » Graduate of the Australian Institute of Company Directors (GAICD) » 25 years' experience as a senior executive across multiple Commonwealth departments leading corporate services, strategy and policy operations and service delivery, including transformation programs	2/4	6,600.00
Cheryl-Anne Navarro	» Master of Business Admin (MBA), Deakin University » Bachelor of Commerce, Australian National University » Fellow Certified Practising Accountant (FCPA) with over 25 years of public sector finance experience, and 8 years in senior executive positions including roles as Chief Finance Officer	4/4	0
Clare Kitcher (Chair) Appointment concluded December 2024	» Bachelor of Science (Hons) Dunelm » GAICD » Certified Chief Risk Officer (CCRO) » Experienced public sector executive and non-executive director specialising in risk management and business transformation » Prequalified independent member of Audit and Risk Committees in NSW	2/4	11,063.42
Ken Kanofski Appointment concluded February 2025	» Bachelor of Business » MBA, GAICD, FCPA » Experienced company director and chair » More than 20 years' CEO experience in the public sector » Extensive experience in transport and safety	2/4	8,107.00

Corporate planning and reporting

Our Governance Framework describes the corporate planning and reporting mechanisms we have in place to support decision-making. We operate within the Commonwealth Performance Framework and in accordance with the PGPA Act. Our Strategic Plan 2023–2026 is our

overarching planning document and clearly articulates our goals and strategies that will enable and enhance the effectiveness of our operations as Australia's national transport safety investigator.

Corporate planning allows us to align our resources and activities with our strategic priorities. Our strategic plan informs the ATSB corporate plan which is updated annually. In addition to detailing key performance information, the corporate plan details our operating environment, capabilities and key activities that allow us to achieve our purpose.

All our planning documents are consistent with the expectations detailed in the Minister's Statement of Expectations 2023–2025. We also prepare an annual plan each year, detailing specific priorities that work towards our strategic goals. The ATSB Annual Plan 2024–25 gave priority to:

- enhancing rail capability and capacity
- building strategic relationships and engagement with the Pacific
- addressing ATSB's ongoing financial sustainability
- implementing initiatives to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of investigations
- developing and implementing data enhancements.

We report on our performance internally through quarterly performance reporting and annually through the annual report, which includes an annual performance statement (see **Section 3** of this report) – detailing how we have performed against our measures included in our corporate plan.

All planning and reporting mechanisms are detailed in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Planning and reporting mechanisms

Business continuity management

The ATSB business continuity management framework details the policies and procedures for the agency to respond to a business disruption. The framework ensures the ATSB is well placed to implement recovery processes and return to business as usual as quickly as possible while preserving the safety of staff and limiting the damage and disruption to business operations.

Risk management

Consistent with the PGPA Act, the ATSB maintains a risk management framework. The framework is consistent with the Commonwealth Risk Management Framework. The ATSB framework includes a risk management policy, statement of risk appetite and tolerance and enterprise risk register. The framework is an integral element of the broader ATSB governance, planning and management framework. The ATSB has integrated risk management practices at both corporate and business unit levels.

The ATSB is committed to a comprehensive, coordinated and systematic approach to the management of risk – directed towards supporting managers at all levels to anticipate and plan for risk, and to respond appropriately. For 2024–25, the ATSB focused on risks related to delivery of outcomes, financial sustainability, reputation, injury (physical and psychological) and security.

Fraud control and corruption

In accordance with the PGPA Act and the *National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022*, the ATSB maintains a fraud and corruption management framework, which includes a Fraud Control and Corruption Policy and a Fraud Control and Corruption Plan.

The ATSB manages a fraud risk register to identify potential fraud risks and subsequently minimise the incidence of fraud. This process is accompanied by development, implementation and regular assessment of fraud prevention, detection and response strategies.

The ATSB mandates a staff awareness program which incorporates activities for existing and new staff. Refresher training is undertaken on an annual basis. The Audit and Risk Committee and the Commission receive reports on fraud and corruption risks and the implementation of controls and treatments.

Ethical standards

The ATSB is committed to upholding the highest standards of ethical conduct and integrity in all activities. Staff operate in accordance with the APS Code of Conduct, which outlines the expected behaviours for those working within, or in partnership with, the agency.

To ensure alignment with these standards, all new employees undertake comprehensive induction training. This includes:

- an introduction to the APS Values and Code of Conduct
- familiarisation with ATSB's vision, mission and values
- guidance on ethical decision-making and professional responsibilities.

This foundational training reinforces our culture of accountability and respect, and supports our people in delivering services that reflect the principles of public service excellence.

People and culture

The ATSB is committed to creating a culture that supports collaboration and inclusive behaviours, provides opportunity for individual growth, and provides a safe working environment for our people.

In 2023, the ATSB initiated a comprehensive cultural reform program, informed by extensive staff consultation. This led to the development and implementation of key initiatives, including a Health and Wellbeing Strategy and a Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan, aimed at fostering a more inclusive and supportive workplace culture.

Throughout 2024–25, the ATSB continued to build on this foundation by delivering a range of staff-identified actions and projects. Notable achievements during this period include the revision of Transport Safety Investigator Work Level Standards and the launch of our inaugural Reconciliation Action Plan. As of 30 June 2025, 181 of the 226 identified actions have been successfully completed, reflecting our sustained commitment to cultural transformation and continuous improvement.

An internal culture survey conducted in November 2024 revealed substantial improvements in organisational culture since the program's inception in 2022. The culture reform initiative has had a demonstrable positive impact on staff engagement and performance, as evidenced by consistent and significant gains in employee satisfaction metrics, including successive improvements in APS employee Census results.

Throughout 2024–25, the ATSB continued to expand and embed its training and development programs. The key focus area was targeted programs to support key ATSB cohorts, such as transport safety investigators, senior leaders and supervisors.

Key initiatives over the period were:

- Development and implementation of a suite of 65 transport safety investigation competencies, providing clear development pathways and standardised capability assessments for our transport safety investigators.
- Development and delivery of a bespoke supervisor skills training course.
- 360-degree feedback and executive coaching provided to ATSB senior leaders.
- Development of eLearning packages to support key initiatives and priorities, including innovation, and diversity and inclusion.
- The delivery of regular online and face-to-face all-staff awareness sessions.

Staffing profile

The ATSB staffing profile has shifted, from 118 at the end of June 2024 to 127 at the end of June 2025. The associated staff turnover rate was approximately 7%, a decrease from 8% in 2024–25. Table 24 displays the ATSB staff numbers, by classification, as at 30 June 2025.

Table 24: ATSB staffing profile at 30 June 2025

Substantive classification	Gender x (full-time)	Female (full-time)	Female (part-time)	Male (full-time)	Male (part-time)	*Non-ongoing	Total
Statutory office holders	-	-	1	1	2	4	4
Senior Executive Service (SES)	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
EL 2	-	10	4	31	3	3	48
EL 1	-	8	1	19	1	1	29
APS 6	-	12	5	14	1	1	32
APS 5	-	6	0	3	1	1	10
APS 4	-	2	0	1	0	1	3
Total	**-**	**38**	**11**	**70**	**8**	**11**	**127**

**The figures outlined in Table 24 include 3 casual employees, employed by the ATSB on irregular and intermittent non-ongoing contracts as at 30 June 2025. Non-ongoing casual employees are counted in the non-ongoing column.*

This total is comprised of the following employment arrangements:

- 122 staff (representing all non-SES employees) covered by the enterprise agreement
- one SES employee covered by a section 24(1) determination, established in accordance with the ATSB SES remuneration policy
- 4 statutory office holders (representing the Commissioners) determined by the remuneration tribunal.

There are no other employment arrangements in place and there is no provision for performance pay.

Of the 123 SES and non-SES employees, 78 employees were based in the Australian Capital Territory, 28 based in Queensland, one based in South Australia, 2 based in Western Australia, 11 based in Victoria and 3 based in New South Wales.

Non-salary benefits provided to employees under the enterprise agreement include:

- in-house capability development programs
- mentoring and coaching programs
- study assistance to eligible employees
- flexible working arrangements, including hybrid working arrangements
- access to various leave, supporting work/life balance
- annual influenza vaccinations
- confidential employee assistance program for employees and their immediate families.

First Nations people

Throughout 2024–25, the ATSB has been implementing actions from the ATSB's inaugural Reconciliation Action Plan. Our key focus areas were recruitment strategies for First Nations employees, cultural awareness and engagement activities.

Salary rates

Table 25 displays the salary rates supporting the above employment arrangements as at 30 June 2025.

Table 25: ATSB salary rates at 30 June 2025

Substantive classification	Lower ($)	Upper ($)
Statutory office holders	As determined by the remuneration tribunal	
EL 2	142,785	175,491
EL 1	120,108	145,610
APS 6	94,563	111,531
APS 5	86,474	93,372
APS 4	77,459	84,169

Note: Maximums include transport safety investigator and legal broadbands, representing an increase on standard administrative APS 6–EL 2 rates.

Senior executive remuneration for 2024–25 is presented in **Appendix C**.

Strategic commissioning framework

The ATSB operates in line with the Strategic Commissioning Framework. Core work is done in-house in most cases, and any outsourcing of core work is minimal and aligns with the limited circumstances permitted under the framework.

Purchasing

The ATSB purchases goods and services in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs). These rules are applied through the accountable authority instructions. The ATSB procurement policies and processes have been developed to ensure that:

- it undertakes competitive, non-discriminatory procurements
- it uses resources efficiently, effectively, economically and ethically
- it makes all procurement decisions in an accountable and transparent manner.

Consultants

The ATSB engages consultants when it lacks specialist expertise, or when independent research, review or assessment is required. Consultants are typically engaged to:

- investigate or diagnose a defined issue or problem
- carry out defined reviews or evaluations
- provide independent advice, information or creative solutions to assist ATSB decision-making.

The ATSB policies on selection and engagement of consultants are in accordance with the CPRs. Before engaging consultants, the ATSB considers the skills and resources required for the task, the skills available internally and the cost effectiveness of engaging an external contractor.

During 2024–25, 5 new reportable consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $128,198 (GST inclusive). There were 6 ongoing consultancy contracts totalling $301,530 carried over from 2023–24.

During 2024–25, 17 new reportable non-consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $552,399 (GST inclusive). There were 33 ongoing non-consultancy contracts totalling $5,799,471 (GST inclusive) carried over from 2023–24.

Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable contracts for consultancies and non-consultancies. Information on the value of contracts and consultancies is available from the AusTender website at tenders.gov.au.

Exempt contracts

No contracts were exempted on public interest grounds from publication on AusTender during 2024–25.

Procurement initiatives to support small business

The ATSB supports small business participation in the Commonwealth Government procurement market. Small and medium enterprises (SME) and small enterprise participation statistics are available on the Department of Finance website at finance.gov.au.

The ATSB seeks to support SMEs, consistent with paragraph 5.4 of the CPRs. It ensures that its communications are expressed in clear and simple language. Its finance system is set up to ensure prompt payments to all contractors and suppliers, and it makes use of credit cards.

Legal services and expenditure

Paragraph 11.1(a) of the Legal Services Directions 2017, issued by the Attorney-General under the *Judiciary Act 1903*, requires chief executives of departments and agencies to ensure that legal services expenditure is appropriately recorded and monitored. Chief executives must also ensure that their agencies make records of their legal services expenditure for the previous financial year, available by 30 October in the following financial year. The following amounts are exclusive of GST.

ATSB expenditure on legal services for 2024–25 was $318,071 comprising:

- $226,420 on internal legal services
- $91,651 on external legal services.

External scrutiny and participation

The Australian Transport Safety and Investigation Bodies Financial Sustainability Review

During 2024–25, the ATSB continued to work with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts to advise the Minister with respect to the findings from the review. The review considered the operations, potential efficiencies and options for cost recovery of the following bodies:

- CASA
- ATSB
- AMSA.

Coronial investigations and inquests

The ATSB is required to participate in coronial investigations and inquests. The ATSB participated in or assisted inquiries for 8 coronial matters during 2024–25 relating to ATSB investigations:

- Midair collision between Beech Travel Air twin-engine aircraft and Piper Seminole twin-engine aircraft south of Mangalore Airport, Victoria, on 19 February 2020.
- Visual Flight Rules (VFR) into IMC, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Airbus Helicopters EC130 T2 near Mount Disappointment, Victoria, on 31 March 2022.
- Collision with terrain involving a Jabiru J230-C aircraft, at Lucyvale, Victoria, on 18 September 2022.
- Midair collision involving 2 Eurocopter EC130 aircraft at Gold Coast, Queensland, on 2 January 2023.
- Midair collision involving Jabiru J430 and Piper PA-25-235 at Caboolture Airfield, Queensland, on 28 July 2023.
- Pilot incapacitation, loss of control and collision with terrain involving Gulfstream 695A south-east of Cloncurry Airport, Queensland, on 4 November 2023.
- Midair collision involving 2 SIAI-Marchetti S-211s west of Tyabb Airport, Victoria, on 19 November 2023.
- Collision with water involving Cessna 208 Caravan at Rottnest Island, Western Australia, on 7 January 2025.

Findings for the matters involving the midair collision south of Mangalore Airport and the collision into terrain involving an EC130 aircraft near Mount Disappointment have been completed by coroners. Other matters above are yet to be completed by the responsible coroners.

Judicial decisions and reviews by outside bodies

During 2024–25, the ATSB was not subject to any judicial decisions or reviews by administrative tribunals, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) or the Australian Privacy Commissioner. There were also no reports on ATSB operations by a parliamentary committee, the Australian Information Commissioner or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.

Freedom of information

In 2024–25, the ATSB received 28 Freedom of Information (FOI) requests for access to documents under the *Freedom of Information Act 1982* (FOI Act).

For further information on the FOI process and information requests during the year, please refer to **Appendix A** and the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/foi.

Public interest disclosure

The FOI Act requires the ATSB to publish information as part of the Information Publication Scheme. An agency publication plan showing what information is published in accordance with the Information Publication Scheme requirements is available on our website at atsb.gov.au/about_atsb/information-publication-scheme.

Section 8 –

Appendices

Appendix A: Other mandatory information

Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act)

The ATSB is committed to maintaining a safe and healthy work environment and promoting strategies to enhance personal wellbeing. In 2024–25, the key focus was managing psychosocial hazards in the workplace and improving our reporting capabilities.

The ATSB Work Heath Safety and Wellbeing Committee held a meeting on average every 6 weeks throughout 2024–25, encouraging collaboration between the person conducting a business or undertaking (PCBU) and work areas, identifying and mitigating emerging risks, and maintaining standards and codes of practice relating to the health and safety of all workers.

Notifiable incidents

In 2024–25, no notifiable incidents occurred under Part 3 or Part 5 of the WHS Act.

Work health and safety investigations

Two proactive investigations were conducted by Comcare, and no corrective action was required. No incident investigations were completed meaning no notices were given in relation to incidents at ATSB workplaces during 2024–25.

Advertising and market research

During 2024–25, the ATSB did not conduct any advertising campaigns.

The Department of Finance prepares an annual report on campaign advertising by Australian Government departments and agencies. The report details all campaigns where expenditure was greater than $250,000 (excluding GST) and can be found on the Department of Finance website at finance.gov.au/publications/reports.

Section 311A of the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* requires Commonwealth agencies to set out in their annual reports the details of amounts greater than $16,300 (inclusive of GST) paid by or on behalf of them during the year to advertising agencies, market research organisations, polling organisations, direct mail organisations and media advertising organisations. There were no amounts greater than $16,300 provided to these organisations during 2024–25.

Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance reporting

Section 516A of the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999* requires that Australian Government entities include a section detailing their environmental performance and contribution to ecologically sustainable development in their annual reports.

The ATSB is fully committed to the principles of ecologically sustainable development. The nature of its work as Australia's national transport safety investigator – with a focus on the investigation of transport accidents, research into transport safety and dissemination of safety information – means that the ATSB commitment is expressed through its day-to-day activities within its offices.

The ATSB operates under the Energy Efficiency in Government Operations (EEGO) Policy, and through its office accommodation leasing arrangements, the ATSB environmental management system complies with ISO 14001:2004 – the international standard for environmental management systems. The system is focused on ATSB office-based activities in Canberra.

Initiatives are applied at regional office premises, where appropriate.

The ATSB has contracted out its data centres to private providers, with the result that servers and ICT infrastructure are located outside the ATSB premises. This produced a significant saving in energy use. The ATSB has limited its energy use through various initiatives that focus on improving the energy efficiency of the property portfolio, for example:

- operating a virtualised and cloud IT infrastructure environment
- using 7% green energy
- ensuring that desktop IT equipment uses energy-saving policies, such as automatic turn- off for monitors and hard drives after periods of inactivity
- reducing the number of printers in the network
- setting each printer default to mono (black) and double-sided printing
- using photocopy paper containing 60% recycled paper for internal use
- conserving energy, water, paper and other natural resources while still maintaining a comfortable work environment
- actively recycling paper waste
- promoting the separation of general waste into recyclable and non-recyclable items before disposal
- promoting video conferencing as an alternative to travel, where practicable
- using motion-sensor lighting in offices
- reducing the effect of direct sunlight on air conditioning systems by installing blinds or tinting, where appropriate.

Read more in **Appendix T.**

Grant programs

The ATSB did not administer any grant programs during 2024–25.

Disability reporting mechanism

Australia's National Disability Strategy 2021–2031 is a national framework that all governments in Australia have signed up to. It sets out a plan for continuing to improve the lives of people with disability in Australia over 10 years.

Back in 2023, ATSB commenced the consultation and implementation of our Diversity and Inclusion Action Plan 2023–26. In 2024–25, we continued to implement this plan, with staff working collaboratively at all levels and removing barriers, creating a workplace where everyone feels valued, respected and are contributing to our community.

The Australian Public Service Disability Employment Strategy 2020–25 sets out a comprehensive plan to improve employment outcomes for people with disability. This strategy aligns with the National Disability Strategy and reinforces the Australian Government's commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Disability reporting is included in the Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) State of the Service Reports and the APS Statistical Bulletin.

Progress reports on the strategy's action plans and outcomes will be published and available at disabilitygateway.gov.au/ads. Disability reporting is included in the Australian Public Service Commission's State of the Service reports and the APS Statistical Bulletin. These reports are available at apsc.gov.au.

Freedom of information

The following information explains how to request access to documents held by the ATSB under the FOI Act. It also explains what records the ATSB holds, and what arrangements the ATSB has in place for outside participation.

Detailed information about the FOI Act is available via the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) website at oaic.gov.au and the Federal Register of Legislation website at legislation.gov.au.

How to lodge a request for documents

Information about how to make an application under the FOI Act can be found on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

A request under the FOI Act for access to documents must:

- be in writing
- state that the request is an application for the purposes of the FOI Act
- provide enough information to enable the documents sought to be identified
- give details of how notices under the FOI Act may be sent.

Submission of FOI requests, or enquiries about access, should be directed to:

Freedom of Information Coordinator

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

GPO Box 321

CANBERRA ACT 2601

Email: FOI-ATSB@atsb.gov.au

Freedom of information requests

In 2024–25, the ATSB received 28 FOI requests, as shown in Table 26.

Table 26: Freedom of information activity

2024–25	Numbers
Requests	
On hand at 1 July 2024 (A)	1
New requests received (B)	28
Requests withdrawn (C)	10
Requests transferred in full to another agency (D)	0
Requests on hand at 30 June 2025 (E)	8
Total requests completed at 30 June 2025 (A+B-C-D-E)	11
Action on requests	
Access in full	1
Access in part	7

2024–25	Numbers
Access refused	3
Access transferred in full	0
Request withdrawn	10
Response times (excluding withdrawn)[1]	
0–30 days	2
31–60 days	6
61–90 days	3
90+ days	0
Internal review	
Requests received	1
Decision affirmed	0
Decision amended	1
Request withdrawn	0
Information Commissioner review	
Applications received	0
Decision affirmed	0
Decision amended	0
Application withdrawn	0
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) review	
Applications received	0

[1] These statistics cannot be compared directly with the deadlines set in the FOI Act, as the FOI Act provides for extension of time to allow for consultation with third parties, negotiation of charges and other issues.

Records the ATSB holds

The ATSB holds records such as:

- human and financial resource management records
- briefing papers and submissions prepared for ministers, parliamentary secretaries, parliamentary committees, the Cabinet and the Executive Council (most of these are classified documents)
- business papers, briefing notes and meeting records for committees, and conferences in which the ATSB services or participates
- documents prepared by international agencies
- documents relating to the development of legislation
- internal administration documents
- memoranda of understanding and international conventions
- legal documents, including legislation, contracts, leases and court documents
- maps and other geographical information
- ministerial responses to parliamentary questions, interdepartmental and general correspondence and papers

- policy documents, recommendations and decisions
- registers of documents, agreements and approvals
- statistics and databases
- technical standards, guidelines, specifications, charts, photographs, drawings and manuals
- accident and incident investigation and notification records.

To view a list of manuals and other documents the ATSB uses when making decisions or recommendations that affect the public, visit the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

Under section 8C of the FOI Act, an exempt matter is not required to be published. The ATSB reserves the right to delete exempt matter from its information prior to providing access.

To find out more about the types of personal information the ATSB holds, please refer to the ATSB Privacy Policy on the ATSB website at atsb.gov.au.

For further information, please contact the ATSB either by telephone on 1800 020 616 or by email at atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au.

Functions and decision-making powers

The ATSB functions are detailed in section 12AA of the TSI Act and are further described throughout this report.

Certain officers exercise decision-making powers under portfolio legislation and other matters. These responsibilities are set out in the Administrative Arrangements Order (AAO) for the Commonwealth of Australia and relate to transport safety, including investigations.

For a complete and up-to-date copy of the AAO, visit the Federal Register of Legislation website at legislation.gov.au.

To assist ATSB employees in exercising their powers appropriately and enable access to their decision-making authorities, the ATSB uses an intranet site which allows employees to view delegations online. It also allows employees to check information about the powers and authorities assigned under the legislation set out in the AAO and by-laws, such as the PGPA Act and the *Public Service Act 1999* (PS Act). Powers delegated under the TSI Act are recorded on the back of identity cards for all investigators.

Arrangements for outside participation

The ATSB consults widely to gain the views of its stakeholders and clients about future policy directions and program delivery. This includes consulting with other Australian state and territory government departments and agencies, as appropriate, and with foreign governments – particularly in the context of transport safety investigations. The ATSB may also contact a very broad range of stakeholders for particular policy issues.

Correction of material errors

There were no material errors in the *2023–24 ATSB Annual Report*.

Appendix B: Entity resource statement 2024–25

Table 27: Entity resource statement 2024–25

	Actual available appropriation 2024–25 $'000 (a)	Payments made 2024–25 $'000 (b)	Balance remaining 2024–25 $'000 (a) - (b)
Ordinary Annual Services[1]			
Departmental appropriation[2]	41,805	28,177	13,628
Total	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**
Total ordinary annual services A	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**
Other services			
Departmental non-operating			
Equity injections	0	0	0
Total	**0**	**0**	**0**
Total other services B	**0**	**0**	**0**
Total net resourcing and payments for the Australian Transport Safety Bureau	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**

[1] Appropriation Act (No. 1) 2024–25 and includes prior year departmental appropriation and section 74 Retained Revenue Receipts.

[2] It also includes an amount of $0.627 million in 2024-25 for the Departmental Capital Budget. For accounting purposes, this amount has been designated as 'contributions by owners'.

Expenses for Outcome 1

Outcome 1: Improved transport safety in Australia including through independent 'no-blame' investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data recording, analysis and research; and influencing safety action.

Table 28: Expenses for outcome

	Budget* 2024–25 $'000 (a)	Actual Expenses 2024–25 $'000 (b)	Variation 2024–25 $'000 (a) - (b)
Program 1.1: Australian Transport Safety Bureau			
Departmental expense			
Departmental appropriation[3]	27,533	27,605	-72
Expenses not requiring appropriation in the Budget year	4,530	4,851	-321
Total for Program 1.1	32,063	32,456	-393
Total expenses for Outcome 1	**32,063**	**32,456**	**-393**

** Full year budget, including any subsequent adjustment made to the 2023–24 Budget at Additional Estimates.*

[3] Departmental Appropriation combines Ordinary annual services (Appropriation Act No. 1) and Retained Revenue Receipts under section 74 of the PGPA Act.

	2024–25	2023–24
Average Staffing Level (number)	116	111

Appendix C: Executive remuneration

Table 29: Information about remuneration for key management personnel 2024–25 ($)

		Short-term benefits			Post employment benefits	Other long-term benefits		Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Name	Position title	Base salary	Bonuses	Other benefits and allowances	Superannuation contributions	Long service leave	Other long-term benefits		
A Mitchell	Chief Commissioner	467,701	-	-	29,893	11,231	-	-	508,825
C McNamara	Chief Operating Officer	326,066	-	11,515	56,982	7,759	-	-	402,322

Table 30: Information about remuneration for other highly paid staff 2024–25 ($)

		Short-term benefits			Post employment benefits	Other long-term benefits		Termination benefits	Total remuneration
Total remuneration bands	Number of other highly paid staff	Average base salary	Average bonuses	Average other benefits and allowances	Average superannuation contributions	Average long service leave	Other long-term benefits	Average termination benefits	Average total remuneration
$260,000 - $270,000	4	172,338	-	46,804	38,362	5,350	-	-	262,854
$295,001 - $320,000	1	179,635	-	69,710	44,245	5,974	-	-	299,564

Appendix D: Employee statistics

Table 31: All ongoing employees current **report period (2024–25)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
NSW	2	-	2	-	1	1	**3**
Qld	18	2	20	8	-	8	**28**
SA	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
Vic	5	2	7	2	1	3	**10**
WA	2	-	2	-	-	-	**2**
ACT	39	1	40	26	6	32	**72**
Total	**67**	**5**	**72**	**36**	**8**	**44**	**116**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 32: All non-ongoing employees current **report period (2024–25)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
ACT	2	1	3	2	2	4	**7**
Total	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**7**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 33: All ongoing employees previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
NSW	3	-	3	-	-	-	**3**
Qld	16	1	17	5	-	5	**22**
SA	2	-	2	-	-	-	**2**
Vic	3	1	4	1	1	2	**6**
WA	2	-	2	-	-	-	**2**
ACT	39	2	41	26	5	31	**72**
Total	**65**	**4**	**69**	**32**	**6**	**38**	**107**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 34: All non-ongoing employees previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
Qld	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
Vic	-	-	-	-	1	1	**1**
ACT	2	1	3	1	1	2	**5**
Total	**2**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**7**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Appendix E: Australian Public Sector (APS) classification and gender

Table 35: Australian Public Service Act ongoing employees current **report period (2024–25)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
EL 2	30	2	32	10	3	13	**45**
EL 1	19	1	20	7	1	8	**28**
APS 6	14	1	15	12	4	16	**31**
APS 5	3	1	4	5	-	5	**9**
APS 4	-	-	-	2	-	2	**2**
Total	**67**	**5**	**72**	**36**	**8**	**44**	**116**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 36: Australian Public Service Act non-ongoing employees current **report period (2024–25)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
EL 2	1	1	2	-	1	1	**3**
EL 1	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
APS 6	-	-	-	-	1	1	**1**
APS 5	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
APS 4	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
Total	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**7**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 37: Australian Public Service Act ongoing employees previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
EL 2	31	2	33	9	3	12	**45**
EL 1	20	-	20	5	1	6	**26**
APS 6	10	-	10	13	2	15	**25**
APS 5	3	2	5	4	-	4	**9**
APS 4	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
Total	**65**	**4**	**69**	**32**	**6**	**38**	**107**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Table 38: Australian Public Service Act non-ongoing employees previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Man/Male			Woman/Female			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
EL 2	2	1	3	-	1	1	**4**
EL 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
APS 6	-	-	-	-	1	1	**1**
APS 5	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
APS 4	-	-	-	1	-	1	**1**
Total	**2**	**1**	**3**	**2**	**2**	**4**	**7**

Rows and columns have been deleted where there is a nil response.

Appendix F: Employment type by full-time and part-time

Table 39: Australian Public Service Act employees by full-time and part-time status current **report period (2024–25)**

	Ongoing			Non-Ongoing			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
EL 2	40	5	45	1	2	3	**48**
EL 1	26	2	28	1	-	1	**29**
APS 6	26	5	31	-	1	1	**32**
APS 5	8	1	9	1	-	1	**10**
APS 4	2	-	2	1	-	1	**3**
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
Total	**103**	**13**	**116**	**36**	**3**	**7**	**123**

Table 40: Australian Public Service Act employees by full-time and part-time status previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Ongoing			Non-Ongoing			Total
	Full time	Part time	**Total**	Full time	Part time	**Total**	
SES 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
SES 2	1	-	1	-	-	-	**1**
SES 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
EL 2	40	5	45	2	2	4	**49**
EL 1	25	1	26	-	-	-	**26**
APS 6	23	2	25	-	1	1	**26**
APS 5	7	2	9	1	-	1	**10**
APS 4	1	-	1	1	-	1	**2**
APS 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
APS 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
APS 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	**-**
Total	**97**	**10**	**107**	**4**	**-**	**4**	**114**

Appendix G: Employment type by location

Table 41: Australian Public Service Act employment type by location current **report period (2024–25)**

	Ongoing	Non-Ongoing	Total
NSW	3	-	**3**
Qld	28	-	**28**
SA	1	-	**1**
Tas	-	-	**-**
Vic	10	1	**11**
WA	2	-	**2**
ACT	72	6	**78**
NT	-	-	**-**
External	-	-	**-**
Overseas	-	-	**-**
Total	**123**	**7**	**123**

Table 42: Australian Public Service Act employment type by location previous **report period (2023–24)**

	Ongoing	Non-Ongoing	Total
NSW	3	-	**3**
Qld	22	1	**23**
SA	2	-	**2**
Tas	-	-	**--**
Vic	6	1	**7**
WA	2	-	**2**
ACT	72	5	**77**
NT	-	-	**-**
External	-	-	**-**
Overseas	-	-	**-**
Total	**107**	**7**	**114**

Appendix H: Indigenous employment

Table 43: Australian Public Service Act Indigenous employment current report period (2024–25)

Total	
Ongoing	0
Non-Ongoing	0
Total	**0**

Table 44: Australian Public Service Act Indigenous employment previous report period (2023–24)

Total	
Ongoing	0
Non-Ongoing	0
Total	**0**

Appendix I: Employment arrangements of SES and non-SES employees

Table 45: Australian Public Service Act employment arrangements current report period (2024–25)

Arrangement title	SES	Non-SES	Total
Enterprise Agreement	-	122	122
S.24.1 Determination	1	-	1
Total	**1**	**122**	**123**

Appendix J: Salary ranges by classification level

Table 46: Australian Public Service Act employment salary ranges by classification level (minimum/maximum) current **report period (2024–25)**

	Minimum Salary ($)	Maximum Salary ($)
SES 3	0	0
SES 2	313,536	313,536
SES 1	0	0
EL 2	137,558	175,491
EL 1	115,711	145,610
APS 6	90,328	111,531
APS 5	83,308	93,372
APS 4	74,623	84,169
APS 3	67,348	75,485
APS 2	59,030	67,647
APS 1	52,124	59,594
Other	0	0
Minimum/Maximum range	52,124	313,536

Appendix K: Performance pay by classification level

No performance payments were made at any classification level during the reporting period (2024–25).

Appendix L: Accountable Authority

Table 47: Australian Public Service Act employment arrangements current **report period (2024–25)**

Period as the accountable authority or member within the reporting period			
Name	**Position Title/Position held**	**Start Date (1 July 2024 or after)**	**End Date (30 June 2025 or before)**
Angus Mitchell	Chief Commissioner/ Chief Executive Officer	1 July 2024	30 June 2025

Appendix M: Significant non-compliance with the finance law

There were no significant issues reported to the Minister under paragraph 19(1)(e) of the PGPA Act, which includes compliance with finance law.

Table 48: Significant non-compliance with the finance law

Description of non-compliance	Remedial Action
Nil	0

Appendix N: Reportable consultancy contracts

Table 49: Expenditure on reportable consultancy contracts current **report period (2024–25)**

Reportable consultancy contracts	Number	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
New consultant contracts entered into during the period	5	128,198
Ongoing consultant contracts entered into during the previous period	6	301,530
Total	**11**	**429,728**

Appendix O: Reportable non-consultancy contracts

Table 50: Expenditure on reportable non-consultancy contracts current **report period (2024–25)**

Reportable non-consultancy contracts	Number	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
New non-consultancy contracts entered into during the reporting period	17	552,399
Ongoing non-consultancy contracts entered into during a previous reporting period	33	5,799,471
Total	**50**	**6,351,870**

Appendix P: Additional information about **organisations receiving amounts under** reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts

Table 51: Organisations receiving a share of reportable consultancy contract expenditure current **report period (2024–25)**

Name of organisation (ABN)	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
Sententia Consulting Pty Ltd (85639580662)	250,712
SYFA Solutions Pty Ltd (50114131387)	88,646
Human Synergistic (11093428098)	13,970
Taradel Consulting Pty Ltd (28145327224)	13,571
Ken Kanofski Advisory Pty Ltd (49634100753)	13,057

Table 52: Organisations receiving a share of reportable non-consultancy contract expenditure current **report period (2024–25)**

Name of organisation (ABN)	Expenditure $ (GST inc.)
NTT Australia Pty Ltd (65003371239)	1,905,917
Knight Frank Australia Pty Ltd (17004973684)	1,110,256
Data3 Ltd (31010545267)	554,291
Investa Asset Management (QLD) Pty Ltd (35098527167)	482,708
Sliced Tech Pty Ltd (53165997008)	468,169

Appendix Q: Aids to access

Table 53: Aids to access details current **report period (2024–25)**

Annual report contact officer	Annual Report Coordinator
Contact phone number	1800 020 616
Contact email	atsbinfo@atsb.gov.au
Entity website (URL)	www.atsb.gov.au

Appendix R: Report on financial performance summary

Table 54: Entity resource statement subset summary current report period (2024–25)

	Current available appropriation (a) $'000	Payments made (b) $'000	Balance remaining (a)-(b) $'000
Departmental			
Annual appropriations – ordinary annual services	41,805	28,177	13,628
Annual appropriations – other services – non-operating	-	-	-
Total departmental annual appropriations	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**
Departmental special appropriations			
Total special appropriations			
Special accounts			
less departmental appropriations drawn from annual/ special appropriations and credited to special accounts			
Total departmental resourcing (A)	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**
Administered			
Annual appropriations – ordinary annual services	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – non-operating	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – specific payments to states, ACT, NT and local government	-	-	-
Annual appropriations – other services – new administered expenses	-	-	-
Total administered annual appropriations	-	-	-
Administered special appropriations	-	-	-
Total administered special appropriations	-	-	-
Special accounts	-	-	-
Total special accounts receipts	-	-	-
less administered appropriations drawn from annual/ special appropriations and credited to special accounts	-	-	-
less payments to corporate entities from annual/ special appropriations	-	-	-
Total administered resourcing (B)	**-**	**-**	**-**
Total resourcing and payments for entity (A + B)	**41,805**	**28,177**	**13,628**

Appendix S: Financial statements summary

The financial statements summary data templates in this appendix are a subset of the full audited financial statements contained in the annual report. These individual line items should be read in isolation of each other. In many cases the 'total' lines will not equal the sum of the previous line items above. The presentation of expenses and liabilities are consistent with the ATSB's audited annual financial statements.

Table 55: Statement of comprehensive income for the period ended 30 June 2025

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
NET COST OF SERVICES			
Expenses			
Employee Benefits Expense	20,195	18,673	20,566
Suppliers Expense	9,470	9,666	9,298
Depreciation and Amortisation Expense	2,642	2,829	2,177
Total Expenses	32,456	31,248	32,063
Income			
Total Own-Source Income	5,166	4,689	5,201
Net cost of services			
Net cost of services	-27,290	-26,559	-26,862
Revenue from Government			
Revenue from Government	26,064	25,270	26,064
Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax			
Surplus/(Deficit) after Tax	-1,226	-1,289	-798
OTHER COMPREHENSIVE INCOME			
Total comprehensive Income/(Loss)	-1,226	-1,289	-798

Table 56: Statement of financial position as at 30 June 2025

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
ASSETS			
Total Financial Assets	14,103	14,090	8,245
Total Non-Financial Assets	13,634	11,766	12,376
Total Assets	27,737	25,856	20,621
LIABILITIES			
Total Payables	4,316	4,712	504
Total Interest Bearing Liabilities	9,731	7,085	6,115
Total Provisions	6,390	6,160	5,840
Total Liabilities	20,437	17,957	12,459
Net Assets	7,300	7,899	8,162
EQUITY			
Total Equity	7,300	7,899	8,162

Table 57: Statement of changes in equity (for the current report period 2024–25)

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Opening balance			
Balance Carried Forward from Previous Period	7,899	7,817	8,333
Adjusted Opening Balance	7,899	7,817	8,333
Comprehensive income			
Total Comprehensive Income	-1,226	-1,289	-798
Closing Balance as at 30 June	7,300	7,899	8,162

Table 58: Cash flow statement for period (2024–25)

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
OPERATING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (OPERATING ACTIVITIES)	28,232	30,322	27,533
Total Cash Used for (OPERATING ACTIVITIES)	27,374	29,055	26,154
Net Cash from OPERATING ACTIVITIES	858	1,267	1,379

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
INVESTING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (INVESTING ACTIVITIES)	-	-	-
Total Cash Used (INVESTING ACTIVITIES)	748	456	627
Net Cash from INVESTING ACTIVITIES	-748	-456	-627
Purchase of Property, Plant and Equipment	219	425	627
Purchase of Intangibles	529	31	-
FINANCING ACTIVITIES			
Total Cash Received (FINANCING ACTIVITIES)	766	437	627
Total Cash Used (FINANCING ACTIVITIES)	1,118	1,102	1,379
Net Cash from FINANCING ACTIVITIES	-352	-665	-752
Cash at the End of the Reporting Period			
Cash at the End of the Reporting Period	144	386	240

Table 59: Current assets and liabilities

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Assets – No more than 12 months	14,730	14,709	14,720
Liabilities – No more than 12 months	8,079	8,017	8,047

Table 60: Commonwealth lessees – Departmental leases under AASB 16 (2024–25)

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000	Original Budget $'000
Note to Depreciation – Depreciation on right-of-use assets	1,302	1,208	1,277
Cash Flow – Operating Activities – Interest Payments on Lease Liabilities	139	70	22
Cash Flow – Financing Activities – Principal Payments of Lease Liabilities	1,118	1,102	1,379

Table 61: Regulatory charging summary note

	30 June 2025 $'000	30 June 2024 $'000
Expenses		
Total expenses	0	0
External Revenue		
Total external revenue	0	0

Appendix T: Climate Statement

As part of the Net Zero in Government Operations Strategy, and the reporting requirements under section 516A of the *Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999*, non-corporate Commonwealth entities, corporate Commonwealth entities and Commonwealth companies are required to report on their operational greenhouse gas emissions.

The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory and Electricity Greenhouse Gas Emissions tables present greenhouse gas emissions over the 2024–25 financial year. The greenhouse gas emissions reported are calculated on the basis of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO_2-e) and in line with the Emissions Reporting Framework. This is consistent with a whole-of-Australian-Government approach, outlined in the Net Zero in Government Operations Strategy, and Commonwealth Climate Disclosure requirements.

Not all data sources were available at the time of reporting and amendments to data may be required in future reports. Please refer to additional information and caveats below:

- Reporting on refrigerants is being phased in over time as emissions reporting matures.
- A portion of electricity and solid waste data was unable to be sourced and has not been included.
- The transition of property service providers under the Whole-of-Australian-Government arrangements during the reporting period may result in incomplete property data.
- Emissions from hire cars for 2024–25 may be incomplete due to a lack of robust data. The quality of data is expected to improve over time as emissions reporting matures.
- Any such incomplete data and resulting changes to emissions calculations will be addressed within the Amendments Process, which is due to take place in the first half of 2026.

Table 62: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory – location-based method (2024–25)

Emission source	Scope 1 t CO_2-e	Scope 2 t CO_2-e	Scope 3 t CO_2-e	Total t CO_2-e
Electricity (location-based approach)	n/a	67.47	5.33	72.80
Natural Gas	-	n/a	-	-
Solid Waste	-	n/a	0.12	0.12
Refrigerants*	-	n/a	n/a	-
Fleet and other vehicles	2.63	n/a	0.65	3.27
Domestic commercial flights	n/a	n/a	89.05	89.05
Domestic hire car	n/a	n/a	1.15	1.15
Domestic travel accommodation	n/a	n/a	32.63	32.63
Other energy	-	n/a	-	-
Total t CO_2-e	**2.63**	**67.47**	**128.94**	**199.03**

Note: the table above presents emissions related to electricity usage using the location-based accounting method. CO_2-e = Carbon Dioxide Equivalent.

n/a = not applicable

Table 63: Electricity greenhouse gas emissions (2024–25)

Emission source	Scope 2 t CO_2-e	Scope 3 t CO_2-e	Total t CO_2-e	Electricity kWh
Electricity (location-based approach)	67.47	5.33	72.80	99,881.57
Market-based electricity emissions	16.85	2.29	19.14	20,804.93
Total renewable electricity consumed	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**79,076.64**
Renewable Power Percentage[1]	n/a	n/a	n/a	18,173.45
Jurisdictional Renewable Power Percentage[2, 3]	n/a	n/a	n/a	60,903.19
GreenPower[2]	n/a	n/a	n/a	-
Large-scale generation certificates[2]	n/a	n/a	n/a	-
Behind the meter solar[4]	n/a	n/a	n/a	-
Total renewable electricity produced	**n/a**	**n/a**	**n/a**	**-**
Large-scale generation certificates[2]	n/a	n/a	n/a	-
Behind the meter solar[4]	n/a	n/a	n/a	-

Note: The table above presents emissions related to electricity usage using both the location-based and the market-based accounting methods. CO_2-e = Carbon Dioxide Equivalent. Electricity usage is measured in kilowatt hours (kWh).

[1] Listed as Mandatory renewables in 2023–24 annual reports. The renewable power percentage (RPP) accounts for the portion of electricity used, from the grid, that falls within the Renewable Energy Target (RET).

[2] Listed as Voluntary renewables in 2023–24 annual reports.

[3] The Australian Capital Territory is currently the only state with a jurisdictional renewable power percentage (JRPP).

[4] Reporting behind the meter solar consumption and/or production is optional. The quality of data is expected to improve over time as emissions reporting matures.

Appendix U: Glossary

Term	Description
AAA	Australian Airports Association
AAD	Australian Antarctic Division
AAO	Administrative Arrangements Order
Accident	An investigable matter involving a transport vehicle occurs when: » a person dies, or suffers serious injury, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle » the vehicle is destroyed, or seriously damaged, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle » any property is destroyed, or seriously damaged, as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the vehicle.
ADS-B	Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
Aerial work	Aircraft operations – including ambulance and emergency medical services, agriculture, mustering, search and rescue, fire control, surveying and photography.
AFAC	Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council
AIC	Accident Investigation Commission. The Papua New Guinea Government institution responsible for the investigation of safety deficiencies in aviation transport.
AIG	Accident Investigation Group
AIMS	ATSB Investigation Management System
Air Transport Operation	A passenger transport operation, a cargo transport operation or a medical transport operation that is conducted for hire or reward.
AMC	Australian Maritime College
AMSA	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
ANAO	Australian National Audit Office
APS	Australian Public Service
ARA	Australian Railways Association
ARTC	Australian Rail Track Corporation
ASL	Average Staffing Level
ATR	Avions de transport régional
ATSB	Australian Transport Safety Bureau
ATSB safety action	Formal activities conducted by the ATSB to initiate safety action by relevant organisations to address a safety issue. Includes safety recommendations and safety advisory notices.
AWS	Automatic Warning System
CASA	Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
Charter	A non-scheduled air transport operation.
CITS	Chief Investigator Transport Safety (Victoria)
CO_2-e	Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
Collective	The collective pitch control, or collective lever, in a helicopter changes the pitch angle of all the main rotor blades at the same time, independent of their position. Therefore, if a collective input is made, all the blades change equally. The result is that the helicopter increases or decreases its total lift derived from the rotor.

Term	Description
Complex investigations	Investigations rated at level 1, level 2 or level 3 in accordance with the ATSB's rating system.
Contributing safety factor	A safety factor that, if it had not occurred or existed at the relevant time, then: » the occurrence would probably not have occurred » adverse consequences associated with the occurrence would probably not have occurred or have been as serious » another contributing safety factor would probably not have occurred or existed.
CPC	Cabin Pressure Controller
CPRs	Commonwealth Procurement Rules
Critical safety issue	Associated with an intolerable level of risk and generally leading to the immediate issue of a safety recommendation, unless corrective safety action has already been taken.
CRM	Crew Resource Management
CTAF	Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
CVR (black box)	Cockpit voice recorder
DCV	Domestic Commercial Vessel as defined by the Marine Safety *(Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012.*
DFSB	Defence Flight Safety Bureau
EEGO	Energy Efficiency in Government Operations
EL	Executive Level
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration (United States)
FACT	Fatigue Assessment and Control Tool
Fatal accident	A transport accident in which at least one fatality results within 30 days of the accident.
Fatality/Fatal injury	Any injury acquired by a person involved in a transport accident which results in death within 30 days of the accident.
FCPA	Fellow Certified Practising Accountant
FDM	Flight Data Monitoring
Flight data recorder (FDR) (black box)	A recorder placed in an aircraft for the purpose of facilitating the investigation of an aircraft accident or incident.
Flying training	Flying under instruction for the issue or renewal of a licence, rating, aircraft type endorsement or any other type of flying aimed at upgrading an individual's flight qualification – including solo navigation exercises conducted as part of a course of applied flying training, or check and training operations conducted by RPT operators.
FOI	Freedom of Information
FOI Act	*Freedom of Information Act 1982*
FRG	Functional Reference Group (ATSB)
GAICD	Graduate of the Australian Institute of Company Directors
General aviation	General aviation covers: » aerial work operations (including aerial agriculture, aerial mustering, search and rescue, and aerial survey) » flying training » private aviation » business and sports (including gliding) aviation – Australian-registered (VH), or foreign-registered.
GPS	Global Positioning System
Hours flown	Calculated from the time the wheels start, with the intention of flight, to the time the wheels stop after completion of the flight.

Term	Description
Human factors	Human factors is the multidisciplinary science that applies knowledge about the capabilities and limitations of human performance to all aspects of the design operation and maintenance of products and systems. It considers the effect of physical, psychological and environmental factors on human performance in different task environments – including the role of human operators in complex systems.
IALA	International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICASS	International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems
Immediately reportable matter	A serious transport safety matter that covers occurrences such as: » accidents involving death » serious injury » destruction or serious damage of vehicles or property » when an accident nearly occurs.
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IMC	Instrument Meteorological Conditions
IMO	International Maritime Organization
Incident	An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of transport vehicle that affects, or could affect, the safety of the operation.
ITSA	International Transportation Safety Association
ITSAP	The Australian Government's Indonesia Transport Safety Assistance Package.
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
kWh	Kilowatt hours
LAT	Large Air Tanker
Less complex investigations	Those rated at level 4 or level 5 under the ATSB rating scheme.
MAIFA	Marine Accident Investigators Forum in Asia.
MBA	Master of Business Administration
Minor injury	An injury sustained by a person, in an accident, that was not fatal or serious and does not require hospitalisation.
MIPP	Major Investigation Preparedness Plan
MSQ	Maritime Safety Queensland
Multi-modal	Across the three 3 modes of transport covered by the ATSB: aviation, marine and rail.
NCO	Network control officer
National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC)	An Indonesian Government institution responsible for the investigation of safety deficiencies in aviation, maritime and land transport.
OAIC	Office of the Australian Information Commissioner
OEB	Operational Engineering Bulletin
NM	Nautical miles
Occurrences accidents and incidents	Occurrences are reportable matters – either an immediately reportable matter (IRM) or a routine reportable matter (RRM). They comprise accidents, serious incidents and incidents.
OCI	Office of the Chief Investigator (Victoria)
ONRSR	Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator

Term	Description
Other aerial work	Other aerial work includes: » operations conducted for the purposes of serial work other than 'flying training' and 'agricultural operations' » operations classified as other aerial work – including aerial surveying and photography, spotting, aerial stock mustering, search and rescue, ambulance, towing (including glider, target and banner towing), advertising, cloud seeding, firefighting, parachute dropping and coastal surveillance.
Other safety issue	Associated with a risk level regarded as unacceptable unless it is kept as low as reasonably practicable. Where there is a reasonable expectation that safety action could be taken in response to reduce risk, the ATSB will issue a safety recommendation to the appropriate agency when proactive safety action is not forthcoming.
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigations (New South Wales)
Pacific Program	Australia-Pacific Partnerships for Aviation Program
PGPA Act	*Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013*
PGPA Rule	Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014
PIC	Pilot-in-command
PM	Pilot Monitoring
PNG	Papua New Guinea
Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS)	These statements explain the provisions of the appropriation bills (budget bills); that is, where the appropriate funds are going to be spent.
Private/business	Private flying is conducted for recreational or personal transport without revenue. Business flying refers to the use of aircraft as a means of transport to support a business or profession.
PS Act	*Public Service Act 1999*
PSP	Poseidon Sea Pilots
RAAus	Recreational Aviation Australia
Recreational aviation	Aircraft being used for recreational flying that are registered by a recreational aviation administration organisation.
Regular public transport (RPT)	A scheduled air transport operation, which the ATSB further categorises as: » low-capacity RPT – an RPT aircraft that provides a maximum of 38 passenger seats, or a maximum payload no greater than 4,200 kilograms » high-capacity RPT – an RPT aircraft that provides more than 38 passenger seats, or a maximum payload greater than 4,200 kilograms.
REPCON	The ATSB's confidential reporting scheme.
Reportable safety concern	Any matter that endangers or could endanger a transport vehicle.
RIM	Rail Infrastructure Manager
RISSB	Rail Industry Safety and Standards Board
RPAS	Remotely piloted aircraft systems.
Safety action	The things that organisations and individuals do in response to the identification of safety issues, in order to prevent accidents and incidents. There are 2 main types: ATSB safety action non-ATSB safety action.
Safety advisory notice (SAN)	Formal advice by the ATSB to an organisation, or relevant parts of the aviation industry, that it should consider the safety issue and take action where it believes it is appropriate. A safety advisory notice is a 'softer' output than a safety recommendation and is used for less significant safety issues – when the available evidence is more limited or when the target audience is not a specific organisation.
Safety factor	An event or condition that increases safety risk – something that increases the likelihood of an occurrence and/or the severity of the adverse consequences associated with an occurrence.

Term	Description
Safety issues	A safety factor which can reasonably be regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations and: » is a characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or » is characteristic of an operational environment at a specific point in time.
Safety Recommendation	ATSB safety recommendations are formal recommendations from the ATSB to an organisation for it to address a specific safety issue. They focus on stating the problem (i.e. the description of the safety issue). They do not identify specific solutions for reducing risk.
Serious incident	An incident involving circumstances indicating an accident nearly occurred.
Serious injury	An injury which is sustained by a person in an accident and involves one or more of the following: » requires hospitalisation for more than 48 hours, commencing within 7 days from the date the injury was received » results in a fracture of any bone (except simple fractures of fingers, toes or nose) » involves lacerations which cause severe haemorrhage, nerve, muscle or tendon damage » involves injury to any internal organ » involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the body surface » involves verified exposure to infectious substances or injurious radiation.
SES	Senior Executive Service
Short investigation	Short, factual, office-based investigations of less complex safety occurrences rated at level 5 under the ATSB rating scheme.
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SME	Small and medium enterprises.
SMS	Safety management system
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea Convention
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SPAD	Signal passed at danger.
Sports aviation	Aircraft excluded from the RPT, GA or military aircraft categories – including ultralights, gliders, hang gliders, rotorcraft and balloon aviation. Most, if not all sport aviation craft are registered with various sporting bodies rather than with the CASA, although exceptions to this rule occur. Sports aviation also includes parachute operations and acrobatics. Sports aviation in this report does not include Australian non-VH registered aircraft.
SSR	Southern Shorthaul Railroad
Statutory agency	A body or group of persons declared by an Act to be a statutory agency for the purposes of the *Public Service Act 1999*.
Systemic failure	A breakdown in the system as a whole.
Transport safety matter	As defined by the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003*, these matters consist of occurrences in which: » the transport vehicle is destroyed » the transport vehicle is damaged » the transport vehicle is abandoned, disabled, stranded or missing in operation » a person dies as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » a person is injured or incapacitated as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » any property is damaged as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the transport vehicle » the transport vehicle is involved in a near accident » the transport vehicle is involved in an occurrence that affected, or could have affected, the safety of the operation of the transport vehicle » something occurred that affected, is affecting, or might affect transport safety.

Term	Description
TSI Act	*Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003*
TSI Regulations	Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2021
UTC	Universal Train Control
VDR	Voyage Data Recorder
VFR	Visual Flight Rules
WHS	Work Health and Safety
WHS Act	*Work Health and Safety Act 2011*

List of requirements

Below is the table set out in Schedule 2 of the PGPA Rule. Section 17AJ(d) requires this table be included in entities' annual reports as an aid of access.

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement
17AD(g)	**Letter of transmittal**		
17AI	Page v	A copy of the letter of transmittal signed and dated by accountable authority on date final text approved, with statement that the report has been prepared in accordance with section 46 of the Act and any enabling legislation that specifies additional requirements in relation to the annual report.	Mandatory
17AD(h)	**Aids to access**		
17AJ(a)	Pages vi–ix	Table of contents (print only).	Mandatory
17AJ(b)	Pages 197–202	Alphabetical index (print only).	Mandatory
17AJ(c)	Pages 187–192	Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms.	Mandatory
17AJ(d)	Pages 192–196	List of requirements.	Mandatory
17AJ(e)	Page 180	Details of contact officer.	Mandatory
17AJ(f)	Page iv	Entity's website address.	Mandatory
17AJ(g)	Page iv	Electronic address of report.	Mandatory
17AD(a)	**Review by accountable authority**		
17AD(a)	Pages 2–4	A review by the accountable authority of the entity.	Mandatory
17AD(b)	**Overview of the entity**		
17AE(1)(a)(i)	Page 170	A description of the role and functions of the entity.	Mandatory
17AE(1)(a)(ii)	Page 19	A description of the organisational structure of the entity.	Mandatory
17AE(1)(a)(iii)	Page 23	A description of the outcomes and programmes administered by the entity.	Mandatory
17AE(1)(a)(iv)	Page 6	A description of the purposes of the entity as included in corporate plan.	Mandatory
17AE(1)(aa)(i)	Page 178	Name of the accountable authority or each member of the accountable authority	Mandatory

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement
17AE(1)(aa)(ii)	Page 178	Position title of the accountable authority or each member of the accountable authority	Mandatory
17AE(1)(aa)(iii)	Page 178	Period as the accountable authority or member of the accountable authority within the reporting period	Mandatory
17AE(1)(b)	Page 7	An outline of the structure of the portfolio of the entity.	Portfolio departments mandatory
17AE(2)	N/A	Where the outcomes and programs administered by the entity differ from any Portfolio Budget Statement, Portfolio Additional Estimates Statement or other portfolio estimates statement that was prepared for the entity for the period, include details of variation and reason for change.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AD(c)	**Report on the Performance of the entity**		
	Annual performance Statements		
17AD(c)(i); 16F	Pages 26–37	Annual performance statement in accordance with paragraph 39(1)(b) of the Act and section 16F of the Rule.	Mandatory
17AD(c)(ii)	**Report on Financial Performance**		
17AF(1)(a)	Pages 26–37	A discussion and analysis of the entity's financial performance.	Mandatory
17AF(1)(b)	Page 181	A table summarising the total resources and total payments of the entity.	Mandatory
17AF(2)	N/A	If there may be significant changes in the financial results during or after the previous or current reporting period, information on those changes, including: the cause of any operating loss of the entity; how the entity has responded to the loss and the actions that have been taken in relation to the loss; and any matter or circumstances that it can reasonably be anticipated will have a significant impact on the entity's future operation or financial results.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AD(d)	**Management and Accountability**		
	Corporate Governance		
17AG(2)(a)	Page 157	Information on compliance with section 10 (fraud systems)	Mandatory
17AG(2)(b)(i)	Page v	A certification by accountable authority that fraud risk assessments and fraud control plans have been prepared.	Mandatory
17AG(2)(b)(ii)	Page v	A certification by accountable authority that appropriate mechanisms for preventing, detecting incidents of, investigating or otherwise dealing with, and recording or reporting fraud that meet the specific needs of the entityare in place.	Mandatory
17AG(2)(b)(iii)	Page v	A certification by accountable authority that all reasonable measures have been taken to deal appropriately with fraud relating to the entity.	Mandatory
17AG(2)(c)	Page 154	An outline of structures and processes in place for the entity to implement principles and objectives of corporate governance.	Mandatory
17AG(2)(d) – (e)	N/A	A statement of significant issues reported to Minister under paragraph 19(1)(e) of the Act that relates to noncompliance with Finance law and action taken to remedy noncompliance.	If applicable, Mandatory
	Audit Committee		
17AG(2A)(a)	Page 154	A direct electronic address of the charter determining the functions of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory
17AG(2A)(b)	Page 155	The name of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory
17AG(2A)(c)	Page 155	The qualifications, knowledge, skills or experience of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement
17AG(2A)(d)	Page 155	Information about the attendance of each member of the entity's audit committee at committee meetings.	Mandatory
17AG(2A)(e)	Page 155	The remuneration of each member of the entity's audit committee.	Mandatory
	External Scrutiny		
17AG(3)	Page 163	Information on the most significant developments in external scrutiny and the entity's response to the scrutiny.	Mandatory
17AG(3)(a)	Page 164	Information on judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals and by the Australian Information Commissioner that may have a significant effect on the operations of the entity.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AG(3)(b)	N/A	Information on any reports on operations of the entity by the Auditor-General (other than report under section 43 of the Act), a Parliamentary Committee, or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AG(3)(c)	N/A	Information on any capability reviews on the entity that were released during the period.	If applicable, Mandatory
	Management of Human Resources		
17AG(4)(a)	Page 158	An assessment of the entity's effectiveness in managing and developing employees to achieve entity objectives.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(aa)	Pages 173–177	Statistics on the entity's employees on an ongoing and nonongoing basis, including the following: (a) statistics on fulltime employees; (b) statistics on parttime employees; (c) statistics on gender; (d) statistics on staff location.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(b)	Pages 173–177	Statistics on the entity's APS employees on an ongoing and non-ongoing basis; including the following: » Statistics on staffing classification level; » Statistics on fulltime employees; » Statistics on parttime employees; » Statistics on gender; » Statistics on staff location; » Statistics on employees who identify as Indigenous.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(c)	Page 177	Information on any enterprise agreements, individual flexibility arrangements, Australian workplace agreements, common law contracts and determinations under subsection 24(1) of the Public Service Act 1999.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(c)(i)	Page 177	Information on the number of SES and non-SES employees covered by agreements etc identified in paragraph 17AG(4)(c).	Mandatory
17AG(4)(c)(ii)	Page 178	The salary ranges available for APS employees by classification level.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(c)(iii)	Page 159	A description of non-salary benefits provided to employees.	Mandatory
17AG(4)(d)(i)	N/A	Information on the number of employees at each classification level who received performance pay.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AG(4)(d)(ii)	N/A	Information on aggregate amounts of performance pay at each classification level.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AG(4)(d)(iii)	N/A	Information on the average amount of performance payment, and range of such payments, at each classification level.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AG(4)(d)(iv)	N/A	Information on aggregate amount of performance payments.	If applicable, Mandatory
	Assets Management		
17AG(5)	N/A	An assessment of effectiveness of assets management where asset management is a significant part of the entity's activities	If applicable, mandatory

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement
	Purchasing		
7AG(6)	Page 161	An assessment of entity performance against the Commonwealth Procurement Rules.	Mandatory
	Reportable consultancy contracts		
17AG(7)(a)	Page 161	A summary statement detailing the number of new reportable consultancy contracts entered into during the period; the total actual expenditure on all such contracts (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing reportable consultancy contracts that were entered into during a previous reporting period; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting period on those ongoing contracts (inclusive of GST).	Mandatory
17AG(7)(b)	Page 161	A statement that "During [reporting period], [specified number] new reportable consultancy contracts were entered into involving total actual expenditure of $[specified million]. In addition, [specified number] ongoing reportable consultancy contracts were active during the period, involving total actual expenditure of $[specified million]".	Mandatory
17AG(7)(c)	Page 161	A summary of the policies and procedures for selecting and engaging consultants and the main categories of purposes for which consultants were selected and engaged.	Mandatory
17AG(7)(d)	Page 161	A statement that "Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable consultancy contracts. Information on the value of reportable consultancy contracts is available on the AusTender website."	Mandatory
	Reportable non-consultancy contracts		
7AG(7A)(a)	Page 161	A summary statement detailing the number of new reportable non-consultancy contracts entered into during the period; the total actual expenditure on such contracts (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing reportable non-consultancy contracts that were entered into during a previous reporting period; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting period on those ongoing contracts (inclusive of GST).	Mandatory
17AG(7A)(b)	Page 161	A statement that "Annual reports contain information about actual expenditure on reportable non-consultancy contracts. Information on the value of reportable non-consultancy contracts is available on the AusTender website."	Mandatory
17AD(daa)	**Additional information about organisations receiving amounts under reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts**		
17AGA	Page 161	Additional information, in accordance with section 17AGA, about organisations receiving amounts under reportable consultancy contracts or reportable non-consultancy contracts.	Mandatory
	Australian National Audit Office Access Clauses		
17AG(8)	N/A	If an entity entered into a contract with a value of more than $100 000 (inclusive of GST) and the contract did not provide the AuditorGeneral with access to the contractor's premises, the report must include the name of the contractor, purpose and value of the contract, and the reason why a clause allowing access was not included in the contract.	If applicable, Mandatory
	Exempt contracts		
17AG(9)	N/A	If an entity entered into a contract or there is a standing offer with a value greater than $10 000 (inclusive of GST) which has been exempted from being published in AusTender because it would disclose exempt matters under the FOI Act, the annual report must include a statement that the contract or standing offer has been exempted, and the value of the contract or standing offer, to the extent that doing so does not disclose the exempt matters.	If applicable, Mandatory

PGPA Rule Reference	Part of Report	Description	Requirement
	Small business		
17AG(10)(a)	162	A statement that "[Name of entity] supports small business participation in the Commonwealth Government procurement market. Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and Small Enterprise participation statistics are available on the Department of Finance's website."	Mandatory
17AG(10)(b)	162	An outline of the ways in which the procurement practices of the entity support small and medium enterprises.	Mandatory
17AG(10)(c)	N/A	If the entity is considered by the Department administered by the Finance Minister as material in nature—a statement that "[Name of entity] recognises the importance of ensuring that small businesses are paid on time. The results of the Survey of Australian Government Payments to Small Business are available on the Treasury's website."	If applicable, Mandatory
	Financial Statements		
17AD(e)	Pages 124–152	Inclusion of the annual financial statements in accordance with subsection 43(4) of the Act.	Mandatory
	Executive Remuneration		
17AD(da)	Page 172	Information about executive remuneration in accordance with Subdivision C of Division 3A of Part 23 of the Rule.	Mandatory
17AD(f)	***Other Mandatory Information***		
17AH(1)(a)(i)	N/A	If the entity conducted advertising campaigns, a statement that "During [reporting period], the [name of entity] conducted the following advertising campaigns: [name of advertising campaigns undertaken]. Further information on those advertising campaigns is available at [address of entity's website] and in the reports on Australian Government advertising prepared by the Department of Finance. Those reports are available on the Department of Finance's website."	If applicable, Mandatory
17AH(1)(a)(ii)	Page 166	If the entity did not conduct advertising campaigns, a statement to that effect.	If applicable, Mandatory
17AH(1)(b)	N/A	A statement that "Information on grants awarded by [name of entity] during [reporting period] is available at [address of entity's website]."	If applicable, Mandatory
17AH(1)(c)	Page 167	Outline of mechanisms of disability reporting, including reference to website for further information.	Mandatory
17AH(1)(d)	Page 164	Website reference to where the entity's Information Publication Scheme statement pursuant to Part II of FOI Act can be found.	Mandatory
17AH(1)(e)	Page 170	Correction of material errors in previous annual report	If applicable, mandatory
17AH(2)	Pages 166–170	Information required by other legislation	Mandatory

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Australian Transport Safety Bureau

GPO Box 321, Canberra ACT 2601
1800 020 616
atsb.gov.au

ABN: 65 061 156 887