

Safety study into Australian balloon transport operation occurrences from 2014 to 2022



ATSB Transport Safety Report

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The Australian Transport Safety Bureau acknowledges the traditional owners of country throughout Australia, and their continuing connection to land, sea and community. We pay our respects to them and their cultures, and to elders both past and present.

Investigation summary

Why the ATSB conducted this safety study

The ATSB occurrence data reported by industry identified a trend towards a heightened exposure to risk in the commercial ballooning sector, compared with other forms of non-scheduled passenger carrying commercial aviation. This study incorporates a detailed analysis of the data and aims to identify key areas of focus for safety improvements, with an intent to reduce passenger injuries.

What the ATSB found

The ATSB found that over the period 2014–2022, commercial ballooning carried a higher risk to fare paying passengers compared with similar operations in small aeroplanes and helicopters. Specifically, a commercial ballooning flight was more likely to have a:

- reported occurrence especially a serious incident or accident
- · passenger sustain an injury.

The ATSB also found that minor injuries, serious injuries, serious incidents and accidents were all more likely to occur during landing than any other phase of flight, and wind was the most common factor reported to have contributed to these occurrences.

Also identified, was that between 2014 and 2022 there was a significant increase in balloons with an envelope size above 400,000 cubic ft on the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's aircraft register. This reflected an increase in the number of balloons capable of carrying the maximum passenger limit of 24 per flight, thereby increasing overall exposure to risk.

Safety message

Balloons are distinct from other aircraft, in that they travel by moving with the wind. Directional control is achieved using differing wind directions at different altitudes. As such, balloon pilots should use all available information sources, including approved Bureau of Meteorology products, to ensure they understand the weather, particularly the wind, and its influence on flight safety. Accurate weather assessment is critical for safe go/no-go decisions. Pilots should also apply threat and error management by anticipating risks such as powerlines and poor visibility, and prioritising safety over logistical pressures in adverse conditions.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns is reducing passenger injuries in commercial ballooning operations.



Reducing accident rates and passenger injuries in balloon operations requires effective safety practices. Although not required by legislation for balloon operators, implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) provides a structured approach to identifying and managing risks.

Recommended risk controls to reduce passenger injury risks include:

- thorough passenger safety briefings and visual safety cards
- ensuring correct brace/landing positions
- clear emergency instructions
- seating or positioning to minimise passenger contact injuries.

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Introduction

Background

The ATSB occurrence statistics report for the 10-year period 2010–2019 (AR-2020-047) identified 19 accidents involving commercial balloon operations. These accidents resulted in 1 fatality and 19 serious injuries. Over the same period there were 70 minor injuries involving commercial balloon operations reported to the ATSB.

The report also found the following rates of accidents per million hours flown for the 5-year period 2014–2019:¹

- 291.2 for commercial ballooning operations
- 26.3 for non-scheduled commercial aeroplane operations
- 20.9 for non-scheduled commercial helicopter operations.

In addition to attempting to reduce the accident rate, one of the ATSB's SafetyWatch priorities is to reduce passenger injuries in commercial ballooning operations.

This study benchmarks ballooning operations against other similar operations in Australia, to identify any systemic areas of concern. The results of this work will form the basis of the ballooning safety watch initiative, and identify what further investigation, research and education work may be required for this sector of aviation operations.

Any systemic safety concerns identified will be shared with industry to promote a generative safety culture, encourage further reporting of occurrences, and drive future safety action.

Safety study goals

This safety study expands the understanding of the risks of Australian commercial ballooning, namely balloon transport operations, to the fare paying passenger compared with other similar operations in an aeroplane or helicopter.

The goals of this study were to:

- define what a similar operation for a fare paying passenger was in an aeroplane or helicopter to provide a valid basis for comparison
- provide a rate analysis of balloon occurrences against similar operations in an aeroplane or helicopter
- provide a statistical description of balloon occurrences, including the severity of injuries and safety factors involved
- identify commonalities between all balloon occurrences
- compare balloon occurrences by location and envelope size
- identify and analyse the risks for a fare paying passenger for a flight in a commercially-operated balloon.

¹ The reduced period was due to data availability limitations at the time the report was published.

Balloon transport operations

Part 131 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) sets out specific requirements for operating balloons and hot air airships, known in industry as 'Part 131 aircraft'.

The CASR dictionary defines a balloon as an unpowered, lighter-than-air aircraft. A free balloon is defined as a balloon that is intended for flight without being permanently tethered.

A manned free balloon is defined as one equipped:

- to carry one or more people
- with controls that enable the altitude of the balloon to be controlled.

For the purposes of the safety study, the term balloon will refer to a 'manned free balloon'.

The focus of this study was balloon transport operations, defined in CASR 131.010 as:

- a passenger transport operation conducted using a Part 131 aircraft that is a registered aircraft or a foreign registered aircraft; and
- · conducted for hire or reward; and
- · undertaken wholly within Australia; and
- not undertaken as part of a flight into or out of Australian territory.

This does not include training, specialised or recreational operations as defined by the CASR.

Commercial ballooning is a flying operation that takes part in a manned free balloon carrying fare paying passengers for the purpose of a joy flight or sightseeing. As such, valid comparable operations were passenger transport operations classified as a joyflights/sightseeing flight in a Part 135 small aeroplane or a Part 133 rotorcraft subset (helicopter).

Methods and sources

Overview

To allow comparison between the different aircraft types and operations, this study used reported occurrence records of aviation incidents, serious incidents, and accidents from the ATSB national aviation occurrence database. Aircraft activity data was collected from the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Research Economics (BITRE) <u>Australian</u> <u>aircraft activity</u> survey, which is conducted annually and made publicly available online.

Data analysis

The collected data sets for balloons, aeroplanes and helicopters were used to conduct:

- a rate analysis of reported occurrences of commercial ballooning against aeroplane and helicopter operations
- an injury rate comparison.

The following analysis of balloon data from the ATSB national occurrence database was conducted:

- · occurrences by phase of flight
- · serious incidents and accidents by phase of flight
- · serious injuries by phase of flight
- · safety factors identified for serious incidents and accidents
- occurrences by location.

A comparison was also conducted of the Bureau of Meteorology weather package services by location to occurrence locations, together with analysis of balloon envelope size changes over the years 2014–2022 inclusive.

ATSB national aviation occurrence database

Occurrence data is reported to the ATSB from industry through the mandatory occurrence reporting requirements of the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* and stored in the national aviation occurrence database. This stored data contains information including:

- aircraft type
- registration
- location
- · time of occurrence
- · number of injuries
- injury level
- occurrence class (incident, serious incident, accident)
- · occurrence summary.

A publicly-available search engine allows users to search the database using multiple parameters including: time period, location, type of occurrence and type of aircraft.

In classifying occurrences, the ATSB used the following definitions:

Accident: an occurrence involving an aircraft where:

- · a person dies or suffers serious injury
- · the aircraft is destroyed, or is seriously damaged
- any property is destroyed or seriously damaged.

Serious incident: an incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred (ICAO Annex 13).

Incident: an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation (ICAO Annex 13).

BITRE Australian aircraft activity survey

Survey data

The annual BITRE Australian aircraft activity survey and associated statistical report covers all Australian (VH-) registered aircraft used in the commercial air transport and general aviation sectors of the Australian aviation industry.

The survey is completed annually by operators, and the following data is collected:

- aircraft registration
- postcode of aircraft base (balloon operators indicate the postcode of the general area from which most flying was conducted)
- · type of activity by hours flown
- type of activity by landings conducted.

The data collection allows aircraft operators to nominate the type of activity that a particular aircraft conducted over that calendar year. The survey results are merged with details from the civil aircraft register. The register gives access to additional relevant information including aircraft type, engine and fuel type, country, and year of manufacture.

Activity classification

In 2013, recommendations from the Tenth Session of the Statistics Division of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) were adopted by the ICAO Council and a new edition of the Reference Manual on the ICAO Statistics Program was published. Included within the manual was a new ICAO Classification of Civil Aviation Activities.

In 2014, BITRE adopted ICAO's new classification and began collecting statistics in their survey to reflect this change.

In 2019, the ATSB adopted the new activity classification to align with BITRE and ICAO. The ATSB conducted a multi-year project to reclassify over 320,000 occurrences and events within the ATSB occurrence database to include the new activity classification. This reduced most of the uncertainty associated with combining/comparing the databases. These changes meant the ATSB could present more accurate, higher resolution rate data (the best measure for comparison between activities) for more activities.

In response to this change, and to enable an accurate classification comparison between balloon, aeroplane and helicopter operations, this safety study used rate and occurrence data for the years 2014–2022 inclusive.

Landings versus flight hours

BITRE provided rate data in 2 forms: flight hours per operational category and number of landings per operational category. The ATSB elected to use the number of landings (as a proxy for number of flights) rather than flight hours when comparing aircraft types.

Unlike aeroplanes and helicopters, which can record several take-offs and landings within a single hour of flight, balloon flights almost always involve only one take-off and one landing. Therefore, using flight hours would not give an accurate comparison across aircraft types. The number of landings offered a more valid and consistent measure of risk exposure between them.

BITRE flying activities

BITRE defined commercial air transport as an 'aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire'; and general aviation as an 'aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport operation'.

The Australian aircraft activity survey had the following relevant flying activities:

- · general aviation
 - sport and pleasure flying
 - joyflights/sightseeing charters. Flying involving the carriage of passengers for joyflight or sightseeing purposes that take off and land at the same location
- · commercial aviation
 - non-scheduled
 - passenger transport charters. Flying involving the carriage of passengers by the aircraft operator or his/her employees for hire or reward (but excluding scheduled airline operations).

A review of initial data collected from BITRE identified that commercial balloon flights had been recorded as either a joyflights/sightseeing charters activity or a passenger transport charters activity. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, data from both aircraft activity types was used to capture all commercial balloon transport operations ('commercial ballooning').

Similarly, it was possible that aeroplanes and helicopter operators also recorded joyflights/sightseeing charters as passenger transport charters and not joyflights/sightseeing charters.

As such, this study analysed the data with the passenger transport charters aircraft activity type included and then excluded for aeroplanes and helicopters for the comparison with commercial ballooning.

Collected data

Australian aircraft activity survey data 2014–2022

The following data was collected from BITRE Australian aviation activity surveys for the years 2014–2022 inclusive:

- balloon landings logged as joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charters
- aeroplane and helicopter landings logged as joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charters
- aeroplane and helicopter landings logged as joyflights/sightseeing charters only. Results of the aircraft activity surveys conducted between 2014 and 2022 showed that there were:
- 68,433 commercial ballooning landings (Figure 1)
- 2,190,607 aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport landings (Figure 2)
- 1,795,332 helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport landings combined (Figure 2)
- 260,506 aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing landings (Figure 3).
- 496,867 helicopter joyflights/sightseeing landings (Figure 3).

The reduction in total landings between 2019–2021 across the 3 groupings was likely due to effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.





Figure 1: Commercial ballooning flights per year (2014–2022)


Source: BITRE, annotated by the ATSB

Figure 2: Aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport flights per year (2014–2022)



Source. BTTRE, affilotated by the ATSB

Figure 3: Aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing flights per year (2014–2022)



Source: BITRE, annotated by the ATSB

ATSB occurrence data 2014–2022

Occurrence data was extracted from the ATSB national aviation occurrence database for the years 2014–2022 inclusive of the following categories:

- manned free balloons
 - commercial ballooning operations
- aeroplanes and helicopters
 - joyflights/sightseeing operations and non-scheduled commercial passenger transport operations combined
 - joyflights/sightseeing operations.

Between 2014 and 2022, the following numbers of occurrences were reported to the ATSB:

- 79 commercial ballooning occurrences (Figure 4)
- 1,658 aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport occurrences (Figure 5)
- 618 helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport occurrences (Figure 5)
- 71 aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing occurrences (Figure 6)
- 62 helicopter joyflights/sightseeing occurrences (Figure 6).

Figure 4: Commercial ballooning reported occurrences per year (2014–2022)




Figure 5: Aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport reported occurrences per year (2014–2022)





Figure 6: Aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing reported occurrences by year (2014–2022)



Reported occurrence rate comparison

The ATSB used reported occurrence data and activity survey data (2014–2022) to obtain an occurrence rate comparison between commercial ballooning and combined aeroplane and helicopter operations.

The 4 rate analyses were:

- occurrence rate (comparison 1)
- serious incident and accident rates (comparison 2)
- injury rate (comparison 3)
- serious injury rate (comparison 4)

Two comparisons were conducted for each rate analysis:

- commercial ballooning versus aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities (comparison X.1)
- commercial ballooning versus aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing (only) (comparison X.2).

Occurrence rate comparison

Comparison 1.1 – reported occurrence rate comparison between commercial ballooning and joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning reported occurrence rate

- 68,433 landings
- 79 reported occurrences
- 115.4 reported occurrences per 100,000 landings.

For the period 2014–2022, the commercial ballooning reported occurrence rate was 115.4 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport reported occurrence rate

- 2,190,607 landings
- 1,658 occurrences
- 75.7 per 100,000 landings.

For the period 2014–2022, the aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport reported occurrence rate was 75.7 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport reported occurrence rate

- 1,795,332 landings
- 618 occurrences
- 34.4 per 100,000 landings.

For the period 2014–2022, the helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport reported occurrence rate was 34.4 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A commercial balloon flight was 1.5 times more likely to have a reported occurrence than a comparable joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and 3.4 times more likely than a helicopter.

Comparison 1.2 – reported occurrence rate comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and helicopter aircraft

Commercial ballooning reported occurrence rate

For the period 2014–2022, the commercial ballooning reported occurrence rate was 115.4 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing reported occurrence rate

- 260,506 landings
- 71 occurrences
- 27.3 per 100,000 landings.

For the period 2014–2022, the aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing reported occurrence rate was 27.3 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing reported occurrence rate

- 496,867 landings
- 62 occurrences
- 12.5 per 100,000 landings.

For the period 2014–2022, the helicopter joyflights/sightseeing reported occurrence rate was 12.5 occurrences per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A commercial balloon flight was 4.2 times more likely to have a reported occurrence than a comparable joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 9.2 times more likely than a helicopter.

Serious incident and accident rates

Analysis of serious incident and accident data 2014-2022, found:

- 23 serious incidents and 15 accidents involving commercial balloons (Figure 7)
- 86 serious incidents and 50 accidents involving aeroplanes engaged in joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities (Figure 8)

- 23 serious incidents and 16 accidents involving helicopters engaged in joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities (Figure 9)
- 15 serious incidents and 12 accidents involving aeroplanes conducting joyflights/sightseeing activities (Figure 10)
- 9 serious incidents and 4 accidents involving helicopters conducting joyflights/sightseeing activities (Figure 11).

Figure 7: Commercial ballooning serious incident and accidents per year (2014–2022)




Figure 8: Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious incidents and accidents per year (2014–2022)




Figure 9: Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious incidents and accidents per year (2014–2022)




Figure 10: Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing serious incidents and accidents per year (2014-2022)





Figure 11: Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing serious incidents and accidents per year (2014-2022)



Serious incident and accident rate comparison

Comparison 2.1 – comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning serious incident and accident rate

- 68,433 commercial balloon landings
- 23 serious incidents + 15 accidents = 38 total
- 55.5 serious incidents and accidents per 100,000 landings.

Commercial ballooning had 55.5 serious incidents or accidents per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious incident or accident rate

- 2,190,607 landings
- 86 serious incidents and 50 accidents = 136 total
- 6.2 serious incidents and accidents per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had a serious incident or accident rate of 6.2 per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious incident or accident rate

- 1,795,332 landings
- 23 serious incidents and 16 accidents = 39 total
- 2.2 serious incidents and accidents per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had a serious incident or accident rate of 2.2 per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A serious incident or accident was 8.9 times more likely to occur on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing or passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and 25.6 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Comparison 2.2 – comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning serious incident or accident rate

Commercial ballooning had 55.5 serious incidents or accidents per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing serious incident or accident rate

- 260,506 landings
- 15 serious incidents and 12 accidents = 27 total
- 10.4 serious incidents and accidents per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing had a serious incident or accident rate of 10.4 per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing serious incident or accident rate

- 496,867 landings
- 9 serious incidents and 4 accidents = 13 total
- 2.6 serious incidents and accidents per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing had a serious incident or accident rate of 2.6 per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A serious incident or accident was 5.4 times more likely to occur on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 21.2 times more likely than a helicopter.

Reported injuries

Analysis of injury data in the reported occurrences 2014–2022, found:

- no fatalities involving commercial balloon flights
- 24 fatalities involving aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities
- 8 fatalities involving helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities
- 7 (of the 32) fatalities occurred in aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing activities.
- 76 injuries (58 minor, 18 serious) involving commercial ballooning (Figure 12)
- 36 minor injuries and 10 serious injuries involving aeroplanes conducting joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities combined (Figure 13)
- 17 minor injuries and 9 serious injuries involving helicopters conducting joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activities (Figure 14)
- 12 minor injuries and 2 serious injuries involving aeroplanes conducting joyflights/sightseeing activities (Figure 15)
- 3 minor injuries and 5 serious injuries involving helicopters conducting joyflights/sightseeing activities (Figure 16).

lujuries 15 0 0 ■ Minor Injuries ■ Serious Injuries ■ Fatalities

Figure 12: Reported commercial ballooning injuries per year (2014–2022)




Figure 13: Reported aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport injuries per year (2014–2022)

Figure 14: Reported helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport injuries per year (2014–2022)





Figure 15: Reported aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing injuries per year (2014–2022)



2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ■ Minor Injuries ■ Serious Injuries ■ Fatalities

Figure 16: Reported helicopter joyflights/sightseeing injuries per year (2014–2022)

Injury rate comparison

Comparison 3.1 – comparison between commercial ballooning and joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning total injury rate

- 68,433 landings
- 76 total injuries (no fatalities)
- 111.1 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Commercial ballooning had an injury rate of 111.1 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport total injury rate

- 2,190,607 landings
- 70 total injuries including fatalities
- 3.2 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had an injury rate of 3.2 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport total injury rate

- 1,795,332 landings
- 34 total injuries including fatalities
- 1.9 per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had an injury rate of 1.9 injuries per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A person was 34.7 times more likely to sustain an injury on a commercial balloon flight than in an aeroplane on a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charter activity and 58.5 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Comparison 3.2 – comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning total injury rate

For the period 2014–2022, the commercial ballooning injury rate was 111.1 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing total injury rate

- 260,506 landings
- 21 total injuries including fatalities
- 8.1 per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing had an injury rate of 8.1 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing total injury rate

- 496,867 landings
- 8 total injuries (no fatalities recorded)
- 1.6 per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing had an injury rate of 1.6 injuries per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A person was 13.7 times more likely to sustain an injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 69.4 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Serious injury rate comparison

Comparison 4.1 – comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning serious injury rate

- 68,433 balloon landings
- 18 serious injuries
- 26.3 serious injuries per 100,000 landings.

Commercial ballooning had a serious injury rate of 26.3 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious injury rate

- 2,190,607 landings
- 10 serious injuries
- 0.5 serious injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had a serious injury rate of 0.5 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious injury rate

- 1,795,332 landings
- 9 serious injuries
- 0.5 serious injuries per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport had a serious injury rate of 0.5 injuries per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding

A person was 57.2 times more likely to sustain a serious injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charter activity in an aeroplane and 52.6 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Comparison 4.2 – comparison between commercial ballooning and a joyflights/sightseeing activity in aeroplane and helicopter

Commercial ballooning serious injury rate

For the period 2014–2022, the commercial ballooning serious injury rate was 26.3 serious injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing serious injury rate

- 260,506 landings
- 2 serious injuries
- 0.8 serious injuries per 100,000 landings.

Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing had a serious injury rate of 0.8 injuries per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing serious injury rate

- 496,867 landings
- 5 serious injuries
- 1.0 per 100,000 landings.

Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing had a serious injury rate of 1.0 injuries per 100,000 landings.

ATSB finding


A person was 34.2 times more likely to sustain a serious injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 26.0 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Occurrence categories

Commercial ballooning occurrence categories

Figure 17 shows the occurrence rate per most common commercial ballooning occurrence categories for the period 2014–2022.² Collision with terrain was the most common with 38.0 occurrences per 100,000 flights, followed by hard landings (16.1), cabin injuries (13.2) and wirestrikes (13.2).

Figure 17: Commercial ballooning occurrence rate per most common occurrence categories (2014–2022)



Source: BITRE and ATSB

Aeroplane and helicopter occurrence categories

The most common aeroplane and helicopter occurrence categories for joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport combined are displayed in Figure 18 and Figure 19 respectively. Aeroplane occurrences involving a birdstrike had a rate of 16.3 occurrences per 100,000 flights, this was followed by diversion/returns (16.0), and a landing gear/indication (12.6). An engine failure or malfunction had an occurrence rate of 6.3 per 100,000 flights. Helicopters' most common occurrence category was diversion/returns at 9.0 per 100,000 flights, followed by warning devices (5.8) and birdstrikes (5.2).

² Multiple categories can be assigned to a single occurrence.




Figure 18: Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport occurrence rate per

Source: BITRE and ATSB





Figure 19: Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport occurrence rate per most common occurrence categories (2014–2022)

Figure 20 and Figure 21 display the most common aeroplane and helicopter occurrence categorisations for joyflights/sightseeing only. Aircraft separation was the most common category with 0.7 per 100,000 flights, followed by engine failure or malfunction (0.6) and air-ground-air (communications) at 0.6. Helicopters' most common occurrence category was a birdstrike at 0.9 per 100,000 flights, followed by forced/precautionary landing (0.8) and engine failure or malfunction (0.6).

Figure 20: Aeroplane joyflights/sightseeing occurrence rate per most common occurrence categories (2014–2022)

0.8



Source: BITRE and ATSB




Figure 21: Helicopter joyflights/sightseeing occurrence rate per most common occurrence categories (2014–2022)

Commercial ballooning occurrences

Flight phase analysis

The following analysis of the 79 balloon occurrences identified the phases of flight in which:


- · the occurrences happened
- · the serious incidents and accidents occurred
- people sustained injuries.

Additionally, the occurrence categories and the key safety factors that contributed to, or increased the risk of, an occurrence were extracted from the ATSB occurrence database and analysed.

Occurrence phases of flight

For the period 2014–2022, Figure 22 shows the number of occurrences per phase of flight for the 79 commercial ballooning occurrences reported to the ATSB. The majority (43 of 79, or 54%) occurred in the landing phase and a further 19% occurred during the approach phase, equalling a combined 73%.

Figure 22: Commercial ballooning occurrences per phase of flight (2014–2022)



Source: ATSB


ATSB finding

A commercial ballooning reported occurrence was more likely to occur during landing than any other flight phase.

Phases of flight of serious incidents and accidents

The reported occurrence data 2014–2022 inclusive identified 23 serious incidents and 15 accidents involving commercial ballooning. Figure 23 shows a breakdown of these serious incidents and accidents with respect to phase of flight.

Figure 23: Commercial ballooning serious incidents and accidents per phase of flight (2014-2022)



Source: ATSB

Proportionally:

- 11 out of 23 (48%) serious incidents occurred during the landing phase
- 7 out of 23 (30%) serious incidents occurred during the approach phase
- 10 out of 15 (67%) accidents occurred during the landing phase
- 1 out of 15 (7%) accidents occurred during the approach phase.

ATSB finding

A commercial ballooning serious incident or accident was more likely to occur during landing than any other flight phase.

Injuries sustained in each phase of flight

For the period 2014–2022, the ATSB occurrence database recorded 58 minor injuries, and 18 serious injuries sustained in commercial ballooning. Figure 24 shows the number of minor and serious injuries sustained in each phase of flight with phases that recorded no injuries omitted.




Figure 24: Commercial ballooning injuries by phase of flight (2014–2022)

Source: ATSB

The data identified that 47 (81%) of the minor injuries and 15 (83%) of the serious injuries occurred during landing, significantly higher than all other phases of flight.

The percentage of injuries that occurred during landing was higher than the percentages of balloon occurrences (55%), serious incidents (48%) and accidents (67%) that occurred during the landing phase of flight.

This is likely due to the nature of a balloon occurrence where an injury has occurred. For an injury to occur, a collision with an object, such as a tree or powerline, or the ground itself is usually required. This is also reflected with 7% of minor injuries occurring during the approach phase, and 10% of minor injuries and 17% of serious injuries occurring when the balloon is inflated and stationary on the ground (standing phase).

ATSB finding

A minor or serious injury on a commercial ballooning flight was most likely to occur during the landing phase of flight.

Types of injuries in commercial ballooning

Severity of injuries was recorded in the ATSB occurrence database, but details of the injuries sustained were limited, especially if the related occurrence was not investigated by the ATSB. Additionally, details of the type of basket fitted to the balloons was not captured in the occurrence database. As a result, no correlation could be made between injuries and basket type. From the available information, there were some minor injuries due to collisions with trees. Layover and hard landings contributed to the largest number

of serious injuries. These resulted from balloon passengers being unrestrained within the basket and, in some occurrences, adopting an incorrect landing position. These injuries were mainly flail-type, due to collisions with other passengers, and lower limb and spinal injuries from deceleration. No fatalities occurred during ballooning operations conducted between 2014–2022.

Common reported occurrence safety factors

The safety factors recorded for the 79 commercial balloon occurrences reported to the ATSB in the period 2014–2022, were extracted from the database. The 4 leading safety factors are listed in Table 1, along with the associated injury count. 75 of the 79 occurrences identified at least 1 of these 4 leading safety factors. The most common safety factor was 'wind', a safety factor in 44.3% of all occurrences. Injuries were also most prevalent when wind was identified as a safety factor. The second most common was 'assessing and planning', which was a safety factor in 19% of occurrences, and aircraft handling also at 19% and monitoring and checking in 12.7% of all occurrences. Most occurrences had multiple safety factors. For example, wind and planning coexisted where pilots had not obtained accurate wind information during pre-flight preparation.

Aviation safety factor types that were identified were:

- Wind: Situations where the direction or magnitude of wind had influenced aircraft
 performance, or the ability of the pilot to control the aircraft. May have also included
 situations where wind influenced performance of ground personnel.
- Assessing and planning: Problems associated with assessment and planning activities, including briefings conducted as part of planning for a particular task. For example, pre-take-off briefings, landing position briefings.
- Aircraft handling: Direct manipulation of aircraft flight path and configuration. Direct manipulation referred to actions having a relatively immediate change of flight parameters or configuration.
- Monitoring and checking: Flight crew actions associated with maintaining awareness
 of system states (e.g. fuel, engine temperature), environmental states (e.g. weather),
 traffic disposition and other relevant variables.

Table 1: Commercial ballooning occurrence safety factors

		Serious				Proportion of
Safety Factors	Occurrences	Incidents	Accidents	Minor Injuries	Serious Injuries	occurrences
Wind	35	8	5	22	5	44.3%
Assessing and planning						
(Aircraft operation action)	15	7	3	6	0	19.0%
Aircraft handling	15	6	1	7	0	19.0%
Monitoring and checking						
(Aircraft operation action)	10	7	0	0	0	12.7%
Communicating and						
coordinating - External	5	2	0	1	0	6.3%
Procedures	4	3	0	3	0	5.1%
Other physical environment						
factors	4	2	0	0	0	5.1%
Passenger action	2	0	1	8	2	2.5%
Other weather conditions	2	0	0	0	0	2.5%
Ground handling action	2	0	1	1	1	2.5%
Distractions	2	0	0	0	0	2.5%
Task knowledge / skills	2	1	0	1	0	2.5%
Using equipment (Aircraft						
operation action)	2	1	1	0	0	2.5%
Communicating and						
coordinating - Internal	2	0	0	2	0	2.5%
Pre-flight inspecting	1	0	0	0	0	1.3%
Runway / movement area						
surface	1	1	0	0	0	1.3%
Electrical discontinuity	1	0	1	7	2	1.3%
Task experience / recency	1	0	0	0	0	1.3%
Other	1	1	0	3	0	1.3%
Wear	1	1	0	0	0	1.3%
Turbulence	1	1	0	0	0	1.3%
Other task demand factors	1	1	0	0	0	1.3%
Design	1	1	0	6	0	1.3%
Light conditions	1	0	1	7	2	1.3%
Other equipment factors	1	1	0	3	0	1.3%
Regulatory influences	1	0	1	1	1	1.3%

Source: ATSB

ATSB finding

Of the 79 balloon occurrences reported to the ATSB between 2014 and 2022, 35 (44%) attributed wind as a safety factor, and 15 (19%) attributed assessing and planning as a safety factor resulting in 8 serious incidents and 5 accidents associated with wind, and 7 serious incidents and 3 accidents associated with assessing and planning.

Occurrence review

A review of the occurrences (Appendix B – Balloon occurrences 2014–2022) identified that 44% had a wind contribution and 33% were categorised as a collision with terrain with 14% categorised as a hard landing. It was found that wind contributed in different ways. Strong winds on the ground necessitate a 'layover' landing, in which the basket is dragged on its side until the balloon deflates, with little directional control. These resulted in collisions with trees or other obstacles within the landing area.

In addition to impact with obstacles, occupants sustained injuries in layover landings when they did not adopt the required brace position, were unable to hold on/brace effectively and were ejected from the basket or were injured by impact with other occupants. In one occurrence, AO-2018-016, the pre-flight safety briefing was ineffective in ensuring that all passengers understood the briefing and as a result the passengers

did not adopt the required landing position during a hard landing, resulting in 4 serious injuries and 7 minor injuries.

Strong winds also increased the approach distance and resulted in collisions with powerlines or trees when the pilot did not allow sufficient distance in which to manoeuvre the balloon. This was also influenced by balloon size, as larger balloons were less manoeuvrable and therefore required more obstacle clearance margin.

Pre-flight planning includes a review of the winds at different altitudes to determine approach launch and expected landing sites. When this was not done adequately, or the wind differed from expected or changed during the flight, this resulted in occurrences due to landing in unplanned locations, where the pilot did not have adequate information about the hazards.

Managing vertical descent rate relies on pilots using winds and temperatures at different heights. In one occurrence, climbing into a temperature inversion resulted in unexpected sink. In others, hard landings resulted from mismanagement of the balloon vents, delayed application of heat, or attempting to land in a confined area. Gusty conditions also resulted in hard impacts and associated injuries due to the limited cushioning of the basket.

In one occurrence, the wind was stronger than expected and the balloon overflew all suitable landing sites. This resulted in the balloon drifting over water, where the pilot elected to offload the passengers onto a boat while there was sufficient gas remaining to control the descent and passenger transfer.

In several occurrences, launching in the early morning resulted in the rising sun affecting the pilot's visibility and subsequent impact with obstacles. Fog was another factor that reduced a pilot's visibility and resulted in impact with obstacles during approach.

Occurrence locations

As the ATSB occurrence data included location, geographical data for Australian balloon occurrences between 2014–2022 was extracted from the database and plotted using Google Earth (Figure 25).


Balloon weather packages

CASR Part 131 requires balloon operators to obtain a weather forecast from an authorised source, such as the Bureau of Meteorology, valid for a period extending 2 hours beyond their landing time. Since October 2020, the Bureau of Meteorology provided balloon weather packages, available through the Bureau of Meteorology website, containing a compilation of relevant information for balloon flight planning. The weather packages replaced a previous recorded phone service for balloon pilots and a text-based product for Alice Springs. The packages have standardised and automated weather information for 21 locations around Australia that are frequently used by balloonists (Figure 25).

Most of the information provided in the product can be found in other aviation weather products, including area and aerodrome forecasts and observations. The unique components of the package are model meteograms (which give time series of wind and humidity at different levels in the atmosphere), 'F160 forecasts' (which show the vertical distribution of wind and temperature) and a wind profiler time series. These products

assist the pilot in determining cloud and wind at different heights throughout the period of the forecast.

Figure 25: Reported commercial ballooning occurrences 2014–2022 (red triangle) and weather package locations (yellow circle)



Source: Google Earth and Bureau of Meteorology, annotated by the ATSB

Occurrences by weather package location

Comparison of the occurrence and weather package locations identified that 77 of the 79 occurrences were geographically located within a 40 km radius of the nearest central point of a balloon weather package location. The remaining 2 occurrences were located about 75 km and 200 km from the nearest respective weather package areas.

The availability of a weather package did not relate to the number of occurrences or their contributing factors.

Injuries by factor and by weather package location

Table 2 shows the number of occurrences by weather package location where wind was identified as a safety factor and the number of those that resulted in serious and/or minor injuries (regardless of how many people were injured). Canberra, Sydney, and Alice Springs had zero injuries in all occurrences. The locations with the highest percentage of injuries per occurrence with wind as a safety factor, were Avon Valley (67%) and the Hunter Valley (50%).

Table 2: Wind occurrences with an injury by location

Nearest weather package location	Wind occurrence	Wind occurrence with injury	Serious injury occurrence	Minor injury occurrence	Occurrences with injuries
Melbourne (Vic)	13	3	2	2	23%
Yarra Valley (Vic)	5	2	0	2	40%
Hunter Valley (NSW)	2	1	0	1	50%
Gold Coast/Ipswich (Qld)	6	2	1	2	33%
Avon Valley (WA)	3	2	1	2	67%

Balloon envelope size

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) maintains a register of all VH-registered aircraft. This register includes the type of aircraft, manufacturer, model, and the registration holder of all VH-registered aircraft. However, the database does not include the type of basket that is used nor the number of passengers that the balloon can carry. The ATSB collected end of calendar year registers from 2014 to 2022 and extracted VH-registered balloon data. The total number of VH-registered balloons by year is shown in Figure 26. This data includes private balloons.




Figure 26: Total number of VH-registered balloons per year (2014–2022)

Source: CASA, annotated by the ATSB

Due to the aircraft register not recording envelope size, the designated model of each balloon was extracted from the database and cross-referenced with manufacturer data to determine the envelope size. Between 2014 and 2022, the total number of VH-registered balloons on the Australian civil aircraft register increased from 386 to 429, an 11% increase. The increase in the number of VH-registered balloons over 400,000 cubic ft is shown in Figure 27.




Figure 27: Number of VH-registered balloons over 400,000 cubic ft per year (2014–2022)

Source: CASA, annotated by the ATSB

At the end of calendar year 2014 there were 25 balloons over 400,000 cubic ft. By the end of 2022 this number had increased to 51, an increase of 104%, with a breakdown as shown in Table 3:

Table 3: VH-registered balloons over 400,000 cubic ft

Envelope size (cubic ft)	2014	2022	Increase
400,000 to 449,999	13	25	92%
450,000 to 499,999	12	20	67%
>= 500,000 (2016 onwards)	0	6	500%
			from 2016

Over the safety study period, there was an 11% increase in total VH-registered balloons. This increase included a 92% increase in balloons between 400,000 and 449,000 cubic ft, and a 67% increase in balloons between 450,000 and 499,000 cubic ft. One balloon above 500,000 cubic ft was first registered in 2016, increasing to a total of 6 by the end of 2022.

CASR Part 131 Manual of Standards, Chapter 25.03, specified that the maximum number of passengers permitted per flight was 24. To carry this number, a balloon must have a minimum volume of 450,000 cubic feet (Cameron Balloons Ltd, 2025). During the safety study period, there was a 116% increase in balloon envelopes exceeding 450,000 cubic feet. This growth indicates a rise in the number of balloons capable of carrying the maximum passenger load on a single flight.

ATSB finding

Over the safety study period, from 2014–2022, there was a significant increase in balloons with an envelope size above 400,000 cubic ft on the CASA aircraft register, and as a result, an increase in the number of balloons capable of carrying the maximum number of passengers per flight.

Occurrences by balloon envelope size

Using the same methodology to determine envelope size as above, the balloon sizes of all occurrences was extracted from the occurrence data. This data was then compared against occurrences and injuries and displayed in Table 4, identifying that:

- balloons with an envelope size of 240,000 cubic ft had the highest number of occurrences with a total of 34, these occurrences resulted in 8 minor injuries and 2 serious injuries
- balloons with an envelope size of 350,000 cubic ft had the highest number of serious injuries, with a total of 6 with an associated 12 minor injuries over 6 occurrences
- there were 2 occurrences involving balloons with an envelope size of 525,000 cubic ft, with 2 serious injuries and 13 minor injuries
- balloons above 400,000 cubic ft had a combined total of 23 occurrences out of 79 (29%), 34 out of 58 minor injuries (59%), and 9 out of 18 serious injuries (50%).

Table 4: Occurrences and injuries by balloon size 2014–2022

Envelope size (1,000 ft³)	Occurrences	Minor injuries	Serious injuries
unknown	1	0	0
90	1	0	0
105	1	0	0
120	2	0	0
210	1	0	0
240	34	8	2
275	1	3	0
300	4	1	1
340	1	0	0
350	6	12	6
400	6	11	4
425	8	4	2
450	11	6	0
525	2	13	3
Total	79	58	18




Figure 28: Average injuries per occurrence by balloon envelope size (2014–2022)

Source: ATSB

The following was identified with wind as a safety factor (Figure 29):

- the 240,000 cubic ft balloons had the highest number of occurrences with 6 minor injuries and 2 serious injuries from 19 wind-related occurrences
- the 350,000 cubic ft balloons had the highest number of serious injuries with 4 serious injuries from 4 wind-related occurrences
- the 350,000, 400,000 and 425,000 cubic ft balloons had 7 serious injuries, 23 minor injuries out of 9 occurrences combined.




Figure 29: Safety factor of wind by balloon size

Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Part 131 exposition requirements

In December 2021 a regulatory change came into effect for ballooning, with the introduction of CASR Part 131 Balloons and hot air airships. These changes were not fully implemented until November 2024, when the Part 131 Manual of Standards commenced.

There are 12 CASR Part 131 AOC holders in Australia. A requirement for the issue of a Part 131 Air Operator's Certificate (AOC), is for balloon transport operators to produce a CASA-approved company exposition. Included within the exposition is the following requirement as per CASR Part 131:

131.195 Content of exposition

(h) details of each plan, process, procedure, program and system implemented by the operator to safely conduct and manage the operator's balloon transport operations in compliance with the civil aviation legislation.

Note: The plans, processes, procedures, programs and systems mentioned in paragraph (h) may be set out in one or more operator manuals.

Australian air transport aeroplane and helicopter AOC holders are also required to maintain a CASA-approved exposition and require a separate safety management system as per CASR Part 119. There is no current requirement for a Part 131 AOC holder to maintain a separate safety management system.

CASA advised the ATSB that it reserved the requirement for Balloon AOC holders to have an SMS in the drafting of Part 131. CASA also assessed that the transition to CASR Parts 91 and 131 was sufficient regulatory change for operators to manage at that time. Since the commencement of Part 131, CASA reported concentrating on implementing the Part 131 MOS and giving operators time to produce a compliant exposition. CASA also advised that the next tranche of work will be the transitioning of balloon pilot licensing to CASRs, followed by the transition of continuing airworthiness and maintenance requirements into Part 131. Inclusion of an SMS for balloon transport operators has not been scheduled at this time.

Summary

The data showed that a commercial balloon flight was 1.5 to 4 times more likely to have a reported occurrence than a comparable joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane, and about 3 to 9 times more likely than in a helicopter. These occurrences were coded as incidents, serious incidents or accidents, depending on the severity of injuries and aircraft damage. The data showed that a serious incident or accident was about 6 to 9 times more likely to occur during a commercial balloon flight than a comparable aeroplane flight and 21 to 25 times more likely than during a helicopter flight.

The data also showed a difference between the most common occurrence categories for balloons, compared with aeroplanes and helicopters. Commercial balloons were more likely to have a collision with terrain, hard landing, cabin injury or wirestrike. Aeroplanes and helicopters were more likely to have a birdstrike, diversion, forced/precautionary landing or engine failure/malfunction.

The balloon occurrences and associated injuries usually happened during approach and landing. The effect of wind was identified as a contributing safety factor to most occurrences. However, as the number of flights per region was not collected from operators, a correlation between the availability of detailed weather information and wind-related occurrences could not be determined. Assessing and planning, aircraft handling, and monitoring and checking were also identified as common safety factors. The combination of wind-related pilot planning and decision-making, and aircraft handling in those conditions, resulted in most of the occurrences and injuries.

There were no fatalities in commercial ballooning during the 2014–2022 period, while aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing activities resulted in 7 fatalities, and a further 24 fatalities occurred in aeroplane and helicopter passenger transport activities. However, passengers in commercial balloon flights were 14 to 35 times more likely to sustain an injury than in an aeroplane and 60 to 70 times more likely than in a helicopter.

Overall, a passenger in a commercial balloon flight was at significantly greater risk of minor or serious injury than in a similar aeroplane or helicopter flight, but unlikely to be fatally injured. Additionally, the number of passengers exposed to the risk in a single occurrence has increased with the increase in balloon size being used for commercial passenger flights. However, there was no apparent link between larger balloons and the number of ballooning-related injuries.

Injury data showed the magnitude of passenger injury risk in balloon flights compared with aeroplane and helicopter flights. While 99.7% of aeroplane and 99.8% of helicopter

joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport incidents, and 100% of both aeroplane and helicopter incidents in joyflights/sightseeing activities resulted in no injuries, only 71% of balloon incidents were injury-free.

Similarly, 95% of aeroplane and 100% of helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport serious incidents had no injuries, and 100% of both aeroplane and helicopter joyflights/sightseeing serious incidents reported no injuries, only 83% of balloon serious incidents were injury-free.

Furthermore, 62% of aeroplane and 38% of helicopter joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport flight accidents had no injuries, and 25% of aeroplane and 50% of helicopter joyflights/sightseeing accidents had no injuries. 27% of balloon accidents reported no injuries. This shows that joyflights/sightseeing passengers in a balloon were slightly less likely to be injured in an accident than in an aeroplane, but more likely to be injured than in a helicopter. Furthermore, balloon passengers were more likely to be injured in an accident than aeroplane or helicopter passengers in a passenger transport accident.

The increased injury risk for balloon passengers is likely due to balloon passengers being unrestrained in an open basket. Fewer injuries per accident for aeroplanes and helicopters shows that these aircraft sustain greater damage with fewer injuries to occupants than balloons. From the available injury information, the majority of the balloon accident injuries consisted of lower limb injuries from terrain collisions, and flail type injuries from passengers colliding with each other.

A collection of more detailed injury data would allow further analysis of the mechanism of injuries, with the aim of identifying possible ways to improve passenger safety in commercial balloon flights. Passengers are therefore encouraged to provide detailed injury information in ATSB occurrence notifications. Prior to a balloon flight, passengers should be informed of the injury risks, as balloons do not have the restraint systems or impact reduction engineering afforded to passengers in aeroplanes or helicopters.

Although not a legislative requirement, an SMS can assist balloon operators to employ a structured approach to managing risk. This study identified several hazards applicable to balloon operations in Australia, such as wind, pre-flight planning, and passenger position during landings. However, there will be additional hazards applicable to specific locations or types of operation that individual operators will be aware of. Structured identification and treatment of these hazards should result in a reduction of occurrences and injuries in commercial ballooning operations.

Previously identified passenger injury risk mitigators include:

- · detailed passenger safety briefings and visual cards
- ensuring passengers can adopt the appropriate brace or landing position
- clear instructions to passengers in an emergency
- positioning of passengers to reduce injuries resulting from contact between them.

Findings

ATSB investigation report findings focus on safety factors (that is, events and conditions that increase risk). Safety factors include 'contributing factors' and 'other factors that increased risk' (that is, factors that did not meet the definition of a contributing factor for this occurrence but were still considered important to include in the report for the purpose of increasing awareness and enhancing safety). In addition 'other findings' may be included to provide important information about topics other than safety factors.

From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the Australian balloon transport operation occurrences between 2014–2022:

ATSB findings

- A commercial balloon flight was 1.5 times more likely to have a reported occurrence than a comparable joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and 3.4 times more likely than a helicopter.
- A commercial balloon flight was 4.2 times more likely to have a reported occurrence than a comparable joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 9.2 times more likely than a helicopter.
- A serious incident or accident was 8.9 times more likely to occur on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing or passenger transport activity in an aeroplane and 25.6 times more likely than in a helicopter.
- A serious incident or accident was 5.4 times more likely to occur on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 21.2 times more likely than a helicopter.
- A person was 34.7 times more likely to sustain an injury on a commercial balloon flight than in an aeroplane on a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charter activity and 58.5 times more likely than in a helicopter.
- A person was 13.7 times more likely to sustain an injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 69.4 times more likely than in a helicopter.
- A person was 57.2 times more likely to sustain a serious injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing and passenger transport charter activity in an aeroplane and 52.6 times more likely than in a helicopter.
- A person was 34.2 times more likely to sustain a serious injury on a commercial balloon flight than a joyflights/sightseeing activity in an aeroplane and 26.0 times more likely than in a helicopter.
- A commercial ballooning reported occurrence was more likely to occur during landing than any other flight phase.
- A commercial ballooning serious incident or accident was more likely to occur during landing than any other flight phase.

- A minor or serious injury on a commercial ballooning flight was most likely to occur during the landing phase of flight.
- Of the 79 balloon occurrences reported to the ATSB between 2014 and 2022, 35 (44%) attributed wind as a safety factor, and 15 (19%) attributed assessing and planning as a safety factor resulting in 8 serious incidents and 5 accidents associated with wind, and 7 serious incidents and 3 accidents associated with assessing and planning.
- Over the safety study period, from 2014–2022, there was a significant increase in balloons with an envelope size above 400,000 cubic ft on the CASA aircraft register, and as a result, an increase in the number of balloons capable of carrying the maximum number of passengers per flight.

Glossary

CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority

CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulations

BITRE Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Research Economics

BOM Bureau of Meteorology

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

MOS Manual of Standards

SMS Safety management system. A systematic approach to

organisational safety encompassing safety policy and objectives, risk management, safety assurance, safety promotion, third party

interfaces, internal investigation and SMS implementation.

Sources and submissions

Sources of information

The sources of information during the investigation included the:

- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
- Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Research Economics
- Bureau of Meteorology
- Australian Balloon Federation.

References

Cameron Balloons Ltd. (2025). *Cameron Balloons a-type*. Retrieved from Cameron Balloons: https://www.cameronballoons.co.uk/a-type

Submissions

Under section 26 of the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003*, the ATSB may provide a draft report, on a confidential basis, to any person whom the ATSB considers appropriate. That section allows a person receiving a draft report to make submissions to the ATSB about the draft report.

A draft of this report was provided to the following directly involved parties:

- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
- Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Research Economics.

Submissions were received from:

- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
- Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Research Economics.

The submissions were reviewed and, where considered appropriate, the text of the report was amended accordingly.

Appendices

Appendix A – Weather package location data

Safety factors and injuries by location

Table 5: Safety factors and total injuries by weather package location

	Wind				Planning			Other weath	er	А	ircraft hand	ling	С	ommunic	ation
Location	Occu	Minor Injury	Serious Injury												
Melbourne	14	4	2	7	1	0	2	0	0	4	1	0	2	1	0
Yarra Valley	5	11	4	4	4	2	3	7	4	3	1	2	2	7	6
Canberra	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sydney	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Hunter Valley	3	3	1	3	15	3	2	16	4	1	0	0	0	0	0
Brisbane Valley	6	8	2	1	0	0	4	7	2	7	5	0	1	1	0
Cairns	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Alice Springs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Avon Valley	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Phase of flight by location

A breakdown of the occurrences by geographical location and phase of flight showed that the locations with a higher number of occurrences had similar percentages of occurrences in the approach and landing phases of flight as the overall totals (71%) (Table 6). However, this is expected as those locations contributed a large proportion of the total occurrences.

Table 6: Occurrences by location and phase of flight

Location	Take-off	Initial climb	Climb	Cruise	Manoeuvring / Airwork / Other / Taxiing	Approach	Descent	Landing	Standing	Total occurrences
Melbourne	0	0	0	2	1	5	0	19	0	27
Yarra Valley	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	7	1	11
Hunter Valley	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	4	10
Brisbane Valley	0	0	0	0	1	5	2	7	1	16
Canberra	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Sydney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Cairns	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	4
Alice Springs	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Avon Valley	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3

Appendix B – Balloon occurrences 2014–2022

The following tables show the summaries of each of the 80 reported incidents or accidents that occurred as a commercial ballooning operation.

Table 7: Balloon occurrences 2014 to 2022

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories				
OA2014-01228		31 Jan 2014	near Mareeba Aerodrome	Minor	Incident	Collision with terrain				
During the approac	During the approach, the balloon basket contacted trees. On landing the basket tipped over and after dragging approximately 15 metres, came to a rest on its side. A passenger sustained a minor injury.									
OA2014-01540		11 Feb 2014	Hawthorne	Nil	Incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Other Miscellaneous				
During cruise, th	e wind decreased s	ignificantly, and the bal	loon was not able to reach the intended lan	ding site. A precaution	ary landing was conducted in a	a garden resulting in minor envelope damage.				
OA2014-02168		28 Feb 2014	Essendon Aerodrome, 150° M 8Km	Minor	Incident	Cabin injuries				
During the landing,	a passenger sustai	ned a minor ankle injur	у.							
OA2014-02538		12 Mar 2014	Beaudesert (HLS)	Minor	Incident	Cabin injuries				
		During la	anding, the balloon basket tipped onto its si	de and one passenger	sustained a minor injury.					
OA2014-07202	AO-2014-157	26 Sep 2014	Gold Coast Aerodrome, 300° M 60Km (near Woodhill)	Serious	Accident	Hard landing				
forecast winds, the The passengers the about a 20-minute to see. The pilot att complied. He repeat	On 26 September 2014 at about 0450 Eastern Standard Time, the pilot of a Kavanagh Balloon, registered VH-CNX, conducted pre-flight preparations for a charter flight with 22 passengers. Due to the forecast winds, the pilot elected to depart from Beaudesert, with a planned landing site in Cedar Grove, Queensland. The pilot conducted a safety briefing including demonstration of the landing position. The passengers then assumed their landing positions and the pilot was satisfied they understood the correct position to adopt. After completing the pre-flight checks, the balloon lifted off at about 0550. Afte about a 20-minute flight, the pilot commenced the descent to the landing site. During the approach, the pilot observed a light ground fog and was heading directly into the sun, making the landing site difficult to see. The pilot attempted to obtain an accurate rate of descent from the altimeter, but it was reading erratically. The pilot instructed the passengers to adopt the landing position, but not all of them complied. He repeated his instructions to the passengers, the altimeter continued to read erratically and facing directly into the sun made visual assessment of the approach difficult. The balloon landed hard and bounced once before landing about 3 m further along the ground. Two passengers sustained serious injuries, and seven had minor injuries. The balloon was undamaged.									
OA2014-08827		5 Oct 2014	Essendon Aerodrome, 078° T 20Km (Anthony Beale reserve)	Nil	Accident	Collision with terrain				
During landing, the	balloon's envelope	contacted a lighting to	ver resulting in substantial damage.	-						

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
OA2014-09253		22 Oct 2014	Gold Coast Aerodrome, 297° M 58Km (near Beaudesert)	Minor	Incident	Hard landing
During approach, t	he balloon's rate of	descent was higher tha	n assessed by the pilot. The balloon landed	hard and four passen	gers sustained minor injuries.	
OA2014-10036		22 Nov 2014	Canberra Aerodrome, 300° T 12Km (Aranda Oval)	Nil	Incident	Other Ground operations
After landing, the d	leflating balloon env	elope made contact wit	th a light pole causing minor damage.			
OA2014-10754		28 Dec 2014	Essendon Aerodrome, 149° T 8Km (Royal Park)	Nil	Incident	Other Ground operations
After landing, the b	palloon envelope ma	de contact with a barbe	ed-wire fence causing minor damage.			
OA2015-00109		28 Jan 2015	Essendon Aerodrome, 085° M 2Km (Strathmore)	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
During landing, the	e balloon envelope c	ontacted powerlines.				
OA2015-01205		28 Mar 2015	Essendon Aerodrome, E M 15Km (Yallambie)	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain
While deflating the	envelope after land	ing, the balloon contac	ted a tree resulting in minor fabric damage.			
OA2015-02055		10 Mar 2015	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 337° M 20Km (Yarra Glen GC)	Nil	Incident	Ground strike
After landing, the b	alloon envelope cor	ntacted a tree that resu	Ited in minor fabric damage.			
OA2015-03465		19 Apr 2015	Amberley Aerodrome, 306.29° M 6Km	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain
During landing, the	balloon contacted a	a tree resulting in minor	fabric damage.			
OA2015-04640		22 Apr 2015	Yarra Glen (HLS), 40.64° M 3Km	Nil	Incident	Wirestrike
During landing, the	e balloon's envelope	contacted power lines	resulting in minor damage.			
OA2015-05274	AO-2015-136	11 Nov 2015	Northam (ALA), 358° M 3Km	Nil	Serious incident	Issues
=	=	-	_			the train rounded a left corner approximately driver applied the brakes in an attempt to sto

Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
passengers of the	balloon that the train n was at the end of th	was approaching. The	•	ore continuing on its jo	urney. The balloon had been o	so sounded the horn to alert the pilot and n an early morning scenic flight in the Avon st above fence height and moving away from
OA2016-00167	AO-2016-008	7 Feb 2016	near Mareeba Aerodrome (Byrnes Rd)	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
two power poles ei sufficient height to powerlines, but the landing into a pado	ither side of the landi pass over the power e left side of the bask dock about 500 m be	ing area but was unabling area but was unabling. The pilot then signet contacted one wire,	e to see the wires. The pilot estimated wher ghted the powerlines, about half a metre ahe breaking it. Due to the amount of heat in the ed landing site. The balloon landed without	e the wires would be be ead of and below the be e balloon, the balloon w	ased on the crossbars on the pasket. The pilot applied all four vas climbing. The pilot then col	burners to try to climb and avoid the
gentle touchdown,	the pilot advised the light of one of the tw	ground crew that the look burners. Moments la	-	m from the tree line. Th	ne pilot checked that the neck	
As the balloon env pulling the top of the in the basket) disc	ne balloon down, to a harged fire extinguis	assisting the passenger hers. Within a few minu	<u> </u>	ea. The pilot pulled the	smart vent to rapidly release	re-directed the ground crew from the task of any air. Both the ground crew and the pilot (stinergency disembarkation, two of the
As the balloon env pulling the top of the in the basket) disc	ne balloon down, to a harged fire extinguis	assisting the passenger hers. Within a few minu	rs to disembark and move away to a safe ar utes, the crew were able to spread the balloo	ea. The pilot pulled the	smart vent to rapidly release	any air. Both the ground crew and the pilot (sti
As the balloon envi pulling the top of the in the basket) disci passengers receiv OA2016-00589	ne balloon down, to a harged fire extinguisl ed minor injuries. Th	assisting the passenger hers. Within a few minu e lower section of the t 22 Apr 2016	rs to disembark and move away to a safe ar utes, the crew were able to spread the balloo palloon envelope was substantially damaged	ea. The pilot pulled the on envelope out and ex d. Serious	smart vent to rapidly release a tinguish the fire. During the er Accident	any air. Both the ground crew and the pilot (sti nergency disembarkation, two of the Ground handling Cabin injuries

to north-west at 5 to 10 kt. The pilot therefore assessed the balloon would track in a southerly direction and nominated potential landing sites at Burnley and Dendy Park in Brighton. At about 0700 Eastern

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories				
with another balloc approached Dendy pole stood directly attempted a landin continued at low le commenced a clim pilot advised that the tracked back over prepared for a water	Standard Time, the balloon departed Bundoora in company with five other balloons. About 35 minutes later, the balloon arrived overhead Burnley. The pilot of VBM elected to continue to Dendy Park, along with another balloon from the same operator, to extend the flight to one hour. At about 0800, the balloon in company with VBM landed safely at Dendy Park. The wind speed was about 10 kt as VBM approached Dendy Park. As the balloon descended to land, the pilot sighted a light pole directly in the balloon's path. The pilot then lit the balloon's burners to climb over the pole; however, a second light pole stood directly in the balloon's path on the far side of the available landing area. Due to the balloon's height and the wind, the pilot assessed that the balloon may collide with the second pole if the pilot attempted a landing and therefore elected not to land in the park. The pilot then attempted to land in a golf course beyond the park, but the balloon did not track towards a safe landing area. The balloon continued at low level over parkland, however, the pilot also assessed this area to be unsafe for landing. At about 0820, the balloon crossed the coast and tracked out over Port Phillip Bay. The pilot commenced a climb into a more westerly wind to track towards land. At about 0825, the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) and requested a clearance to climb to 5,000 ft. About 90 seconds later, the pilot advised that they were now at 4,000 ft and may require emergency assistance. At that time, the pilot stated that the balloon had an estimated 30 minutes of fuel remaining. At about 0830, the balloon tracked back over land. The pilot advised ATC that in the 5 minutes it would then take to descend and land, the balloon would track back over water. The pilot elected to descend to conserve fuel and prepared for a water landing. The pilot briefed the passengers and descended about 1 km from shore. The pilot then enacted the company emergency procedures. When asked by ATC if it was their 'intention to ditch the									
arrange the evacua	ation of passengers.	The passengers evacu	uated one or two at a time onto the vessel on nded safely at Mount Martha, Victoria. The	ver the next 30 minute	s. After evacuating the passen	gers, the pilot conducted a climb to about				
OA2016-01346		13 Apr 2016	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 43° M 40Km	Nil	Incident	Wirestrike				
		During landi	ng, the hot air balloon's envelope struck po	wer lines resulting in m	inor damage to the envelope.					
OA2016-01808	AO-2016-080	16 Jul 2016	York (ALA), 139° T 1Km (Bayly Road)	Serious	Accident	Cabin injuries Hard landing				
passengers. The b made an initial ground the balloon envelop	palloon tracked in a sund contact with abo	south-easterly direction out 15 kt forward speed	and after about 52 minutes of flight covering. When the balloon struck the ground, the purely injured and air lifted to the Royal Perth	g a distance of about 3 ilot was ejected from tl Hospital. One passenç	3 km, the pilot made an approa he balloon basket. The basket ger received a minor injury, and					
OA2017-02689		8 Jun 2017	Southport Aerodrome, 327.42° M 5Km (Robert Dalley Park)	Nil	Incident	Controlled flight into terrain				
During approach, t	he basket contacted	d a goalpost, resulting ir	n damage to the goalpost.							
OA2017-03172		16 Jul 2017	near Moorabbin Aerodrome	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain				
During landing, the	balloon struck a fer	nce resulting in minor d	amage.							
OA2017-04979		3 Oct 2017	Boonah (ALA), 069° M 32Km (Veresdale)	Minor	Incident	Cabin injuries				

Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
During landing, a p	passenger was not b	racing correctly, resulti	ng in minor injuries.			
OA2017-05386		15 Oct 2017	near Cessnock Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Other Crew and Cabin Safety
During balloon infla	ation, a passenger g	ot their scarf caught in	the fan.			
OA2017-05614		22 Nov 2017	Essendon Aerodrome, 151° T 15Km (Fawkner Park)	Serious	Accident	Hard landing
During landing, the	e balloon basket land	ded hard resulting in se	rious injury to a passenger.			
OA2017-06145		18 Dec 2017	near Lilydale (ALA)	Nil	Accident	Collision with terrain
After landing, the b	balloon envelope drif	ted into a tree resulting	in damage to the fabric.			
OA2018-00050	AO-2018-004	13 Jan 2018	Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 288.92°	Serious	Accident	Collision with terrain Hard landing
			ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first s			onsequently, the balloon deviated from its unded with a significant forward velocity and
intended flight path was dragged for a	h and landing area. [considerable distan	Due to the adverse con ce on its side by the ba	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first s	suitable site. Due to the	wind conditions, the balloon la	
intended flight path was dragged for a considerable force	h and landing area. [considerable distan	Due to the adverse conce on its side by the baceived severe injuries, v	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the balloon's partially deflated envelope. As the balloon's partially deflated envelope.	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge	wind conditions, the balloon la	inded with a significant forward velocity and g it upwards before impacting the ground with
intended flight path was dragged for a considerable force OA2018-00097	h and landing area. I considerable distan c. One passenger red	Due to the adverse conce on its side by the baceived severe injuries, v	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the bawhile three others sustained minor injuries. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 277.82° M 10Km (Greta)	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge	wind conditions, the balloon la	inded with a significant forward velocity and g it upwards before impacting the ground with
intended flight pathwas dragged for a considerable force OA2018-00097 During landing, the	h and landing area. I considerable distan c. One passenger red	Due to the adverse con ce on its side by the ba ceived severe injuries, v	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the bawhile three others sustained minor injuries. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 277.82° M 10Km (Greta)	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge	wind conditions, the balloon la	inded with a significant forward velocity and g it upwards before impacting the ground with
intended flight path was dragged for a considerable force OA2018-00097 During landing, the OA2018-00197	h and landing area. I considerable distante. One passenger red e balloon struck a tre	Due to the adverse conce on its side by the baceived severe injuries, value 13 Jan 2018 the resulting in substantive 13 Jan 2018	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the bawhile three others sustained minor injuries. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 277.82° M 10Km (Greta) al damage. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 278.73°	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge NiI NiI	wind conditions, the balloon labed, it struck a large bush, forcin Accident Serious incident	nded with a significant forward velocity and g it upwards before impacting the ground with Collision with terrain Fire Control issues Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst
intended flight pathwas dragged for a considerable force OA2018-00097 During landing, the OA2018-00197 During approach, t panels being burnt	h and landing area. I considerable distante. One passenger red e balloon struck a tre	Due to the adverse conce on its side by the baceived severe injuries, value 13 Jan 2018 the resulting in substantive 13 Jan 2018	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the bawhile three others sustained minor injuries. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 277.82° M 10Km (Greta) al damage. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 278.73° M 10Km (Greta)	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge NiI NiI	wind conditions, the balloon labed, it struck a large bush, forcin Accident Serious incident	nded with a significant forward velocity and g it upwards before impacting the ground with Collision with terrain Fire Control issues Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst
intended flight pathwas dragged for a considerable force OA2018-00097 During landing, the OA2018-00197 During approach, t panels being burnt OA2018-00344 On 8 February 201 over the Yarra Vall	th and landing area. It considerable distants. One passenger receive balloon struck a tree balloon encounter. AO-2018-016 18, a Kavanagh B-35 elley, the balloon experience.	Due to the adverse conce on its side by the baceived severe injuries, value resulting in substantian 13 Jan 2018 13 Jan 2018 13 Jan 2018 20 Feb 2018 50 hot-air balloon, registerienced a sudden wind	ter Valley. Shortly after take-off, the balloon ditions, the pilot decided to land at the first silloon's partially deflated envelope. As the bawhile three others sustained minor injuries. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 277.82° M 10Km (Greta) al damage. Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 278.73° M 10Km (Greta) ditions resulting in a loss of altitude. The pilot Lilydale (ALA), 36.7° T 9Km	suitable site. Due to the asket was being dragge Nil Nil ot applied heat to gain had been been been been been been been bee	wind conditions, the balloon laced, it struck a large bush, forcin Accident Serious incident neight but the flame blew to the Accident ight with a pilot and 15 passengers	rinded with a significant forward velocity and ig it upwards before impacting the ground with Collision with terrain Fire Control issues Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst back of the opening, resulting in multiple

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
		After thre	ee missed approaches due to variable surfa	ce winds, the balloon l	anded with minimum fuel.	
OA2018-01542	AO-2018-027	30 Mar 2018	near Cessnock Aerodrome (Pokolbin near McDonald Rd.)	Serious	Accident	VFR into IMC Hard landing
launched from a si 2,000 ft and realisi low-visibility condit	te near Pokolbin, Ne ng how far the fog la ions, HVW collided v	w South Wales for a p yer extended, the pilot	of HVW, along with the other two pilots, ded d the basket to rotate 180 degrees. It then I	of three balloons launch cided to abort the flight	ned by the company from the sand descend for a landing at	same site. After climbing through fog to about the nearest suitable site. On approach to land in
OA2018-01543		31 Mar 2018	Tyagarah (ALA), 338.62° T 12Km (The Pocket Road, Billinudgel)	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
During landing, the	e balloon struck a po	werline.				
OA2018-01558		2 Apr 2018	Narrandera Aerodrome, 0° M 25Km	Minor	Incident	Collision with terrain Loss of control
After landing while	the balloon was def	lating, a gust of wind ca	aused the basket to roll over, and two passe	engers received minor	njuries.	
OA2018-01638	AO-2018-028	2 Apr 2018	Essendon Aerodrome, 085° M 18Km	Minor	Incident	Operational / Crew and Cabin Safety Cabir Injuries
minutes before lan	ding the pilot told pa ed minor injuries and	ssengers to adopt the d there was no damage	proper landing position. The balloon toucher	d down and the pilot co importance of followin	onducted a lay-over landing, w g the safety procedures and e	positions to adopt for each stage of flight. Five there the basket tips and drags on the ground. A insuring that all passengers fully understand the assenger suffering minor injuries.
OA2018-01789		9 Apr 2018	near Mareeba Aerodrome	Nil	Serious incident	Other Ground operations
During final approa	ach, a ground crew n	nember walked in front	of the approaching balloon. The pilot called	out to the ground crev	v member who took evasive a	ction to avoid the landing basket.
OA2018-01933		24 Apr 2018	Southport Aerodrome, 280° T 40Km (near Cedar Grove Rd Beaudesert)	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
After landing, the o	rown rope broke and	d a gust of wind blew th	ne balloon envelope into powerlines.			
OA2018-02105		2 May 2018	Gold Coast Aerodrome, 316.82° T 22Km (Lakeside Drive, Emerald Lakes.)	Nil	Incident	Controlled flight into terrain

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
During final approa	ach over a waterway	, the balloon briefly ma	de contact with the water.			
OA2018-04934		17 Aug 2018	The Oaks (ALA)	Nil	Incident	Rejected take-off Ground handling Other Airframe
Prior to take-off, th	e tie-off rope betwee	en the balloon basket a	nd the vehicle snapped resulting in the bask	ket dragging for 20 m. ⁻	The crew subsequently rejecte	d the take-off.
OA2018-05220		22 Aug 2018	Kooralbyn (ALA), 56° M 17Km	Nil	Incident	Fire Control issues Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst
Passing 500 ft on	approach, the balloc	on encountered windshe	ear and descended. The turning vent lines o	f the balloon were sub	sequently singed by the burne	r flame resulting in minor damage.
OA2018-06829		23 Sep 2018	near Essendon Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Other Flight preparation / Navigation Avionics / Flight instruments
During approach, t	the hot air balloon lo	st communication with	ATC and landed approximately 4.5 nautical	miles from the intende	d landing site.	
OA2018-06913		5 Oct 2018	Gold Coast Aerodrome, 307° M 61Km	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain
During landing, the	e balloon scoop bou	nced and hit a tree resu	lting in minor damage.			
OA2018-07160		9 Oct 2018	abeam Southport Aerodrome (Maudsland)	Nil	Incident	Ground handling
Due to another bal	lloon obstructing the	take-off path, while the	pilot was moving the balloon to a more suit	table spot the balloon s	struck a nearby tree resulting ir	n minor damage to the envelope.
OA2018-08008		8 Nov 2018	Essendon Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Airspace infringement Aircraft preparation
During cruise, the	hot air balloon climb	ed above the assigned	level of 2,000 ft. The crew were not aware	of the updated controll	ed airspace steps.	
OA2018-08298		18 Nov 2018	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 321° T 11Km (Princes Park in Caulfield South)	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain Unforecast weather
During landing, the	e balloon collided wit	th a tree and sustained	minor damage.			
OA2018-09104		21 Dec 2018	Lilydale (ALA), 265.70° M 21Km (Ramptons Road Reserve, Eltham)	Nil	Serious incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Collision with terrain Unforecast weather
During approach, t	the balloon encounte	ered unforecast weathe	r and the crew conducted a precautionary la	anding. The balloon en	velope subsequently struck tre	ees resulting in minor damage.
OA2018-09128	AO-2019-001	26 Dec 2018	near Coldstream (ALA)	Minor	Accident	Forced / Precautionary landing Collision with terrain Fire

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories		
on board. After 20 outside of the burnetwo on-board exting compartment caugi pilot's compartment struck some treetop freed the ropes from	On 26 December 2018, a Kavanagh B-350 hot air balloon, registration VH-ZYO, operated as a scenic charter flight by Go Wild Ballooning, departed from Wandin, Victoria with the pilot and 15 passengers on board. After 20 minutes in flight, and while operating at an altitude of about 800 ft, the pilot recalled hearing a small explosion from the front left burner and observed that a small fire had started on the outside of the burner. The pilot switched off the vapour valve at the fuel tanks to the front two burners and disconnected the hoses. About a minute later, the pilot attempted to put out the fire using one of two on-board extinguishers, but the fire re-ignited almost immediately. After a further minute, the pilot discharged the second fire extinguisher, but again the fire re-ignited. Moments later, the pilot's compartment caught fire. The pilot was wearing a cotton shirt, synthetic vest, rolled-up pants, and rubber slip-on shoes and began to feel uncomfortable with his proximity to the fire. He then moved from the pilot's compartment to the back left compartment of the basket. About 8 minutes after the fire started, the pilot identified a suitable landing position and began the approach. During the descent, the basket struck some treetops, and the ropes became tangled in the branches. Passengers reported that the branches whipped around and into the basket, with one passenger sustaining cuts to his hand. The pilot freed the ropes from the tree and brought the balloon to rest in the paddock below. As the basket touched the ground, the passengers jumped out and ran to safety. The fire continued to burn as the pilot secured the balloon. When emergency services arrived on site, flames had engulfed the balloon. By the time firefighters extinguished the flames, the fire had destroyed the balloon.							
OA2018-09492		31 Dec 2018	Camden Aerodrome	Minor	Incident	Cabin injuries		
During balloon defl	ation, the basket rol	led over, and a passen	ger sustained a minor injury.					
OA2019-00907		18 Feb 2019	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 41° T 15Km (High St and George St Wantirna South)	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain		
The balloon encour	ntered a sudden wir	nd change resulting in a	longer landing run. The balloon subsequer	itly contacted trees and	d the envelope sustained mino	r damage.		
OA2019-00909		18 Feb 2019	near Melbourne Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain Control issues		
During landing in w	rindy conditions, the	balloon's basket skidd	ed along the ground and the envelope was	deflated over trees. The	e envelope sustained minor da	amage.		
OA2019-01685	AO-2019-014	16 Mar 2019	Coldstream (ALA), 6° T 5Km	Serious	Accident	Ground handling Cabin injuries		
scenic charter flight	On 16 March 2019, two passengers were seriously injured when the basket of a Kavanagh B 400 hot air balloon tipped over during vehicle-assisted deflation. Prior to the accident, the balloon, operated as a scenic charter flight, landed without incident at a private property near Coldstream, Victoria. Due to a lack of wind and the large size of the envelope, the crew elected to use the retrieval vehicle to assist by pulling the envelope over (by the crown line) during the deflation. During this process, with 16 passengers and the pilot on board, the vehicle assisting inadvertently pulled the basket over, seriously injuring two passengers.							
OA2019-02491		8 Apr 2019	Melbourne Aerodrome, 090° M 46Km	Nil	Accident	Fire		
During descent, as	the pilot began to a	rrest the rate of descer	nt by applying heat the burner flame contact	ed the balloon fabric re	sulting in substantial burn dam	nage.		
OA2019-02917		30 Apr 2019	Kooralbyn (ALA), 49° T 22Km (Gould Hill Road, Beaudesert)	Nil	Serious incident	Fire		
During descent, the	e burners were point	ted backwards resulting	g in fire damage to the balloon fabric and the	e turning vent line.				

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
OA2019-04093		7 Jun 2019	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 345° M 15Km	Nil	Incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Other Weather
During approach, t	the wind became un	predictable, and the pil	ot conducted a precautionary landing on a p	rivate property.	-	
OA2019-05253		23 Jul 2019	Kooralbyn (ALA), 55.50° M 17Km (Beaudesert)	Nil	Incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Collision with terrain Unforecast weather
During the flight, th	ne balloon encounte	red unforecast weather	and conducted a precautionary landing. Th	e balloon envelope su	bsequently made contact with	a tree resulting in minor damage.
OA2019-07006		22 Sep 2019	Moorabbin Aerodrome, 360° M 11Km	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain
		= =	crew. The pilot determined that the balloon ket of the balloon contacted the roof of a hou		d instructed ground crew to let	go of the handling line in order to manoeuvre to
OA2019-07324		7 Oct 2019	Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 300° M 9Km	Minor	Serious incident	Collision
During landing, the	e balloon collided wi	th another balloon's ba	sket on the ground.			
OA2019-07651		21 Oct 2019	near Southport Aerodrome (Boyland/Biddadaba)	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain
During descent, th	e balloon struck tree	etops resulting in minor	damage.			
OA2019-09230		30 Nov 2019	Wirraway Station (ALA), 13.86° T 3Km (Private Property 3459 Beaudesert)	Nil	Incident	Ground handling
During post-flight b	palloon deflation, the	crown line rope gave v	way and the envelope rolled onto a fence re	sulting in minor damag	je.	
OA2020-03379		4 Jul 2020	Alice Springs Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Air-ground-air
While overflying th	e aerodrome, the ba	alloon pilot did not make	e the necessary radio calls on the CTAF.			
OA2020-05252		27 Oct 2020	Cessnock Aerodrome, 256° T 6Km (De Beyers Road)	Nil	Incident	Taxiing collision / Near collision
During preparation	for departure, a gu	st of wind caused the b	alloon basket to come into contact with the t	ie-off vehicle.		
OA2020-05343		31 Oct 2020	Maitland (NSW) Aerodrome, 200.08° T 6Km (Bishops Bridge)	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
During launch, the	pilot released the la	unch restraint early res	ulting in the balloon colliding with trees and	sustaining minor dama	age.	
OA2021-00592		31 Jan 2021	Melbourne Aerodrome, 085° T 48Km (Yarra Glen)	Minor	Incident	Other Aircraft control Hard landing
The balloon landed	d hard and the baske	et bounced and was dr	agged by the envelope resulting in minor inju	uries to 3 passengers.		
OA2021-01304	AB-2021-008	14 Mar 2021	Essendon Aerodrome, 108° T 16Km (Bulleen Park)	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
During approach, t	the balloon struck a v	vire resulting in minor	damage.			
OA2021-02927		29 Apr 2021	Essendon Aerodrome, 152° T 15Km	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst
During landing, the	e balloon encountere	d an unexpected wind	change and made contact with a light pole i	resulting in minor dama	age.	
OA2021-03261		23 May 2021	Wangaratta Aerodrome, 044° T 6Km	Nil	Serious incident	Wirestrike
During approach, t	the balloon basket st	ruck powerlines.				
OA2021-04964	AO-2021-042	8 Oct 2021	14.6 NM 268 degrees from Amberley Aerodrome	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain
Queensland. On b localised fog where The pilot continued	oard was a pilot and e visibility reduced to d the descent into the	9 passengers. About \$ 10 m. e fog until a tree was o	oserved in the path of the balloon. The pilot	ed a descent to locate attempted to avoid the	a suitable landing area. During	the descent, the balloon entered an area of the balloon collided with, and came to rest on the
	ng. There were no inj		spe. The pilot subsequently climbed the ball	oon on the tree and ab	ove the log. The hight continue	ed to an uneventful landing in a nearby paddoc
that was clear of fo	= = :		2 NM 84 degrees from Lilydale	Nil	Serious incident	
that was clear of fo	og. There were no inj	uries. 31 Dec 2021		Nil		ed to an uneventful landing in a nearby paddoc Wirestrike Turbulence / Windshear / Microburst

ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories	
1-hour flight, the pilot received a report that the surface wind near the landing area was increasing. The pilot assessed multiple landing options over the next 17 minutes while the wind was increasing. The pilot then made an approach to a landing field and the balloon landed hard with 2 passengers seriously injured.							
OA2021-05712		28 Dec 2021	8 NM 140 degrees from Melbourne Aerodrome	Nil	Serious incident	Collision with terrain	
During approach to	o a small landing are	a, the balloon struck a	tree and building.				
OA2022-00243		24 Jan 2022	3.5 NM 173 degrees from Essendon Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain	
During landing, the	During landing, the balloon struck a pole on the edge of the race track resulting in minor damage to the balloon envelope.						
OA2022-01035	AO-2022-015	27 Mar 2022	Moorabbin Aerodrome	Serious	Serious incident	Hard landing Loss of control	

Section 21 (2) of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) empowers the ATSB to discontinue an investigation into a transport safety matter at any time. Section 21 (3) of the TSI Act requires the ATSB to publish a statement setting out the reasons for discontinuing an investigation. The statement is published as a report in accordance with section 25 of the TSI Act, capturing information from the investigation up to the time of discontinuance.

Overview of the investigation

On 28 March 2022, the ATSB commenced an investigation into a hard landing involving a E-240 Kavanagh balloon, registration VH-ZON, which occurred at Moorabbin Airport, Victoria, on 27 March 2022.

The balloon was being operated on a scenic passenger flight between Reservoir and Moorabbin Airport with a pilot and 10 passengers on board. The pilot provided the operator's standard safety briefing to the passengers before take-off, while the passengers were in the basket, to explain and demonstrate the position to adopt during normal landings and emergencies. The position was facing opposite to the landing direction, standing with slightly bent knees, holding on to the rope handholds in front, and back rested against padding on the basket. Passengers were to remain in that position until the basket stopped.

There were several other balloons operating the same scenic flight route, and the pilots had collectively decided the departure point and that the weather was suitable for their respective flights (all along the same route). The pilots reviewed several sources of weather information, including the Bureau of Meteorology aerodrome forecasts (TAF) for Melbourne, Essendon and Moorabbin. The Moorabbin TAF forecast the wind to be 11 kt from the north-east at the time the balloons were due to land.

The pilots had also obtained information about the actual wind conditions prior to departure by releasing 2 piballs[1] in different locations to assess the speed and direction of the wind at different levels. Following this assessment, the balloons departed at about 0700 local time.

The pilot had about 30 years' experience as a balloon pilot and had been operating balloons in the area for about 18 years, with extensive knowledge of the planned route.

On approach to Moorabbin Airport, VH-ZON was travelling in a south-easterly direction and was about 500 m to the west of the other balloons. The pilot obtained automatic terminal information by radio for Moorabbin, and it advised of a 4-kt north-easterly surface wind.

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ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories
	app)					

The pilot reported that they had commenced the descent into Moorabbin Airport after the other balloons and found the wind to be faster at the lower levels than expected. Data collected via another balloon pilot's navigation equipment post-accident showed the wind was about 38 kt at 1,400 ft and 35 kt at 1,000 feet, which was significantly faster than the pilots had anticipated. This meant that the pilot had to conduct a faster than usual descent to ensure they could land the balloon in a suitable area.

When the balloon reached 300–400 ft, it travelled through a temperature inversion (where temperature increases with altitude, which is a reversal of typical atmospheric conditions) and the balloon rotated 120°. Although the passengers had been instructed to adopt the landing position, the pilot did not have time to rotate the balloon to the correct orientation (with the passengers facing opposite to the landing direction) before reaching the ground. On landing, the balloon impacted the front right corner of the basket and bounced. The basket was then dragged for a short distance, coming to rest in a culvert at the end of a runway within the airport boundary.

As a result of the hard landing and the orientation of the basket, 1 passenger was seriously injured and 2 passengers received minor injuries.

As part of its investigation, the ATSB interviewed the pilot and passengers and reviewed:

- weather information including observations and forecasts used by the pilot
- air traffic control recordings
- recorded navigation information used in-flight by one of the other balloon pilots (data could not be retrieved from the equipment used on the accident balloon)
- the operator's procedures for passenger briefings
- photographs taken in-flight by the balloon operator and others that were provided by passengers and a witness on the ground.

The ATSB notes that, due to unexpected wind speed on descent (which was much higher than the surface wind information that the pilot had previously obtained), and the limited landing site options, the pilot decided to land as soon as possible. This resulted in a faster and harder landing than normal. The balloon's abnormal orientation after passing through the temperature inversion meant that although the passengers were in the correct position for landing, there was a greater risk of injury.

Reasons for the discontinuation

Based on a review of the available evidence, the ATSB considered it was unlikely that further investigation would identify any systemic safety issues or important safety lessons from this specific occurrence. Consequently, the ATSB has discontinued this investigation.

However, the ATSB is concerned about the number of accidents that have been occurring in commercial balloon operations and has listed the reduction of passenger injuries in commercial ballooning operations as one of its Safety Watch items. The evidence collected during the investigation involving VH-ZON will be used in a safety study further examining these types of accidents.

OA2022-0146	6 AO-2022-028	20 Apr 2022	14.6 km 314 degrees from	Minor	Serious incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Collision
			Moorabbin Aerodrome			with terrain Flight controls

On the morning of 20 April 2022, a Kubicek BB78Z hot-air balloon, registered VH-RJR and operated by Liberty Balloon Flights, was being prepared for a balloon transport flight for 13 passengers from Royal Park, Victoria. This was the first flight of the balloon since manufacture and the intended destination was Moorabbin Airport.

The pilot did not observe any abnormalities during the pre-flight inspection, and after the passengers boarded, the balloon departed for an anticipated 1-hour flight. Shortly after departing, and while flying over the Melbourne Central Business District, the pilot noticed a small gap in the balloon's manually operated deflation system between the edge of the vent panel – a fabric panel used to

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ATSB Ref Number	Investigation Number (if app)	Occurrence Date	Location	Highest Injury Level	Occurrence Class	Occurrence Categories	
vent air out of the circular opening at the top of the balloon (vent aperture) – and the vent aperture. This gap allowed hot air to leak out reducing the buoyancy of the balloon. The pilot was unable to seal the gap and descended the balloon to a lower altitude in search of a suitable landing location.							
The pilot decided to attempt a landing at Elwood Beach, with the basket impacting the roofs of 2 buildings on the way there. During the approach to the beach, the pilot descended the balloon through trees into a suburban street. The basket landed outside the entrance of an apartment building and the envelope deflated over the building's roof. The balloon and basket sustained minor damage during the forced landing, and 3 passengers sustained minor injuries.							
OA2022-02688		15 Jul 2022	near Canberra Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Forced / Precautionary landing Other Weather	
		During cruise, the	wind became unpredictable and the pilot co	onducted a precaution	ary landing on the side of the r	oad.	
OA2022-04444		25 Nov 2022	6.7 NM 131 degrees from Essendon Aerodrome	Minor	Serious incident	Collision with terrain	
During landing, the	balloon struck a tre	e resulting in minor dar	nage to the envelope. One passenger susta	ained a minor injury.			
OA2022-04461		18 Nov 2022	4.06 NM 42.07 degrees from Lilydale	Minor	Incident	Cabin injuries Hard landing	
The balloon bounce	ed and landed hard	resulting in a passenge	er sustaining minor injuries.				
OA2022-04611		21 Nov 2022	8.58 NM 160.07 degrees from Essendon Aerodrome	Nil	Incident	Collision with terrain	
During landing, the	balloon basket cam	ne into contact with a si	gn.				
OA2022-04850		4 Nov 2022	near Northam	Minor	Incident	Other Ground operations	
During inflation, the	balloon envelope o	came into contact with a	a person and a fence.				

About the ATSB

The **Australian Transport Safety Bureau** is the national transport safety investigator. Established by the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* (TSI Act), the ATSB is an independent statutory agency of the Australian Government and is governed by a Commission. The ATSB is entirely separate from transport regulators, policy makers and service providers.

The ATSB's function is to improve transport safety in aviation, rail and shipping through:

- the independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences
- safety data recording, analysis, and research
- influencing safety action.

The ATSB prioritises investigations that have the potential to deliver the greatest public benefit through improvements to transport safety.

The ATSB performs its functions in accordance with the provisions of the *Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003* and Regulations and, where applicable, international agreements.

Purpose of safety investigations

The objective of a safety investigation is to enhance transport safety. This is done through:

- identifying safety issues and facilitating safety action to address those issues
- providing information about occurrences and their associated safety factors to facilitate learning within the transport industry.

It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or provide a means for determining liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings.

At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner.

The ATSB does not investigate for the purpose of taking administrative, regulatory or criminal action.

About ATSB reports

ATSB occurrence investigation final reports are organised with regard to international standards or instruments, as applicable, and with ATSB procedures and guidelines.

Reports must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased manner

An explanation of ATSB terminology used in this report is available on the <u>ATSB</u> website.