Executive summary
Key investigation outcomes
The ATSB has completed its investigation into the
in-flight rupture of a pressurised oxygen cylinder and the
resultant aircraft damage and depressurisation. The investigation
was prolonged and made significantly more difficult by the evident
loss of the failed cylinder from the aircraft during the
depressurisation event.
Despite this significant obstacle, the ATSB's
investigation has proven successful in highlighting the
improbability of the failure event, and has confirmed the safety of
current systems and procedures relating to the provision of
emergency supplemental oxygen for passengers and crew of
pressurised aircraft.
The investigation found no record of any other
related instances of aviation oxygen cylinder rupture (civil or
military). Given the widespread and long-term use of this type of
cylinder in aerospace applications, it was clear that this
occurrence was a very rare event.
A comprehensive program of testing and evaluation of
cylinders of the same type, and from the same production batch as
the failed item, did not identify any aspect of the cylinder design
or manufacture that could represent a threat to the operational
integrity of the cylinders. Published maintenance procedures were
found to be valid and thorough, and inspection regimes
appropriate.
In light of these findings, it is the ATSB's view
that passengers, crew and operators of aircraft fitted with
DOT3HT-1850 oxygen cylinders, can be confident that the ongoing
risk of cylinder failure and consequent aircraft damage remains
very low.
Summary of the occurrence
On 25 July 2008, at 0922 local time, a Boeing Company
747-438 aircraft, registered VH-OJK, departed Hong Kong
International Airport on a scheduled passenger transport flight to
Melbourne, Australia (flight number QF30). Aboard the aircraft were
350 passengers, 16 cabin crew and three flight crew.
Approximately 55 minutes after departure and while
the aircraft was cruising at 29,000 ft (FL290), a very loud bang
was heard by passengers and crew, followed immediately by the rapid
depressurisation of the cabin. Many of the cabin crew reported
feeling air moving and seeing light debris flying about. Oxygen
masks dropped from the overhead compartments and the cabin crew
reported that while most passengers began using them appropriately,
some passengers had to be given immediate and direct instruction to
use their masks. All cabin crew moved to crew seats or spare
passenger seats and commenced using oxygen as emergency procedures
dictated. At the time of the depressurisation, the aircraft was
over the South China Sea, approximately 475 km to the north-west of
Manila, Philippines.
The flight crew reported the initial event as a 'loud
bang or cracking sound', with an associated jolt felt through the
airframe. The autopilot immediately disengaged and multiple alert
messages were displayed on monitoring instrumentation. The flight
crew reported that upon noting a cabin altitude warning, they
immediately donned oxygen masks and began executing the appropriate
emergency procedures. A 'MAYDAY' radio call was made and an
emergency descent initiated.
At 1024 local time, the aircraft reached and was
levelled at an altitude of 10,000 ft, where the use of
supplementary oxygen was no longer required. The flight crew
cleared the cabin crew to 'commence follow-up duties' and after a
review of the aircraft's position, commenced preparation for a
diversion to Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila. Despite
the apparent failure of multiple aircraft systems, the flight crew
reported that the descent and approach into Manila was uneventful,
and the aircraft landed safely on runway 06 at 1111 local time.
Airport emergency services attended and inspected the aircraft
after it was stopped on the runway; after which it was cleared for
towing to the terminal and passenger disembarkation. None of the
passengers or crew on board the aircraft had been physically
injured during the event.
Summary of the investigation
From an inspection of the aircraft by engineering
staff and investigators from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau
(ATSB), it was evident that the aircraft's fuselage ruptured over
an area measuring approximately 2 x 1.5 m (6.6 x 4.9 ft) and
located immediately forward of the right wing leading edge
transition. Fuselage materials, wiring and cargo from the
aircraft's forward hold were protruding from the rupture. Further
investigation determined that the fuselage rupture had, in itself,
been induced by the forceful bursting of one of a bank of seven
oxygen cylinders located along the right side of the cargo hold.
Those cylinders (with an additional six located above the hold)
provided the passengers' emergency supplementary oxygen supply. An
analysis of the damage produced by the ruptured cylinder showed
that the force of the failure had projected the cylinder vertically
upward into the aircraft's cabin, where it had impacted the R2 door
frame, handle and the overhead panelling and structure, before
presumably falling to the cabin floor and being swept out of the
aircraft during the depressurisation. No part of the cylinder body
was located within the aircraft, despite a thorough search.
The operator's records showed the failed oxygen
cylinder (S/N: 535657) was manufactured in January 1996, and had
been subsequently inspected and re-qualified on four subsequent
occasions (at 3-yearly intervals). The last inspection had been
conducted on 26 May 2008; approximately 8 weeks before the
in-flight failure.
In the absence of the failed cylinder, the ATSB
undertook a comprehensive failure modes and effects analysis
(FMEA), utilising the information known about the cylinder design
and service history. Five key possibilities arose as factors that
may have contributed to the cylinder failure:
- the cylinder contained a manufacturing flaw that subsequently
developed during service
- the cylinder was critically damaged at some time
before the last overhaul and inspection
- the cylinder was critically damaged during the last
overhaul and inspection
- the cylinder was critically damaged at some time after
the last overhaul and inspection
- the cylinder was critically damaged during the accident
flight.
Each of the factors was explored in depth, using all
available evidence and knowledge to assess the likelihood of the
factor being associated with the cylinder failure. To add to the
available evidence and understanding of the cylinder
characteristics, an engineering examination and test program was
conducted using 20 similar oxygen cylinders, including the
remaining 12 from on board the aircraft and five that were sourced
(with the assistance of the aircraft manufacturer) from the failed
item's production batch. The objectives of the program were to
determine whether there was any aspect of the cylinder design
(including materials and methods of manufacture) that could
predispose the items to premature failure while in-service, and to
assess whether there was any aspect of the particular production
batch of cylinders that had an inherent flaw or weakness.
In summary, the investigation found that the manner
of cylinder failure was unusual and implicated the presence of a
defect, or action of a mechanism that directly led to the rupture
event. However, despite the extensive exploration of the available
evidence and the study of multiple hypothetical scenarios, the
investigation was unable to identify any particular factor or
factors that could, with any degree of probability, be associated
with the cylinder failure event.
Despite the inconclusive outcome of the investigation
as to contributing factors, the associated engineering study did
confirm that the cylinder type was fit-for-purpose. There was no
individual or broad characteristic of the cylinders that was felt
to be a threat to the safety or airworthiness of the design.
Similarly, there was no aspect of the batch of cylinders produced
with the failed item, which deviated from the type specification,
or provided any indication of the increased potential for the
existence of an injurious flaw or defect within that particular
production lot.
The validity and efficacy of the component
maintenance procedures and practices prescribed for the oxygen
cylinders were examined and substantiated; as were the procedures,
practices and facilities employed by the operator for the periodic
inspection and re-certification of the cylinders. The investigation
found no evidence that maintenance of the cylinder (or associated
aircraft systems) was a factor in the occurrence.
Safety action stemming from this event centred on
ensuring that oxygen cylinder handling and maintenance procedures
are optimal; that flight and cabin crew are suitably prepared for
efficient management of a depressurisation situation; and that
passengers are clearly and succinctly informed of their
responsibilities and likely experiences during a situation that
requires the use of the cabin oxygen masks.