Recommendation R20030037

Recommendation issued to: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Recommendation details
Output No: R20030037
Date issued: 30 June 2003
Safety action status:
Background: Why this Recommendation was developed

Output text

Safety Recommendation

As a result of this investigation, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends that the United States Federal Aviation Administration liaise with the German Airworthiness Authority, Luftfahrt-Bundesamt to develop and issue an airworthiness directive to mandate compliance with Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd and Co KG Service Bulletin SB-BR700-73-900316.

Initial response
Date issued: 29 July 2004
Response from: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Action status: Closed - Partially Accepted
Response text:

FAA Enqine & Propeller Directorate Response

The BR700-715 engine has experienced four in-flight shutdowns (IFSDs). The IFSDs result from the failure of the Engine Electronic Control (EEC) in 2002. Since that time, the Engine & Propeller Directorate Engine Certification Office (ECO) of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been conducting an on-going investigation of this airworthiness issue with Luftfahrt-Bundesamt (LBA) and Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd and Co (RRD). On October 15, 2003, LBA issued AD-2003-235 to mandate Service Bulletin (SB) SB-BR700-73-900334 Revision 1 and SB SB-BR700-73-900316 Revision 2. However, the ECO disagrees with issuing an AD at this time for the following reasons:

(1) Based on RRD's investigation, without taking any corrective action, the risk of a dual engine IFSD rate is at 1.1x10-10, which satisfies FAA airworthiness guidelines.

(2) RRD SB SB-BR700-73-900316 introduces a number of inspections and modifications to isolate, remove, and replace certain components to improve the EEC reliability. RRD has been conducting an active EEC hardware campaign since March 2003 to remove the units that have not met SB SB-BR700-73-900316 standard. More than 209 EECs have been campaigned to date. There has been no report of an IFSD caused by the failure of an EEC since December 2002, which could be attributed to the problem areas addressed by RRD SB SB-BR700-73900316. During this time, the EEC mean time between removals has increased by 95%. It is expected that the reliability of the EEC will be further improved through the campaign on its completion in September 2004.

The Engine & Propeller Directorate concludes the failure of the BR700-715 EEC is an airworthiness issue and requires continued monitoring. However, it is not a safety issue at this time. Therefore, the Directorate does not plan to issue an AD to mandate RRD SB SB-BR700-73-900316.

Last update 03 April 2012